The High Court · 2025

...RESPONDENTS/DEFENDANT No' 1 & 2 IANO:1 OF 2024 Petition under section 1 51 CPC praying that in the circumstances. stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may !e .O]e-a.se! Ji.pun." with certified copy of the decree dated 24 01.2024 passed in I A.No. 771 oF 2022 in A.S.S.R.No .ilzs ot 2022, on the fite of Hon'ble Ditrict Judge, Vikarabad District, at Vikarabad' in the above C R P' lA NO: 3 OF 2024 Petition under Section '151.cpc praying that in the circrms ances stated in th: affiq3)/it fiteJ n ;upport the p"iitio'n, inliign Court may l)e pteased to suspend the ope ratiorr of the.order passed oy irrl Hon.ure Ditri:t Jrrdge. vikarabad District at vikarabad rn lA No. tzi or iiiz';" n.! s n r.r" '72! rtf 2022 tN os No.111 of 2013, datect 24 01 .2024 tiil the pe;;; Oi.porrr of the C(?) lA NO: 2 oF 2024 -of Petition urrdr:r {)ection -l5i.CpC praying that in the r:ircu mst.l rrces stated in the affidavit firec i'r support of the p"irtio'n. ir," Hrgl,, cor.rrt rnay be preased to condone the detarv of 49),dsys_1n fifi;g th; aboJe'C R p liled aga nst the l.A.No. 771 oF 2022 in rt s; s'n or zdzz,-oziJi"zi ot zozo orr the fire of Hon,bre Ditrict Judge, Vikarabad District, at VitarJaO-'"" 'o-tzzs Counsel for the petitioner: SRI V VENKAT RAM NARSAIAH Counsel for the Respondents: SRI p SHIVA REDDY The Court made the following: ORDER -- I LNA.J CRP No l89E oI2024 HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE LN(MI NARAYANA ALISHEfTY CTVIL REVTSION PETITON NO.189 80F 2024 ORDER: ThisCivilRevisionPetitionislrledassailingthedocketorder d.ated24.Ol.2O24 passed in I'A'No'771 of 2022 in A'S'S'R'No'1725 of 2022 in O.S.No.111 of 20 13 on the hle of the Principal District Judge, Vikarabad District'

2. Heard Sri V.Venkat Ram Narsaiah' learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri P'Shiva Reddy' learned counsel for the respondents.

3. The petitioner herein is the plaintiff' respondent Nos' I and 2 herein are the defendant Nos'3 and 4' respondent Nos'3 ald 4 herein are defendant Nos' 1 and' 2 in the suit' For convenience' the parties are referred to as they are arrayed before the trial Court' 4,Brieffactsofthecasearethattheplaintifffrledsuitfor declaration that he is the adoptive son of Late Narayan Reddy and that registered.. sale deed vide document Nos' 1057 of 2013 dated 26.03.2013 and L142 of 2013 dated 30'03'2013 are not binding on ^r. I I 2 LNA,J (Ct No t898 of202a I l l the plaintiff zrnd r so for perpetuar injunction in respt:cr .f the suit Schedule "A a.d B', properties. Defendant Nos. 1, 3 ancl I failed to contest the sru.t irnd defendant No.2 remained ex-parte. 'the triar Court on appreciation of oral and documentary el,,idence placed on record, decrer:d the suit vide judgment dated lT .OgJ2Olg.

5. The deft:nCa.rt Nos.3 and 4 filed appeal vide A.S.S.Ft. Vo. 1725 of 2022 alorLg rvith an apprication in I.A.N o.77 r of. 2)22 for condonation c,f ,lelay of 47O days in preferring the appeal. ,l.he trial Court vide im pr Lgn ed docket order dated 24.O 1 .2024 c oncj o ned the delay on payntenl. of costs of Rs.5,000/_ with an ,tbsrx.ation that though there ir; zL lapse on the part of the petiti rne. . in not contacting the counsel to know the outcome of the s _.rit, t owever considering the fa.c t that va-luable rights in immovable p:.c perties are involved, the ap,plication was allowed on heavy r:osts. Ag3rieved by the same, rr:visicn is filed. 6 Learned c:o,nr;el for the petitioner would subm.it t,at the trial Court withoirt lrrr:perly considering the scope and cor cept of Section 5 of tht: l,irr.itation Act, 1955 and guidelines formu, atecl by the Hon'ble Apex court has mechanically condonecl the <ielav in ) ) J LNA,J CRP No.l696 oJ2021 hling the appeal, despite observing that there is lapse on the part of the petitioner in pursuing the matter and contacting the counsel' He would further submit that the appellate Court allowed the application lna cryptlc manner instead of passing a reasoned order. He would further submit that petitioner/ plaintiff though Iiled detailed counter, the same was returned and the appellate Court without considering the said aspect allowed the application' He would further submit that the reasons stated by the defendants are vague, baseless and therefore, the frrst appellate Court ought to have dismissed the application as the same was devoid of any merit and thus, prayed to allow the petition' Learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the judgment of 7 . Division Bench of this Court in I'A'No' I of 2O2l in/and City Civil of 2O2l dated 27'06'2023' wherein' this Court Appeal .No.llo Court dismissed an application filed for condonation of delay of (561) days a-fter excluding the Covid pandemic lockdown period with an observation that petitioner therein failed to explain the reasons for condonation of delay and that the petitioners are not diligent in Pursuing the matter' / / 4 LNA,J ( R]) No t898 o/202a .l

8. Per contro. learned counsel for the respondents u,orLll submit that the appelJatr: Court has rightly allowed the apprlis2lion since valuable righ ts o;' respondents over the immovatrle l)rotrrerties are involved. He w()uld further submit that the respc ndents/ defendants have e xplained proper, cogent reasons for not Iiling the appeai withirL lhe limitation period and first appellate Oourt has rightly allowr:d tlte application on payment of hear,y r:c,sts. He hnally contend,:d that revision is devoid of any merit and no grounds are tnadr, out to interfere with the imptrgned crrier and hence, prayed to ri smiss the revision.

9. Learned counsel for the respondents relied on tie jrdgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Suo Motu Writ petiton (C) lto.3 oJ 2O2O, wherei 1, it was held that covid pandem ic perirlrl f16r, 15.03.2020 ttl) 28.1)2.2022 shall stand excluded in cornptrt.ng the period of limitation.

10. Perusal ol rec,rrd wourd discloses that the applicarion f red for condonation o1'delirv of $ZO) days in preferring the appe,ll, the defenda.ts star.e(r l-llat defendant No.4 was residing in a v lage and was \adoing agri,:ulture and defendant No.3 was r.esirling at 5 LNA,J CRP No. t898 of2021 Hyderabad for education of his children and after the death of their mother, i.e., defendant No'1, the defendant No'4 shifted his family to Kurnool for his children education and they are not aware of passing of decree; that when the petitioner/ plaintiff frequently interfered with the possession, the respondent Nos'3 and 4 made enquiries and came to know that a decree was obtained behind their back; that immediately' they filed application for obtaining certified copy of judgment and came to know that fraud has been played by the plaintiff and that plaintiff did not bring to the notice of the trial Court about the death of defendant No'1 and therefore' judgment and decree passed by the trial Court is nullity; that they approached the counsel on record and they were advised to file appeal. 1 1 . Perusal of counter filed on behalf of petitioner/ plaintiff in I.A.No.771 of ZnZZ in A'S'S'R'N o'1721 of 2022 would disclose that plaintiff lrled a memo on O3'O7'2OL7 bringing to the notice of the trial court about death of defendant No. 1 along with death certifrcate and it is further mentioned that defendant No.1 expired 6 LNA.J 'Rj No t898 of2021 .-. ) '..J on 22.1O.2O l5i leaving behind plaintiff and defeniant No,2, who ar.e already on recrtrd .

12. Perusal rf rLffidavit hled in support of the appi cation for condonation o1' dclay i.e., I.A.No.77 I of 2022 in A.S.Sl.R.l,Io.lT2l of 2022 disclose th,tt suit was decreed on 17 .09.2019 , wlrr:reas the appeal along u.itl said application was filed on 15.O3.2A2O and in fact, actual clela, rs of I 185 days. However, defencla,t No.3 and 4 while computi.g the delay excluded the covid pandemic l,rckdown period of 715 clal,s and thus, shown the delay as 471) days in preferring thcr apps2l.

13. It is releyarrt to note that suit was decreed o, 1.:,.09.2019 and time limit rbr preferring the appeal has elapsed rnucrr prior to the Covid par-'dr:mic lockdown period i.e.., 15.O3.2O2O, r.herr:lbre, the exempted penocl from 15.O3.2O2O to 28.O2.2O22 currnot be excluded while cornputing the delay in preferring the app,eal since the beneht is apphcable only where the limitation p,:rio,l expires during the lock Co'r n period. I \ 7 LNA'J CRP No.t898 of)02a

14. In I.A.No. I of 2O2l inland' CCCA No'110 of 2O2l' a Division Bench of this Court had occasion to examine the above aspect and has come to a conclusion that where the appeal period expired prior to Covid pandemic lockdown period' the delay has to be computed from the date of the order passed by the trial Court till the date of frling of the appeal after excluding '90' days appeal period.

15. Admittedly, in the Present case the suit was decreed 17.Og.2olg and therefore, limitation for preferring the appeal had expired much prior to Covid pandemic lockdown period and therefore, defendant Nos.3 and 4 are not justified in excluding the said period while computing the delay in hling the appeal' Therefore, the delay in preferring the appeal would come to 1185 days and not 47O days as projected by the respondent Nos' 1 and 2 andthisaspectwasnotexaminedbythefirstappellateCourtwhile allowing I.A-No.77 1 of 2022 in A'S'S'R'No'1721 of 2022' It is also relevant to note that except stating that respondent Nos' I and 2 have shifted to Hyderabad for their children education and that -/l I \ 8 LNA.J :RP No 1898 of202t they are not a\\'are of passing of decree, no other reilsorr has been assigned for inorrlinate delay of 1lg5 days in prefr:rring tJrt: appeal.

16. In E'sha Bhattacharjee a. Raghunathprttr NaJar Academgt, thr: Fl on'ble Supreme Court summ arized the p rinciples to be applie,l rvtule deciding a condonation of delay F,etition as under: "2l.Frort t l-Lc afore said broadly [:e,:rri]cd orrt are: authorities the princip;ss hzrt cal ',4 I [r')There should. be a liberal, praguratic justice- ,n( n tecl, non- nr .."^. l-_'dantrc approach whil.' dealint ..,:r!_..- wrrr r :rn rl) ) t( attun lor condonation of delay, for trt, c,rurtr are not slrcposed to legalise injustice Uui'a.e oUiig.,a ,. remove t).tlstice. .. .,. (ii) "he under,st()od i n their proper spirit, pfritosoffry ..rj'irlror. regarrt beinq hacl to the frct ihat ti,ese,"i-," llastir anct .rre to be applied in p..;;-;;;r;;i,."Ji. obtaln ill3 ,i.t situation. terms "sufficient cause. should be ".J #"1i.",v t," iii Srt.,stantial juslice being paramounr an,l ni\olal . Ihe. re:hrr r .onsideiatio." J.iri-"li'il"*rL,,' l,"or. and u nc. tile i fnr e6O1,a.,". (iu)ry" presunqttlon c<zn be q.tta.ched. co _ ,,, qe.t.Derate cqusa.tlort oJ delag but, gross negllqence on that part oJ the corz,nset oi ttug,aTt * ti-i.-l)rc"" note of. __ _,-, :t l h,rk- oJ bona. lldes trnputable to a portg seektng condonatlon oJ deta.g ls a. slgntJica,ni crnd relevant fact. - (\ i) Ir i s to be kept in mind that adherence 10 st:ict -prlrti,, proof shcri ( not affect public justice and .^r". mischit:f i>er: ruse the courts are required to be vigltint so s(2013) 125CC649 l1 \ I that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of j ustice. LNA.J CRP No 1698 of202t (vill The concept oJ llberal approdch hqs to encaltsttle the conceptlon oJ rea,sona.bleness o.nd. lt crrr.rtot be alloued. a tota.llg untettered. Jree pldy. (vii1l There d. dlstl.rlctlo7r between Tnord.Lnqte dela.g a.nd. a delag ol short duratlon or Jew dags, Jor to the Jorrncr doctrlne of preJudlce ls attra.cted. uthereq.s to the latter tt tnay not be qttra.cted, That aparl the Jirst orte warrqrtts strlct d.pproach wherea.s the second. calls Ior a llbe rq.l de llneqtLotr,. Irxl The conduc| behavlor a.nd. dttltude of d to lts lna.ctlon or negllger.ce qre pa.rtg relatlng releuartt factors to be tq.ken lnto conslderq'tlon. It ls so crs the fittdannentq.l Prl,l.clple ls thqt the courts are requlred to utelgh the scole of ba.la.nce oJ Justlce ln respect oJ both partles and the sqld prlnclple ca.'an.ot be gluen q. total go bg ln the nqne o.f llb era.l app ro a.ch. (xllf the expla.'1.atlon olfered ls cortcocted or the grounds urged in the appllcatlon are fanc{u| the courts should. be ulgllant not to e.xpose the other slde unnecessa.rilg to face such a. lltlgdtton. (xi) It ls to be borne ln ,nlnd. that no one gets tnlsreltresentatLon recourse Jraud, Lnterpolatlon technlc(rlltles oJ lau, oJ Urntt(rtlon, tdklng (xiilThe entlre ganut ol lacts are to be carefitllg scrtttLnlz,ed and the approach should be bq.sed on the pdradlgrn ol Juatct.,,l dlsctetTotl. uhlch ls lounded on obiectitE rea.sonlng and. ,tot o n Trnd.Lttlduql pe rceptLon - (xiii)The State or a public body Oran entity representing a collective camse should be given some acceptable latitude. To the aforesaid principles we rrlay add some more 2.2 guidelines taking note of tie present day scenario. They are: - (al An appllcatlon tor con.dorro.tlott o.f delay shortld be drafted. wlth co.reJul concerrr and not Lrt a hql.f hazard rrlatt'rer harbourlng the notlo't that the couras q.?e requlred to cottdone delag on the bedrock oJ thdt adJudlcatlon of (rllson ,Il,etits ls the princlple I l0 LNA,J :hP No J898 ol2021 l se'nlnql t., Jt stlce d.lspens(,,l.on sgsterrl ib) An apptication lor condonation of delay r;hou tci not be deal rv th in a routine manner on the base ot indiviclu al philosophv n h ir:h is basically subjective.

22.3(c) 't-h,ru g lr no precise formula can be laid down regard being hrrcl tc -he concept of judicial discretion, yet a conlciolts effort for a:J'rieving consistency and collegialiry cf tlLe adjudicirtory system should be made as that is the ul ,irna,e institution a1 rnotto, 'l're increasing tendency to perceive clelay as a 22.4(d) non serioLS rtittter and, hence, Iackadaisical propensitr cen be exhitit( d i'r a non-challant manner requires to be crtrbe.l, of cours3, !('it tin legal parameters.,, (emphasis supplied)

17. From thr: :lbove decision, it is clear that the Courl is vested with power to condone the delay in frling an appeal il sufficient cause is shc)wn ly the party and the Court has to adrtl;t liberal approach whilr: condoning the delay. However, said power. llas to be exercised orrl). \lrhere valid reasons are shown €rnd .rlausible explanation s EI1\cn for condonation of delay and in carr( of non_ satisfactorily e:{planation, there was deliberation, \ /antorr delay in prosecuting ris arrd where reasons are vague, devoid of iury merit, the discretionary power of the Court in condoning the d,,rl ty could not be exercis;erl.

18. The Hc,n'blr Apex Court in Union ol Ind.ia q.nd another a, Jahanglr Bgrar4ii Jeejeebhog (D) through hds LR (SLp (Ciuit) I \ No.27O96 of 2019 dated O3.O4,2O24), by referring the judgment LNA,J CRP No.l69E oI2024 of the same Court in Esha Bhattachariee (supra), held that "delag should not be excused as a matter of generosity. Rendering substantial jus tice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite partg" ' lg. In Basawaraj and another v. Special Land Acquisition Officer2, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under: "11. The expression "suflicient cause" should be given a libera-l interpretaLion to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inoction or lack of bono ftdes cannot be imputed to the partA ancemed, whether or not sufltcient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible. (Yide Madanlol v' Shgomlal l(2OO2l I SCC 535 : AIR 2OO2 SC 10Ol and Ram Nath Sao v' Gobardhan Sao l(2OO2l3 SCC 195:AIR2OO2 SC 12011 ')

12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to exlend the period of limitation on equitable grounds' "A result flowing frorrr a statutory provision is never an evil' A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a ii"t."*" .""rltit-rg from its operation." The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same' The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means "the law is hard but it is Ihe lav/', stands attracted in such a situation lt has consistently been held that, "inconvenience is not" a decisive factor to be considered white interpreting a statute.

15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation' the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate ald enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation' In 1 'z 2013 (14) scc 81 I I I2 LNA,J ( Rl'No 1898 o/202a .l case ir f,ar1) is found to be negligent, or for wal] t of bon r hde on his prrrt ir-r lhe facts alrd circumstances of the rlase. or .ound to have -ro I a :ted drligently or remained inactive, there cann()t be a justil-r':d ground to condone the delay. No court :oultl be jrrstified in cor donilrg such an inordinate delay by impos:ng z.n1' r'o:dition whatsoe ver The application is to be decided onll. wir.h in the pararrreters laid down by this Court in regard to the cc,nclo.rzLtion of delar.. In cese there was no sufhcient cause to pr(t!,en a liti ]ant to appro,rch the court on time condoning the delay with out any justifi,)al ior , putting any condition whatsoever, amo -r:tts to passir.g an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantaraornts to showing utter disrega-rd to the leglslattrre."

20. From a roacing of the aforesaid observations, it is cltrar that the Hon'ble Ape>r Oorrrt at paras- 1 1 and 12 of the jtrdgrnen: interpreted the expressicn "s rfhcient cause' and at para-15 summa:.i:zed the law with regard to the issue of limitation.

21. In Postm.aster General and others vs. Living lt/I,edia India Limited and another3, Hon'ble Apex Court havinq consi(ir,red catena of decisions, including Pundlik Jalam Patil (dead) t,y LRs. Vs. Executive EnEirreer, Jalgaon Medium Project an(l another4, wherein it was )-reld that, "l7...... 1'lrt]- evidence on record suggests neglecl of its or,z, right for lorLg tirre in preferring appeals. The court carnot enquire into belated rLr stale claims on the ground of equitl-. Delay defeats equity. 'l'hi: court helps those who are vigilant and do not slumber ov:r their rights" and observed that taking very l:nient view jn cr: rdoning the delay, particularly, on the part of the Gover:rrrLen - ard Government Undertaking, would nc,t be grroper ald ollsr:rvr 11 as under:- 3 lzotzl t lzooa; r o scc s63 lrsc ++a ,. - l3 LNA,J CRP No.l898 012024 """ pubtic interest' -Prompt "29. It needs no restatement at our hands that the object for fixing i;i; fr. litigation is based on pubtic policy hxing a lilespan ;; They are i..-"r.g"i re*ed/ fo, the purpose of general .lelfare. ,tt", ,n" parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but ;;;;; ,r-i it "t legal remedies promptly' Salmond in-his Jurisprudence ;;",;" G;, tfie hws come to the assistance of the vigilant and not of the sleepy. 30. Public inlcrest undoubtedly is a paramount consideration in the courts' discretion wherever conferred upon it by the ;;;.;*G ..l"u^.r, "",.,r,.s. Pursuing stale claims and multiplicity of ,.r1*ai"*" in no mar.rner "'b"t-"" oi lornp".,"r.tlott to th; landlosers facilitating their i;i"";;;;;;, i"irr^drri*',i"" 7."*iit"-" n, is equallv an integrat part oT Public nterest demands t'hat ihe Stare or the beneficiary of ""ii.r--prUfi.'i ih".u"" may be, should not be allowed to indulge 5.q"i"1ifu", "" inlny .ct'to unsettle the settted legal rights. accrued in law by litigation untess the claimants are guilty of ."*.ilrU a a.riui"g'U.".nt to which lhey are olherwise not i.""a"i"", manner. One shouid not forget the basic fact that what i" not tte land but the livelihood of the landlosers' i" ".q";;a it es.'prrUtl. interest parameters ought to be kept in mind by the the discretion dealing with the application -;;;;; of the Limitation Act Drasging the """r,"'*f-,ii. "r,"rcisini il; i--rato""r" to courts of law years aJter the termination of legal oroceedinss would not serve any public interest Settled rights Ir"r.'- U"- ri*t,iy interfered with by condoning inordinate delay *ithort th".J being any proper explanation of such delay on the revenue lt serves no public ;;;;; interest-" ;"i;";i""i.,".,i or iublic "ttidabte Section *5 .entit -in led' -

22.InGovernmentofMaharashtra(WaterResources Departmentf rep.by Executive Engineer vs' Borse Brothers Engineers arrd Contractors Private Limiteds' Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under: "63. ......In a fit case in which a party has otherwise acted bona fideand not in a negligent manner' a short delay beyond such period can, in the discretion of the court' be condoned' s (2021) 6 scc 460 T l4 LNA,J C tP No 1898 0[2021 alwal s bezring in mind that the other side of the pictur e is that the opposite party may have acquired both in equity and justice, rv| at may now be lost by the first par:y's nerc it'n' neglipler.cc or laches."

23. In the pres,lnt case, the first appellate Court has cbserved that respond,snt llos. I and 2 were not debarred from r:onlacting the counsel to kno.,V the disposal of the suit and that lhere is also lapse on the part of th e respondents in pursuing the matter however, allowed the application on payment of costs. lt is pe r"inent to mention that A.pp ellate Court did not examine the aspect of actual delay that o(lc;lsioned in preferring the appeal a nd fail :c[ to note that limitation for preferring the appeal expired much pri('r to Covid lockdown anil therefore, lockdown exempted peno(l is not applicable tc the present case. The trial Court has a1s'.r failed to note about sutrstrntial rights accrued to the other pzrrty and thus, committed eIrc,r in allowing the application.

24. Therefc re , in the light of above discussion anrl st'tr.led legal position, the imtrrugnsd docket order passed by the' leitrned hrst Appellate Corrt isr unsustainable and the Revision Pet-itiorr deserves to be allowed . \ \\ l5 LNA,J CRP No.1896 of2024

25. In the result, the Civil Revision Petition is allowed setting aside the impugned docket order dated 24.O1.2024 in I.A.No.771 of 2022 rn A.S.S.R.No. 1725 of 2022 in O.S.No. 111 of 2013 on the file of the Principal District Judge, Vikarabad. There shall be no order as to costs. Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall stand closed. //TRUE COPY// SD/- MOHD. ISMAIL EPUTY REGISTRAR SECTION OFFICER To, -SRl

1. District Judge, Vikarabad District, at Vikarabad 2. One CC to 3. One CC to SRI P SHIVA REDDY Advocate [OPUC] 4. Two CD CoPies V VENKAT RAM NARSAIAH Advocate [OPUC] SS/gh HIGH COLIRT DATED:09106,t2025 ORDER CRP.No.1898 ,rf 2024 ALLOWING THE C.R.P. WITHOUT COSTS t1l6la{ -:. ){."i.\ J.Tfi :ll -"/'