V, Vinod Rao v. Government of A.P., Revenue Department

HON'BLE MRS JUSTICE SUREPALLI NANDA AND HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE J. SREENIVAS RAO R APP AL o OF o2 JUDGMENIj _(per the Hon,bte Mrs lustice Surepa. i Nanda) Hearcl Sri Bobbili Srinivas, learned counsel appearing on beharf of the appefiant,/petitioner and Sri Gadi Pr,aveen Kumar, learned Deputy Solicitor General of India appearing on behalf of respondent Nos.;L to 3.

2. The present writ appeal is preferred aggrieved by the order c,f this Court dated 29.O4.ZO2S passetl in W.p. No.1346O of 2O25. PE USED TH E RECORD:-

3. Th tm u n d d rda d2 202 assed tn W.P.N o 2 5i e dh reu er: "hl otice before admission. Pr:st on OL-07-2025. Ir the meantime, both shall maintain the t;fafus grlo unti the next date of hearing.,, 3 SN,J & JSR,J W.A.No.550 2025 oF the pay within one month from the date oF issue of this order.

6. The aDDellant herein is the petitioner in W.P.No.1346O of 2025 and the same is filed seekinq Draver a u nder: - ".....to issue an appropriate writ, order or direction, more particularly one in the nature of Writ of Mandamus declaring Proceedings bearing No. A-17.0014.0/4/2024-Budgacc_Part(1) dL 24.4.2025 issued by l't Respondent rejecting Petitioners representation dt 26/2/2025 wherein Petitioner requested the 1't Respondent to forward her request for extension of deputation to 3'd Respondent as per the orders dt 26.t0.2023 and dt 7/12/2023 issued by the 1st Respondent and also declaring the Office Note bearing A-17.001,4.0/4/2024-Budg acc-Part(1) dt 25/4/2025 issued by the 1't Respondent as illegal unjust arbitrary and violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India vitiated by the colourable exerclse of power and also vitiated by mala fide on the part of the 4th Respondent and consequentially set aside the impugned proceedings dt 24/4/2025 and dt 25/04/2025 and direct the 1't Respondent to forward Petitioners request for extension of deputation to 3'd Respondent and also direct the 3'd Respondent to extend the Petitioners deputation by condoning the delay on the part of the 1't Respondent and pass..." DISCUSSION AND EONELUSION :- 4 SN,J & JSR,J \\' A.]..o.550 2025 DISC SSION:-

7. Learned cou nseI aooearinq on aDDell a nt / oetition er mainlv outs-forth the {bllowinq behalf of the submissiong:- 'Ihe irrpugned order, dated 29.04.2025 p:assed in i) W.P.N0.13460 of 2025 directing status-quo to be rnaintained without considering the grant of interim prayer as soLght for by the appellant/petitioner virtually defeats, the very purpose of the appellant/petitioner approaching this Court by filing W.P.No.13460 of 2025. ii) In view of the impugned proceedings, dated 24.04.2025 and 25.04.2025 ssued by the 1't respondent, i.e., t'le orders impugrned in /V.P.No.13460 of 2025 by the appellant herein, the appeilant/petitioner cannot be retained and continuec as Senior Executive ( = nancial Administration) in the office rlf the 1't respordent. iii) The im6rtrgned proceedings, dated 24.04.2025 of the 1't respondent is an unreasoned order rejecting appellant/petitioner's request for extension of deputat.ion period : I 5 i,iri't'r'r}'j up to 30.11.2026, the said impugned order clearly indicates ^ * that the request of the appellant had not been approved by the competent Authority without assigning any single reason and therefore, this Court in its order, dated 29.04.2025 passed in W.P.No.13460 of 2025 went wrong in granting status-quo instead of suspending the said impugned order, dated

24.04.2025 of the 1't respondent herein. iv) The consequential impugned order, dated 25.04.2025 of the 1't respondent is also an order passed without considering appellant/petitioner's grievance as put-forth vide representation, dated 27.04.2025, and therefore, this Court in its order, dated 29.04.2025 passed in W.P.No.13460 of 2025 ought to have granted the interim order as sought for by the appellant/petitioner in W.P.No.13460 of 2025. v) Reliance is placed on the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court daled 27.LL.L998 reported in 1999 l ALD 147 in "V, Vinod Rao v. Government of A.P., Revenue Department", in particular, paragraph No.27 and is contended that the present writ appeal is maintainable against the interlocutory order, since grave injustice would be caused to the j I 6 S}.I,J & JSR,J \V.A.No.550 2025 appellant/petitioner in the event appropriate orders are not passed in th€) present Writ Appeal, since the impung'::d status quo orrJer, defted 29.04.2025 has the effect of perpetuating the orders, dalec 24.04.2025 which is illegal, unconstitutronal and vitiated by melafides. vi) This Cotrrt while passing the orders dated 29'0'1'2025 in W.P.No.13460 of 2025 failed to take into consideration, the orders datec 26.10.2023 and 07.12.2023 issued by the 1't respordent and the office note dated 25'04'2025 ir"hich was issued by the I't respondent malafidely contrary to its earlier orders, dated 26.10.2023 & 07.12.2023 issued in fav':ur of the appelliant/wr t petitioner by the 1't respondent' Based on the fores id submissro ns, the lea rne d a o oea rinoon behalf of the a ooellant / oetiti ner tends that the Writ Aooeal as to be allowed as counsel p-raJ-effat

8. Learn ed Deoutv Solic itor Genera I of India aDoea rt no on behalf cf respondent Nos,1 to 3 mainlv outs-'forth the followinq s!-b!nissigrs.!: 7 SN,J & JSR,J W.A.No.550 2025 i) The order impugned in the present Writ Appeal warrants no interference by this Court, since issue pertains to the request of the appellant/petitioner for continuing the appellant/petitioner's services as Senior Executive (Finance & Administration) in the office of the 1't respondent, which is the'Prerogative of the employer since the employer is the best judge to decide where the services of an employee ought to be utilized. ii) The subject issue involved cannot be interfered under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, unless the appellant/petitioner convinces the Court that the decision of the employer is contrary to statutory provlsions and therefore, there is no illegality in the order impugned in the present Writ Appeal. iii) The interim relief as sought for by the appellant in W.P.No.1346O of 2025 cannot be granted by this Court and this Court rightly passed the order, dated 29.04.2025 in W.P.No.13460 of 2025 since the appellant had been relieved on

28.O4.2025 itself and the same had been approved on the said date i.e., 28.04.2025 itself by the competent Authority' 8 SN.J & JSR,J W.A No.550 ,2025 iv) Reliance is placed on the Division Bench judgnrent, dated 22.0,+.2025 passed in W.A.No.455 of 2025 in particular para No.6 in suplort of the case of the respondent Nos.1 trl 3. o t Ba sed_ on the aforesaid submi ssions, thr: lea rned Deoutv Solicitor Ge eral of India a Dea rr n onbehalf of resEondent Nos.1 to3 t the ds t esent Wr Dr n t eal n eds to be dismi sed. CONCLU SItf N:-

9. In so far as the maintainability of the present wrat Appeal is concerned, this Court opines that the same is maintainable since it is the specific case of the appellant that the refrrsal of the interim order as prayed for by the appellant in W.P.No.1346O of 2025 had caused serious injustice or irreparable injury to the appellint/pretitioner herein.

10. In vierry of the fact that the continuance of the order of status-quo, dated 29,04.2025 has the effect of perpetuating the orders, dated 24,04.20.25 imprrgned in W.P.No.13460 of 2o25,and hence, the said rrrder of ., -. J--\ 9 SN,J & JSR,J W.A.No.550 2025 status-quo dated 29.04.2025 containing the quality of finality would therefore be a "judgment" within the meaning of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. This Court opines that when an interlocutory' order has the semblance of finat order or affect the rights of the parties, it can be treated as an "order" for all practical pu rposes. o ines t h ent Writ A maintainable in view of the soecific observations of the Aoex Court in its two iudoments and iud oment of the referred to and extracted Madhva Pradesh Hiqh Cou below. A. The iudqment of the Apex Court in Shvam Sel and Power Limited and Another reoorted in 2O23 1 SCC 634. dated 14.O3.2O22 and in oarticular Dara No.19 ls extracted hereunder:-

19. It has been held in Shah Babulal Khimji that most of the interlocutory orders which contain the quality of finality are clearly specified in clauses (a) to (w) of Order XLIII Rule 1 CPC and would be 'judgments' within the meaning of the letters patent and, therefore, appealable. However, there may be interlocutory orders which are not covered by Order XLIII Rule 1 CPC but which al so oossess the characteristics and traooinqs of finalitv l0 I]N,J & JSR,J W.,\.i.Io.550 2025 a able ri tnas uch as such orders mav advers affect a v or decide an important aspect of the trial in an ancillary proceeding . It has further been held that however, for such an o rder to be a 'judgnrr:nt', an adverse effect on the party concerned must b,e direct and immediate rather than indirect or remot(t. Various illustrations of interlocutory orders have been q ven by this Court in para (120), whicl could be held t,: be appealable. This Court held that tlrough any discret i,ln exercised or routine orders passed by the trial Judge in the course of the suit may car.jse some inconvenience or, to some extent, prejudice to one party or the other, they cannot be treated as a ,ludgmen[. unless they contain the traits and trappings ,:>f finality. This Co"rrt has expressed in para (122) that Lhough it had, by wav of sample, laid down various illustrative examples of an crder which may amount to a judgment, it would not be possible to give such an exhaustive li:,t as may cover a I possible areas. This Court, in the facts r.rf the said case, eld that a n order of the Sinole Ju dqe refu sinq tment of a recelver an d qrant of an adinterim ADD Tai .iniunction wa sun nt'w hin the t V EC!!!!! nq of Letters Patent, both beca use Order XLIII Ru le 1 CPC aDDlies to internal aD eals in the ourt and that such an ord er evenonmerits conta i ns the oua litv of fi alitv a d would therefore be a 'iudo ent'w thin them eaninq of Clause 15 of ttre_Lctters Patent. d u h t B. The judgment of the Apex Court inMi naDore PeoD les' Coooerativer Bank Ltd. v. Chuni reported in (2006) 5 SCC 399 and in particular para Nos.15 & 16 are extracted hereunder:- lNa a

1.5. int,3rim orders/interlocutory orders passed curing the pendency of a case, fall under one or the oth,3r of the following categories: (i) Orders which finally decide a question or issue in controversy in the main case. *-s i1 SN,J & JSR,J W.A.No.550 2025 (ii) Orders which finally decide an issue which materially and directly aFfects the final decision in the main case. (iii) Orders which finally decide a collateral issue or question which is not the subject-matter of the main case. (iv) Routine orders which are passed to facilitate the progress of the case till its culmination in the final judgment. (v) Orders which may cause some inconvenience or some prejudice to a party, but which do not finally determine the rights and obligations of the parties.

16. The term "judgment" occurring in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent will take into its fold not only the judgments as defined in Section 2(9), CPC and orders enumerated in Order 43 Rule 1, CPC, but also other orders which though may not finally and conclusively determine the rights of parties with regard to all or any matters in controversy, may have finality in regard to some collateral matter, which will affect the vital and valuable rights and obligations of the parties. Interlocutory orders which fall under categories (i) to (iii) above, are, therefore, "judgment" for the purpose of filing appeals under the Letters Patent. On the other hand, orders falling under categories (iv) and (v) are not "judgments" for the purpose of filing appeals provided under the Letters Patent. In the present case(i) and (ii) above are attracted. C. The Full Bench iudqment of the Madhvapradesh Hiqh Court in Arvind Kumar Jain and Others. Vs. State of . and others r orted in AIR 2 7 MP 276 an 't n particular oara Nos.27 & 3 a re extracted hereu nder: -

27. In the case of W.A. No. 69/2007 Nav Nirman (Milan) Deria v. State of M.P. and Ors., the Division Bench had taken note of the decision rendered in the case of Shah Babulal Khimii (supra), and exoressed the opinion that l2 Si{,J & JSR,J \U A.N c.550 2025 the refusal of the interim o rder had ca usec serious iniustice to th aDDellan s and hence, the a DDEAI inta i nable. .j 1 . In view of the aforesaid premised reasons wr: proceed to recor,l our conclusions in seriatim: (.a) The decision rendered in the case of Arvind Kumar -iain (srpra), does not lay down the law correc.:ly and is hereby ()verru led. r.b) Any decision treading on the same path lras to be rleemel to have been overruled. ic) The decisions rendered in Nav Nirman (Milan) Deria isupra i and Tejpal Singh (supra), enunciate the law ,:o rreCt l'/. (d) The proviso to Section 2(1) of Madhya Prade!;h Uchcha Nyayalaya (Khand Nyaypeeth Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005 ctoes not create an absolute bar to prefer an appeal to the Drivision Bench. (e) An appeal can be preferred against an order regard being had to the nature, tenor, effect and impact of the order passed by the learned Single Judge. (f) The guidelines given in the cases of Sha.h Babulal Khimji (supra), Central Mine Planning and Desiqrl Institute Ltd. (su pra), Deo ra (supra), Liverpool & Londor'r S.P. & I. ul (su pra ) Associ,l lion and Midna oore Peo ples'Co ooerative Ba n k Ltd . (r;upra) are to be l(,rpt in view while deciding the mainta ina l.)ility of an appeal. (supra), Subal Ltd Per (g) It should be borne in mind that instances glven in the aioresaid decisions are not exhaustive but illuitrative in nature, because various kinds/catego ries of orders may be pa:;:;ed in exercise of jurisdiction under Art cle 226 of the Ccnstitution of India. (h) The facts character of appreciate the trappings of the same. each case, the nature and the order are to be scrut(nised to 13 SN,J & JSR,J W.A.No.550 2025

11. On perusal of record, it is evident that through an e- mail, the appellant had been intimated that a relieving letter/order, dated 2a.O4.2O25 had been issued to the appellant herein which had been approved by the competent Authority and the appellant/petitioner was requested to submit No dues certificate at the earliest. L2. A bare perusal of record indicates that on an earlier occasion, the 1"t respondent vide order, dated 26.1O.2023 intimated the appellant/writ petitioner that the appellant is offered the post of Senior Executive (Finance & Administration) in Group-A in the pay level-11 of VII CPC, pay matrix on deputation basis(Foreign Service Terms) for a period of O3 years. A bare perusal of the record, further indicates that the 1"t respondent vide office order, dated 07.L2.2O23 addressed to the appellant/petitioner informed the appe!!ant/writ petitioner, that the deputation period is for O3 years as per the offer of appointment, dated 26.LO.2O23 which is further subject to grant of extension of deputation period beyond 2a.O4.2O24 by the parent department. But, 14 S}.I,J & JSR,J W.A.No.550 2025 o.-) however, the impugned order, dated 24'04'2025 had been issuedl by the l't respondent reiecting appellant's representation, dated 26.02-2025 seeking extension of deputation period up to 30.11'2O26 without assigning any reasons simply stating that the said request had not been appro,red by the competent Authority' the 1't 13, Taking into consideration the fact as horne on record, that the order impugned, dated 24'O4'2O25 respondent rejecting issued by appellant/petitioner's representation, dated 26'O2'2O25 wherein appellant/writ petitioner requested the 1't respondent to forward her request for extension of deputation to the 3'd respondent as per the orders, dated 26.LO.2O23i and 07.L2.2O23 issued by the 1't respondent had been rejected without assigning any single reason except stating that the request letter of the appellant/ petitioner for extension of deputation period' dated 26..02.2025 had not been approved by the competent Authority, this Court opines that the appellant/Writ Petitioner is entitled for the relief as prayed for in the present Writ Appeal since it is settled \. I / 15 SN,J & JSR,J W.A.No.550 2025 principle of law that any order of judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative Authority should be supported by the reasons. t4. The Aoex Court emDhasized the need of assiqnino reasons rn administrative, ouasi-iu dicial and iudicial proceedinqs in the case of Kranti Associates (P) Ltd. v. Masood Ahmed Khan reo orted in (2O1O) 9 SCC 496. The relevant oortio reads as under: "12. The necessity of giving reason by a body or authority in support of its decision came up for consideration before this Court in several cases. Initially this Court recognised a sort of demarcation between administrative orders and quasijudicial orders but with the passage oF time the distinction between the two got blurred and thinned out and virtually reached a vanishing point in the judgment of this Court in A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India [(1969) 2 SCC 2621. 13

14. The expression "speaking order" was first coined by Lord Chancellor Earl Cairns in a rather strange context. The Lord Chancellor, while explaining the ambit of the writ of certiorari, referred to orders with errors on the face of the record and pointed out that an order with errors on its face, is a speaking order.

15. This Court always opined that the face of an order passed by a quasi-judicial authority or even an administrative authority affecting the rights of parties, must speak. It must not be like the "inscrutable face of a sphinx".

47. Summarising the above discussion, this Court holds: 16 S N,J & JSR,J \\r.A.}l1o,550 2025 ria) in India the judicial trend has always been to record reason s, even in administrative decisions, if such rlecisio ns affect anyone prejudicially. (b) A ,1uasi-judicial authority must record r':)asons in su pport of its conclusions. (c) Insi:;tence on recording of reasons is meanl to serve the widr:r principle of justice that justice must nr:t only be Cone it must also appear to be done as well. (d) Rer:ording of reasons also operates as a valirl restraint on an)/ possible arbitrary exercise of judicial arnd quasi- judicia or even administrative power. (e) Reasons reassure that discretion has been exercised by thr: decision-maker on relevant grounds, and by disregarding extraneous considerations. (f) Roasons have virtually become as indisp3nsable a component of a decision-making process as observing principl,:s of natural justice by judicial, quasi-jt.dicial and even br,' administrative bodies. (g) Rerasons facilitate su perir: r co u rts. the process of judicial review bY (h) Ttr,: ongoing judicial trend in all countries r:ommitted to rule of law and constitutional governance is irr favour of reasor ed decisions based on relevant facts'. This is virtuallv the lifeblood of judicial decision - ma king; justifying the principle that reason is the soul of justice. (i) Juc icial or even quasi-judicial opinions thesc: days can be as clifferent as the judges and authorities \ iho deliver them. All these decisions serve one comrnorl purpose which is to demonstrate by reason that th':) relevant factors; have been objectively considered. This is import:ant for sustaining the litigants' faith in l:he justice d e live rv system. (j) Insistence on reason is a requirement for both judicial accou n:a bility and transParencY. t7 SN,J & JSR,J W.A.No.S50 2025 (k) If a judge or a quasi-judicial authority is not candid enough about his/her decision-making process then it is impossible to know whether the person deciding is faithful to the doctrine of precedent or to principles of increm enta lism. (l) Reasons in support of decisions must be cogent, clear and succinct. A pretence of reasons or "rubber-stamp reasons" is not to be equated with a valid decision-making process. (m) It cannot be doubted that transparency is the sine qua non of restraint on abuse of judicial powers' Transparency in decision-making not only makes the judges and decisionmakers less prone to errors but also makes them subject to broader scrutiny. (See David Shapiro in Defence of Judicial Candor [( 1987) 100 Harvard Law Review 731-371 .) (n) Since the requirement to record reasons emanates from the broad doctrine of fairness in decision-ma king, the said requirement is now virtually a component of human rights and was considered part of Strasbourg Jurisprudence. See Ruiz Torija v. Spain [(1994) 19 EHRR 5531 EHRR, at 562 para 29 and Anya v. University of Oxford [2001 EWCA Civ 405 (CA)] , wherein the Court referred to Article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights which requires, "adequate and intelligent reasons must be given for judicial decisions". (o) In all common law jurisdictions judgments play a vital role in setting up precedents for the future. Therefore, for development of law, requirement of giving reasons for the decision is of the essence and is virtually a part of "due process.

15. This Court opines that the impugned status-quo order, dated 29.O4.2O25 is nothing but a final order as according to the 1"t respondent, the appellant is already 18 SiN,J & JSR,J W.A.|'1o.550 2025 relieved on 28.04.2025 and the appellant has no other go except to report to the 3'd respondent within 12 days from the date of relieving order.

16. This Court taking into consideration the fact as borne on record that the 1"t respondent vide office order, dated 26..LO.2O23 & 07.L2.2O23 intimated to the appellant/writ petitioner that the appellants derputation is for a period of O3 years and the offer of appointment issued in farrour of the appellant/writ petitioner is dated 26.1O.2023, 'opines that the request of the appeltant/writ petitioner made vide representation dated 26,O2.2O25 seeking extension of deputation period up to 3O.11.2O26 needs to be reconsidered in accordance to larrv in the interest of j ustice.

17. .Takinct into consideration:- a) The aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case, b) The submissions made by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant,/petitioner and learned Deputy Solicitor General of India appearing on behalf of respondent Nos.1 to 3. ,., tt. 19 SN,J & JSR,J W.A.No.550 2025 c) The order impugned, date 29.04.2025 passed in W.P.No.13460 of 2025 d) The order, dated 24.04.2O25 and ZS.O4.ZO2S issued by the lst respondent. e)The contents 'the letter No. N FD B/Ad mn, / Dep / 3 49 / 2O22-Zg, dated 26. 1O,ZO23 of the l"t respondent herein addressed to appellant/petitioner (referred to and extracted above) f) The contents of the letter dated 07.L2.2O29 issued by the l't respondent to the appellant,/ petitioner (referred to and extracted above) g) The observations of the Apex Court and other Courts, in the judgments (referred to and extracted above) and again enlisted below: a)2o231 SCC 634 ii) 20o6(s) sc 399 ii) ArR 2OO7 MP 276 iiix2olo) 9 scc 495 Accordi qlv, the orese nt Writ ADDea I is allowed. The order impugned, dated 29.04.2O25 passed in W.P.No.13460 of 2O25 is set-aside and the lst respondent is directed to reconsider the representation of the 20 Si.l,J & JSR,J W A No.550 2025 appellant/writ petitioner, dated 26'O2'2025 seeking extension of deputation period up to 30'11'2026 and its impugned's decision dated 24.04'2O25 and 25'O4'2O25 and the 2nd respondent is directed to reconsider the representation of the petitioner, dated 2L'O4'2025 seeking fonwarding of appellant's extension note for appellant's tenure at NFDB Hyderabad to appellant's cadre controlling Authority within a period of one (01) week from the date of receipt of copy of the order in accordance to law, duly taking into consider;ltion the office orders of the 1't respondent, dated 26'1O':2023 and 07.:-2.2023 issued to the appellant/writ petitioner intimating the appellant/writ petitioner that the post of Senior Executive (Finance & Administration) in' Group-A in the Pay t-evbl-Il of VII CPC pay matrix on deputation basis (Foreign Service Terms) for a period of tlrree (03) years had been offered to the appellant herein and duly communicate the decision on the said representations to the appellant/writ Petitioner. W.P.No.13460 of 2025 is directed to be listed after summer v.acation on 12.O6.2025 fot the counter of the 2t SN,J & JSR,J W.A.No.550 2025 respondents. The counsel for the appellant is permitted to take out personal notice to the unofficial respondent No.4 herein who is also the 4th respondent in W.P.No.1346O of 2O25 and file proof of service of notice upon the said 4th respondent in W.P.No.13460 of 2O25 into the registry. However, there shall be no order as to costs. Miscellaneous applications, if any, pending shall stand closed. To, //TRUE COPY// SD/.P.PADMANABHA REDDY DEPUTY REGISTRAR t, IMSECT OFFICER 1 I|'p.9tl"t Execulive, National Fisheries Development Board, pillar No.235, PVNR Express Way, SVPNpA post, HyderabaO-SOOOSZ Z. ]tr9 p99p_!9ry, Department of Fisheries, Union of tndia, Krishi Bhavan, New Delhi-1 10001

3. The JS and-CAO, Ministry of Defence, Union of lndia, Defence Offices Complex, Africa Avenue,-New Delhi - 110023

4. One CC to SRI SRtN|VAS BOBBtlt, Advocate. tOpUCl 5. one cc to sRl GADI PRAVEEN KUMAR, (Deputv solicitor General of rndia). - - v-Iiers,, High Court forthe State of Tetangana at ftfoelao5o. iopnCi-

6. Two CD Copies. BSK LS HIGH COURT DATED:0710512025 VACATION GOURT I {T /, t; ,: \:1 1;G s \- \ ' 1.\, :l a'.7 a\' ,, <.',/ JUDGMENT WA.No.550 of 2025 ALLOWING THE WRIT APPEAL WITHOUT COSTS q /t