The High Court · 2025

Order

This Civil Revision Petition is filed under Article 227 of Constitution of India by the revision petitioners/defendant Nos. 1 to 4 aggrieved by the order, dated O7.06.2O19 passed by the learned I Additional Senior Civil Judge, Warangal 1n I.A.No. 1195 ot 2018 in O.S.No.557 of 2018, wherein and whereby an application filed under Order VII Rule 11 read with Section 151 of C.P.C. to reject the ptaint was dismissed.

2. Brief facts of the case are that the revision petitioners herein are the defendants and the respondent is the plaintiff before the trial Court. The respondent filed O.S.No.557 of 2018 against the revision petitioners for recovery of money of Rs. 13,42,848/- together with interest at L2Yo per annum from the date of suit till the date of realisation. It is stated that the respondent is having acquaintance with one Neelarapu Venkateswarlu (hereinafter referred as "the deceased"), who is the husband of revision petitioner No. 1, father of revision petitioner Nos.2 and 3 and son of revision petitioner No.4 and basing on the said acquaintance, the respondent requested to 2 NN&I io t7t9 m79 zurange plot or land for purchase for : total sum of Rs. 15,OO',OOO /- in and around Bheemara-rr Chinthagattu, Erragattu or Wad.depally area, for which the leceased ifreed and prciinised to search and arrange for pur<:l ase and he'has shown one or two properties but the said trat saction was not materialized.

3. It is further stated that reposing cc I fidence on the deceased, the respondent had paid amounts r r different dates making total sum of Rs. I 1,21,221 I - and the rarticulars were reflected in the plaint. It is further stated tha- ,ne said amount was transferred to the account of the decease: lying in Andhra Bank, Warangal Branch from the account of t.t : respondent i.e. State Bank of India, Industrial Estate Br z nch, Warangal, H.D.F.C. Bank, Warangal and Bangalore Bran [res. Even after receiving the said amount, the deceased did rot arrange any plot/land to the respondent. On 28.01.2017 t re deceased was admitted in Yashoda Hospital, for treatmer 1 of Infection in Lungs and on his request, as a part of thr: r-ransaction the respondent had deposited an amount of Rs.15,000/- to the account of the deceased on 28.01 .2017 . S r bsequently, the deceased died in the month of Februarv-, 2O1',' tnd the revision \ 3 NNR,J ctP_1779_2019 petitioners being the Class-I legal heirs of the deceased are under obligation to discharge the liability of the deceased and when ttte respondent contacted the revision petitioners to discharge the aforesaid liability, they did not evince any interest and as such, the respondent filed the aforesaid suit for recovery of money of Rs. 13,42,848/- together with intere st @ l2o/o per alnum.

4. After receiving the summons, the revision petitioners entered their appearance and hled an application under Order WI Rule 11 read with Section 151 of C.p.C. uidel.A.No.1l95 of 2O 18 seeking for rejection of the plaint in the said suit contending that there was no such transactions between tl"e deceased and respondent and the deceased never took any amount frorn the respondent. It is further stated that the said suit deserves to be rejected on the ground that as it is hit by the infirmities as provided in four clauses of Order VII Rule 11 of C.P.C. arld it is also contended that there is no valid document executed by defenda,t No. r or her deceased husband in favour of the respondent and that the suit is barred by limitation. It is also contended that in the absence of filing of pronote, issuance of legal noticerti the deceasecl or to the revision petitioners ::jt>*ni..'+-+-,,. 4 NNR,I qPJ779-2019 demanding paynient of the amount, no cause < f action would arose to the respondent for filing t-he suit' It is rlso contended that the suit is liable to be rejected on two grourr ts that the suit is barred by limitation and that ttrere is no c;r se of action to file the suit.

5. The respondent/plaintiff frled counter averments made in the allidavit frled in suppor denying the of the petition f,rled under Order MI Rule 11 of C'P'C' and cor said suit is very much within the limitatior pleadings in the plaint clearly establishes that of action ald which accrue on various datt' respondent had transferred the amounts to th' deceased. It is also contended that the si culminating into the entire suit arnount \r'll petitioners/ defendants are liable to pay arr .,:nded that the and as the trere is a cause on which the account of the id transactions :h the revision a s such, it is contended that the deceased received the m( rev, w'hicLr was transferred by the respondent, and did not di arnount and the revision petitioners failed t ' there are suffrcient grounds for rejection of the plaint and establish that ,r:harge the said prayed to dismiss the Petition. \ 5 NNR,J crpfTl9_mt9 6, Considering the reasons crted and disbelieving the veision of the reyision petitioners, the leamed trial Court had dismissed the said application. '7 ' Being aggrieved by the said orders, the present civil Revision Petition has been filed by the revision petitioners/ defendarrts, contending that the learned tria_l Judge without considering the contentions of the revision petitioners that there is no cause of action to the respondent for filing the suit and the very statements, which are filed and relied upon by the respondent in support of his contentions or claim in the suit, itself establish that the entire transactions are barred by limitation as there is no such plea that the suit is within limitation and even there is no plea raised in the plaint that when and where the cause of action arose and in the absence of such pleas in the plaint it leads to rejection of the plaint.

8. It is also contended that the learned trial Judge did not consider the said aspects and disrnissed the application stating that except the three transaction s rest of the transactions pertain to HDFC, Warangal branch and further whether the respondent is entitled for recovery of entire claim in the suit or 6 NNRJ $p-1779-2079 (' notcannotbe.seenatthisstage'andpimafat..?underOrder VII Rule 11 of C.P.C. plaint cannot be rejected f : mis-joinder or non-joinder of cause of actions and the enlire lspects have to be gone into at the time of trial and not at the st ge of threshold i.e., in an application filed under Order VII Ru r 11 of C P-C' is being decided. 9 Heard Sri K.Buchi Babu, learned counse I lbr the revlston learned :ounsel for the petitioners, Sri C.A.R.Seshagiri Rao, respondent and perused the record'

10. Learned counsel for the revision petition': :; has reiterated the grounds mentioned in the Civil Revision Pet tion.

11. Learned counsel for the respondent contended that cause of action mearrs it is a b - even as per the plaint, wherein it is mentionec' action arose on all the dates, which are lr statements, are extracted in the plaint' further contended that the acquaintance amor been proved by way of admission of defendant has contended that there were transacti ' deceased husband and the respondent rvi ras vehementlY ndle o[ facts and hat the cause of entioned in the ,,3arned counsel g, the parties has I',1o.1 though she rs between her ,r:h leads to an \ 7 NN&I ct?:1779_m19 inference that tJrere a_re ceriain transactions arnong the parties. Learned counsel also pointed out that the contents of alfidavit filed by defendant No. 1 clearry establishes that her deceased husband is a realtoJ and the paJments which are transferred by the respondent to the account of the deceased are the payments towards discharge of the loals obtained by the respondent from the deceased. In view of tl-e above admission, there were certain transactions arnong the parties and those aspects cannot be gone into at the threshold. Learned counsel also pointed out that even if there is a cause of action which is shown as vague that cannot be gone at the stage of deciding the application Iiled under Order VII Rule 11 of C.p.C. Learned counsel also pointed out that the limitation aspect, which is a mixed question of fact t"* cannot gone into at threshold that too at the stage of decid-ing arr application filed under Order VII Rtrle 11 of C.p.C. In support of his contentions, he relied upon the following judgments:_ "rrd aaothert

7. Veturu prabhauathi a. 2. Bajranglal Agarual o. Suslleela Agarual and others2 3. Mohamtaed Nord,eem Wah Klun-u. Moharnmed Akber Ali Sirigireddg Arjun Reddg and and. otllr;rss ',1zoz+y a eto sea(Ap) (DB) . (2024) 6 ArD 116 (rS) (DBi - (2024) 4 ALD 736 OS) 8 NNR'J crP -1719 -2019 f and other* others5 -ini

4. Chtndan Khandeusal dnd others a' G.Rantr'.krishna Reddg

5. Gurdea Singh u. Harvinder Singhs O. etaA Gafiir and another v' -Sltolte oj Ut'atakh-and' and T.RasumalloYelloriahandotlersa.chielCommissioner, rrta adrninistratlon, Hgderabad cna' tthersT 8. Rcrgann Yelloriah and otlers "' Cni*a Shan karc.ia,hs 9. sri Lrrxmi co-p"ritti Housing Soc:tt.tg itmited v' lO. Thanamki Prasad a Gutamadugtt Puliamt ta'1o G.V.Mohan and otherse

12.Nodoubt,itisasuitwhichisfrledforre()'|veryofamount fromthedefendants,whoarethewife,childrtlaldmotherof the deceased Venkateswarlu, who said to be t re friend of the respondent. On the face of the plaint aveflnerr :s it would show that there are certain transactions between tL r:' deceased and the respondent in respect of the Paym-ent of ar lounts ald also transfer of amounts from the account of the res rondent into the account ol the deceased. It appears that therr is no denial on the part of [he revision petitioners/defendant ; with regard to the acquaintance between the respondent ar d the decea-sed' Though the learned counsel for the responderrl has pointed out that there is an admission made by defendanr: |vo.1 with regard to the transfer of the amounts into the accoul l of her deceased o (zoz+) z nro a+o (rs) ' 2022 Law Surt (SC) 1358 | {zooa) to scc oz ' (2007) 5 ALT 215 u (zoo3) s nLr +oa " (zooo) t nLo ooz 'o 2OO5 Law suit (AP) 296 9 NNtt,I ctP_1719_mL9 husband, the main grievance of the revision petitioners is that the very suit itself is barred by limitation.

13. In Veluru Ptdlthdtathi o. Sirigireddg Arjun Redd.g and another (7 supre, the Honble High court of Andhra pradesh at Amaravathi in paragraph Nos.g, 9 and 15 held as under:_ "8. It is a trite law tiat for adjudicating a petrhon under Order VII Rule ll CpC to reject a plaint at the threshold, the pleadings a::rd averrnents in the plaint alone are to be looked into ald considered. A slew of decisions have reiterated so. In P.V.Guru Raj Reddy and Others v. P.Neeradha Reddy and Otlersrr the Apex Court obsened thu s: "S lylectb-n^9f..th1t Otaint under Order W Rule I t of the Lod.e oJ Ciuil Proedure is a dra_stic potuer confioed in the qurt to terntinate a ciuil action at tlte thrcshold. Tlre anditiorts precedent to the exercise oJ Pouer Undq Order VII Rule 1 1, therefore, are stingent and h-aue been consistentl1 latd to be so bg the Court. It is the auerments in the plaint that h.ts to be read. as a uhole to firld out uheiher it discloses q cause of adbru or uhetler the suit is barred under Tg, bY;_ At -tlle st@ge oJ exercise of power Llnder ttrd-er Wf RuIe I1, the stard. of the Defendants in the uitten statement or in the applicatbi for ,.1ntion o1 t!e- eloTt ? ?hohu tmmatcrial. rt L onig if the auerments in tlu plaint ex Jacie do not disclise a cause of actbn or on a. rad.ing thereof the suit oppears to be baned under ang laut the pliint can be relgcted: fn alt other situations, the claii.x- ruill haue to be adjudicafed in the course of the tial. ,, Therefore, ir this case also the pleadings alone are to be scrutin2ed and ex facie, if such pleadings reveal that the suit " 1zor s1 o scc ast 1() NNR,J cap-1779-2019 a claim is barred by any lat', t1len the plaint bas to I r: rejected in terms of Order VII Ruie 1 1(d) CPC'

9. In this context, when plaint averments are l paras 4 & 5 the plaintiff has narrated about tJ:e I ransactions that have been taken place in resg piaint schedule property right from beginning of tlt' dt-30.10. 1998. The said sale deed was allegedly r:: the plaintiff and her mother-in-law in favour c defendant. There were other transactions narrat€ paragraphs. Ttren a perusal of tle pleadings in prr the plaint would show, according to plaintiff, she I Telangana State a-long with her husband and sett't her livelihood and as she visited the suit schedul€ the month of October, 2023 to clear the cheeky that time. 1* defendant obstructed her and clain e owner of the plaint schedule property' Ttren, on enquiry she came to know about all the transactions t).at have ta-ken place behind her bz trespass made by the defendants. The plaiatilf s : she was not aware of these facts ald she ca'rne lc when she visited the suit property in October', therelore, she hled the suit immediately for differ'l rused, in quence of :'r:t of the sale deed ecuted by the 2nd I in these a.4&6of rugrated to :l there for vicinity irt rushes. At I to be the r.er further liau dulent :k and the .itn is that know only 2023 arrd t reliefs. x)o( Thus going by the plarnt averments the st \,'rthin the period of [mitation. We must however to say, since the aspect of limitation is a mixe<l lact and law, the veraci$r of the pleadings of bct that context has to be decided only at tl.e end ol not at this stage. This point is accordingly answe r it claim is e hastened question of r parties in he tria-l but rd in favour of the appeUant-" 11 NNR,J crP_7719 _mt9 a. Susheela Agarutat and

14. ln Bajrangtal Agarual others (2 suprcr) a Division Bench of this Court had an occaslon to dea_l with the aspect as to the expression of cause of auticr and what means the cause of action and in paragra-_:h Nos.25 and 2g held as under:_ '25. The expression cause of action has been described to mean every fact which would be necessalr for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support the plaintilps right to judgment. In other words, cause of action consists of a bundle of material facts which are necessal/ for the plaintiff to prove in order to entitle the plaintill to the relief claimed. For ascertaining cause of action, the averments in the plaint must be read in its entirety and not in isolation and must be held to be correct. Simply put, the plaintill must prove its case on the averments made in the plaint and further the relief claimed must have a real nexus with the cause o[ action pleaded.

26. x:or 27 . xxx

28. Order VII Rule ll of the CpC lists 6 cases in which a plaint should be rejected. The word .shall" in Order WI Rule 11 makes rejection mandatory where any of the 6 conditions exrst including where ttre plaint does not disclose a cause of action. as in the present case. Order VII Rule 11 presumes disrnissal of a Suit on rejection of the plaint without the rigour of tria]. The only requirement is that tJ:e Court rnust conclude that the plaintiff has frled a meritless suit by way of a plaint which fails to drsclose a cause of action. The apperJant's argument that the cause o[ action L2 NNR.J (j^P-lTl9-2019 e pleaded in the plaint should have been tested in t:: I trial is therefore contrary to the CPC as well as the case law ' 15. ln Mohammed Ndd'eem tlllo,h Khan Akber Ali and others (3 supra) this Cour ul Nos.23 and,24 held as under:- trfiohammed paragraph the Specifrc re that the arty to the C., the suit :rt a plaint ,ed the suit :n him but .s per the lse (suPra), lainti-ff is in *23. Even for the sake of arguments' if we prestLl suit is not maintainable as the plaintilf is not a l suit documents, which aJe sought to be cancell' cannot be rejected because it is settled law th cannot be rejected in pan' as *re plaintiff has fi not only tor declaring the sale deeds not bindin; also for perpetual injunction Furthermore' principle taid down in Tekulapally Veera Reddy t this Court is of the opinion that the suit of the 1 conformity with three ingredients of Section 31 oi Relief Act- Moreover, the facts of the case in th decisions relied upon by the learned couc defendant are entirely different from the facts oi hand., therefore, the principle laid down in th' decisions cannot be made appticable to the fact on hand. Though the tria'l Court has made som: in the impugned order with regard to relief of ': sale deeds, there is no whisper at all on the zs relie[ sought by the plarntifl in t]re suit i'e'' rel t the said sale deeds not binding on him and als: injunction- Thus, it can be said that the tli rejected the plarnt in part i e ' only to tJ:re exl t cancelhng the sale deeds' 24. Thus, r'iewed from aJIy angle, the trial CouI ought not to have rejected the plaint of the plaintiff as the i3 pugned order of declaring ror perpetual d Court has rt of relief of >b servations ncellation of .:ect of other above said lel for t]:e the case on above said i of the case \ 13 NNR,J crp_7T19_2079 did not satisfr any of the ingrcdients incorporated under Order VII Rule I I of the Code of Civil procedure. The plaintiff could successfully establish that the plaint is not liable for rejection under any of tJre grounds prescribed under Order WI Rule I 1 of the Code of Civil procedure. Henee; the im1-,ugrred order is liable to be set aside., In Chand.an Khandeual dnd. others o. G,Ramakrishna Redd.g and. otherslz a co-ordinate Bench of this Court in paragraph Nos.14 to 16 held as under:_

16. "14. It is settled principle of larv that the Court is competent to reject a plaint at any stage of proceeding if it frnds that condidons under Order VII Rule ll of CpC exist. The Court carnot take into account the materials beyond tJ.e plaint to declare the case of the plaintills as frivolous and vexatious. While considering the application filed under VII Rule I I of CPC, the Court is not required to take into consideration the defence set up by the defendant in the written staternent. The question whether the plaint discloses any cause of action is to be decided by looking at the averments contained in the plaint itself but not the defence set up in the written statement. While examining the said issues, the strength or wea.kness of the case of the ptarntrlls should not be seen. ln order to reject the plarnt under Order VII Rule 11 of CpC, the Court has to scrutinise the averments/pleas in the plaint, the pleas taken by the defendant in the rryritten statement are wholly irrelevant and the matter is to be decided only on t]1e plaint averments. If the allegations are vexatious and meritless and not disclosing a clear right to materiaj(s) to sue, it is the duty of the tria_l Court to exercise its power under Order W nut" if of CpC. " lzoz+; z ALD a+o 1.rs1 t4 NNRJ $p-!779-2019 - Merely because the cause of action in the plaint i incomplete it is not a ground for rejection of th': settled principle of law that there is a Cifference : disclosure of cause of action in the plaint and til' cause of action for t}Ie suit' The ground for rejct t i! failur. to disclose a cause of action and not tha cause of action for the suit lt is not competent for go into the correctness or otherwise of the constituting tlte cause of action and t]le same I scope of Order Vll Rule 11 of CPC What is 13 disclosed by the plaintiff is a clear right to sue e do so must necessarily entail in rejection of the pl

15. In Saleem Bhai vs. State of Maharashtra [t 557} the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as foll r "9. A perusal of Order 7 Rute I 1 CPC makes it relevant facts which need to be tooked into Ir application thereunder are the averments in the J court can exercise the power under Order 7 Rrtl: stage of the suit - before registering the plaint sufirmons to ttre defendant al any time before t r the tria-l. For the purposes of deciding an alr clauses (a) and (d) of Rule I I of Order 7 CPC' ll the plaint are germane; the pleas taken by the c written statement would be wholly irrelevant therefore, a direction to file the writLen strr deciding the application under Order 7 Rule I I be procedural irregtrlarity touching the exercii by the trial court. vague and plaint. It is tween non- absence of on of plaint there is no 'he Court to I allegations oeyond the luired to be rd failure to int. 1,103) 1 scc ,I]S: clear that the - deciding an taint. The trial l1 CPC at any r after issuing conclusion of lication under e averments in rtendant in the at that stage' .:ment without )PC cannot but of j urisdiction

16. In Jageshwari Dewi v' Shatrughan Ram 52) the Honble Supreme Court observed as follt (2007) ls scc \S: 15 NN&I CIp:rn9_xt9

3. We have heard learned counsel fo: the par1is5. We have perused the order of the ". r,Jl::T ili.::ff.:T"#,T: have arso perused main ground on which rejection of the plaint was sought was ti;at the plaint does not disclose a cause of action *r; ;; grounci specified under Order 7 Rule l1{a) CpC. The trial court on consideration of the avr ents in the plaint herd, and in our view rightry, that it courd discrose a cause of acrion. ?::J.::::,11"::"r#;::i,:.j difference between the nondisclosure of a cause of action and defective cause of action: while the former comes within the scope of Order 7 Rule l l, the latter is to be decided during trial of the suit. The contention .he cause or action .,".,.":il:i:;:'H I"H,T::f::i ground for rejection of the plaint, under Order 7 Rule lt CpC no exception can be taken to the order.,

17. In Guntdea Singh u. Apex Court held as under:_ Ilarwtnder Singh (S srrtprol) 'The application preferred by the petitioner to reject the plaint under Order 7 Rule l l of the Code of Civil procedure, 19o8 has been dismissed by the trial court which has been confirmed by the High Court. It is the case on behalf of the petitioner that the plainriff is not endtled to any relief in the suit. The aforesaid cannot rej'ect the plaint at ttre threshord in exercise oro" powers under otder 7 Rule 11 of the cpc." " *o"'to

18. In Abdul GaJar and another u. Strlte of llttarakhand. the Honble Apex Court while dealing and others (6 sutrtrol) L6 with the provision under Secrion 9 of C'P'C' Order MI Rule 11of C'P'C' held as under:- NN&I sp 1719-2019 ilLd also under "16. Section 9 of the Code provides that civil cou' jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepti of *tticfr their cognizance is either expressll' t barred. To put it differently' as per Section 9 of the types of civil disputes, civil courts have inherent unless a part of that jurisdiction is carved orL' jurisdiction, expressly or by necessary implicir provision and conferred on other ","*,o5t Authority. Thus, the law confers on every perso .'l right to bring a suit of civil nature of one's cLc peril, howsoever frivolous the ciaim may be' unle s by a statute. shall have ,g the suits r impliedlY Code, in all lurisdiction from such .on bY anY l'ribunal or an inherent ce, at one's r it is barred )Go( impugned

20. Having considered the matter in the ligh' rlf the afore- stated legal position, we are of the opinion that 'e ord.er cannot be sustained' It is true that unde r tq!1o42-4 of suo motu the Code, the High Court has jurisdictior-r '' withdrawaSuitorappeal,pendinginanyCourt,dbordinateto it, to its file and adjudicate itsetf on the issues i clved therein and dispose of t.}".e same Unless the High C I r:t decides to transferthesuitortheappea|asthecaserrz'rbe'tosome other court or the same court' it is obliged to ry' adjudicate and dispose of the same' It needs litt.le emphzrsi that the High Court is competent to dispose ol the suit ' rt preliminary issues, as contemplated in Order t4 Rule 1 8! 2 of the Code' which may include the rssues with regard to nrr intainability of the suit. If the High Court is convinced that tlL' plair-rt read as a whole does not disclose arry cause of action' i may reiect the t7 NNRJ .lP_1719_2079 plaint in terms of Order 7 Rule 1l of the Ccde. As a matter of fact, as observed by V.R. Krishna Iyer, J., inT. Arivandandam (supra), if on a meaningful - uot formal - reading of the plaint, it is rnanifestly vexatious, ald merifless, in tJ:e sense of not disclosing a clear. right to sue, the court should exercise its power - under the said provision. And if clever dral-ting has created an illusion of a cause of action, it should be nipped in the bud at the first hearing by exa:nining the party searchingly under Order X CpC. Nonetheless, the fact rema.ins that the suit has to be disposed of either by the High Court or by ttre courts subordinate to it in a meaningful lnanner as per the procedure prescribed in the Code and not on one's own rvhims.-

19. In Rasumo,lla yettaiah ond others a. Chtef Commlssioner, La-nd qnd Administration, Hgd.erabad. and. others (7 s-upra) the High Court for the combined State of Andhra Pradesh held as under:_ '7. On the aspect when the right to sue accrues in the context of Articles l 13 and 58 of the Limitation Act, 1963, strong reliance was placed on the decision reported tn K.M.SdnlIrcrh t . Secretary, Gouentm.ent of Karnataka, BoLngorJorr,r3, ln Ragam Yellaiah and others u. Chinta. Shankaraiah (g supra) it was observed at paragraph I I as hereunder:- "The next aspect to be decided is whether the impugrred order of rejection of plaint und.er Order VII Rule I 1 (d) of the Code is sustainable in the facts and circurnstances of the case- A copy of the plarnt is produced before this Court and I had gone 13 A1R 2OoO Karnataka 374 18 NNR,J cry-7719 2019 through paras 4 to 12 of the said plaint' \ at para 6 of the plaint it was pleaded t defendant, who obtafured the registered sal: 28.72.1994 fraudulently and on misrepre:r used the same to get his name mutat€ ( revenue records and got entries made in 1 arld also obtained. pattadar pass book- | several otlter factual allegations were mad') in the plaint, which may not be essentiai tl with for the purpose of deciding the matt3 carefully scrutinized the impugrred o: virtually the learned Judge decided the s while rejecting the plaint. It may be appl ( have a look at Order 7 Rule i I (d) of t which reads as hereunder:- r doubt rat the leed on .rtation, in the ahalies r doubt n detaii ce dealt . I had er and rit itself iriate to Lc Code, "W'here the suit appears from the " in tJ:e plaint to be barred by any latv atement On an over all reading of the allegatic r plaint, on the face of the a-llegations tt r said t.l:at it is barred bY anY law elaborate contentions had been advanct counsel representing the respondent defer it is a question of limitation, which i question of law and it is Article 58 of the Act, 1963, which is aPPlicable, ancl appellants-plaintiffs had not sought for cz within three years from the date of re c plaint in O.S.No.93 of 1996 i'e" on 23 [( filing the suit on or before 23 09 1999' clearly barred by limitation' This is th(' which the plaint was rejected as can bt: pao:a 12 of the imPugned order' The re s in the rnnot be o doubt t by the lant that a pure imitation ince the rcellation iving the 1996, by re suit is r)ason on ;een from r.soning is 19 NNR,J ctp_1779_2o.l9

23.09.1996 and on 2.3.1998 and that the appeliant-plaintiff got knowledge that registered instrument dated 23.12.1994 is a sa.le deed when they received plaint copy in O.S.No.93 of 1996 on filed written statement the suit was nslrh.rted beyond the period of three years, the suit iS barred by limited. [t was also stated that the said instrument at the best is voidable and not void and hence on the ouestion of limitation the plajnt is liable to be rejected an<i accordingly the same was rejected". It was also further observed at paragraph 12 as hereunder: At the outset I may state that the question of lirnitqti6n necessarily aJways is not a pure question of law. but it is a mked question of fact and law. May be that there may be certain circumstances where on the face of the allegations in the plaint a suit may be clearly barred by limitation. Here the dispute appears to be whether Article 5g of the Limitation Act or Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is applicable to the facts alrd circurnstances o[ the case. Reliance also was placed on State of Maharashtra v. pravin Jetha]al Kamdar case. No doubt on facts this decision is distinguishable because it !,ras a case where the docurnents in question were treated to be a nullity. But in th€ present case no doubt a ground that tlre docurnent is voidable had been raised. Be that as it may, a-ll the factual disputes which may have to be gone into on both parties letting in evidence cannot be dec-ided at the threshold unless on the 20 NNR,J c.P-1779-m79 allegations made in the plaint itself' the (r arrive at a conclusion that the suit is clear I by any law, be that i question of limitatiot other question. When several other factuzl are also to be gone into while deciding a q r law involved incidentally, the rejqction of J at the threshold cannot be sustained' In tll the allegations made in the plaint' I a r considered opinion that these are all aspec are to be gone into at the time of regular I both parties adducing evidence" "" ir rt can barred or any aspects stion of e plaint Iight of of the s; which ial aJter In Sri l,axml Cooperatioe Housing Soc 20 G.V.Mohan crnd ot:ners (9 suprQ, the erstwhi ': High Court of Andhra Pradesh in paragraph Nos'2 1' 24 arrd t to 43 held as '.etg Limited u. under:- "2 t . From the above, it is obvious that the expte of action' does not mean a single or a solitalv f is a bundle of facts other hand, it petitioner/plaintiff must prove, if traversed' sc him to a judgment in his favour by the Court' the controversy basing upoa tJre cause o[ act < shall look into the facts mentione d' inter alia without embarking upon an e[qrriry as to tht: ( otherwise of the said facts' In this con .t appropriate to draw a distinction between thg cause of action and adjudication of clarm cf based on the said cause of action' At adjudication of the claim perhaPs the Court n t controversy about the existence of such caust: ,sion'cause ct. On the which tl-re rs to enLitle tn deciding rr the Court 1 the plaint ,rrecLions or ction, it is exstence of the plaintiff he time of / go tnto t].e r[ action but 2L NNR,J dp l'n9_2o79 to see whether ttrere is a cause of action tc lay the suit or not, the Court has to go by the averments made in the plaint. )(:o(

24. As can be seen from the plainl, the reliefs sought for are three fold. The first relief is to direct the defendants to cooperate with the plaindlf by strictly adhering to the terms and conditions of the suit agreement ald by supporting the applications filed by the plaintiff before the Govemment or other authorities for grant of exemption. The basis for such relief seems to be the alleged non-co-operation as set forth in Para 14 of the plaint when the plaintiff wanted to avarl the benefit of two G.Os. passed on 29-7-2OO2.ln my considered view, t}.is is an independent relief by itselt apa::t from the second relief being specific relief sought for in the plaint for the performance of the suit ag-eement of sa_le. The third relief being the relief of perpetual rnjunction to restrain the defendants from transferring the property by any means and from changing the nature of the property. Even this relief could independenfly be maintained basing upon rhe suit agreement of sale. The facts thus set forttr inter alia in the plaint clearly show the necessary cause of action on a prima facie consideration. )og(

41. But, ttren, one question remains to be addressed- As discussed hereinabove, if the suit on the face of it appears to be frivolous, the plaint can be rejected or not albeit it is not one of the grounds enjoined under Rule 11 of Order 7 of the Code. Frivolity is again a ground which requires a detailed enquiry qnless it is a case where frivolity is writ large on the face of tlre averEents made inter alja in the plaint, on that ground the plaint calnot be rejected at th€ threshotd, tt 22 NNR,J crP 7719-2019 seems that the Court below was of the view ti ; the suit having been frled two decades a.fter tJ:e rejection c'f alleged exemption and inasmuch as a part of tl1e retainalrl area was sold to respondents 3 to 6 for higher price inv; 'ring some crores of rupees, it is too much on the part of th: plaintiff lo have :.spired for the property by payrng q- paftry ttm of Rs' 10,000/- and the whole consideration under th': agreement being onl-v Rs. 1O lakhs, oblivious of the fact thit' under the very G.O. Ms. No. 4270 it was made conditiotr I t.I:at the consideration shall not exceed t.l:e a'mount sti;r lated inter alia therein and the sale should be in favour of fl r registered housing co-operative society. Therefore, tlte intrr :ion of the State in grarting exemption shall have to be giverr jlaramount consideration. It is not a case of {ixation of t r: price in between the willing vendor and the wiling ven c :e and the subsequent astronomical rise in prices due to pas 'zrge of time or given the importance to the area in which th3 ProPerty in question is situate ard, tlterefore, it can be a glr lnd for the Court to have refused the relief of specilic perfrr: nance The Court belou' exceeded its jurisdiction in making I attempt to consider the factum of possession so as to eventr rtly come to the r:onclusion that it is a case of frivolous I I gation ' The factum o[ possession shall have to be cons Cered after heanng on either side and considering the evid I ce adduced on the point by the parties. For tlte above rear'r .rs' il is not that easy for the Court to decide that the very s it itself is a lrivolous one which entails rejection of t]re aint at the threshold.

42. Atl this seems to be not quite gennane hav rlg regard to the matrlx of the instant case. Whetlter reli' 1' of specihc performance can be granted in favour of the plzLi Ltiff or not rs a larger question which shal] have to be addr ssed by the 23 NN&J clp_lTi9'?o79 trial Court having regard to tJle respective con-entions of the pa.rties to the suit. It is noteworthy here that by granting relief of specific performance, the necessa-r5r conveyance <ieed will not be executed and it is only the person against whom Cre decree for specific performance is passed, has to execute the sale deed pr11suan1 to the decree and if he fails to execute the sale deed on his behatf, the Court has to execute the sale deed. That stage has not yet reached. In that view of the matter, the decree for speci-fic performance can be made conditional by granting the relief of specific performance directing the defendants to execute the necessar1r conveyance deed in the event the necessary exemption is $anted by the Government or as a matter of that the execution of t}le sale deed by tJle Court for tJre default of the Judgment Debtor be made conditional in the sirnilar way are all matters to be considered by the trial Court and, in my considered view-, shall be left to be considered by that Court. Delving deep into such larger issues which have not fallen for consideration as yet, for the plea of the defendants a-re not germane for consideration at the threshold when the Court is asked to reject the plaint, in Ey considrred view, seems to be quite impermissible at tlis stage.

43. As discussed hereinabove, the scope o[ enquiry rn an application filed under Order 7, Rule 1I of the Code seeking rejection of the plaint is indeed lirnited. The Court cannot go beyond the four corners of the plaint and the documents, if any, annexed therew'ith. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any relief for specific perforrrrance in terms of G.O. Ms. No 4270; whether the plaintiff is entitled to clarn any beneflrt of the G.O. Ms. Nos. 455 and 456; whether eventua-lly the plaintiff is entitled to any such relief or not; seem obviously to be extraneous at this juncture for consideration, 24 NNR,J to l7l9 20L9 particularly when the matter is at its thresh,r l. Even tl're plea of the plaintiff taken inter alia in the countt fiIed in LA. No. 3665 of 2003 to the effect that an exterr, of 7064.16 square meters of site has been exempted and h ld to be not excessive land by the authorities un(l r the ULC Act subsiquent to the suit agreement and t Lerefore tfre plaintitfs claim could be maintained to that e:< cnt and the Court shall have to mould the relief at th€ en,l equally not germane for consideration at this stage iL d becomes extraneous. It may be made clear that the Cour below shall proceed to dispose of the suit on its own merits ninfluenced in any manner by any of the observations made 1'tl.is Court inter alia in the order on the larger issues."

21. It is held bv the Hon'ble Supreme Court, s well as by this Court in catena of judgments that limitatic, being a mixed question of lact and law, which cannot be gon . into at the very threshold of deciding of an application filed rnder Order VII Rule 11 otC.P.C.

22. So also in respect of the cause of action, no doubt, as per Order VII Rule 1l of C.P.C. one of the grounc s for rejection of the plaintift on the ground that it lacks cause rf action. But in the present case, the learned counsel I rr the reyision petitioners had pointed out that there is n,) cause of action arose and the clate of cause of action which a- les has not been properly made in the plaint 25 NNR.I ctp_7779 2019

23. Learned counsel for the respondent vehemently contended that the cause of action is bundle of facts which have to be made out from the entire plaint avem?ents and he contended that the cause of action for the respondent arose on different dates whenever the respondent/plaintiff had transferred the money into the account of the deceased are the dates when the cause o[ action arose. No doubt, tfrere was no demand notice issued by the respondent to the revision petitioners/defendants to sho',v that there was a denial of payment or the transactions by the revision petitioners/defendants. It is also contended by the learned counsel for the respondent that non-disclosure of cause of action in the plaint and absence of cause of action stand on dilferent footing. In fact, in present case in the plaint, it is mentioned that 'the cause of action to the plaintiff on all the dates above mentioned at Warangal where the trar"Isaction took place and parties are residing" and in respect of limitation it is mentioned that "the suit is filed within period of limitation from the date of cause of action above stated".

24. On perusal of the order passed by the learned Judge, it clearll' disclose that the aspects of lirnitation, which is being a I I I I t , t I t 26 NNTI] crP_1779-2019 () mixed question of fact and law, cannot b , gone into at , threshold and pima facie on the face of it, tt cugh it appears that there are certain transactions, which. ar: well within the Iimitation' beSioes other transactions which hr,; to be go.reltto and where the subsequent transactions which r re continuation of tlle earlier tra_nsactions or not, has to be gor :: into only after going into the merits of the case. So also, ar; to the cause of action, learned counsel for the respondent has, :ontended, that it is for the respondent to show it before the t ial court as to whether the cause of action exists or not and sz rrle can be gone into after a full fledged trial. Therefore, I do rr ,t see any error committed by the learned Judge in dismissirrl; the application and no reasons are ,,r,arralting interference ry r:h the findings given by the learned trial Judge.

25. In the resulr, this Civil Revision petitio r is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. Miscellaneous applications, if aay, penri 619 shall stand closed. SD/. K.I3 .IAVANI SWAMY ASSIS]) NT REGISTRAR //TRUE COPY// , , SE ;TION OFFICFR I Additional Senior Civil Judge, at Warangal, Warangal Dislr )t One CC to SRl. K BUCHI BABU Advocate [OPUC] One CC to SRI C A R SESHAGIRI RAO Advocate [OPUCI Two CD Copies I I To, 1 2 3 4W HIGH COURT DATED:2210912025 DISMISSED 1- ( .,ir€'))+. \JA. \ o'l 17 tr8 2m6 (ti, ci ll )., l * :'.'!l'fo\t' CRP.No.1719 of 2019 b