The High Court · 2025

THE HONOURABLE SMT JUSTICE JUVVADI SRIDEVI CRIMINAL PETITION No.6283 0F 2024 ORDER This Criminal Petition is filed by the petitioner-accused seeking to quash the proceedings against him in Crime No.351 of 2024 on the file of the Station House Officer, Kukatpally Police Station, Cyberabad, registered for the offences under Sections 353, 506, 509 of the lndian penal Code (for short 'lPC').

02. Heard Sri Baglekar Akash Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioner-accused and Sri t\LRamachandra Reddy, learned Additional public prosecutor for the State. Even after service of notice, none appeared on behalf of the unofficial respondent No.2. perused the material on record.

03. The case of the prosecution, in brief, is that the respondent No.2 is working as lVlanager (EnSS), [Vloosapet Section, Sub-Division ll, O & tVl Division lX of the Hyderabad lVletropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board, and is responsible for attending to the complaints pertaining to 2_ Wards No.115 (Balajinagar) and 117 (Moose pet) lt is alleged that the petitioner-accused, claiming to I : a lawYer, visited the office of the respondent No.2 on 02') 12024 and contacted her over the phone while she was en(l rged in site work, during which she answered his call and atle nded to his issue. Thereafter, the petitioner-accused allegecll / continued to call her repeatedly until 07:09 PM and sent tex messages containing warnings. lt is further alleged that, cr spite being aware that the respondent No.2 is a woman pl rlic servant discharging her official duties diligently anc addressing various public grievances, the petitioner-accust: 1 frequently visited her office, used abusive language, and tl^r :atened her over phone calls and text messages during oclr I hours. On

03.04.2024, the petitioner-accused along with I s followers, again visited her office and intentionally pic <ed up an argument with her. lt is alleged that such i- :idents had occurred on three earlier occasions, durinr; which the respondent No.2 refrained from reacting. tl lwever, the petitioner-accused conduct allegedly be'; tme more aggressive and intimidating over time. Due to ttt : continuous 3 acts of the petitioner-accused, the respondent No.2 was emotionally disturbed and unable to discharge her regular official duties. Hence the complainant requested to take necessary legal action against the petitioner_accused.

04. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner-accused has nothing to do with the alleged offences. The petitioner-accused never used any criminal force towards the respondent No.2 and he never insulted her modesty and never threatened her. There are no specific allegations leveled against the petitioner_accused. All the allegations are vague. It is further contended that there is no incriminating material to substantiate the said allegations. The contents of the complaint or FIR do not disclose the necessary ingredients to constitute the offences punishable under Sections 353, 506, 509 of lpC.

05. With the above submissions, while praying to quash the criminal proceedings against the petitioner_ accused, Iearned counsel for the petitioner relied upon a decision of High court of Kerara at Ernakuram in p.v. Mathai 4 v. The State of Kerala and othersl wherein it vr;s held at Paragraph Nos.'1 3 and 14 that: ' "73.. tn the case on hand, the prosecution ha; no case that the petitioner has used any fon: t on the 2'd respondent. On the other hand, ttt > case of the prosecution in short is that, afle r entering into the office room of the petitiortt> the accused asked as follows:- "Who askt j you to enter into my propefty, who is yct r authorized officer, who gave you the authori/ to enter into my tand." Apaft from uttert''tr these words, there was absotutely tlo Ltsa t f force or even an attempt fo use force. Apzl from the vague allegation that the official tirr e of the 2"d respondent was /osf on account f the alteged acts of the petitioner, there is r o specific allegation that the above mentior<d words were uttered by the petitioner with I e intent to deter the 2nd respondent fr:n discharging her dutY.

14. A Singte Bench of this Coutt in Jaicl;'s v. Sfate of Kerala and Another [2017 11) KHC 669l has hetd that entering into a put ic office in order to ventilate one's grievance ur th an intention to enquire about the stafus of apptication one has submitted, does t o[ amount to an offence of criminal trespttr s' Another Slng/e Bench of this Court in Hariprasad and another v' Stafe of Keri la [t.L.R. 2017 (2) Kerala 395] has held that rn I'nANU/KE/3170/2022 5 order to attract an offence under Section 353 of lPC, the prosecution has to prove that the accused had used criminal force with the intention to cause injury, fear or annoyance to the public servant. Yet another Singte Bench recently in Rilgin V. George and Another v. Sfate of Kerala and Another [2021 (4) KHC 2231 has held that to attract Section 353 of lPC, one of the main ingredients is that the assau/f or criminal force should be to deter the public servant who was discharging his officiat duty "

06. Further he relied upon a decision of the Hon,ble Supreme Court in Manik Taneja and another v. State of Karnataka and anothel wherein it was held at paragraph Nos.10 to 12 that; "10. So far as fhe lssue regarding the registration of FIR under Section 353 tpC is concerned, it has to be seen whether by posting a comment on the Facebook of the traffic police, the conviction under that Section could be maintainable. Before considering the materials on record, we may usefulty refer to Section 353 IPC which reads as follows: "353. Assault or criminal force to deter pubtic servant from discharge of his duty.- Whoever assau/fs or uses criminal force to any person 2 12015; z Supreme Court Cases 423 6 being a public servant in the execution of h s duty as such public servant, or with intent tt prevent or deter that person from dischargi''tr hls duty as such Public servant, or 1 consequence of anything done or attemptt 7 to be done by such person in the lawf rl discharge of his duty as such public servar t, shalt be punished with imprisonment of eitlr' r description for a term which may extend o two years, or with fine, or with both." A reading of the above provision shows tt lt the essential ingredients of the offence und )r Section 353 tPC are that the person 266s1t d of the offence should have assaulted 't e public servant or used criminal force with 't'e intention to prevent or deter the public servztt from discharging his duty as such putic servant. By perusing the materials availat le on record, it appears that no force was u:; td by the appellants to commit such an offer<e' There is absolutely nothing on record to sl't w that the appellants either assaulted t te respondents or used criminal force to preut nt the second respondent from discharging 'r15 officiat duty Taking the uncontrove'1td altegations, in our view, that the ingredients of the offence under Section 353 IPC are t ot made out. 11 Secfion 506 IPC prescribes punishnttnt for the offence of criminal intimidati tt' "Criminat intimidation" as defined in Sect on 503 IPC is as under: "503. Criminal lntimidation - lr1,,/l1ee rer threatens another with any iniury to ris 7 person, reputation or propefty, or to the person or reputation of any one in whom that person is interested, with intent to cause alarm to that person, or to cause that person to do any act which he is not legatty bound to do, or to omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled to do, as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat, commits cri m i n al i nti m id ation. Explanation.- A threat to injure the reputation of any deceased person in whom the person threatened is interested, is within this section ', A reading of the definition of "Cridnat intimidation" would indicate that there must be an act of threatening to another person, of causing an injury to the person, reputation, or property of the person threatened, or to the person in whom the threatened person is interested and the threat must be with the intent to cause alarm to the person threatened or it must be to do any act which he is not legally bound to do or omit to do an act which he is legally entitled to do.

12. ln the instant case, the altegation is that the appellants have abused the complainant and obstructed the second respondent from discharging his public duties and spoiled the integrity of the second respondent. lt is the intention of the accused that has to be considered in deciding as to whether what he has sfafed comes within the meaning of "Criminal intimidation" The thrcat must be with intention to cause alarm to the colnplainant to cause that person to clo or omit I to do any work. Mere expression of any t without any intention to cause alarm woutr be sufficient to bring in the application c,t section. But material has to be placet record to show that the intention is fo <:, alarm to the complainant. From the fact; circumstances of the case, it appears there was no intention on the parl cf appellants to cause alarm in the minds o second respondent causing obstructic,t discharge of his duty. As far as the comrt posted on the Facebook are conceme appears that it is a public forum meatt helping the public and the act of appett posting a comment on the Facebook may attract ingredients of criminal intimidatit Section 5031PC." ' not 'USE :nts t, it

07. On the other hand, learned Adrll ional Public Prosecutor appearing for the State contended t rat there are triable issues and factual aspects to be exar^rined by the learned trial Court and it is not a fit case t I quash the proceedings against the petitioner at this jun: ure and the matter is to be decided after conducting trial t r the learned trial Court and prayed to dismiss this Criminal Fr tition

08. lt is a well-settled principle of law tl-: t, in order to attract the provisions of Section 353 lPC, ther > must be a I specific allegation that the petitioner-accused has assaulted or used criminal force against a public servant with the intention to prevent or deter such public servant from discharging his or her laMul duties. Likewise, for invoking the penal provision under Section 506 lpc, there should be a specific allegation that the petitioner-accused threatened the respondent No 2 with injury to her person, reputation, or property, or to the person or reputation of someone in whom she is interested, with the intent to cause alarm or to compel her to act against her free will. Similarly, to attract the ingredients of Section 509 lpc, there must be a allegation that the petitioner-accused uttered any word, made any gesture, or performed any act intended to insult the modesty of a woman or intrude upon her privacy. ln the absence of these essential ingredients, the invocation of the aforesaid penal provisions cannot be sustained in law.

09. Having considered the submissions advanced on erther side and upon a careful perusal of the material available on record, it is evident that there is no allegation of any physical assault by the petitioner upon the respondent 10 No.2, or any assertion that the petitioner ap1> ied criminal force against her. There is also no specific or p articularised averment that the petitioner used or attemptec :o use force with the intention of preventing or deterring the respondent No.2 from discharging her official duties On the' lontrary' the factual narration in the complaint indicatt s that the respondent No 2 answered the petitioner's cal ruhile on site and attended to his grievance

10. Except for the vague and general : legation that the petitioner frequently visited the office engaged in arguments, and sent text messages during cr d hours' the complaint does not disclose any specific thre i t of injury to the person, reputation, or property of the respcr dent No.2' or does it contain any material to suggest an ir t :ntion on the part of the petitioner to cause alarm or to corr lel her to act against her free will. Furthermore, the complai rt is devoid of any particulars regarding words, gestures, or I cts which' by their very nature, are intended to insult the nodesty of a woman. There is no specific averment o any sexually coloured remarks, gestures, or conduct f -r rm which an i 11 intention to insult the modesty of the female public servant can reasonably be inferred. In the absence of any specific act involving the use of criminal force, any attempt to obstruct the respondent No 2 in the discharge of her officiar functions, or any particularised utterances or gestures intended to insult her modesty, the essential ingredients constituting the offences punishable under Sections 353, 506, and 509 of the IPC are not made out. Hence, the continuation of criminal proceedings against the petitioner-accused cannot be sustained in law 11 ln Stafe of Haryana and others v. Ch.Bhajan Lal and othersi the Hon,ble Supreme Court of lndia held "ln the exercise of the extra_ordinary power under Afticle 226 or the inherent powers under Section 4g2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the foilowing categories of cases are given by way of ittustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any Couft or othenuise to secure the encls of justice, though it may not be possible to lay diwn any 'r992 scc (supp) 1 335 12 precise, clearly defined and sufficie't ly channelised and inftexibte guide myriad kitt ls of cases wherein such power should E exercised: (l) where the altegations made in the Fir st lnformation Report or the complaint, e't tn if they are taken at their face value a rd accepted in their entirety do not pr"r n facie constitute any offence or make ou a case against the accused; @ where the allegations in the l: "sf lnformation Repoft and other materials, if tt rv, accompanying the F l.R. do not dlsc/ose a cognizable offence, iustifying an investiget on by potice officers under Section 156(1) ot he Code except under an order of a Magistr tte within the purview of Section 155(2) of he Code; Q) where the uncontroverled allegati|tts made in the FtR or 'comPlaint and he evidence collected in supporl of the samc, do nof disc/ose the commission of any offe rce and make out a case against the accused' (!) where the altegations in the FIR dc nat constitute a cognizable offence but cons;i ute onty a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police o1 cer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) ol the Code: '13 (!) where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherentty improbable on the basrs of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused; (9) where there is an express tegal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party; (I) where a criminal proceeding is manifesily attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge "

12. ln the present case, as discussed hereinabove, the material available on record clearly reveals that, except for making a general allegation that the petitioner-accused frequently visited the office of the respondent No.2, engaged in arguments, used abusive language, and allegedly threatened her by making calls and sending text messages during odd hours, there are no descriptive particulars or 14 specific averments constituting the ingredients of lre alleged offences. Although the respondent No 2 makes tt ference to the petitioner being accompanied by certain follc'r rers, there is no mention of any such names or details to ; rbstantiate such an allegation. Hence, even if the contents o the FIR or complaint are taken at their face value and accep ted in their entirety, they do not prima facie disclose the cor rmission of any offence against the petitioner-accused lence' the present case falls within the parameters of p > nt No 1 of Bhajan LaI's case cited suPra

13. ln view of the aforementioned facts and circumstances and having regard to the well-settled principles of law enunciated by the Honouratr : Supreme Court in the decisions referred supra, this Cct rt is of the considered view that the essential ingredients ^:cessary to constitute the offences under Section 353, 50€, 509 of IPC are not made out against the petitioner-accusec Hence' the continuation of the criminal proceedings rgainst the petitioner-accused amounts to abuse of proces;l of law and the same are liable to be quashed 15 14 Accordingly, thrs Criminal Petition is allowed and the criminal proceedings against the petitioner-accused in Crime No.351 of 2024 on the file of the Station House Officer, Kukatpally Police Station, Cyberabad, are hereby quashed As a sequel, pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall stand closed SD/. P. PONNA KRISHNA SSISTANT REGISTRAR //TRUE COPY// SECTION OFFICER To, r The Xll Addl JCJ cum & XllAddl. Metropolitan Nlagistrate' Mechal' lt/lalkajgiri , 71'J {i: iT* i :" s:l?j?,,i,,,[t :i.']3 I ?,1" 3H,?3? 1x,, n s, n,,, i , g'"t""SttS il?'Jlott*o* AKASH KUI,TAR' Advocate toPUCl 5 Two CD CoPies !*,?rl"s -r*o CCs to the Puottc t 4t' HIGH COURT DATED: 3111012025 ORDER CRLP.No.6283 ot 2024 - :. _ _-_--:\ -'- . rrl: S T r, pj.- -r...- 1'* :j !i5 0i[ ?025 2, i..'--.,--,r'.,'":'' -i---_::: Accordingly, this Criminal Petition is All )wed. t0"" tD/) 1 ,L\