Kvndrvl Solutions Private Limited v. 1. The State of Telangana

Counsel for the Petitioner: SRI AVINASH DESAI, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR Counsel forthe Respondent Nos.1 & 2: GP FOR LABOUR Counsel for the Respondent No.3: SRI R.SHAYAM SUNDAR SRI M.PRANAV The Court made the following: ORDER THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE PULLA KARTHIK WRIT PETITION No.159O4 of 2Ol9 ORDER: This Writ Petition, under Article 226 of the ConstiLution of India, is filed seeking the following relief '...to issue a writ of Certiorari or aly other writ calling for records pertaining to the Order dated 13.06.2019 passed b)' the 2nd Respondent in SE No. 09 of 2O18 and consequently quash the Order dated 13.06.2019 passed by the 2"d Respondent rn S.D No.09 of 2018 as being patently rllegal, unconstitu tional and wholly without jurisdiction, artd pass..."

2. The brief facts of the case are that respondent No.3, u'ho was an employee of the petitioner Company, was terminated from scrvicc vlde order dated 24.12.2015, on account of disciplinary grounds, viz., abnormal absenteeism, harassment and misbehaviour at workplace. As such, respondent No.3 was constrained to approach the I.abour Court-I, Hyderabad, by ltling I.D.No.50 of 2016, seeking reinstatement and back wages, along with continuity of service and other attendant benefrts. However, on 28.02.2OI7, respondent No.3 hled an application, seeking withdrawal of thc said I.D., and the Labour Court dismissed the said I.D. vide order dated 73.06.2O17, with an opportunity to respondent No.3 to approach the authority under the Shops and Establishments Act, 1988. Thereafter. respondent No.3 2 PK, J w. P.No.159O4 of 2O19 '.i approached respondent No.2 and filed an application under Section 48 (1) of thc Andhra pradesh Shops and Establishmcr_rts Act, 1ggg, vide S.E.No.Or) of 2Olg, which was allowed vrdc order dated 13'06 20 19, sr'rting aside his termination order dated. 24.12.201.5, and directing thc petitioner to reinstate respondent No.3 with fu back wages, il ttendant/ consequentia-l benerrts and co,tinuitv of service. Hence, the present writ petition.

3. Heard Sn Avinash Desai, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of thc petitioner and Sri R. Shyam Sundar, learncd counsel on appearing for respondcnt No.3.

4. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No.3 had earlier approached the Labour Court_I, Hyderabad, and filed I.D.No.SO of 2016 on its file only as the petitioner Company fell outside the scope of the Shops and Establishments Act, 19gg, in view of ttle arr exemption on the Inlormation Technology Enabled Companies under G.O.Ms.No.22 dated 2)..06.2012. In the said I.D., the petitioner Company filed its counter affidavit to show that the termination of respondcnt No.3 was in accordance rvith law. However, respondent No.3 took several adjournments on one or the other pretexts. It was furthcr submitted 3 PK, J W.P.N'.15904 of 2019 that this Court granted stay of operation of G.O.Ms.No.22 dated

21.06.2012, vide order dated 06.O7.2016 in W.V.M.P.No.2582 of 2Ol5 in W.P.M.P.No.43388 of 2Ol4 in W.P.No.34685 of 2074. As such, respondent No.3 himself fiIed a withdrawal application in the said I.D. on 28.02.2017. Thereafter, the Labour Court dismissed the I.D. firled by respondent No.3 on 13.06.2017, and granted him an opportunity to approach the authority under the Shops and Establishments Act, 1988, subject to the issue of limitation. The Labour Court has left the decision of delay in hling the application under Section 48 (1) of the Shops and Establishments ,Act, 1988, to the authority, i.e., respondent No.2 herein. To that effect, an award, vide G.O.Rt.No.522 daLed 06.07 .2O 17 was also published on the notice board of the Labour Court on 25.07 .2077 .

5. It was further submitted that after withdrawal of the said I.D., respondent No.3 approached respondent No.2 and filed al application on 19.06.2077, making the same allegations against the petitioner as were made before the Labour Court. However, the said application was in itself a premature application as the award of the Labour Court dated 06.07.2017, was published only on 25.07.2017. Therefore, as per Section 17 of the Industria.l Disputes Act, 1947, the said award came into force only after 30 days of its publication. It 4 PK, J w.P.No.15904 of 2019 was further submitted that respondent No.3 had frled an application for condonation of a delay of 542 days in hling the application, without any reasons, except citing pendency of I.D., and no reasons were also assigned as to why he withdrew the said I.D., even though the Labour Court was had the jurisdiction to proceed with the case. In spite of the same, without deciding the issue of delay, respondent No.2 treatcd the application as a regular one and arbitrarily proceeded with the matter. It was further submitted that the petitioner herein had hled an interim application raising preliminary objections on the maintainability of the petition frled by respondent No.3, in addition to it being premature, and prayed respondent No.2 to put the case in abeyance till this Court decides the writ petition, wherein, G.O.Ms.No.22 dated 27.06.2O12 was stayed. However, without considering the same, respondent No.2 has passed orders in the interim application on 28.02.2O 18, holding that the petition was maintainable in light of stay of G.O.Ms.No.22 dated 27.06.2012. As such, the petitioner herein hled a Memo, seeking hearing of the deiay condonation application before proceeding with the main case. However, the said Memo was surprisingly treated as an interim application, and orders were passed on 11.03.2O19, holding that the 5 PK, J W.P.N,.15904 oI 20 19 petitioner is fiting Memos to drag the case, which is totallv false and misconceived

6. It was further submitted that the petitioner hled another Memo before respondent No.2, bringing it to its notice that W.p.No.346g5 of 2OI4, wherein, operation of G.O.Ms.No.22 was stayed, was disposed of on 20-O3.2O18, and in view of vacation of stay of G.O.Ms.No.22, it was again in force, and thus, respondent No.2 does not have the jurisdiction to adjudicate the application filed by respondent No.3. It was further submitted that during the pendency of the aforesaid writ petition, i,e., W.P.No.34685 of 2014, respondent No.2 continued with the proceedings against the petitioner therein and passed hnal orders, which were challenged before this Court in W.p.No. 17453 of 2017. This Court, vide order dated 02.06.2017 in W.p.M.p.No.21320 of 20t7 in W.P.No. 17453 of 2O17, suspended the order impugned in the said writ petition and eventually allowed the said writ petition on O4.O5.2O2O , holding that rhe order impugned therein was ex_facie illegal and passed by an authority without jurisdiction. It was further submitted that after dismissal of W.p.No.34685 of 2014, G.O.Ms.No.22 dated 2 t .06.2012, has once again come into force, thereby, it was binding on respondent No.2. However, respondent No.2 erroneously proceeded further with the case ald passed the 6 PK, J tU.P No.15904 of 2019 ..t impugned order, even though its jurisdiction was ousted as a result of G.O.Ms.No.22. As such, the impugned order passed by respondent No,2 is wholiy without jurisdiction and is patently i1legal, arbitrary, contrary to lau', and in violation of Articles 14 a-nd 19 (1)(g) of the Constitution ol' India. Therefore, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner prayed this Court to allow the present writ petition, by setting aside the impugned order passed by respondent No.2 dated

13.06.2019 in S.E.No.O9 of 2018. In support of his case, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner relied on a decision of this Court in Cognizant Technologg Solutions Plrt. Ltd. u. The Appellate Authoritg and othersl.

7. Learned counsel for respondent No.3 vehemently contended that the writ petition is not maintainable either in law or in facts, as the order passed by respondent No.3 is appealable under Section a8(3) of the Shops and Establishments Act, 1988. However, without frling a statutory appeal, only to avoid the deposit of full payment, as directed by respondent No.2, the petitioner has hled the present writ petition. It was submitted that respondent No.3 joined the services of the petitioner Compaly on 17.08.2009, and successfully complete probation on 17.O8.2010. However, falsely alleging that respondent t 2o2o 14) ALD 146 7 PK, J W.P.N,.15904 of 2019 No.3 did not cooperate with a Pakistani client (who was repeatediy insisting on cooperating in unlawful things), the petitioner forced him to resign on 24.01.2071. Aggrieved by the same, respondent No. I had hled S.E.No.05/2O11 before respondent No.2, and the authority passed an order on 05.ll.2O12, directing the petitioner to reinstate respondent No.3 into service, with back wages and other consequential benefits. However, instead of reinstating respondent No.3, the petitioner dragged the matter months together, arld only on

16.09.2013, reinslated him into service. After receiving his pay-slip, respondent No.3 ree ized that the petitioner, instead of reinstating him into service, issued fresh re-appointment orders, duly allotting a new PF Number, instead of conlinuing the old one, ald also denied the payment of consequential benehts. However, when respondent No.3 forced the petitioner to implement the order of respondent No.2 in to-to, disciplinary proceedings were initiated against him, culminating in termination of his services, w.e.f., 24.12.2015.

8. It was further submitted that as on the date of his termination, i.e., 24.12.2015, G.O.Ms.No.22 dated 21.06.2012 was in operation, prohibiting the jurisdiction of the Shops and Establishments Act, 1988, to entertain the application hled under Section a8 (1) of the Act, with specific exemption for the establishments of IT industry. As 8 PK, J W.P.No.159O4 oJ 2O19 such, respondent No.3 approached the Labour Court llnder Section 2- A(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, by hling LD.No.SO of 2016, seeking to set aside the illeg"rl termination order and to reinstate him into service, along with back ivages and all other consequential benefits. In the said I.D., the petitioner took several adjournments, \Mithout even filing a counter affidavit, and in thc mean time, this Court suspended the operation of G.O.Ms.No.22 <laLed 21.06.2012 vide order in W.P.No.34685 of 2014. As such, rcspondent No.3 immediately approached the Labour Court and hled an apptication on 2a.O2.2O77, seeking withdrawal of the I.D., with a libert1, to approach the under Authority under Section a8(1) of the Shops and Establishments Act, 1988. Thereafter, the Labour Court passed an award vide ().O.Rt.No.522 dated 06.O7.20I7, permitting respondent No.3 to withdraw the I.D., and the said award was published on the Notice Board on 25.O7 .2017. It was lurther submittccl that soon after withdrawal of his I.D., respondent No.3 approached the authority under Section 48(1) of the Shops and Establishments Act, 1988, vide S.E.No.O9 of 2018, wherein, respondent No.2 passed the order dated

13.06.2019, directing the petitioner to reinstate respondent No.3 into service, with full back wages, attendant benefits :rnd continuity of servlce 9 PK, J W.P.No.tS9O4 of 2019

9. It was further submitted that the Authority had stopped entertaining the applications under Section ag(1) of the Shops and Establishments Act, 198g, from l|.ll.2f 14, in view of lack of jurisdiction to entertain the applications for Information Technologz and Information Technologr trnabled Service Units. However, only after this Court had suspended G.O.Ms.No.22, respondent No.3 hled an application before respondent No.2. As such, the question of Iimitation does not arise and no delay can be attributed to respondent No.3, and the time spent before the Labour Court has to be deleted while computing the limitation. It was further submitted that contention of the petitioner that the application filed by respondent No.2 is a premature one, is untenable, as the Labour Court passed the award on 13.06.2017, and respondent No.3 has hled the application before respondent No.2 only on rg.06.20rz. As such, the primary authority has rightly held that the publication of award is only a directory provision but not mandatory. It was further submitted that respondent No.2 has rightly passed the order in the interim application fiied by petitioner, holding that the said petition was maintainable. Further, the petitioner hrst filed a Memo stating that the appiication is premature ancl a-lso hled alother Memo stating that the delay was on the part of respondent No.3. As such, the 10 PK, J W P.No.l5904 of 20 19 '! authority has rightly held that the petitioner was trying to prolong the proceedings.

10. lt was further submitted that the main contentron of the petitioner was Lhat the impugned order passed by respondent No.2 is not maintainable in view of G.O.Ms.No.22 dated 21.06.2O12, which came into operation aJter the stay was vacated in W.P.No.34685 of 2Ol4 vtde order dated 20.03.2018. However, in the said writ petition, this Court did not decide the validity of the said G.O., particularly prohibiting cer( ain provisions to certain establishmen ts by an Executive Order. Further, the Government of Telangana has stopped the continuation of the said G.O. and restored the pou.ers of the authorities unrler the Shops and Establishments Acr, 1988, vide G.O.Ms.No.2S daLed 25.O7.2079. It was further submirted that the petitioner has filed the present writ petition, without first availing an alternate remedy of appeal under Section a8(3) of the Shops and Establishments Act, 1988. Therefore, it was contendecl that the present writ pel-ition is not maintajnable, and thus, pral,ed to dismiss the same. 11 PK, J W.P.N1. tS9O4 of20lg 1 1. This Court has tal<en note of the riva_l submissions/ contentions urged by the learned counsel for the respective parties arld perused the material on record

24.12.2O15, and

27.06.2O12, which Admittedly, respondent No.3 was terminated from service on at that point of time, G.O.Ms.No.22 dated exempted the Information Technolory and Information Technolory Enabled Service Establishments from the purview of the Shops arrd Establishments Act, l9gg, was very much in force. As such, in view of lack ofjurisdiction of respondent No.2, i.e., the Authority under Section 4g(i) ol. the Shops and Estabiishments Act, l9gg, respondent No.3 has righty approached the Labour Court-I, Hyderabad, and filed I.D.No.50 of 2016. However, it is to be noted that the operation of G.o.Ms.No.22 d,ated 2r.06.2or2 was stayed by this Court vide order 06.07.2016 in W.V.M.p.No.25g2 of 2O15 in W.p.M.p.No.43388 of 2Ot4 in W.p.No.34685 of 2014. Subsequently, on 29.02.2017, respondent No.3 liled arr application before the Labour Court seeking withdrawa_l of the aforesaid I.D. and the Labour Court, vide award dated 13.06.2017, dismissed the I.D. with a liberty to respondent No.3 to approach the authority under Section 48(r) of the Shops and trstablishments Act, I9gg, subject to limitation and the issue of delay. Thereafter, respondent No.3 filed t2 PR, J w.P.No.l59Oq oJ 2019 S.E.No.O9 of 20 18 before respondent No 2 on 19 06 2017 ln this connection, it is to be noted that petitioner specifrcally contended the application as premature, as the award of the Labour Court vide G.o'Rt.No.522d,ated'06.0T.2olT,waspublishedonitsnoticeboard on 25.O7.2077 However, the main dispute before this Court pertains to the jurisdiction ol respondent No'2 in entertaining the petition' but not the timing of filing the said petition'

13. Further, it is pertinent to note that this Court' vide order dated 2O.O3.2O18, dismissed W'P No'34685 of 2074' and categorically held that the interim orders staying G'O'Ms'No 22 d'ated 21 '06'2012 stands automatically vacated As such' it carl be inferred that the exemption of IT/ITES establishments from the scopc of thc authority under the Shops and Establishments Act' 1988' has come in[o force' According to the petitioner, the same was. also brought to the notice of respondent No.2, by filing a Memo to that effect' on Nil'O4 2O18 However, in spite of ousting of jurisdiction' respondent No'2 proceeded to adjudicate the matter and passed the impugned order dated 13.06.2019, directing the petitioner to reinstate respondent No.3 into service with al1 back wages and consequenlial benefits' 13 PK, J W.P.N,. tS9O4 of 20 jg

74. In a near identical matter, in Cognizant Technologg Soluf,ions hrt. Ltd. (supra), this Court categoricalty held as follows: -ro"u. .1o..,"."

22. The quasi_iudicial Authority is a creature of the Act. He has limited jurisdiction. He has ,, *in_ i.# or tr,. Act under which he was created. Under thl Aillhe nutnorlty rs ",", required to adjudicate dispute on ,..J"rii""? ,f emptoyee by the employer, who answeis ttre desc.iption of l.#uU"t ^".,t,. f f the employer, like the Detitione. do"" ;oi ;;;;r iii oescnption or 'establishment,, albeit on.account of exemptlon notiflcation under Section 73(4), the Authority under the e.ll" .r"t*i'.f lurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute. As the issue of lu*.isaictio., a.,a competence to decide dispute on termination of,J., ._ptoy.. Uy the establishment toes ro the root of .h;;;;;; t... ."., u" .,o bar to raise the said isr or*econstituuJ;;i j""H,ii?.:.i:ffi,I'il"lJ,:L::."::fi::l:ar,? such plea was not raised before the Ar,;;; "'' "

25. - Further. it is settled principle of law rhat parlics do nor confer jurisdiction on a quasi .iuai"i.t nr*,o.iii. ,Ii',i)', Lr,,.. even on the Court- The Authonty created by the statute has to work within four corners or in"t nrr" iunsdiction onty if matter ar_ises under the Act_ Thouqh the A-uthonty has jurisdicrion to .;;";f"^,." of service of ar emptoyee of ITES/rT ,r the exempuo-n of operarion of provisions .i'-ii.'ao i.'iirslrr :l-l_urri.", !V waf. of exemptron notification issued by the ;.T1',lT::,::Li;"j"#:#trH;,,;"fl:::[.;.'i."-i5r+irr,r," ""t"uri"t ri."i,tii"'r.* "a,rai."i" ir," i;:;";;" '""i'l"T"ia' "trtri'" ol,,n. param:Je.r_s of judicial review to test the validiry of a ;11,91: oecrston ol quasi_iudicial authority is on the ."rnp",.r." ,.a jurisdiction to decide the dispute in issue. Thus. when the petitioner raises plea of iurisdiction^of qr."i1ra i.iJ'.rinJn U. ,o adjudicate the dispute in issue, the couri i. #;;J; Jr.*",L. .n" said objection to test the validity of tt" o.a.i-r"j"."J#i,"I*. ,. such a case, petitioner need not u. ..t.g"t"a to-Irii'1...'lo" ., second appeal under Section 4g(3) of the ;ct.

30. The. Authority formulated three issues for consideration. The ;e^c91d lssue is with reference to the exemption.,otific"t,oi''a"t.a 30.O5.2012. The objection on maintainabitit_1. of rpp.^f, '- L4 PK, J w.l' No ! 590a of 2019 I .l apparentll , over-ruled by referring to interlocutory order passe(l by this Courl rn W.V.M.P. No. 2582 of 2015 in WPMP No. '+338 of 2Ol4 in w.P.No. 34685 of 2014. By this order, the High Court vacated the earlier interlocutory order staying the proceedtngs before the authority and suspended the operation of G.O. Ms. No. 22, dated, 21.06.2013. With reference to application of relevant notifications, the authority holds that having raised plea before the Hrgh court that G-O.Ms. No. 22 was issued, it was not permissible to petitioner to now contend that G.O.Ms. No. 62 is relevant, but not G.O.Ms. No. 22. Further on the day when the appeal \\'as filed by the 2nd respondent, G.O.Ms, No. 22 was in force and as said Government Order was suspended, Authority is competent to decide the appeal.

31. The said view of the authority is clearly erroneous. The Authority misdirected itself in appreciating the rssue of jurisdiction. On the day when second respondent was terninated, exemptiorr notification pubtished vide G.O. Ms No.62 dated 30.05.2012 was in force. Sub-sections (1), (2), (3) & (4) of Set:tton 47 of the Act stipulate procedural saJeguards against termination of servicc of employee by the establishment. Under Section '18 of the Act, the Authority is vested with jurisdiction to decide validit-v of tcrmination of employee under Section 47 of the Act. Thus, Authority acqurres jurisdiction only if terrnination of employee attracts provisions of Section 47 and not otherwise. As on the datc of termination of second respondent, application of Section'17 of the Act was exempted to petitioner, such termination of service was outside Section 47 of the Act. While testing the validity of an order of termination of an employee by an 'establishment'. \,r'hat is relevant is date of order of tcrmination and not the date of filing of appeal. Iiven otherwise, even on the date of fiting o[ appeal cxemption notification pubhshed vide G.O. Ms No. 22 was in force. Further suspensron of G.O. Ms No- 22 would ultimately abide the result of the wrlt petition and once writ petition was dismissed, vacatrng the interim order made in the WVMP, the interlocutory order ge1-s dissolved. Thus, even otherwise exemption wzrs in operation. Therefore, decision taken by the Management of an establishment exempted from the purview of the Act \r'as not amenabk: for challenge before the Authority.

33. From the cumulative assessment of above aspects, t!r'o things are palpable. Firstly the paJties cannot confer jurisdiction on a quasi-jundical Authonty who is a creature of the Statute whose application is expressly exempted to petitioner company. Even if parties do not raise objection on jurisdicLion and subject themselves to the jurisdiction, the decision cannot be legal and valid as the Authority was not competent to adjudicatc the dispute- It ls a case of inherent lack of jurisdiction and the same l 15 PK, J w.P.No. 15904 of 2019 cannot be cured merely because parties subject to its jurisdiction. Secondly, the petitioner did not waive his right to raise objection on maintainability and said issue was contested and merely because petitioner participated in the proceedings before the authority, does not amount to waiving his right to raise objection on the jurisdiction of the Authority. Further, arld more importantly jurisdictional fact is a core issue and question ot waiver/acqu iescence does not arise.

36. Petitioner sought for writ of prohrbition and to restrain proceeding with adjudication in appeal hled by the 2nd respondent. By order dated 14.11.2014 made in WMP No. 43388 of 2014, Court granted interim suspension prayed. In W.V.M-p. No. 2582 of 2015, the said interim order was vacated and the court also stayed the operation of G.O.Ms. No. 22. After vacation of the interim order, the appeal was disposed of finally. Decision of appellate authority is against the petitioner. Section 48(3) provides for remedy of appea1.. Without availlng remedy of appeal, challenging the order of the Authority under the Act, this wrir petition is hled, primarily on the ground that, he rs not competent to decide the issue. In view of the subsequent developments, petitioner sought withdrawal of earlier writ petition. 42- Havir.g cleared three ancillary issues and as the petitioner establishment was not amenable to the jurisdiction of the Authorify under the Act, the decision of the Authoriry under Section 48(2) of the Act dated 06-04-20I7, impugned herein, on t}te order ol termination from service of 2nd respondenr by the petitioner, is without jurrsdiction, ex-facre illegal and unsustainable. It is liabte to be set aside. It is accordingly set aside. The Writ Petition is allowed. Consequentty, all pending Interlocutory Applications are closed. However, it is made clear that the right of the 2nd respondent to work out his legal remedics against aueged illegal termination are presewed and it is open to him to work out remedies as available in law. lt is also made clear that there is no expression of opinion on merits. Miscellaneous petitions, if aly pending, are closed."

15. From the above, it is clear that the jurisdiction of respondent No.2, who is a quasi-judicial authority under the Shops and Establishments Act, 1988, has been ousted in view of the vacation of 1 16 PK, J w.P.No.159A4 ([ 20 19 interim stay on G.O.Ms.No.22 dated 2I.06.2012, vide order passed by this Court dated 20.O3.2O18 in W.P.No.34685 of 2O14. As such. the impugned order passed by respondent No.2 is without jurisdiction ald unsustainable in the eye of law.

16. Further, it is to be noted that the Government issued G.O.Ms.No.25 dated 25.O7.2O19, rescinding G.O.Ms.No.22 dated

27.06.2012, restoring the jurisdiction to the authority under the Shops and Establishments Act, 1988. However, the said G.O. came into effect only after the passing of impugned order dated 13.06.2019. Hence, it is of no avail to respondent No.3.

17. In light of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the vier,,, that impugned order dared 13.06.2019 suffers from lack of jurisdiction and is legally unsustainable. As such, the impugned order is liable to be set aside. i8. Accordingly, the Writ Petition is a_llowed setting asidc the impugned order dated 13.06.2019 passed by respondent No.2 in S.tr.No.09/2O18. However, it is made clear that the right of respondent No.3 to work out his legal remedies against his termination orcler dated 24.12.2015 is preserved and it is open to him I 77 PK, J w.P.No. t 5904 of 20 Ig to work out his remedies as available in law. It is also made clear that this Court has not expressed any opinion on the merits. Miscellaneous applications, if any, pending in this writ petition, shall stand closed. No costs. That Rule Nisi has been made absolute as above' Witness THE HON'BLE THE ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE SUJOY PAUL, on this FRIDAY, THE ELEVENTH DAY OF JULY TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE //TRUE COPY// Sd/. B. REKHA RANI ISTANT REGISTRAR SECTION OFFICER To 1- The Principal Secretary Department of Labour, Secretariat Building, Hyderabad, State of Telangana - 500 004. 2. The Assistant Commissioner of Labour, Ranga Reddy, and The Honorable Appellate Authority under Section 48(1) of the _Telangana Shops and- - ^ .. Eiiablishments Ait, 1988. T.Anjaiah Karmika Samkshema Bhavan, R.T C X Roads, Chikkadpally, Hyderabad - 500 020. 3. One CC to SRI M.PRANAV, Advocate IOPUCI 4. Two CCs to GP FOR LABOUR, High Court for the State of Telangana, at 5 Ohe CC to SRI R.SHYAM SUNDAR, Advocate [OPUCI 6. Two CD Copies Hyderabad. [OUT] PSK PVL Yr/ HIGH COURT DATED:1110712025 ORDER WP.No.15904 of 2019 ALLOWING THE WRIT PETITION WITHOUT COSTS ."fAq & crJ ( * rilE S,A 1 i tl]E 2025 ,k ,1 .srP.;ia:11 :I::::.:::;;::