Union of India v. C. Aruna Devi

Railway, Secunderabad stating that the first respondent was not adopted daughter of P. Obulesu and she had managed to produce a fake adoption deed as if she was adopted by P. Obulesu. Thereafter, the Railway Vigilance Branch conducted detailed investigation. In the investigation, all relevant documents were scrutinized viz., adoption deed dated 13.04.1995, affidavit of P. Obulesu dated 16.09.1995, affidavit of first respondent dated 22.02.2001, nomination dated

17.01.2003 executed by the first respondent, copy of divorce petition of the first respondent seeking for divorce from her husband and school/college certificates obtained by her during the years 1994, 2001 & 2004. On the scrutiny of above documents, it was noticed that as per adoption deed dated 13.04.1995, Sri C.Obulesu, S/o.C.P.Obulesu, r/o.D.No.13/440-A, Srinivasanagar, Ananthapur is the party, who adopted C. Arunadevi, first respondent herein, whereas as per affidavit dated

16.09.1995 of Sri P. Obulesu, s/o. Pedda Obulesu Chakala, r/o. D.No.13/678, C-117-2, Sreenivasanagar, Ananthapur, he is the party who adopted her. By which it was evident that Sri P. Obulesu, s/o. Pedda Obulesu Chakala did not adopt the first respondent. Therefore, the first respondent was issued with a show cause notice dated 27.10.2009 by the Assistant Personnel Officer (Traffic), Guntakal calling upon her to establish her relationship as adopted daughter of the deceased employee, failing which to submit her explanation as to why her services should not be terminated. In response to the show cause notice, the first respondent by letter dated

11.12.2009 sought time for 90 days for submitting relevant documents in proof of her adoption to Sri P. Obulesu. Despite time was granted up to 10.03.2010, she had not produced the relevant documents and therefore, she was terminated with immediate effect vide order dated

28.05.2010. c) Questioning the termination order, she filed O.A.No.553 of 2010 before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Hyderabad seeking to reinstate her as Senor Ticket Collector. After considering the matter in detail, the Tribunal by order dated 05.08.2010 allowed the said O.A. setting aside the termination order dated 28.05.2010 and the railway authorities are directed to reinstate the first respondent immediately and grant all consequential benefits within one month from the date of receipt of a copy of said order. Further, in regard to validity of the registered adoption deed, the respondents are, however, at liberty to approach the appropriate authority/forum to declare the registered adoption deed, which was accepted by the administration as void with due notice to the first respondent. Assailing the Tribunal order dated

28.05.2010, the South Central Railway filed the present writ petition.

3. Along with the writ petition, the South Central Railway filed WPMP No.37444 of 2010 seeking to suspend the order dated

05.08.2010 of the Tribunal pending disposal of the writ petition. While admitting the writ petition on 26.11.2010, this Court granted interim suspension as prayed for. Aggrieved by the order of interim suspension, the first respondent filed vacate stay petition seeking to vacate the interim suspension granted by this Court on 26.11.2010.

4. When the vacate stay petition came up for hearing, with the consent of both the counsel, the writ petition is taken up for final disposal.

5. Heard Sri C.V. Rajeeva Reddy, learned counsel appearing on behalf of C.V. Vinitha Reddy, learned Standing Counsel for the writ petitioner-South Central Railway, Secunderabad and Sri K.R.K.V. Prasad, learned counsel for the first respondent.

6. Now, the points that arise for our consideration is a) Whether the impugned order of the Tribunal dated

05.08.2010 passed in O.A.No.553 of 2010 is perverse or not; and b) Whether there is any fraud or misrepresentation committed by the first respondent.

7. The learned Standing Counsel for the petitioner-South Central Railway contended that the statutory presumption under Section 16 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 (‘the Act’ for brevity) is a rebuttable presumption and mere producing the registered adoption deed is not a conclusive proof of adoption; that the legal presumption u/s.16 of the Act stood rebutted in the facts and circumstances of the case rendering the first respondent not entitled for appointment in South Central Railway and that the impugned order of the Tribunal is contrary to the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in Jai Singh v. Shakuntala[1], wherein, it was observed thus: “The issue thus arises as to whether the High Court was justified in laying emphasis on the conduct of the adopted son. While it is true that the registered instrument of adoption presumably stands out to be taken to be correct but the Court is not precluded from looking into it upon production of some evidence contra the adoption. Evidence, which is made available to the court for rebutting the presumption, can always be looked into.”

8. The learned Standing Counsel for the petitioners further contended that the finding of the Tribunal that after the death of her adopted father, respondent has declared Smt. Ch. Narayanamma, who is her natural mother, as her nominee on

17.01.2003 and in her school certificates obtained by her during 1994, 2000 and 2001, her father’s name is shown as C. Ranganayakulu, is not sufficient reason to declare that the registered adoption deed, is not legally valid and is perverse and such a finding is liable to be set aside. He further contended that the adoption deed dated 13.04.1995 is sham and is brought into existence only for the purpose of her claiming compassionate appointment; that the first respondent secured the appointment on compassionate grounds by fraudulent means by playing fraud on Railway administration and also committed fraud on the Constitution and therefore, the order under challenge in this writ petition is liable to be set aside.

9. The learned Standing Counsel for the writ petitioners further contended that as per adoption deed dated 13.04.1995, Sri C. Obulesu, s/o.C.P. Obulesu residing in Door No.13/440-A, Srinivasanagar, Ananthapur is the party who adopted the first respondent, whereas as per the affidavit dated 16.09.1995, P. Obulesu, s/o. Peda Obulesu Chakala residing in D.No.13/678-C- 117-2, Srinivasa Nagar, Ananthapur, is the party who adopted the first respondent and therefore, as per the adoption deed dated 13.04.1995, P. Obulesu Chakala working as a Senior Gangman is not the person who adopted the first respondent. He further submitted that as per notarised affidavit sworn and signed by the first respondent on

20.02.2001, P. Obulesu adopted her, vide registered deed No.188/98 dated 13.04.1998 and whereas in terms of the adoption deed, it was registered on 13.04.1995, vide deed No.188/95, which is indicative of lack of bona fides and therefore, the impugned order is liable to be set aside.

10. The learned Standing Counsel for the writ petitioners further contended that the first respondent has declared one Ms.C. Maheswari aged 22 years, who is her natural unmarried sister in the declaration of family members in the year 2008; the first respondent availed three railway privilege passes including her natural sister, even though P. Obulesu adopted her and therefore, the first respondent remained in her natural parents house rendering the adoption deed legally not valid. He further contended that the Tribunal committed a serious error in not going into the factual matrix and the entire proceedings of the first respondent in securing appointment on compassionate grounds in the South Central Railway as Ticket Collector consequent to the death of P. Obulesu, is void ab initio and the first respondent was rightly terminated from service.

11. In support of his contentions, the learned Standing Counsel for the writ petitioners placed the following citations: a) In Meghmala v. G. Narasimha Reddy[2], the Supreme Court in paras 28 to 36 & 52 observed thus: “Fraud/Misrepresentation: -

28. It is settled proposition of law that where an applicant gets an order/office by making misrepresentation or playing fraud upon the competent Authority, such order cannot be sustained in the eyes of law. "Fraud avoids all judicial acts ecclesiastical or temporal." (Vide S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (dead) by L.Rs. Vs. Jagannath (dead) by L.Rs. & Ors. AIR 1994 SC 853). In Lazarus Estate Ltd. Vs. Besalay 1956 All. E.R. 349), the Court observed without equivocation that "no judgment of a Court, no order of a Minister can be allowed to stand if it has been obtained by fraud, for fraud unravels everything."

29. In Andhra Pradesh State Financial Corporation Vs. M/s. GAR Re-Rolling Mills & Anr. AIR 1994 SC 2151; and State of Maharashtra & Ors. Vs. Prabhu (1994) 2 SCC 481 this Court observed that a writ Court, while exercising its equitable jurisdiction, should not act as to prevent perpetration of a legal fraud as the courts are obliged to do justice by promotion of good faith. "Equity is, also, known to prevent the law from the crafty evasions and subtletties invented to evade law."

30. In Smt. Shrisht Dhawan Vs. M/s. Shaw Brothers. AIR 1992 SC 1555, it has been held as under:- "Fraud and collusion vitiate even the most solemn proceedings in any civilized system of jurisprudence. It is a concept descriptive of human conduct."

31. In United India Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Rajendra Singh & Ors. AIR 2000 SC 1165, this Court observed that "Fraud and justice never dwell together" (fraus et jus nunquam cohabitant) and it is a pristine maxim, which has never lost its temper over all these centuries.

32. The ratio laid down by this Court in various cases is that dishonesty should not be permitted to bear the fruit and benefit to the persons who played fraud or made misrepresentation and in such circumstances the Court should not perpetuate the fraud. (See District Collector & Chairman, Vizianagaram Social Welfare Residential School Society, Vizianagaram & Anr. Vs. M. Tripura Sundari Devi (1990) 3 SCC 655; Union of India & Ors. Vs. M. Bhaskaran (1995) Suppl. 4 SCC 100; Vice Chairman, Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan & Anr. Vs. Girdharilal Yadav (2004) 6 SCC 325; State of Maharashtra v. Ravi Prakash Babulalsing Parmar (2007) 1 SCC 80; Himadri Chemicals Industries Ltd. Vs. Coal Tar Refining Company AIR 2007 SC 2798; and Mohammed Ibrahim & Ors. Vs. State of Bihar & Anr. (2009) 8 SCC 751).

33. Fraud is an intrinsic, collateral act, and fraud of an egregious nature would vitiate the most solemn proceedings of courts of justice. Fraud is an act of deliberate deception with a design to secure something, which is otherwise not due. The expression "fraud" involves two elements, deceit and injury to the person deceived. It is a cheating intended to get an advantage. (Vide Dr. Vimla Vs. Delhi Administration AIR 1963 SC 1572; Indian Bank Vs. Satyam Fibres (India) Pvt. Ltd. (1996) 5 SCC 550; State of Andhra Pradesh Vs. T. Suryachandra Rao AIR 2005 SC 3110; K.D. Sharma Vs. Steel Authority of India Ltd. & Ors. (2008) 12 SCC 481; and Regional Manager, Central Bank of India Vs. Madhulika Guruprasad Dahir & Ors. (2008) 13 SCC 170).

34. An act of fraud on court is always viewed seriously. A collusion or conspiracy with a view to deprive the rights of the others in relation to a property would render the transaction void ab initio. Fraud and deception are synonymous. Although in a given case a deception may not amount to fraud, fraud is anathema to all equitable principles and any affair tainted with fraud cannot be perpetuated or saved by the application of any equitable doctrine including res judicata. Fraud is proved when it is shown that a false representation has been made (i) knowingly, or (ii) without belief in its truth, or (iii) recklessly, careless whether it be true or false. Suppression of a material document would also amount to a fraud on the court. (Vide S.P. Changalvaraya Naidu (supra); Gowrishankar & Anr. Vs. Joshi Amba Shankar Family Trust & Ors. AIR 1996 SC 2202; Ram Chandra Singh Vs. Savitri