WRIT PETITION NO:9314 OF 2015 v. placed at the disposal of the 2nd

Petition unrier Siection 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to receive this Additional counter Affidavit along with Material papers i.e., (1) Letter of the 2nd Resporrdent to the Petitioners, dated o2to2t2o16, (2) orrler of Revision of pay scales of Petitioners dated 01/10/2020, (3) Letter of the 2nd Respondent to the 1st Petitio ner: later j 13105t2022 and (4) Compendium on HR Ma.Iers 2015. Counsel for the Petitir:ners: SRI VEDULA SRINIVAS, SENIOR COtTNSEL FOR M/s. VEDULA CHITRALEKHA Counsel for the Respondent No.1: SRI M.V.SURESH, SC FOR IRDAI Counsel for the Respondent No.2: SRt K.G.KRISHNAMURTHY, SEINIOR The Court made t1e following: ORDER COUNSEL FOR M/s. K.KIRAN MAYEE I THE HON'B E SRI IUSTICE N GESH B EE WRIT PETITION No.9314 of 20ts wp_9314 2015 NBK, J KA ) ORDER: Heard Mr. Vedula Srinivas, learned Senior Counsel appearing for Ms. Vedula chitralekha, learned counsel for the petitioners, and Mr. M.V.Suresh, learned Standing Counsel for 1't respondent-IRDAl and Mr.K.G.Krishnamurthy, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of Ms.K.Kiranmayee, learned counsel on record for 2nd respondent-llB'

2. The 1"t respondent-lnsurance Regulatory Development Authority' which is an enactment of Parliament under the Insurance Regulatory Development fluthoriry Act, L999, issued an Employment Notification, dated 19.10.2011, notifying certain vacancies' The petitioners applied in response to the said notification and were successful in the selection process. Petitioner No.1 was appointed as Deputy Director [LifeJ and wasofferedAppointmentvideLetterdated24.l2,20ll.Petitioner Nos.2 to 5 were also successful in the selection process and were also offered appointments. It is their case that the 2nd respondent-[nsurance Information Bureau of India [IIBJ was conceptual and is not in existence at the time of issuance of Employment Notification dated 19.1.0.2071, and the petitioners were recruited to work under 1't respondent' and petitioner Nos.1, 2, and 5 completed their probation period' whereas the probationary period of petitioner Nos'3 and 4 was extended without disclosing any reasons. It is the grievance of the petitioners that on 24.Og.2013,the 2nd respondent-llB issued an Office Order declaring its Organizational Structure and approving the Pay scales for various posts in the 2nd responden! and showing the petitioners under the 2na 2 wp_9314 201s NBK, J respondent-llB. 'fhe erstwhile posts of Deputy Director and Assistant Director wer e t :ifurcated and the petitioners were iliven new designations in the newly created posts of Managel, and Analyst, with no linkage r,vith their original pay scales. The said re-designation and changing of tlreir pay scales is done without notice or consent of the petitioners. Pr rtiti0ners Bave many representations to the respondents, the latest one dat,:d 10.03.2015, bringing to the notice of rt:spondents the anomalies in t-heir designation, pay scales and other br:nefits. The 2nd responder t gaue Reply dated 03.07.2014 stating that ther terms and conditions of ap pointment of petitioners is not connected to 1't respondent, :nd that the 2nd respondent has its own independent existence, and th.rt the re-designation of petitioners is validly done and the 2nd respo rdent is entitled to frame their own Human Resources policy and th: acceptance of Appointment Offers by the petitioners precludes the petitioners from raising any objection.

3. Learnec counsel for the petitioners would contend that the 2na respondent i s b ound to continue the petitioners in the same designations and under the same terms and conditi,:ns under Employment \otification dated 19.10.2011. It is contended that the petitioners ar: to be treated as employees of 1st respondont as they were recruitetI for the work of 1't respondent, and by the 1.t respondent and they wer,r on the rolls of the 1.t respondent even befr:re the Znd respondent w rs brought into existence. It is contended that the original pay-scale in 'rrhic h the petitioners were recruited would run for 12 years giving tt em periodical increments and pay raises. It is contended that due to tri urr:;rtion of posts and fixation of different pay scales, the petitioners we re placed.at lowest level of newly created posr:s and they &r:t *i.]'..,.*x&- 3 wp 9314_2015 NAK,I have to earn promotions subject to the same being provided by the 2"d respondent for reaching the maximum in the pay scale' It is contended that the petitioners, due to re-designation, have been in fact downgraded in the nomenclature and the same is impermissible'

4. Learned counsel for the petitioners would further contend that though the lebters of appointment dated 24'72'2071were issued in the name of 2nd respondent, it was not in existence as on that date and it has nolegalcapacitytoimposetermsandconditionsonthepetitioners.A non-existing body cannot dictate terms to the persons recruited by its parent organization and hence the contention of the 2nd respondent based on the terms and conditions shown in the Annexure to the letter of appointmertt cannot bind the petitioners and the same have no legal sanctity. In support of his contentions, Iearned Senior Counsel relied on the Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd' V' Broio Nath Gangulyl, and Cement Corporation of India Ltd v' B'B'V' Krishnam Raiuz, and Somesh Thapliyal v. Vice Chancellot H'N'B' Garhwal Universitya, Learned counsel draws attention to various paragraphs' specifically to paragraphs 24, 26, 28, of B'B'V' Krishnam Raiu (supra) ; the relevant portions read as follows: "24. -.....|n the absence of any express term in the contract of servicetotheeffectthattheemployerhasarightto'compelthe employee to serve in any future concern of the employer can the employer compel the employee serve in any future concern was the question which came up before the Supreme Court in Kundan Sugar Mills case (supra). After referring to the relevant case law the Supreme Court held that an employer has no inherent right to l AtR 1986 5c 1571 , MANU/AP/0873/1999 3 (2021) 10 scc 116 .,,,i..Grr,,r''":-{itttt 7 4 wp_9314_2015 NBK, J transfer his employee to another place where he chooses to start a businesr; sut,sequent to the date of employment and that right of the emp oyer to transfer the employee to the new concern (;annot be implied as a condition of service of employment because such a power o'the employer can only flow from an express term of the contract " "26(c) Tl^e general principle that a subsisting contract of service under one master is a bar to serve any other master, leads to a conclusi,:n that the services of an employee cannot be transferred without an e).press and explicit consent of the employee to serve the new rnaster/employer;" "28. .... ... in the absence of any tripartite agreement, the officers cannot be transferred to third party and that if by any reason the Unit at Hindupur is required to be closed or transferred to some third pa(y, th(! petitioners could be transferred to other units, ifthey are not willing to go under the employment of a third party.,,

5. Learned counsel for the petitioners draws afl.ention to paragraphs 7), '73, and L02 of Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd (supra), the relevant portions of whir:h read as follows: "7O. We novv turn to the second question which falls for determin:rtion in these appeals, namely, whether an unconscionable term in a r:ontract of employment entered into with the Corporation, which is ' the {itate" within the meaning of the expression in Article 12, is voic as hreing violative of Article 14. What is challenged under this head is clause ({ of Rule 9 of the said Rules. This challenge levelled b'7 the respondent in each of these two appeals succeeded in the High CorJrt." "73. The r;ubrnissions of the contesting respondents, on the other hand, were that the parties did not stand on an equal footing and did not (,njoy the same bargaining power, that the contract contained in the service rules was one imposed upon these ) 5 wp_9314,201s NBK,I respondents, that the power conferred by Rule 9(') was arbitrary and uncanalized as it did not set out any guidelines for the exercise of that power and that even assuming it may not be void as a contract, in any event it offended Article 14 as it conferred an absolute and arbitrary power upon the Corporation." '102. lt was, however, submitted on. behalf of the appellants that this was a contract entered into by the Corporation like any other contract entered into by it in the course of its trading activities and the court, therefore, ought not to interfere with it' lt is not possible for us to equate employees with goods which can be bought and sold. lt is equally not possible for us to equate a contract of employment with a mercantile transaction between two businessmen and much less to do so when the contract of employment is between a powerful employer and a weak employee."

6. Learned counsel for the petitioners refers to paragraph 31 of Somesh Thapliyal (supra) which reads as follows: "31.The Departrnent of Pharmacy/Pharmaceutical Sciences was a constituent teaching department of HNB Garhwal University which was a State University governed by the 1973 Act, established under Section 4('t ) of the Act. On 15-1-2009, the Universitlr was converted into the Central University and since then, it is governed by the 2009 Act'"

7. Learned Standing Counsel appearing for 1st respondent' on the basis ofthe counter affidavit filed by 1$ respondent, would contend that the l-'t respondent is an enactment of Parliament under IRDAI Act' 1999' and to fulfil the mandate under the Act, the 1't respondent constituted the znd respondent in the year 2009 as an Advisory Body to meet the information needs ofthe Insurance industry, and the 1st 1s5p6ndgn! in \ l I 6 wp_9314-2015 NBK, J its 73.d Meet ng held on 37.08.2072, approved the registration of 2"a respondent lnd,:r the A.P. Societies Registration Act, 2001 on

27.77.2072 u nder the title Insurance Information Bureau of India. It is contended th rt the Znd respondent is a Society governed by rr Governing Council with 20 Ivlembers, who are experts from various :;ectors, like insurance, te :hnology, management and eminent acadern icians, with ex-officio mernbr:rs from the Life and General Insurance Councils, and the decision naking process of the 2^d respondent is goverrned by its own Articles of A,ssociation, and the 2na respondent is a distinct and separate entity from the 1.t respondent though it is constituted by IRDAI to further the intr:rests of stakeholders of insurance policir:s and fulfil the statutory mandate under the IRDAI Act, 1999. B. Learnerl Sl.anding Counsel further contended that the 1st respondent, nerely by issuance of Employment Notificatiolr for and on behalf of the 2nr respondent-llB, does not become the employer of petitioners. It is :riso contended that even the Employment ltlotification clearly specified that the recruitment is being done for 2',d respondent- Insurance InibrrrLation Bureau of India, and further tht: Offers of Appointment issrred to the petitioners also clearly show that they have been appointcd in the Insurance Information Bureau of India, and the Terms and Conditions of appointment make it amply clear .:hat the 2"d respondent is a soparate entity managed by a Board and the positions offered were no 'y1,.ay connected to the 1"t respondent-IRDA and the service conditions and service regulations of 1't responcjent or the Government of India do not apply to their positions and 1-he officers selected for the posts in 2na respondent-llB would not be eligible for transfer or altsorption in any manner in 1"t respondent. It is also 7 wp 9314_2015 N8(,1 contended that the terms and conditions of the Employment Notification clearly disclose that the petitioners were recruited solely to the 2.d respondent-llB, and the terms and conditions of employment would be as determined by the 2nd respondent and the petitioners are estopped from making the plea that they should be treated as employees ofthe 1't respondent. Learned Standing Counsel relies on the judgment in Union of India v. s,B. Vohraa. It is further contended that the officers who are on the rolls of the 1't respondent are liable to be deputed to the 2nd respondent if required, and such a condition is a general condition; and the petitioners cannot deem themselves as employees of 1't respondent and as if they were sent on deputation to 2nd respondent merely for the reason that the 1st respondent issued Employment Notification for the 2nd respondent and conducted recruitment process for the 2nd respondent. It is contended that the 1't respondent proposed the necessity of an independent Advisory Body to carry out its statutory mandate and thereby the znd respondent took shape as a Society under the Societies Registration Act'

9. Learned Standing Counsel appearing on behalfof 2"d respondent- Insurance Information Bureau, basing on the counter affidavit filed by the chief Executive officer, would submit that the 2"d respondent-llB is a separate legal entity distinct from the 1't respondent in terms of its governance as well as functions. It is contended that none ofthe officers and staffare on deputation from the 1't respondent-IRDAl as on today including the chief Executive officer of the 2"d respondent-Society. It is furthercontendedthattheEmploymentNotificationdatedl9.l0.20ll 4 2oo4 (!|sQg 1so I wp_9314_2015 N8K, J though issue,l by the 1.t respondent-lRDAl, it was exclusively to the posts in the 2,4 respondent-Society and the same is clearly stated in the Notification itself and it is further stated that the service corrditions and regulations cf IR.DAI or Government of India do not apply to the positions to whi,:h the petitioners were recruited, and further the Appointment; Le.tters were issued by the 2nd respondent. It is further contended th rt the 1.t respondent constituted the 2nd respondent as an Advisory Bocy, and helped the 2nd respondent in the formation by advertising in recruitment, receiving applications, sel'ection and appointment of ,:andidates for the 2nd respondent-llB Io meet its staffing requi rem:nts, and merely the act of initiative and r;onstituting by the 1't rt-,s ponrlent and issuing recruitment notification for the 2nd respondent d:es not make respondent Nos.1 and 2 one and the same entities. It is lurther contended by the learned Standing Counsel that once the Gorerning Council of the 2na respondent approved the Organization: I Structure, the change in the nomenclatur,: was duly communicatel to the petitioners which they acknowledged, and this is the case of re-designation within the 2nd respondent Society with the approval of Governing Council of IIB.

10. lt is alst contended that since the petitioners have been giving representatio-rs rr:peatedly about their grievance, the 2nt r.espondent clarified that thev have been employed by the appointment orders and the terms and conditions of the appointment. It has also be,:n clarified that the first a rd s,:cond respondents are tvvo separate legal cntities and that the petitioners are in the employment of 2nd respondent but not for the I.t respon,lent. -:L I 9 wp_9314_2015 NB(,I

11.. It is further contended by the learned Standing Counsel for the 2nd respondent in the additional counter affidavit that at the time of joining the 2"d respondent, the petitioners were paid a consolidated salary of Rs.1,13,333/- in the cadre of Deputy Director re-designated as Manager Grade-lll and in the cadre of Assistant Director re-designated as Manager Grade III, and in the cadre of Assistant Dir'bctor re-designated as Analyst Grade-lll upto fanuary 2012. Thereafte4, pay-scales of 2nd respondent-llB were approved by the Governing Council of the 2nd respondent and their consolidated salary was increased to Rs.1,51,000/- and Rs.B3,29O/-, respectively, apart from other allowances, with effect from fanuary, 2Ol2- It is contended that subsequently the pay-scales/allowances of the petitioners have been revised on O1.1O.ZOZ0 with effect from 01.01.2018, and the 1$ petitioner retired on L3.05.2022 and all his benefits have been settled fully and finally.

12. Learned Standing Counsel for 2nd respondent relies on Union of India v. S.B. Vohras, and draws attention to paragraphs 12, 13' 25' 26, and27 thereof, which read as follows:

12. Mandamus literally means a command' The essence of mandamus in England was that it was a royal command issued by the King's Bench (now Queen's Bench) directing performance of a public legal duty.

13. A writ of mandamus is issued in favour of a person who establishes a legal right in himself. A writ of mandamus is issued against a person who has a legal duty to perform but has failed and/or neglected to do so. Such a legal duty emanates from either in discharge of a public duty or by operation of law' The writ of s AtR 2oo4 5c 1402 t 10 wp,9314 2015 NBK, J a- mandarus i!; of a most extensive remedial nature. The obiect of mandar us i!; to prevent disorder from a failure of justice and is required to b,e granted in all cases where law has established no specific remedy and whether justice despite demanded has not been gr;lnted.

25. How:ver, we may notice thalin Comptroller and Auditor General of lndia't. K.!i. Jagannathan (1986) 2 SCC 679 : 1986 SCC (LE,S) 345 : (1986) I AT(l 1 : AIR 1987 SC 53fl this Court upon considering a Iarge number of decisions including Dwarka Nath v. I7O [AlR 1966 SC 81 : (1965) 3 SCR 536J , Hochtief Gammonv. S(ale of Orissa [(1975) 2 SCC 649: {975 SCC (L&S) 362: (1976) 1 SCR 664 , Mayor )f Rochesterv. R. [1858 EB & E 1024 : 120 ER 791 : 27 LJ OB 434] , R. \,. Revisrng Barister for the Borough of Hanley li,(9121 3 KB 51 3 : 8l LJ KB 11521 and Padfield v. Ministet of Agriculture, Fisherie:; and Food [1968 AC 997 : (1968] 1 All ER 694 : ('1958) 2 WLR 924 (HL)l and Halsbury's Laws of Englan4 4th Edn., Vol. l, para 89 observerl: (S{lC pp. 692-93, para 20) ";10. There is thus no doubt that the High Courts in lndia exercising their jurisdiction under Article 226 hitve the power fo issue a writ of mandamus or a writ in the nature of mandamus or (o pass orders and give neces:;ary directions where the Government or a prtblic authority has failed to exercise or has wrongly o'erci:;ed the discretion conferred upon it by a statute or a rule or a policy decision of the Government or has e>'ercised such discretion mala fide or on irrelevant considerations or by ignoring the relevant considerations and materials or in such a manner as to frustrate the object of conferring such discretion or the policy for implementing which such discretion he's been conferred. rn a/ sucr, cases and in any other fit and proper case a High Court can, in the exercise ol its luisdiction under AtTicle 226, issue a writ of m.zndamus or a writ in the nature of mandamus or n 11 wp 9314 2015 NB(, J pass orders and give directions to comPel the pertorrnance in a proPer and laviul manner of the discretion conferred upon the Govemment ot a public authority, and in a proPer case, in order to prevent injustice resutting to the padies concerned, the court may ibelf pass an order or give directions which the Government or the public authotity sho.uld have passed or given had it properly and lawtully exercised its discretion." (emphasis supPlied)

26.|n Mansukhtal Vrthaldas Chauhan v. State of Guiarat ll1997l 7 SCC 622: 1997 SCC (L&S) 1784: 1997 SCC (Cri) 11201 this Court held: (SCC pp. 632-33, Paras 22-231 "22. Mandamus which is a discretionary rcmedy uitder Article 226 of the Constitution is requested to be issued, inter atia, to compel Pefiormance of public duties which may be administrative, ministerial or : statutory in nature- Statutory duty may be either directory or mandatory. Statutory duties, if they are intended to be mandatory in character, are indicated by the use of the words'shall'or'must'. Butthis is not conclusive as 'shatl' and 'must' have, sometimes, been interpreted as 'may'. What is determinative of the nature of duty, whether it is obligatory, mandatory or directory, is the scheme of the statute in which the 'duty' has been set ouL Even if the 'duty' is not set out ctearty and specifically in the statute, it may be imptied as correlative to a 'right'-

23. tn the pertormance of this duty, if the authority in whom the discretion is vested under the statute, does not act independentty and Passes an order under the instructions and orders of another authoity, the Court would intervene in the matier, quash the order f L2 wp 9314 2015 NB( I and issue a mandamus to that authority to exercise its own discretion."

27. Ptof . Wade, also, in his well-known treatise Administrativ'e Law, 8th Edn,, at p. 609 makes a distinction between a discretionary power a ld obligatory duties in the following terms: " )bligatory duties must be distinguighed from discretionary powers. With the lalter mandamus has nothing to do: it will not, for example, issue to compel a minister to promote legislation. Statutory duties are by no means always imposed by mandatory language with w,ords such as 'shall' or 'must'. Sometimes they will be' the implied counterparts of rights, as where a person 'may appeal' to a tribunal and the tribunal has a correlative duty to hear and determine the appeal. S crnefr'rnes also language which is apparently merely p,trmi:;sive is construed as imposing a duty, as where 'ntay' is interpreted to mean 'shall'. Even though no ct)mpulsory words are used, the scheme of the Act may imply a duty. Havingl developed from a piece of purely administrative machinery, mandamus was never sttbject to the misguided notion which at one time alflicted its ,ess fortunate relative certiorari, that it could itpply only to 'judicial' functions. Administrative or ministerial duties of every description could he enforced by mandamus. lt was, indeed, sometimes sttid that this remedy did not apply to judicial functions, meaning that where a public authority was given .oower to determine some matTer, mandamus w,)uld not lie to compel it to reach some particular dercision. The law as to this is explained below under 'Duty to exercise jurisdiction'. .) 13 wp 9314 20\5 NBK,I The fact that the statutory duty is directory as opposed to mandatory, so that default will not invalidate some other action or decision, is no reason for not enforcing it bY mandamus'"

73. Learned Standing counsel also relies on the judgment of Privy Council in Poosathurai v. Kannappa Chettiar6, and draws the attention of the Court to the following portion of the iudgment: "Thb Indian Contract Act by section 14 provides that "Consent is said to be free if it is not caused by "" undue influence as defined by s. 16." 8y s. 16, sub-s. 1, "the contract is said to be induced by 'undue influence' where the relations existing between the parties are such that one of the parties is in a position to dominate the will of the other, and uses that position to dominate the will of the other' and uses. that position to obtain an unfair advantage over the other.". Sub-sect. 3 of the same section may also be referred to' lt provides that "Where a person who is in a position to dominate the willofanotherentersintoacontractwithhim,andthetransaction appears on the face of it, or on the evidence, to be unconscionable' the burden of proving that such contract was not induced by undue influence shall lie upon the person in the position to dominate the will of the other." It is a mistake (of which there are a good many traces in these proceedings) to treat undue influence as having been established by a proof of the relations of the parties having been such that one naturally relied upon the other for advice' and the other was in a position to dominate the will of the first in giving it' Up to that Point "influence" alone has been made out' Such influence may be used wisely, judiciously and helpfully' But, whether by the law of lndia or the law of England, more than mere influence must be proved so as to render influence, in the language of the law' "undue"' lt must be established that the person in a position of domination has used 6 AI R 1923 P555 I L4 wp 9314 2015 NBK, ] I that position to obtain unfair advantage for himself, and so to cause injury tc the person relying upon his authority or aid."

74. LearneC Standing Counsel for respondent No.1-IRDAI relies on the judgmen- in Sathi Sattemma v. Sathi Subbi Reddy?, and draws attention to p aralpaph No.6 and 9 thereof, which read as follows: 7, The question whether in any particular case the transaction was brought about by the exercise of undue influence must be decided upon the facts and circumstances of that case. lt is however necessary that the conditions of section 16 of the Indian Contract Act should be satisfied before it may be held that the transactions are a produr:t of undue influence. "Undue influence" has; been defined n section 16 thus:- "(1) A contra<:t is said to be induced by 1'undue influence,, where the relations subsisting between the parties are such that one of the parties is in .a position to dominate the will of the other and uses that pos tion to obtain an unfair advantage over the other. (2) ln particular and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing principle, a person is deemed to be in a position to dominat,r the will of another- (a) wher,: he holds a real or apparent authority over the other, or where he stands in a fiduciary relation to the other; or (b) wherr: he rnakes a contract with a person whose mental capacity is temporaril)'or permanently affected by reason of age, illness or mental or boclily distress. (3) Where a lrerson who is in a position to dominate the rrvill of another, enters into a contract with him, and the trans,action appears, on the face of it or on the evidence adduced, to be unconsc,onable, the burden of proving that such contract was not 7 elR tgRJ npzz 15 wp,9314,2015 NBK,I induced by undue influence shall be upon the person in a position to dominate the will of the other'

9. This is the state of law on the decided cases' That is so because law and equity have always for their aim justice and fair play' Exploitation of the weak and unwary they greatly detest' T'he feeble minded and the innocent victims are always within their protection and on proof of exercise of undue influence ate relegated to their original position. Fraud would vitiate all transactions' cases of misrepresentation and undue influence are zealously guarded against. So then, if it be shown that a party exercised his dominance over the mind and will of the other undermining substantially letter's independence ofJudgment and obtained undue advantage there by' the aggrieved party whose will is thus overborne is entitled to ??? against the effects of such undue influence' But such undue influence must be satisfactorily established. lt may be proved by evidence, direct or circumstantial. Circumstances of the transaction and relationship of the parties may even shiftthe onus of proof' But there should be material on which the court is satisfied that undue influence as defined in section 16 of the Contract Act has been exercised

15. Learned Standing Counsel for respondent No'1 relies on Ladli Prashad faiswal v. the Karnal Distillery Co' Ltd', Karnal8' and draws the attention of the Court to paragraph Nos'20, 25' and 26 thereof' which read as follows: "20. Order 6, Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that in all cases in which the party pleading relies on any misrepresentation, fraud, breach of trus( wilful default or undue influence, and in all other cases in which particulars may be necessary beyond such as are exemplified in the forms in the Appendix, particulars (with dates and items if necessary) shall be stated in the pleading. The reason of the rule is obvious' A plea that 8 AtR 1963 sc 1279 I 16 wp_9314 2015 NsK J (. a transerction is vitiated because of undue influence of the other party theretc, gives notice merely ihat one or more of a variety of insidious forms of influence were brought to bear upon thr: p34y pleading undue influence, and by exercising such influence, an unfair advanlage was obtained over him by the other. But the object of a ple.rding is to bring the parties to a trial by concentrating their aftention on the matter in dispute, so as to narrow the controversy to preci!;e isr;ues and to give notice to the parties of the nature of testimony required on either side in support of their respective cases. P vague or general plea can never serve this purpose; the party pleading must therefore be required to plead the precise nature ,)f the influence exercised, the manner of use of the influenc,:, and the unfair advantage obtained by the other. Ttlis rule has bee r evolved with a view to narrow the issue and protect the party ch rrge(t with improper conduct from being taken by surprise. A plea of undue influence must, to serve that dual purpose, be precise and all necessary particulars in support ofthe plea must be embodied in the pleading; if the particulars stated in the pleading are not s ufficient and specific the Court should, before proceeding with the trial of the suit, insist upon the particulars, which give adequate not,ce to the other side of the case intended to be set up.,' "25. The doctrine of undue influence under the common law was evolved by the Courts in England for granting protection against transactions procured by the exercise of insidious forms of influence spiritual and temporal. The doctrine applies to acts of bounty as w€lll as be of other transactions in which one party by exercisir g hili position of dominance obtains an unfair advantage over another. The lndian enactment is founded substantially ,ln the rules of English common law The first sub-section of Section 16 lays dovrn the principle in general terms. By sub-section (2) a presumption arises that a person shall be deemed to be in a position to dominate the will of another if the conditions set out therein are fulfilled. Sub-section (3) lays down the conditions for rais,ing a presumption that a transaction is procured by the Sbuttable exetise cf undue influence. The reason for the rule in the thirrl sub_ a') !7 wp 9314_2015 NB(, J section is that a parson who has obtained an advantage over another by dominating his will, may also remain in a position to suppress the requisite evidence in support of the plea of undue influence,"

26. A transaction may be vitiated on account of undue influence where the relations between the parties are such that one of them is in a position to dominate the will of the other. and he uses his position to obtain an unfair advantage over the other. lt is manifest that. both the conditions have ordinarily to be established by the person seeking to avoid the transaction: he has to prove that the other party to a transaction was in a position to dominate his will and that the other party had obtained an unfair advantage by using that position. Clause (2) lays down a special presumption that a person is deemed to be in a position to dominate the will of another where he holds a real or apparent authority over the other, or where he standsin a fiduciary relation to the other or where he enters into a transaction with a person whose mental capacity is temporarily or permanently affected by reason of age, illness or mental or bodily distress. Where it is proved that a person is in a position to dominate the will of anothe. (such proof being furnished either by evidence or by the presumption arising under sub-s, (2) and he enters into a transaction with that other person which on the face of it or on the evidence adduced, appears to be unconscionable the burden of proving that the transaction was not induced by undue influence lies upon the person is a position to dominate the will of the other. But sub-section (3) has manifestly a limited application: the presumption will only arise if it is established by evidence that the party who had obtained the benefit of a transaction was in a position to dominate the will of the other and that the transaction is shown to be unconscionable. lf either of these two conditions is not fulfilled the presumption of undue influence will not arlse and burden will not shift. I I 18 wp_9314_2015 NBK, J () L6. Learned Standing Counsel for respondent No.1 further relies on Landmark ftevelopers, Hanmakonda, Warangal Distrir:t v. State of Andhra Pradeshe, and draws attention to paragraph No.29 thereof, which reads rrs follows: "29. Ther petitioner is seeking a mandamus. A writ or in the nature of manclamus, it is trite, is ordinarily issued where the petitioner establishes a legal right in itself and a corresponding legal duty in the public authority. lt is elementary that no one can ask for a mandanrus 'without a legal right. There must be a judicially enforceable right as well as legally protected right before one sufferinr; a legal grievance can ask for a mandamus. A person can be said lo be aggrieved, only when the person is denied a legal right by someone, who has legal duty to do something or to abstain from doing something. The object of Mandamus being simply to c;ompel perform;rnce of a legal duty on the part of some person or a body, who is entrurited by law with that duty, the Court, in a proceedings of Mandamus;, will never sit as a court of appeal so as to examine the facts or to substitute its own wisdom for the description vested by law irr the person or body against whom the writ is sought.,,

17. The ess enc,l of the case pleaded by the petitioners is that they were recruited by 1s respondent-IRDAI by issuing a Notification dated 1,9.\0.2011 rnci after due selection process, they rvere given Appointment Let.:ers dated 24.1.2.2011. It is their case that the 2na respondent-hrsur lnce Information Bureau [llBJ is prornoted and funded by thr l. respondent and carries out the very sam0 objectives ofthe 1't respond,3nt thereby the 2nd respondent is an exterLded arm of 1.t respondert. Ir,rrther; the officials of 2nd respondent are taken on \_* ,2013 (1) ALD 338 19 wp 9314 2015 NBK,I deputation from 1s responden! therefore, the petitioners are to be treated as officials of 1't respondent' The 2nd respondent-IlB' vide Proceedings d,ated' 24.09.2013 declared the Organizational Structure' Posts and Pay scales; and by Proceedings dated 25'09'2013' the 2"4 respondent re-designated the petitioners as per the nomenclature of the posts created in the 2"d respondent' PetitionerS submitted various 09.04.2013, representations, namely, 70,04-2012, 24'07'2072' 04.07.2013, 13.03.2074, 06.06.2014, 25'06.2014' 06.03.2015 and 10.03'2015. To the representation dated 25'06'2014' the 2'd respondent furnished reply dated 03'07 '2014 stating that the Terms and Conditions of Appointment of petitioners is not connected to 1., respondent. The petitioners therefore assail the Proceedings dated 25.0g.2013 as illegal and arbitrary and seek a consequential direction to the 1$ respondent to treat the petitioners as employees of 1't respondent-lRDAI.

01.08.20'1.4,

18. At this iuncture, it is relevant to note that the Employment Notice dated 19.10.2011 specifically states that the recruitment is for Insurance Information Bureau and the monthly emoluments are inclusive of various allowances like DA, HRA' CCA etc' as stated in the Other Conditions / General Instructions' Further; the Appointment Offer letter dated 24.72-2017 would show that the petitioners have been selected to work in the 2nd respondent-IlB, and the petitioners were directedtoreporttothe2ndrespondentwithalltheoriginaldocuments. The relevant paragraphs of the Appointment Offers dated 24'12'20L1 are extracted below for convenience' "T{is has reference to your application for the post of Deputy Oired\or and the subsequent interview held on December 21' 2011' 20 wp_9314 2015 N8K, ] 0 We are lrleased to inform you that you have been selected as Deputy Director (Non-Life) in the lnsurance lnformation Bureau, in the pay scale of 39850-1200(2)42250-1300(9)-S3950(12 years). The terms ;tnd conditions of appointment are detailed in the Annexu'e enclosed herewith. You are advised to sign the duplicate copy ot the document, containing the terms and conditions of appoinhnent, in case, the same are acceptable to you and return it to the lnsurance lnformation Bureau within a period of 15 days from the date of rerceipt of this letter. You are also advised to report to the lnsurance lnformation Bureau along with the original documents certifying your date of birth, qualification:;, caste (where applicable), experience and relieving order fr(rm the previous employe The Ternts and Conditions of Appointment read as follows:

1. lnsurance lnformation Bureau (llB) is neithera statutory Body nor a governrr ent department.

2. lnsurance lnformation Bureau is a separate entity managerl by a Board with representation from IRDA, lnsurance Companies and experts lrom information technology and insurance.

3. The pos,tion being offered is no way connected with IRDA. The service c onditions and service regulations of IRDA or Government of lndia clo nct apply to this position.

4. The officer selected for this post will not be eligible for trans;fer or absorpti()n in any manner into IRDA. The service conditions and service r'-.gulations for the IIB shall be established by the Board of the llB in the (rue course.

5. xx 6. xx 7. xx 8, xx 9. xx 10. xx (t 2t wp 9314 2015 N8K, J

11. You shall enter into a service bond for an amount of Rs.3 lakhs to serve the IIB for a period offive years. After successful completion of 5 years of the bond period, a notice period of 3 months shall be served in case of resignation from the services of llB.

12. You shall be on probation for a period of 2 years on duty within a continuous period of 3 years from the date of appointnent and the llB may extend probation citing sufficient ground sin advance upto a maximum period of 2 years. Confirmation to the said post shall be subject to the officer's satisfactory work record and conduct during the period of probation or extended probation, as the case may be, and if the work record and/or conduct during this period is not found satisfactory your services shall be liable to be terminated' {3. Upon joining the services of the llB you would be eligible for the benefits as applicable to the post of Deputy Director in llB'

14. While in sewice of the llB, including the probation period, you shall be goverired by the various Rules and Regulations of the llB as are in force from time to time." lg. It may further be noted that the 1't respondent issued an Order dated 15.10.2009 constituting the znd respondent-lnsurance Information Bureau, the relevant portion of which reads as follows: "lnsurance Regulatory and Development Authority october L5,2009 ORDER Re: lnsurance lnformation Bureau (llB) For efficient functioning of the insurance sector companies as well as for the protecfion of the interests of the policyholders, it is necessary that reliable, timely and accurate data is collected' processed and disseminated by an independent bodv' t: i i I I ; ,i I I I 22 wp_9314_2015 NSK, l 0 ln view rf the above and in order to fulfill the statutory mandate as enunciated in Section l (2XrXe) of the IRDA Act, 1999, the Authoril:y hereby constitutes lnsurance lnformation Bureau (llB) with the following membership: - 1. Chai,'mar, IRDA 2. Direr:tor {ieneral (R&D) - 3. Exec rtive Director (Admn) - 4. Secretary General, Life lnsurance Council - Member 5. Secr(rtary General, General lnsurance Council- Member 5. Prof. Arun K. Pujari, Dean, University of Hyd - Member 7. Prol. H.Krishnamurthy, PRO, lndian lnst. of Science - Member 8. Dr. B,C. Jirraga, Professor, JNTU Mem ber Chairman Vice Chairman Member - Convenor -

20. fhs /tLrt rer;pondent was formed in the year 2012 trs a Society registered urder the A.P. Societies Registration Act,2011. The Order dated 15.10.2 009 would show that the 1.r respondent-lRD.A, being the Regulator of Insurance sector in the Country, fbr the purpose of ensuring tha: thr: data is processed in a fashion useful for various market players, rt:searches, policy holders as well as cornmc n public for use in real-tinre dt:cision making, proposed to have a body as enunciated under Sectio r 1 + l2)(1)(e) of the IRDA A ct, 7999. 21-. Thus, it can be seen that by the date of Employment l\otification dated 19.10. l0l l, the 2nd respondent-llB was in the process of formation. H(,wevel, the content of the Notification dated 19.L0.2011 would disclose th rt recruitment notification was specificallg issued for and Znd respc ndent-IlB and even the Appointment Offers vide Letter d.ated 24.12.201 [ were issued assigning the petitioners sp :cifically to the 2nd respordert-llB as notified under the Employment lrlotification datd 19.10.2r)11 . Therefore, the petitioners are undisputabJy recruited for placement on the rolls of 2nd respondent-llB. { 23 wP_9314_2O15 NgK,I

22. The 1"t respondent-IRDA has proposed to have an Expert Body to collect and analyze the insurance sector data and thereby constituted of Insurance an Independent Body under the name and style from various Information Bureau, with Board Members drawn organizations, and thereafter issued Employment Notification dated 1rg.Lo.zo7l for 2nd respondent, as the 1't respondent has pioneered for an Independent Advisory Body. The 2nd respondent was registered in the form of a Society under the Societies Registration AcL

23. The petitioners were recruited in December 2011' The Office Order issued by the 1s respondent dated 15.10'2009 would show that thel.trespondent-IRDAhascommencedtheactivityofforming2nd respondent-llB during 2009, and apparently the 2nd respondent being in its nascent/formative stage, the 1't respondent promulgated in the said office order dated 15.10.2009 that the staff and officers of the Bureau will be on deputqtion from IRDA and functional duty allotment witl be done by the Bureau' However, it may be noted that the very act ofStaffand officers ofthe Bureau being taken on deputation from IRDA shall not necessarily preclude the 1't respondent from notifying and proceeding with recruitment for staffing 2nd respondent' andl.trespondentbeingtheRegulatoroflnsurancebusinessistheone who proposed for an Advisory Body. The 1't respondent has taken the taskofissuingEmploymentNotificationforandonbehalfof2nd respondent-llB during its formative period, howevet' the act of recruitment done by 1" respondent on behalf of 2"d respondent' by itsell does not entitle the petitioners to any claim as employees on the rolis of 1't respondent; more so, when the Offer of Appointment clearly specifiesthatthepetitionersarerecruitedinthelnsurancelnformation F 24 wp_9314_2015 NBX, J 0 Bureau, and wele also asked to report to the Insurance Information Bureau with rll original documents/certificates. The 2nd respondent-llB is an indeper:dent non-profit Society registered under the ,,\.P. Societies Registration Act, 20tL, and functioning under the purview of 1s respondent:-lRDl,l, which is an enactment of Parliament, for data collection and storage. The judgments sought to be relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioners are not applicable to thr: facts ofthe present case as, in the instant case, there is no transfer of employees to serve under rr third parff per se, as the very Employment \otification, dated 19.10.,i011 clearly speaks that the recruitment is sp,:cifically for 2nd respondent-llB and further the selected employees (petitionersJ were specificrlll'assigned to the 2nd respondent-llB in the r,rmployment offers; and therefore there is no question oftransfe4 let alorre obtaining consent, as [he petitioners have applied against the r,rmployment notification by wrich the vacancies of 2nd respondent-llB rvere sought to be filled.'Ilrerr:lore, there being no third party, the question of serving under a third palty, or consent of employees for transferring them to serve under a third party does not arise in the instant case, as it cannot be disputed that .,he employer of petitioners is the 2nd respondent-llB and not the 1 t re,s;pondent-lRDAl.

24. With regarrl to the grievance of re-designation of peritioners by Order dated i',5.09.2013 issued by 2nd respondent-llB, it may be noted that the Boarrl constituted by the 1't respondent-IRDA has fLnalized the organizational structure, posts and pay scales of Znd respondent-llB on 24.09.2013, vrhir:r is after the recruitment of the petitioners. Upon finalization of organizational structure, the posts and pay sr:ales under Znd responderrt-ll l were renamed and redesigned. Furthermore, the 25 wp_9314_2015 NBK,.I Office Order dated 15.10.2009 specifically stipulates that the functional duty atlotment will be done by the Bureau' apart from stating that th e rules of business of the Bureau may be decided by the Bureau in its first meeting and amend them subsequently as found necessary, which makes it clear that by the date 15'10'2009' there was no Insurance Information Bureau Rules, and it is only after 2012, the Bureau came into existence as a Society, and thereafter the Organizational Structure, Posts and Pay-scales were notified by the 2na respondent-llB, and the petitioners designations and pay-scales were revised to align with the nomenclature of posts and pay-scales determined by the Board of 2nd respondent-llB'

25. ln that view of the matte[ there is no contravention of the terms mentioned in the Offers of Appointment dated 24'72'20L1in relation to the Employment Notice dated 19'10'2011, and there is no illegality in the order dated25.09.2013 re-designating the petitioners and granting them pay-scales determined to the posts in accordance with the policies framed by the Board of 2"d respondent-llB' 26. AccordinglY, the writ Petition Miscellaneous petitions, if any pending, shall stand closed IS dismissed. No costs. t._ //TRUE COPY// SD/-P. PADMANABHA GI DEPUTY DDY R SECTION FIGER 'l . One CC to M/s. VEDULA CHITRALEKHA, Advocate [OPUC] 2. One CC to SRI M.V.SURESH, SC FOR IRDAI [OPUC] 3. One CC to M/s. K.KIRAN MAYEE, Advocate [OPUC] 4. fwo CD Copies To r;. HIGH COURT DATED:1010112025 ORDER WP.No.9314 of 2015 1ri S T4 16- nC, ( -l o rA0 2025 ($ t' z C 4' DISMISSINCi THE WRIT PETITION WITHOUT COSTS