Writ Petition No. 12588 of 2023 · The High Court · 2025

Heard Sri S.Krishna Sharma, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner and learned Assistant Government Pleader for Services-I appearing on behalf of the respondents. Z. The itioner aDoroac ed the Court seekino amended oraver as under: "...to issue an appropriate Writ order or direction more particularly one in the nature of WRIT OF CERITIORARI calling for the records pertaining to G.O.Rt.No.711, dated 20.09.2023 issued by the Respondent No.1 whereby a penalty of withholding of entire pension and gratuity permanently and recovery of Rs.6,16,897/ including interest was imposed on the petitioner and to declare the action of the Respondent No.1 as arbitrary, illegal, unjust and violative of service Law principles and set aside the same and consequently, direct the respondents to revoke its decision taken in G.O.Rt.No. 7Ll, dated 20.09.2O23 and forthwith disburse the pension and all pensionary benefits with arrears to the petitioner and may pass such other order or orders benefits with arrears to the petitioner and may pass such other order or orders as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the case and in the interest of the justice It is prayed that pending disposal of the Writ petition this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to suspend the operation of G.O.Rt.No. 711, dated 20.09.2023 issued by the Respondent No.1 and forthwith direct the respondents to disburse the pension and all pensionary benefits with arrears to the petitioners and may pass such other order or orders as 2 Sr-. J this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the case..." T s n b ents made in the affidavit led bv'th e Detitio er tn suooort of the r'resent rit Petitio nisasun der:- It i:; specific case of the petitioner that the petitioner is a Senior /\uditor in the Secunderabad Division. The petitioner was issued a Charge Memo vide G.O.Rt.No.1366 MA & UD (12) Dept', dated 17.10.2003 on allegations of misappropriation and fire sabotagle, and was placed under suspension. An Enquiry Officer was appointed on 20,05.2005, but the enquiry officer had submitr:ed enquiry report on 26.07.2008, holding the charges as "not proved." The criminal cases filed against the petitioner also ended in acquittal for lack of evidence. However, the disciplinary authority disagreed with the enquiry findings and, through Memo No.3304/Vi9.Il-2/2003-16 dated 06.03.2009, treated the charg€:s as "proved." The petitioner had submitted written reply on 17 04.2009, but no further action was taken for a long time' In pursuance to the orders of this Court dated 20.09.2019 in W.P.No.19621 of 2019, the petitioner's suspension was reviewed J SN. J by the Respondent No.2, and subsistence allowance was paid until petitioner's retirement on 29.02.2020. It is further the case of the petitioner that subsequently, the 1't Respondent issued G.o.Rt.No.139 MA & uD (vig.III) Dept., dated 03.03.2020, dismissing the petitioner from service and ordering recovery of Rs.6, L6,Bg7/-. This order was withdrawn through Memo No.3304/vIG.III/2003 dated 24.ot.2023, and a provisional penalty of permanent withholding of entire pension and gratuity along with recovery of Rs.6,t6,897/- was imposed. The petitioner submitted an explanation to the Respondent No.1, dated 27.02.2023 requesting revocation of the penalty and release of pensionary benefits. However, the Government, through G.o.Rt.No.711 dated 20.09.2023, confirmed the penalty of withholding entire pension and gratuity permanenuy and recovery of Rs.6, L6,Bg7/- with interest. Aggrieved by this, the petitioner had challenged G. o. Rt. N o.7 LL dated 20.09. 2023 , seeks suspension of its operation and the present Writ petition is filed. 4 SN, ., A 2 i.t is proposed to hold an inquiry against Sri Aravind Raj. Senior'Auditor, Audit (SD) Municipal Corporation of Hy,Jerabad in accordance with the procedure laid down in Ru e 20 of the Andhra Pradesh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules' 1991' 2. The substance of the imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour in respect of which the inquiry is proposed to Oe nefO is set out in the enclosed statement of articles of charges (Annexure-1). A list of documents by which, and a Iiii ol *iinestes by whom, the articles of charges proposed to be sustained are also enclosed (Annexure-I to III) 3. Sri Aravind Raj, Senior Auditor, Audit (S'D) Municipal -orporation of Hy-derabad is directed to submit within 10 days from the date of receipt of this order, a written statement of his defence. 4 Sri Aravind Raj, Senior Auditor, Audit (S'D) Municipal Coiporation of Hyderabad is informed that an inquiry will be ireld only in respect of those articles of charges as are not admitted. He should, therefore, specifically admit or deny each article of charge. 5. Sri Aravind Raj, Seimor Auditor, Audit (SD) Municipal i:orporation of Hyderabad is further informed that if he ooes not submit his written statement of defence on or before the date specified in para 3 above, further action lvill be processed based on the material available' 6. Attention of Sri Aravind Raj, Senior Auditor, Audit (S'D) iqunii'paf Corporation of Hyderabad is invited to Rule 24 of r:nl nnOnra Pradesh Civil Services (conduct) Rules, 1964' r:nder which no Government Servant shall bring or attempt ':o bring any political or outside influence to bear upon any superior authority to further his interest in respect of matters pertaining to his service under the Government. If any representation is received on his behalf from another ) SN, J person in respect of any matter dealt within these proceedings it will be presumed that Sri Aravind Raj. Senior Auditor, Audit (SD) Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad is aware of such a representation and that it has been made at his instance and action will be taken against him for violation of Rule-24 of the Andhra pradesh Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964.

7. The receipt of the G.O. may be acknowledged. B. Coming to the final arguments of the charged officer- III Sri Aravind Raj, the then senior Auditor, Secunderabad, the charged officer contended that the arguments of the Presenting Officer alleging that charged officer-Ill was responsible are not based on any records and are in fact contrary to records and the presenting Officer made submissions out of his own delusions inferences but not based on records. He continued that presenting Officer concealed purposely the facts that market police station. Secunderabad filed a final report before Hon'ble Metropolitan Magistrate, Sec'bad with a finding "UNDETECTABLE" and for lack of The Charged Officer-III contended that when an independent Investigating agency who are well-versed in detecting crimes filed a report that there is lack of evidence. The submissions of the Presenting Officer should be totally rejected and that there was no evidence that the Charged Officer was a party to the alleged misappropriation and the remittance of the amount by any of the officer could be in no way be inferred that the Charged Officers admitted their guilty and it was only on the threatening and undue influences by the Senior Officers, the amount was remitted by the Charged Officer- II but not by him (Charged Officer-Ill). The Charged 6 SN. J Ofllcer further contended that the report of the Vigilance & Entorcement Cell was inconclusive and not a final report and no reliance could be placed on the said record. He quoted the depositions before the Inquiring Authority of PV/-3 who admitted that the "papers produced were blank and had no traces of any connection to the register under review". He refuted the fact that he remitted any amount in the MCH Account. Now the point under consideration is, the evidence, written and oral placed before the Inquiring Authority to prove the charges 14 against Charged Officers-I to III. There is no doubt that preponderance of probability points tcwards the Charged Officers- 1 to 3 in case of misappropriation and fire sabotage. The needle of suspicion strongly points to the Charged Officers-1,2,3 but what is heard, conclusive, unimpeachable evidence before the Inquiring Authority to prove the charge. After cr>nsidering the depositions of the witnesses and the dccuments listed to prove the charge and other connected rr:cords there is no doubt that misappropriation and fire sabotage has taken place and Charged Officers-1 & 3 are connected with the alleged misappropriation and fire sabotage. But there is no doubt the Auditors did not and could nor name any one, much less Charged Officers-1,2,3 f,rr the misappropriation. The report of AddI.S.P., Vigilance 8r Enforcement, MCH is only preliminary and not final and tre himself recommended further thorough probe in the rnatter. The remittance slips baring the signature of the Charged Officer II were not send to Handwriting Expert to pinpoint the culprit, the market police station could not locate the culprits in their Investigation and referred the cases of misappropriation and fire sabotage as UNDETECTABLE. Charged Officers-283 have flatly denied ,rnd they admitted the misappropriation before the Addl. :ommissioner, Sri Chandravadan The Charged Officer-Il had not signed the statement prepared for him. There is no doubt credibility has to be given to the statement of Sri Chandravadan but his contention is not supported by any other independent evidence and Charged Officers-2&3 have vehemently denied it. As mentioned above, the facts undeniably point towards the Charged Officers-1,2,3 in 7 sN, , both misappropriation and fire sabotage, but unimpeachable, conclusive, clear evidence is not forthcoming to bring home the charges of Charged Officers-1,2,3. Even the police have failed to locate the culprits. The evidence available to the Inquiring Authority is not at all adequate to prove the allegations against the Charged Officers-1,2,3. There is no doubt that strong presumptions and assumptions and preponderance and probability. But that can not be relied upon to prove a case beyond all reasonable doubt. Agreeing with the defence of the Charged Officers-1,2,3 and due to the reaons discussed above, I hold both the charges of misappropriation and fire sabotage against all the Charged Officers-1,2,3 as NOT PROVED. : c 'l

16. As seen from the evidence of pwsl to 4, there is no evidence to show that, either pwl or his subordinates delivered any property or any valuable security to either Al or to A3 and that, at the time of delivering the said property the accused induced the above person with dishonest intention in order to cheat them. Further, the counsels for Accused Nos.1 and 3 have submitted the copy of enquiry report, which was conducted by the officials of Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad against the accused nos,1 to 3 for the alleged charges of misappropriation and fire sabotage, as per the said report, the concerned officials failed to prove the charges against the accused nos.1 to 3. Further, the enquiry officer has observed that there is no clear 8 SN. J t7.

18. ,3vidence of the involvement of A1 to A3 in the audit section and even they did not point out exactly who could have been done it' Even Ex.P2 did not disclose the involvement of A1 to A3. In view of the above, I hold this point in favour of accused no.1 and 3 and against the prosecution. In view of the answers given in Point Nosl and 2, I hold that the prosecution has miserably failed to bring home the quilt of the accused nas.1 and 3 with which they were charged. Hence, I hold that the Al and A3 are entitled for acquittal. In the result, the Accused Nos.1 and 3 are found not guilty for an offence punishable under section 409 and qZO of Indian Penal Code and accordingly they are acquitted the same under section 248(1) of the Code of criminal procedure. The bail bonds of the Accused nos'1 and 3 shall stands discharged after expiry of six months as per Section 437-A of Code of Criminal Procedure' The case against accused no.2 is abated, since he died' o n l Learned counse! appearing on behalf of the 5. petitioner mainly contends that the Charge memo issued the petitaoner is in the year 2OO3 and the enquiry initiated against the petitioner had been concluded by the Department in the year 2OO8, but however keeping in view of the pending subject issue, the 1"t respondent issued G.O.Rt.No.139 MA&UD(Vig.III) Dept', dated O3.O3i.2O2O imposing, a penatty of dismissal from service against the petitioner as per Rule 9 of TSGS (CC &A) Y 9 SN. J Rules, 1991 and ordering recovery of the misappropriated amount to the share of the petitioner to a tune of Rs.6,16,897 / - including interest in terms of G.oMs.No.33, Finance (TFR.I) Department, dated 'og.o2.2006, but however, the Government vide Memo No.33o4/vrg.rrr /2oo3, dated 24.oL,2023, had withdrawn the said order, dated 03.03.2020, a provisional penalty of permanent withholding of entire pension and gratuity along with recovery of Rs.6, L6,8gt /- was imposed. The petitioner submitted an exptanation to the Respondent No.1, dated 2l.o2.zoz3 requesting revocation of the penalty and release of pensionary benefits. However, the Government, through G.o.Rt.N o.7lt dated zo.og.2oz3, confirmed the penalty of withhotding entire pension and gratuity permanently and recovery of Rs.6, 16$97 /- with interest.

6. Learned counsel apoearing on behatf of the oetitioner mainlv contends that the order imouoned- dated 20.09.2023 has to be set-side for the foilowing reasons:- a) Firstly, the order impugned is without any reason and there is no justification in issuing the order impugned. l0 SN, J ii) The gratuity and pension of the employee cannot be recovered. iii) The order impugned, dated 2O'O9'2023 passed by the Governmentfailedtotakeintoconsiderationtheverd.ct rendered in favour of the petitioner particularly the concluding findings in the iudgment, dated O1'11'2O19 passed in C.C.No.14O of 2017 by the XXII Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Secunderabad, in particular para Nos.16 to 18 (referred to and extracted above) fhe order impugned ignored the Inquiry report iv) detailed preliminary Inquiry report, dated 26'07'2o08' which, upon enquiry, gave a very ctear finding that the charges of misappropriation and fire sabotage against Charged Officer Nos. 1 to 3 had been held as not proved' the order impugned passed by the Government is contrary to its own Inquiry report, which held that the charges of misappropriation and fire sabotage against all the Charge Officer Nos. 1 to 3 could not establish beyond the reasonable doubt. Based on the aforesaid submissions' learned !f n SN. J

7. Learned Assistant Government pteader for services-r appearing on beharf of the respondents on the basis of the averments made in the counter affidavit contends that due procedure as contemprated under taw had been followed, the disciprinary proceedings undertaken by the Department cannot be ignored in the proceedings of the criminar case and therefore, the verdict in the criminat case cannot be reried upon in the disciprinary proceedings initiated by the Department against the petitioner, there is no i'egarity in the order impugned passed by the respondent No.l and therefore, the present writ petition is liable to be dismissed. 8' Learned Assistant Government preader for services_r appearing on beharf of the respondents in support of the respondents' case praces reriance upon the judgment of the Apex court in state of Madhaya pradesh vs. Akhiresh Jha And another, dated 09.06.2021 reported in (2021) t2 scc 460 in particutar para No.15 and contends that there r' 17 SN, J is no illegatity in the order impinged passed by the 1't respondent and no interference is warranted by this Court in the present writ petition' ,euirY -ih; in its .entire.ty' -This'

15. The line of reasoning which weighed with the Tribunal is riiounat *ouli have been justified in pl;linty erroneous directing tne expeditious conclusion of the enquiry' but instead' in our it proceeded to qr.if'.r-if.rl. e1 view, was clearri-i'p"itissibie' Every delay in conducting a io"t not'. ipso facto' lead to the enquiry disciplinary "nquity being vitiated. wnJtn*-preiuaice is caused to the officer who is b'ling enquired inio-it u-'nutt"t *nitft has to be decided on the b;lsis of the .ir.r,itunces of each case' Prejudice must be demonstrated to have been tu"uJ and cannoi be a matter of srrrmise. Apart from suUmitting that the first respondent was unable to proceeO on O"putation or to seek promotion' there is nobasisonwhichitcouldbeconctudedthathisrighttodefend himself stands prejudicially affected bv a delay of Y"^I:i::.:: -I.ft" High Court' therefore' in our vlew' concluding tne en-duiry' l.ras clearly failed to pioperty exercise the jurisdiction vested in it try simply um.ring inu :uOb'ent of the Tribunal' The judgment of the Tribunal ,rti.i"O irorir Oasic-errors which go to the root of the matter and ilnitf'.l t''u'e been ilnored both by the Tribunal as rryell as bY the High Court'

9. A bare perusal of the record indicates that the respondent No.1, after a lapse of t7 years from the date of framing of charges and after t2 years from the receipt oftheinquiryreportbythedisciplinaryAuthorityand l3 SN, J amount after a lapse of 11 years from issuing a notice cafling for explanation, issued G.O.Rt.No.139, MA & UD (Vig.III) Department, dated 03.03.2O2O dismissing the petitioner from service and ordering recovery of-misappropriated the share of the petitioner to a tune of Rs.6,16,897. Challenging the same, the petitioner on an earlier occasion approached this Court by filing W.P.No.25273 of 2O2L, on the grounds of belated conclusion of departmental enquary, impermissibility issuance of the punashment of removal from service after the retirement along with other legat grounds and during pendency of the said writ petition, the earlier impugned order, dated O3.O3.2O20 had been withdrawn Government and a bearing No.33O4IVIG.III/2OO3, dated 24.0,-.2023 was issued isionally deciding to impose a penalty of withholding of entire pension and gratuity permanenily on petitioner along with recovery ol Rs.6,1,6,g9l l-. fresh Memo by the

10. The petitioner submitted a detailed representation, dated 27.02.2029 to the l't respon reconsider the decision and to withdraw proposal l4 SN, J pertainingtotheprovisionaldecisionofthel.t respondentimposingapenaltyofwithholdingofentire pension and gratuity permanently on the petitioner along with recovery of Rs'6r16rgg7l-' but however the same wasnotconsideredandtheorderimpugned,dated z4.or,.v.o23 had been passed by the 1't respondent herein'

11. A bare perusal of the order impugned' dated 24.Ot.i2O23clearlyindicates,thesamehadbeenpassed withoutapplicationofmindinaroutinecasualmanner withotltassigninganyreasonswithoutanyjustification, para No.7 of the said order impugned' dated 24'OL'2O23 only indicates that the Government had decided provisionallytoimposeapenaltyofwithholdingofentire pensionandgratuitypermanently,besidesrecoveryofthe misappropriatedamountofRs'5'L6'6891-including interest in terms of Tetangana State Revised Pension Rules, 1980. t2.Abareperusaloftherecordindicatesthatthe verdict,datedOl.ll.2olgpassedinC'C'No'14Oot2Ot7by thexxllAdditionalChiefMetropolitanMagistrate, / / l5 SN, J secunderabad, acquitting the petitioner herein with a clear finding in its verdict in particular para Nos.16 to l8(referred to and extracted above), had been tota[y ignored by the l't respondent. ,, 30' The judgments reried on by the rearned counser appearing for the respondents are distinguisnabre on l6 SN. J facts and on law. In this case, e same. In the same It is true that the nature of charge in the departmenta I proceedings and in the criminal case is grave. The nature of the case lau nched against the the basis of evidence and material app,:llant on collected against him during enquiry and investigation and as reflected i n the charg e-sheet, factors mentioned other words, charges, are one and th eviclence witnesses and circum stances are one and the sarle. In the Present case, cri minal and dePartmental ro:eedings have alreadY noticed or granted on the e ly, raid cond ucted at the p nre set of facts, nam SA apPrel lant's residence, recovery of articles therefrom Investigating Officer Mr V.B. Raval and other Thel the onlY witnesses depa rtmental witnesses were exermined bY the enquirY officer who bY relying upon n that the ent came to the their statem charges were established against the aPPellant. The satne witnesses were examined in the criminal case and the criminal court on the exa mination came to the not Proved the cotrclusion that the prosecution has nt beYond any st the appella guitt alleged reil sonable dou bt and acquitted the appetlant bY its jutlicial Pro nouncem ent with the finding that the charge has not been proved conclusio

31. In our opinion, such facts and evidence in tl're departmentit as well as criminal proceeO!1g= were tl.re same witnout there being any iota of difference, tlre appellant snould succeeO' fne distinction which is u:;ually proved bltween the departmental and criminal p'oceedings on the basis of the approach and burden [f-pioof iould not be applicable in the instant case. I I t7 SN. J Though the finding recorded in the domestic enquiry was fou nd to be valid by the courts below when there was an honourable acquittal of the em ployee during the pendency of the proceedin gs challenging the dismissal, the same requires to be taken note of and 0 B) The Aoex Court. in the iudqment dated

34. There is yet another rea the case of the respondents. son for discarding the whole of roved by Police Officers an namely, 'the raid conducted at the appellant' s residence and recove ry of incriminating articles the refrom.' The findings record ed by the Inquiry Officer, a copy of which has been placed before us, indicate that the charges framed against the appellant were sought to be p d Panch witnesses, who had raided the house of the appellant and had effected recovery. They were the on ly witnesses examined by the Inqui ry Officer and the Inquiry Officer, relying upon their statements, came to the conclusion that the charges were established against the appellant. The same witnesses were examined in the criminal case but the court, on a considerat ion of the entire evidence, came to the conclusion that no search was conducted nor was any recovery made from t he residence of the appellant. The where the appellant is pronouncement with the recovery" at the residence . In this situation, therefore, acquitted by a judicial finding that the ,,raid of the appellant were not l8 SN. J proved, it would be unjust, unfair and rather oppressive to tttcw the findings recorded at the ex- parte departmental proceedings, to stand. c) m In the Present case, the APPellate e has recorded that Ext. P-3, the original mark JuCg she:et carries the date of birth as 2L-4-1972 and the sarne has also been Proved bY the witnesses examined on behalf of the Prosecution.

29. We are satisfied that the findings of the Appellate Judge in the criminal case clearly indicate that the ctrarge against the appellant was not just , "not proved" in fact the charge even stood "disProved " by the verY As held bY this Court, a fact is prosecution evidence. said to be "disProved" when, after considering the nratters before it, the court either believes that it does not exist or A fact is said l9 SN, J be "not proved" when it is neither ..proved', -to "disproved" (see Vijayee Singh v. State of il.e. TViiayee Singh v. State of U.p., (L990) 3 SCC 190 : 1990 SCC (Cri) 3781 ).

1. The writ petitioner was prosecuted for alleged offence of murder of his wife. The death of the wife of petitioner took place on 25th of February, 1996. The petitioner was working as Depot Controller at Srikalahasti Depot of the Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation (for sho.rt the '1.f.C'1. A prosecution was initiated against the petitioner after registration of crime. In the mean while the department initiated departmental proceedings on the following charge 'For having involved in a criminal case of alleged killing on 25-2-1996 which has resulted in framing climinal case against you as Crime No. 30 of 1996 under Sec. 302 of the Ind.ian Penal Code (I.p.C) by Muthyatareddypaili potice station which amounts misconduct under Sec.'29 (xxxi) of A.P.S.R.T.C. Employees Conduct Regulations, 1963.',

2. The criminal prosecution initiated against the petitioner ultimately ended in acquittal in S.C.No. 1 of 1997 before the learned IV Additional Sessions Judge, Tirupathi by judgment dated 8-8-1997. The said acquittal has become final. However, the disciplinary authority in the departmental-enquiry, upon completion of tire enquiry passed orders on 28-11-1996 removing the petitioner irom service. The petitioner preferred appeal against the said order. The same was dismissed. The review petition was also dismissed by the Regional Manager of the R.T.C. As a 20 SN. J result, the petitioner filed the writ petition to challenge the orcer of his removal. 3. The learned Single Judge held that 1 the disciplinary aur:hority was in error in holding the petitioner guilty of the ihurg" iramed against him in disciplinary proceedings in vierw of the judgment of the Court' The petitioner- detinquent wai entitted to be cleared of the charge in dis;cipiinary enquiry and accordingly allowed the writ petition.

4. Challenging the order of the learned single Judge, the R.T.C. has filed this Writ APPeal. We find no merit in the a6rpeal insPite of the Persuasion of the learned counsel for the appella nt-R.T.C. We have alrea dy pointed out as to what charge was framed in the disciplinary enquiry against tl"e petitioner. It has to be noted that the charge was not fc,r the substantive act of having caused death of the wife. . The argument of the s that in course of the It:arn ed counsel for the aPPellant i enqurry the petitioner had himself stated that death of his vrife was result of his delinquencY. It is argued that in view c,f this admission of the petitioner the disciplinary authoritY was justified in accepting the same and Court cannot reapprec iate the evidence. We fail to understan d as to how the statement of Petiti oner was relevant in the instant (:ase. . It cannot be is entitled to hold O disputed that the disciplinary authority rge as is before a disciplinary enquiry on the same cha disciplinary enquiry Criminal Court because the scope of and a criminal trial is different' But where the charge in 2t SN. J the disciplinary enquiry is necessarily dependent 5 on the result of the criminal case if the criminal case itself ends in favour of the delinquent, the charge in the disciplinary enquiry will become unsustainable one. In the facts and circumstances of the case having regard to the charge framed against the petitioner and having regard to tfie result of the criminal case, we have no manner of doubt that the learned single Judge was right in allowing the petitioner's claim. E) The oex Cou in the i dqment d ted O8.Oa .200s reoorted in (2OO5) 6 SCC 636 in p.V.Mahadevan Vs. MD, T.N. ousano Board, a oartic !ar, Dar qraoh No.19 observed as under:

19. 'It is not possible to lay down any predetermined principles applicable to all cases and in all situations where there is delay in concluding the disciplinary proceedings. Whether on that ground the disciplinary proceedings are to be terminated each case has to be examined on the facts and circumstances in that case. The essence of the matter is that the court has to take into consideration all the relevant factors and to balance and weigh them to determine if it is in the interest of clean and honest administration that the disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to terminate after delay particularly when the delay is abnormal and there is no explanation for the delay. The delinquent employee has a right that disciplinary proceedings against him are concluded expeditiously and he is not made to undergo mental agony and also monetary loss when these are unnecessarily prolonged without any fault on his part in delaying the proceedings. In considering whether the delay has vitiated the disciplinary proceedings the court has to consider the nature of charge, its complexity and on what account the delay has occurred. If the delay is unexplained prejudice to the delinquent employee is writ large on the face of it. It could also be seen as to how much the disciplinary authority is serious in pursuing the charges against its employee. It is the basic principle of administrative justice that an officer entrusted with a particular job has to perform his duties honestly, efficiently and in accordance with the rules. If he deviates from this path he is to suffer a penalty prescribed. Normally, disciplinary proceedings i 22 SN, J should be allowed to take their course as per relevant rules but the:n delay defeats justice. Delay causes prejudice to the charged oificer unless it can be shown that he is to blame for thr: Jelay or when there is proper explanation for the delay in conducting the disciplinary proceedings' Ultimately, the court is to balance these two diverse considerations. " F) The Aoex rt, in the iudq ent dated 19.08. 998 reported in (1998) 7 SCC 84 in Puniab National Bank and oth rs vs. uni Be ari Mas a", in rticula Darao aoh No.19 observed as under:

19. The result of the aforesaid discussion would be that the principles of natural justice have to be read into Regulation 7(2'l' A:s a result thereof whenever the disciplinary authority disagrees with the inquiry authority on any article of charge then before it records its own findings on such charge, it must record its t(:ntative reasons for such disagreement and give to the delinquent officer an opportunity to represent before it records its findings. The report of the inquiry officer containing its findings *ill have to be conveyed and the delinquent officer will have an opportunity to persuade the disciplinary authority to accept the favorable conclusion of the inquiry officer' The principles of natural justice, as we hav-e already observed, iequiie the authority, which has to take a final decision and can irnpose a penalty, to give an opportunity to the officer charged of misconduct to file a representation before the disciplinary .ruthority records its findings on the charges framed against the office r. G) reoorted in (1998) 4 scc 154 in State of A.P. Vs. N.Radhakishan. in oarticular. oaraoraoh Nos'18 and 19 observed as under: 23 SN. J

18. In State of Punjab and others vs. Chaman Lal Goyal (1995 (2) SCC 57O), state of Punjab was aggrieved by the order of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana quashing memo of charges against Goyal and also the order appointing Inquiry Officer to inquire into those charges. In this case the incident, which was the subject-matter of charge, happened in December, 1986 and in early January, 1987, when Goyal waS working as supdt. of Nabha High Security lail. It was only on July 9, 1992 that memo of charges was issued to Goyal. He submitted his explanation of January 4, L993 denying the charges. Inquiry Officer was appointed on July 20, 1993 and soon thereafter Goyal filed writ petition in the High Court on august 24, 1993. The High Court quashed the memo of charges on the principal ground of delay of five and a half years in serving the memo of charges, for which there was no acceptable explanation. This Court examined the factual position as to how the delay occurred and if Goyal had been prejudiced in any way on account of delay. This Court relied on the Principles laid down in A.r. A . R.S. Nayak (1992 (1) SCC 225), and said, that though that case pertained to criminal prosecution the principles . enunciated therein were broadly applicable to the pleas of delay in taking the disciplinary proceedings as well. Referring to decision in a.r. Antulay case this Court said: - "In paragraph 86 of the judgment, this Court mentioned the propositions emerging from the several decisions considered therein and observed that "ultimately the court has to balance and weigh the several relevant factors - balancing test or balancing process - and determine in each case whether the right to speedy trial has been denied in a given case.,' It has also been held that, ordinarily speaking, where the court comes to the conclusion that right to speedy trial of the accused has been infringed, the charges, or the conviction, as the case may be, will be quashed. At the same time, it has been observed that that is not the only course open to the court and that in a given case, the nature of the offence and other circumstances may be such that quashing the proceedings may not be in the interest of justice. In such a case, it has been observed, it is open to the court to make such other appropriate order as it finds just and equitable in the circumstance of the case.', In that case this Court said that it was more appropriate and in interest of justice as well as in the interest of .administration that inquiry which has proceeded to a large extent be allowed to be completed. At the same time the Court directed that Goyal 24 SN, J should be considered forthwith for promotion without reference io and without taking into consideration the charges or the pendency of the inquiry, if he is found fit for promotion'

19. It is not Possible to lay down any pre-determined principles ap p,licable to all cases and in all situati ons where there is delay in concluding the disciplinary Procee dings. Whether on that I round the disciplinary proceedings are td be terminated each ca se has to be examined on the facts and circumstances in that EA, . It could also be seen as to how mu ch disciplinary authority is serious in pursuing the charges against its employee. It is the basic Principle of administrative justice that an office r enterusted with a Particular job has to Perform honestly, efficientlY and in accordance with the rules. tes from this Path he is to suffer a penalty Prescribed. Nc,rma lly, di:elelinary-PsssediEsc. uItimately, the court is to balance these two diverse consideration. H) Th ADex Court, reoorted in 1999) in th iudq ent dated 3 1.O3.1 99 r scc 66 in Bha irathi Jena vs. 25 sN. I n

9. The question has also been raised in the appeal in regard to the payment of arrears of salary and other allowances payable to the appellant during the period he was.kept under suspension and upto the date of superannuation. Inasmuch as the enquiry had lapsed, it is, in our opinion, obvious that the appeilant would have to get the balance of the emoluments payable to him after deducting the suspension allowance that was paid to him during the above said period. r)

9. The question has also been raised in the appeal with regard to arrears of salary and allowances payable to the appellant during the period of his dismissal and upto the date of reinstatement. Inasmuch as the inquiry had lapsed, it is, in our opinion, obvious that the appellant would have to get the balance of the emoluments payable to him.

10. The appeals are, therefore, allowed and the judgment and order of the High Court are set aside and the reipondents are directed to pay arrears of salary and allowances payable to the appellant and also to pay him his all the retiral benefits in accordance with the rules and regulations as if there had been no disciplinary proceeding or order passed therein. No costs. 26 SN. J L4. This court opines that the judgment relied upon by the learrned Assistant Government Pleader for Services-I appearing on behalf of the respondents in "state of Madhay:r Pradesh vs. Akhilesh Jha And another, dated 09.06.2021 reported in (2021) 12 SCC 46()" in particular para No.15 of the said judgment does not apply to the facts of the present case, in view of the simple fact that in the present case, the charge sheet was issued against the petitionrer in the year 2OO3 and the enquiry against the petitioner concluded in the year 2OO8, but however, the order impugned had been passed against the petitioner imposing the punishment of dismissal from service, on O3.O3.2-O2O after the date of superannuation of petitioner ,,2g.o2.2o2o and the same however had been withdrawn and another order impugned, dated 20.09.2f,23 vide G.O.Rt.No.7L1 had been passed against the petitioner imposing the penalty of withholding of entire pension and gratuity permanently and recovery of Rs.5, ]a6,8g7 /- including interest erroneously, arriving at a predeltermined conclusion at the threshold itself without conducting anY enquirY. 27 SN, J Takino in

15. a) The aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case. considera tion:- b) The submissions made by the "learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner and tearned Assistant Government pleader for services-r appearing on behalf of the respondents c) The averments made in the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent No.1, the findings in the enquiry report in favour of the petitioner (referred to and extracted above) d) The contents of the order impugned, dated zo.og.zoz3, G.O.Rt.No.7l1 of the 1"t respondent e) The fact as borne on record that the order impugned is passed without any reasons and without any justification and had been passed after an inordinate delay of Ll years by the 1't respondent herein from the date of charge against the petitioner herein and after a lapse of L2 years on the date of receipt of enquiry report by the disciplinary Authority, clearly recording findings in favour of the petitioner herein indicating that the I 28 SN, J petitionelrdidnothaveanyroleinthemisappropriation andfiresabotageandtheorderimpugnedhavingbeen passed after a lapse of 11 years from the date of issue of noticecallingforexplanation,datbdo3.o3.2023 dismissing the petitioner from service and ordering recoverlr of misappropriated amount to the share of the petitioner to the tune of Rs.6, t6,689l. erroneously and whimsicallY. f) The judgments of the various courts(referred to and extracted above) and again enlisted below:- u (2006) s scc 44 ii) (?-024) 1 SCC 17s iii) (1e9e) 3 SCC 67e (iv) 19ee(1) A.P.L.J. 189(Hc) (v)(2oos) 6 scc 636 (viX1e98) 7 scc 84 (viix:1998) 4 SCC 1s4 (viii) (199e) 3scc 666 (ix) (:zo1.4) 7 Scc 260 g) The discussion and conclusion as arrived at para Nos.S to 14 of the Present order. This Court ooines that the imouoned order had been passect without anv iustification and without leqal basis anCl nor there is any orovision uncter the Telanqana State n. 29 SN, J unsustainable in the eve of law. The Writ Petition is allowed. the imou order- shall be no order as to costs. I I I i ,1 30 SN, J Miscellaneous petitions, if EflY' pending in this Writ Petition, shall stand closed' I Sd/. P.C. SULEKHA DEVI ASSISTANT REGISTRAR6 SECTION OFFICER /ffRUE COPY// To,

1. The Principal Secretary, MunicipalAdministration, And Urban Development Department, State of Telangand, Secretariat, Hyderabad-

2. The Commissioner, Great Hyderabad MunicipalCorporation, Tank Bund, Hyderabad.

3. Oner CC to SRl. S KRISHNA SHARMA, Advocate IOPUCI 4. Twq CCs to GP FOR SERVICES I ,High Court for the State of Telangana At Hyderabad.[OUTI

5. Two CD Copies DAN (b n HIGH COURT CC TODAY DATED:03/1 112025 ,q F &, ORDER WP.No.12588 of 2023 L UT -.N + ,$ + ALLOWING THE WRIT PETITION WITHOUT COSTS rofufre