The High Court · 2025

Bhupat! _Gattumallu, S/o. Kanakaiah, aged about 46 years, Occ lnspector of Police lT Cell, Rachakonda Police Commissionerate, R/o. H. No.11- 1Oi2S2t5O1, The Retreat, Road No. 2, Vijayapuri Colony, Beside ST. Martins School, RK Puram, Kothapet, Saroornagar, Hyderabad- 35. (Bhupathi is Sur Name of Gattumallu it is not mentioned in FIR) ...petitioner/Accused No. 3 AND 1 2 The State of Telangana, Through Jubliee hills Police Station, Rep. by its Public Prosecutor, High Court for the State of Telangana, Hyderabad. Chennupati Venu Madhav, S/o. Late C. Sambasiva Rao, Aged about 46 years, Occ Business, R/o. Villa No. 40, Aditya Fort View Villas, Secretariat Colony,Manikonda,RangareddyDistrict. ...De-factoComplainant ...Respondent Petition under Section 482 of Cr.P.C praying that in the circumstances stated in the Memorandum of Grounds of Criminal Petition, the High Court may be pleased to call for the records and quash the same in the proceedings in FlR. No. 30512024, dated 08.04.2024 on the file of Jubilee Hitts Police Station, Hyderabad Comm issionerate. l.A. NO: 2OF 2024 Petition under Section 482 of Cr.P.C praying that in the circumstances stated in the Memorandum of Grounds of Criminal Petition, the High Court may be pleased to stay of all further proceedings including not to arrest in FIR No. 30512024, dated 08. 04. 2024 on the file of Jubilee Hitts Police Station, Hyderabad Commissionerate, Pending disposal of above Crl.P. This Petition coming on for hearing, upon perusing the Memorandum of Grounds of Criminal Petition and upon hearing the arguments of Sri CH Venkat Raman, Advocate for the Petitioner and the Sri Rudresh Deshpande, Assistant Public Prosecutor on behalf of the Respondent No.1 and of Sri Gandham Durga Bose, Advocate for the Respondent No. 2. The Court made the following: ORDER THE HONOURABLE SMT. JUSTICE K. SUJANA CRIMINAL PETITION Nos.5O18, 5731 and B3O9 of20124 COMMON ORDER: Sincc.the issue involved in all these criminal petitions is one and lhe satne, they are being heard together and arc being decided by way of this common order.

2. Criminal Peririon Nos.5018, 5731 and 8309 of 2024 were filed bv accused Nos.3, 5, 6,7 and 8, resp,:<;tively, uhder Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1,) 73 (for short 'Cr.P.C.') to quash the proceedings against thr:m in Crime No.305 <tf 2024 of Jubliee Hills Police Station, Hyderabad, registererl irlr the offences punishable under Sections 3g6, 365, 34 I and 120(b) read with 34 of the Indian penal Code, l86O (for shorr 'lPC).

3. The brief facts of the cases are that responrJent No.2 in all the carst:s is one and the same. He lodged a complaint before the Policc against the petitioners and other accused stating that in the year 201 1, respondent I\1o.2 founded M/s. Kria Healthcare Seruices, providing affordable healthcare 2 srs,J CrLP.No.iOfi oJ 2021 and tut&h ;1 solutions in Andhra Pradesh. By the year 2016, the said Company.had grown signihcantly, operating 165 urban health centers, telemedicine facilities, and emergency vehicles These projects were established before the four part time Directors namely Gopal, Raj, Naveen and Ravi. Initially, respondent No.2 hired Mr. Balaji Utla as CEO and later few investors joined the company. By the end of financial year 2076-17, the said company had four shareholders, respondent No 2-Venu with 60%, Balaji with 2Oo/o, Gopal with 1O% and Raj with 1O%' The company has total six Directors, including two Full Time Directors, Venu ald Balaji, and four part-time directors, Gopal, Raj, Naveen and Ravi. However, things took a dark turn in the year 2O18. Four Part-Time Directors pressurized respondent No.2 to sell his 607o shares at a low value' One Chandrasekhar Vege is the Managing Director and CEO of Goldfish Abode Private Limited, is the neighbor of resPondent No.2 and engaged in construction business, approached him in the month of March, 2018 for an investment in his Goldhsh Company. Four Part Time Directors teamed up with the said Chandrasekhar Vege, who pretended to help respondent No'2 but secretly worked with the said Directors. 3 sl<s,J C.LP.No.5O[8 <'f 2024 and tutch 4- [t is fnrther stated that on Novembr r 22, 2078, respondent No.2 was kidnapped by DCP Radha Kishan and his tcam, a llegedly on the orders of influential individuals. The kidnappers forced respondent No.2 to sign away his shares wiLhout compensation by showing guns and sticks. The said Chandrasekhar Vege and the said four Part Time Directors of Kria Healthcare threatened him, citing connections with powerful people. They demar-r,Ced silence, \ rarning of rlire consequences if he sought legzrl action or media a[tention. They entered into an agreeme]-r t and taken shares in their favour and released respondent No.2. Thereafter, rvhen respondent No.2 has seen the arrest of DCP- Radha Kish:r n on television; he felt safe enough to report the incident to the Police and accordingly, he urged the Hyderabaci ('itv Police to investigate into the l<idnapping, threats, and fraudulent activities perpetrated by the said Chandrasekl'rar Vege, the four part-time directors, and the ofhcials, s,ho involved and that he sought prc,tection for himself and his firmily members. Basing cn the said complaint, the Police registered a case in Crime No.305 of 2024 of Jubliee Hills Police Station, Hyderabad, for the SKS'J CrLP.No.sOla oJ 2024 d d batch :i..r{-r,! offences punishable under Sections 386, 365, 341 and 12O(b) read with 34 of IPC.

5. Heard Sri B. Adinarayana Rao, learned Senior Counsel, representing Pillix Law Firm, appearing on behalf of the petitioners in Cr1.P.No.5O18 of 2024, Sri Ravi Kiran Rao, learned Senior Counsel, representing Sri Aruva Raghuram Mahadev, learned counsel appearing on behaif of the petitioner in Crl.P.No.573l of 2024, Sri Ch. Venkat Raman, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner in Crl.P.No.8309 of 2024 as well as Sri Rudresh Deshpa4de, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf of respondent-State in CrI.P.Nos.5O18 and 5731 of 2024, Sri Palle Nageshwar Rao, learned Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf of the respondent-State in Cr.P.No.83O9 of 2024 and Sri Gandham Durga Bose, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No.2.

6. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the petitioners are law-abiding citizens; they did not commit any offence as alleged in the complaint and that there is an unreasonable delay in frling the complaint i.e., six years after 5 SI<S,J CrLP.No.SOla ol 2024 ddd bd,tch the alleged incident and the same lacks satisfactory explanation. I{e further submitted that the conrplaint was hled after thc arrest of accused No.I-DCP Radha Krshan, which is trnclear and unsatisfactory and that initially complaint zrgainst accused No.2-Chandrashekar Vege was lodged by respondent No.2 and the same was registered as Crime No. 1O55 of 2023, which contains the samr-. allegations as allegcd in the present complaint, however, by erlleging the offe nces of k idnapping and extortion, and by ir cluding the peLitioners. l'herefore, registering second FIR wir_tr the same facts violates Sections 154 and 156 of Cr.P.O, which is nothing but a ttuse of process of law.

6.1. Learne<l counsel for the petitioners further submitted that thc pres( nr complaint is an afterthought, contradicting the initial cornplaint i_e., FIR No. 1O55 ot 2023, lodged by respondent No. 2. Primarily, respondent No.2 himself has translerred 2 l;rkh shares voluntary, but now alleges extortion, kidnapping, zurd rvrongful restraint. He further submitted that this incon sistency suggests that the present ccmpiaint is fabncated onh, to harass the petitioners. Learned counsel for the petitioners contended that the allegations in th<: complaint SI(S,J crLP.No.'O7a ol 2024 and tutch are absurd and inhere ntly improbable He speciltcally contended that respondent No.2 initially stated that the petitioners voluntarily sold their remaining shares for Rs. l,7O,0O,O0O/-, but now claims that he was kidnapped and coerced into signing off those shares, which is contradictory to the complaint.

6.2. Learned counsel further submitted that the allegations in the complaint are false and even if they are considered to be true, they do not constitute an offence under Sections 365 and 341 of the IPC. Respondent No.2 allegedly deceived and misappropriated an amount of Rs.14 crores from accused Nos.6, 7, and 8, leading to a criminal breach of trust, as such, the said accused lodged a complaint against respondent No'2 and the sarne was registered as Crime No.644 of 20 18 for the offences punishable under Sections 42O and 506 of IPC'

6.3. Leamed counsel for the petitioners contended that Section 386 of IPC which relates to extortion does not apply here. To constitute an offence of extortion, there must be an element of inducing fear to obtain property, valuable security, or something signed/ sealed that could become a valuable 7 sxs,J CiLP.No.SOIA ol2024 atud. tutch security. In the present case, even if the allegations are considcred to b(' true, there is no evidence of inducing fear to obtain propr:rty or valuable security. Respondent No.2 claims that the p('titioners were coerced into signing a settiement agreement, but thev did not explain the conl.ents of the agreement or lrow it is being utilized by the accus,:d. Notably, the alleged settlemcnt deed, which was supposedly signed on November 2. 2O\8, in the ofhce of accused No.1, was never utilizecl, an<l no settlement deed was hled with the Registrar of Companies

6.4. Learned counsel for the petitioners furthe;: submitted that to attriict the charge under Section 12OB ol IPC, there must bc an .rgrccmcnt between at lcast two peopl-' to commit an unlavr,lul zrct or to carry out a lawful act through illegal means, Essentially, a "meeting of minds" is necessary to prove conspiracl . In the present case, the complaint nrerntions that CI Gattu :rnd Krishna were instructed to draft a settlemenl agreement in the office of DCP.

6.5. Learnecl c:ounsel for the petitioners further contended that the allegations of kidnapping and coercion to sign away C?LP.No.SOIA oJ 2024 and Dd,trh shares seem to be unfounded and contradictory to the established procedures for share transfer under the Companies Act, 2013. To transfer shares, a proper transfer deed in Form SH.4, duly stamped and executed by both the transferor and transferee, must be delivered to the Company within 60 days from the date of execution. This form requires the details such as the name, address, and occupation of the transferee. Additionally, stamp duty must be paid, and two witnesses must attest the transfer deed. Even that respondent No.2 did not claim to have signed Form SH.4 or receive consideration for their shares, the allegations. of kidnapping and threats to sign away shares appear to be false and improbable.

6.6. lrarned counsel for the petitioners incessantly contended that the petitioners were not involved in the transactions between respondent No.2. and accused No.2, as they have already filed cases against each other. The only accusation against the petitioners is that they pressurized respondent No.2 to resign from the company i.e., M/s. Kria Healthcare Private Limited, which led to a settlement deed being forcibly executed on November 2, 2018, allegedly with 9 srs,J CrLP-llo.sola of 2024 and tutch the use of guns. Hou,ever, respondent No. 2 has not explained the contents of Lhis settlcment deed or how it is trcing utilized by the accused.

6.7. Learned counsel submitted that Kria Healthcare Private Limited was originalll. founded as Vasanthi HR Consultancy Services Private Limited on October l, 2OO9, by Kiran Babu Chundru and Phani Raja Kumari Meka. 'I'he company underwent namc changc, becoming Uber Gang Marketing Consultants Private Limited on July ).6, 2Ol1, and hnaliy, Kria Healtht:are Private Limited on February 6,, 2016- This means respondent No.2 cannot be the founder Djrector of Kria Healthcare, oontrary to their claims. Additionally, the alleged allotment ol' 165 prin-ran health care centers to Firia in 2074 by the Govcrnment of Andhra Pradesh is also lalse, as Kria Healthcar,'does r)ol exisl until 2OI6.

6.8. The credibility of Respondent No. 2 is questionable due to suppressed information about FIR No.644 o1 2O18 and receipt of payment upon leaving Kria Company. This raises concerrr as rr:spondent No. 2 has a history of liling and being involved in multiple cases, including counter cases with 10 srs,J CrLP-No.sOlA oJ 2024 a^d tut h accused No.2. The fact that respondent No.2 typically files complaints promptly when grievances arise contradicts their current reasoning for delaying the complaint until the arrest of accused No. 1 . Learned counsel further submitted that the complaint of respondent No.2 is malicious and driven by an ulterior motive to usurp the shares of the company. Further, respondent No.2 filed the present complaint aiming to coerce the Directors into a settlement and, transferring shares at a lower price. Therefore, the allegations leveled against Lhe petitioners are vague and baseless and they do not constitute any offence as alleged by respondent No.2 and prayed the Court to quash the proceedings.

7. In support of the submissions of the petitioners, they relied upon the Judgments of the Hon,ble Supreme Court are as follows:

7.1 In Thulia Kali v. R.M.D.The State of Tanilnadu r, wherein in paragraph No. 12, it is held as follows: "12. It is in the evidence of Valanjiaraju that the house of Muthuswami is at a distance of three 'rszz 1:1 scc:st ,a 11 srs,J CrLP-No-sOta o! 2024 d,td tutch fullongs from the village oI Vatanjiaraju. t'olice Strltion Valavanthi is also at a distance of lhree frrrlongs from the house of Muthuswami. Ass.rming th,rt Mllthus\^,ami PW u'as not found at his house till 10.30 p.m. on March 12, 1970, by Valanjiaraju, it rs not clear as to why no report was lodge,l by Valanjiaraju at the police statron. It is, i;r our opinion. most diJficult to believe that even thorrgh th('accused had tleen seen at 2 p.m. committing the murder of Madhandi deceased and a large nttrrber of villagers had been told about it soon thereafter, no report about the occurrence could be lodge(l titl thc following day. The police station was less than t$.r mil( s from thc village of Valanjiaraju and K,rpia anrl their failure to make a report to the poli.( ti1l the follorving day would tend to show that ncne of tht'm had u,itnessed the occurrence. It seems lil.:ely, as has been stated on behalf of the accused. :hat the villagers came to know of the death ol Madhztrrdi de('ease(l on lhe cvening of March t2, 1970. They di(l not lhen kno$' about the actual assailant ('f the det'ease<l. and on the following day, their susF,i( ion Iell on the accused and accordingly they invllved hirn in this case. First information report in a crirninal case is an extremely vital and vahrurble piece of evidence [or the purpose of corroborlting the oral evrdence adduced at the trial. 'lhe importance of the above report can hardly' be overestimated from the standpoint of the accrtsed. Thc object of rnsisting upon prompt lodging o' the report to the police in respect of commission (,[ an offence rs to obtain early information regardin6l i]re circumstances in which the crime was committed, the rlames of the actual culpnts and the part plrved by rhem as rvell as the names o[ eyewitnesses a_ ! srs,J CrLP.No.sOlA ol2024 a^., tutEh present at the scene o[ occurrence. Delay in lodging the first information report quite often results in embellishment which is a creature of afterthought. On account of delay, the report not only gets bereft of the advantage of spontaneity, danger creeps in of the introduction of coloured version, exaggerated account or concocted story as a result of deliberation and consultation. It is, therefore, essential that the delay in the lodging of the frrst information report should be satisfactorily explarned. In the present case, Kopia, daughter-in- law of Madhandi deceased, according to the prosecution case, was present when the accused made murderous assault on the deceased. Vatanj iaraj u, step-son of the deceased, is also atleged to have arrived near the scene of occurrence on being told by Kopia. Neither of them, nor any other villager, who is stated to have been told about the occurrence by Valanjiaraju and Kopia, made any report at the police station for more than 20 hours after the occurrence, even though the police station is only two miles from the place of occurrence. The said circumstance, in our opinion, would ralse considerable doubt regarding the veracity of the evidence of those two witnesses and point to an inhrmity in that evidence as would render it unsafe to base the conviction of the accused appellalt upon it. " 13 sxs,J CrLP-No.SOLA of 2024 and tutch ,/.

7.2 In Hasmukhlal D. Vora & Ors v. State of Tamilnadu2, wherein in paragraph No.24, it is held as follows: "24. While inordinate delay in itself nLa-y not bc ground for quashing of a criminal complaint, in srrch cases, unexplained inordinate delay c,f such lellgth must be taken into consideration as a very crucial factor as grounds for quashing a cininal complaint."

7.3 In Mohmood AIi & Ors v. State of Uttar pradesh & Ors3, wherein in paragraph No.13 it is held as frrllows: "13. At this stage, we woulcl like to obr;(:rve somethinEl important. Whenever an accused cotnes beiore the Court invoking either the inherent pou.ers Lrnder Section 482 of th,e Code of Crrntinal Procedtrre (CrPC) or extraordinan juris(liction under Artrcle 226 ot the Constitution to get the FIR or the <:riminal proceedings quashed essentially on the ground that such proceedin!s are manifirstl\. frrvolous or vexatious or instituted with the ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance, then in such circurnstances the Court owes a duty to look rnto the FIR with care and a little more closcly. We say so because once the complainant decides to prfoeed against the accused with an ulterior moti\e for wreaking personal vengeance, etc., then he rvorrld ensure that the FIR/complaint is very rvelt dratted ' zozz 1rs1 scc t o+ r 2023 scc onLine sC a5o )-4 srs,J CrLP.No.SOra o! 2024 dnd. tut'h with alt the necessary pleadings The complainant would ensure that the averments made in the FIR/comptaint are such that they disclose the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence. Therefore, it will not be just enough for the Court to look into the averments made in the FlR/complaint alone for the purpose of ascertaining whether the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence are disclosed or not- [n frivolous or vexatious proceedings, the Court owes a duty to Iook into many other attending circumstances emerging from the record of the case over and above the averments and, i[ need be, with due care and circumspection try to read in between the lines The Court white exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC or Article 226 of the Constitution need not restrict itself only to the stage of a case but is empowered to take into account the overall circumstances teading to the initiation/ registration of the case as well as thc materials collected in the course of investigation. Take for instance the case on hand. Multipte FtRs have been registered over a period of time. It is in the background of such circumstances the registration of multiple FIRs assumes importance, thcreby attracting the issue of wreaking vengeance out of private or personal grudge as alleged."

7.4 In T. T. Antony v. State of Kerala & Orsa, wherein in paragraph Nos.19, 20,22 and 27, it is held as under: o zoot 161 scc tst 1 \ 15 SKS,J crLP.No.sola oJ 2024 d d tutch "19. The scheme of CrPC is that an officor in charSie of a police station has to com'nence investigation as provided in Section 156 or 157 CrPC on the basis of entry o[ the first inforrnalion report, on coming to know of the commissior o[ a cogniz.able offence. On completion of investig:rtion and on the basis of the evidence collected, he h:rs to form an opinron under Section 169 or 170 Crl)(1, as thc casc may be, and forward his report lo the Ma€listrate concerned under Section 173(2) CrPC. Hor,r,ever, even after hling such a report, if he :r,mes into possession of further information or matorial, hc need not register a fresh FIR, he is empower(xl to ma ke frlrther investigation, normally with the leave oI Ihe court, artd where during further investig.rtion he collects fr-rrther evidence, oral or documen lary, he is obliged to forward the same with one or tnore further reports, this is the import of sub-sectior-r (8) of :iecti()n 173 CrPC. 20 From the above discussion it followlr that under tl)e scheme of the provisions of Section:; 154, 15.!). t56, 157, 162, 169, 17O and 173 CrP(l onll' thc earliest or the first information in regard to the commission of a cognizable offence satisfies the requirements of Section 154 CrPC- Thus there (:an be no sccond FIR and consequently there can b: no fresh investigation on receipt of every subsequent information in respect of the same cognizable offt'nce or the same occurrence or incident 3iving rls(' to one or more cognizable offences. On rer:eipt of information about a cognizable oflence rrr an incident giving rise to a cognizable offen,)r or offr'nces and on entering the FIR in the slatron t6 srs,J CrLP.No.sOla of 2024 d^d bdtah house diary, the officer in charge of a police station has to investigate not merely the cognizable offence reported in the FIR but also other connected offences found to have been committed in the course of the same transaction or the same occurrence and hle one or more reports as provided in Section 173 CrPC.

22. On a perusal of thejudgment of this Court in M. Krishna v. State of Karnataka [(19991 3 SCC 247 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 3971 we do not find anything contra to what is stated above- The case is distinguishable on facts of that case. In the case on hand the second FIR is filed in respect of the same incident and on the same facts after about three years.

27. A just balance between the fundamental rights of the citizens under Articles [9 and 2l of the Constitution and the expansive power of the potice to investigate a cognizable offence has to be struck by the court. There cannot be any controversy that sub-section (8) of Section 173 CrPC empowers the police to make further investigation, obtain further evidence (both oral and documentary) and forward a further report or reports to the Magistrate- [n Narang case Il979l 2 SCC 322 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 479] it was, however, observed that it would be appropriate to conduct further investigation with the permission of the court. However, the sweeping power of investigation does not warrant subjecting a citizen each tilne to fresh investigation by the police in respect of the same incident, giving rise to one or more cognizable offences, consequent upon hling of 1 77 sr(s-J crLP.No.so.t B oJ 2024 o]..d b{:tch srrccessive FlRs whether before or atter filinta the final report under Section 173(2) CrpC- It $/ould c)early be beyond the purview of Sections 154 and l5tr CrPC, nay, a case of abuse of the statutory porver of investigation in a given case. In our riew a casc of fresh investigation based on the seccnd or su(ccssive FlRs, not being a counter_case, filed in cor)nr.ctlon with the same or connected cognizable of,i,nce alleged to have been committed irr r he co rrs, o[ the same lransaction and tn resp(.cl of which pursuant to the first FIR either investigation is urrrler u a-v or final report under Section 173(2) lra: b(.en forwarded lo the Magistrate, may be ir llt casc firr exercise of power under Section 4g2 ,lrllc or under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution." 7 .5 In Amitabhai AniI Chandra Shah v. Central Bureau of Investigation, and Orss, wherein in paragraph Nr>s.36 to 3g, it is held as ft)llow-s 3(r. Now, let us consider the legat aspects rais,td b,\ the petitioncr Amit Shah as well as CBL.flrr: factrrrrl details rvhich we have discussed in tlx: earJicr paragraphs show that right from tlrr. inceplion of entrustment of investigation to CBI tD order dated 12 t.2o1o l(2o tol 2 scc 200 : (2O1Cl 2 SCC {Cri) 10061 ti filing of the charge_sheet dared 1-() 2012, this Court has also treated the allege,C Iake ('ncoLlnter of Tulsiram prajapati to be ar.t oulconle oI one single conspiracy alleged to hav,: been lratched in November 2O05 which ultimatt.l,z 'zor:101 scc :as // 18 srs'J crLP.No.SOlE ol2024 dnd. bt h (, 1 culminated in 2006. ln such circumstances, the hling of the second FIR and a fresh charge-sheet for the same is contrary to the provisions of the Code suggesting that the petitioner was not being investigated, prosecuted and tried "in accordance with lav/'.

37. This Court has consistently laid down the law on the issue interpreting the Code, that a second FIR in respect of an offence or different offences committed in the course of the same transaction is not only impermissible but rt violates Article 21 of the Constitution. [n T.T. Antony [(2001) 6 SCC 181 : 2OO1 SCC (Cri) loaSl , this Court has categorically held that registration of second FIR (which is not a cross-case) is violative of Article 21 of the Constitution. The following conclusion in paras 19, 2O and 27 of that judgment are relevant which read as under: (SCC pp. 196 97 e' 2OOl "19. The scheme of CrPC is that an ofhcer in charge of a police station has to commence investigation as provided in Section 156 or 157 CrPC on the basis of entry o[ the first information report, on coming to know of the commission of a cognizable offence. On completion of investigation and on the basis of the evidence collected, he has to form al opinion under Section 169 or l7O CrPC, as the case may be, and forward his report to the Magistrate concerned under Section i73(2) CrPC. However, even after hling such a rePort, if he comes into possession of further information or material, he need not register a fresh FIR; he is empowered to make further investigation, normally with the leave \ \ 19 SI(S,J C.LP-No.5Ola oJ 2024 and. bdtch of the court, and where during further investigation he collects further evidence, oral or docuflrentary, he is obliged to fonvard the same with one ()r more frrrther reports; this is the import of sub-se( tion (8) oi Section I73 CrPC.

20. Fronr the above discussion it followsr that ur)der the sr:heme of the provisions of Sectionsr 154, 155. 156, 157, 162, 169, l7O and 173 Cr[,C only the ear-liest or the first information in regard lo the commission of a cognizable offence satisfies the rcquirements of Section 154 CrPC. Thus therr: can bc no sr:cond FIR and consequently there car lle no fr( sh investigation on receipt of every subse(luent irrlbrmzrtion in respect of the same cogniz;rble oilence or the same occurrence or incident giving rise to one or more cognizable Offences. On rcceipt ol rnlormation about a cognizable offence or an int rdenr giving rise to a cognizable offenc,: or ol[,:nr:es an<i on entering the FIR in the st(rtion horrsr: dian, the officer in charge of a police stzrtion hirs to investigate not merely the cognizable offence rc[)orte(l rn the FIR but also other connected oflr.nc es found to have been committed r the collrsc of the same transaction or the same oc( Llrrence and file one or more reports as prcvided in Section 173 CrPC.

17. A just balance between the fundame ntal rights of the citizens under Articles 19 and 21 of the Constrtution and the expansive power of the Pclice to rnvcstigate a cognizable offence has to be slruck by the court. There cannot be any controversy that sub sectron (8) of Section 173 CrPC empowers the L 20 srs,J CiLP-N'.5Or' of 2024 dnd tutch police to make further investigation, obtain lurther evidence (both oral and documentary) and forward a further report or reports to the Magistrate. In Narang case {Ram Lal Narang v. State (Delhi Admn.), (1979) 2 SCC 322 : 1979 SCC (Cri) a79l it was, however, observed that it woutd be appropriate to conduct further investigation with the permission of the court. However, the sweeping power of investigation does not warrant subjecting a citizen each time to fresh investigation by the police in respect of the same incident, giving rise to one or more cognizable offences, consequent upon filing of successive FIRS whether before or after hting the frnal report under Section 173(21 CrPC. It would clearly be beyond the puwiew of Sections 154 and 156 CrPC, nay, a case of abuse of the statutory pnwer of investigation in a given case. In our view a case of fresh investigation based on the second or successive FIRS, not being a counter-case, filed in connection with the satne or connected cognizable offence alleged to have been committed in the course of the same transaction and in respect of which pursuant to the ltrst FIR either investigation is under way or final report under Section 173(21 has been forwarded to the Magistrate, may be a ht case for exercise of power under Section 482 CrPC or under Arlicles 2261227 ofthe Constitution." The above referred declaration of law by this Court has never been diluted in any subsequent judicial pronouncements even while carving out exceptions. \ 27 srs,J CrLP.No.SOIa of 2024 dnd tutch il8 Mr Raval, Iearned ASG, by referring T.T. Anlonv [(2001) 6 SCC 181 :2001 SCC (Cri) tO48] sul)mitted that the said principles are not applicable anrl relevant to the facts and circumstances o' Lhis cast' as rhe said ;udgment laid down the ratio that Lh(r(' cannot be two FlRs relating to the serrne offr':rcc or occurrence. The Iearned ASG further Poinled out that in the present case, there ar(. two dislinct incrdcnts/ occurrences, inasmuch as ,:ne being the conspiracy relating to the murd(.r of Solrrabuddin \.!,ith the help of Tulsiram PrajrrPati an(l the other being the conspiracy to murder a potential witness to the Tulsiram Pra.laltati - earlier conspiracy to murder Sohrabuddin. Wt are unal)le to accept the claim of the learned ASG. As a malrcr oI fact, the aforesaid proposition of ]aw making registratron of fresh FIR impermissible and violative of Article 21 of the Constitution is reitcrated and reaffrrmed in the follo.ving subsequent de(:isions of this Court : (l) Upkar Singh v. Ved Prakash [(2004) 13 SCC 292; 2005 SCC (Ori) 2l1l . 12) Babrrbhai v. State of cujarat I(2010) 12 SC(' 254 : (2{) I I ) 1 SCC (Cri) 3361 , (3) CtLirra Shirraj v. State of A.P. [(2010) 14 SCC 444 : (2t). 1) 3 S( rC (Cri) 757 : AIR 20 1 1 SC 6oal , and (al C. Munrzrppan \,. State ot T.N. [(2O10) 9 SCC 5(ri' : (20lo) 3 SCC (Cri) t4o2l ln C. Muniappan I(2010 9 SC(l 567 : (20IO) 3 SCC (Cri) 14021 this Court explained the 'consequence test" i.e. if an offt.nce formrnB part of the second FIR arises as a cons('quence of the offence atleged in the frrst FIR then ofl-ences covered by both the FlRs are the sirroe and. accordingl\', the second FIR will be impcr missiblc in law. [n other words, the offerces 22 s,(s,J CrLP.No.SOla oJ 2024 d d tutch ? covered in both the FlRs shall have to be treated as a part of the flrst FlR." 7 .6 In Surender Kaushik & Ors v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors6, wherein in paragraph No.24, it is held as follows: "24. From the aforesaid decisions, it is quite luminous that the lodgment of two FIRS is not permissible in respect of one and the same incident. The concept of sameness has been given a restricted meaning. It does not encompass filing of a counter FIR relating to the same or connected cognizable offence . What is prohibited is any further complaint by the same complainant and others against the same accused subsequent to the registration of the case under the Code, for an investigation in that regard would have already commenced and allowing registration of further complaint would amount to an improvement of the facts mentioned in the original complaint. As is further made clear by the three-Judge Bench in Upkar Singh [Upkar Singh v. Ved Prakash, (2004) 13 SCC 292 ; 20O5 SCC (Cri) 21ll , the prohibition does not cover the allegations made by the accused in the first FIR alteging a different version of the same incident. Thus, rival versions in respect of the same incident do take different shapes and in that event, Iodgrnent of two FlRs is permissible." t zot: (s) scc raa 23 srs,J C.LP.No.5O.|8 ol 2024 aad tutch 7 .7 In Rajiv Thappar and Ors v. Madan Lal Kapoor 7 , wherein in paragraph No.29, it is held as under rt would negate "29. The issue being examined in the instant case rs thc ;urisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC, if it chooses to quash the initiation of the prosecutlon against an accust:d at the stage of issuing process, or at the stit€le of committal, or even at the stage of framrng of charges. 'lhese are all stages before the cornnrencement of the actual trial. The same parameters woulcl naturally be available for later stages as l\ell. The power vested in the High Court un(ler Section 482 CrPC, at the stages refen.ed to hereinabove, would have far reaching consequences inasmuch as prose<:ul ion s/complarnant's case without allowing thc l)rosecu t ion/ complainant to lead evidence. Such a detcrrnin:rtion must always be rendered rvith caution, carc and circumspection. To invoke its inIrcr-ent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrpO the lligir (lourt has to be fully satisfied that the marerial Dro,luce(l b\ tlle a.cused is such tliat would le,xl to the conclusion that his/their defence is baseC on sound. reasonable, and indubitable facts; the material produced is such as would rule out and displa<'e the assertions contained in the charges levelle(l agarnst the accused; and the material produced is such as would clearly reject and overrule the veracity of the allegations contained in l.he prosecution / complainant It should be sufhcient to accusations levelled 'zor: 1:1 scc:ro 24 sr(s,J C"LP.No-so7a oJ 2024 ond batch rule out, reject and discard the accusations levelled by the prosecution/ complalnant, without the necessity o[ recording any evidence. For this the material relied upon by the defence should not have been refuted, or alternatively, cannot be justifiably refuted, being material of sterling and impeccable quality. The material relied upon by the accused should be such as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the actual basis of the accusations as false. In such a situation, the judicial conscience of the High Court would persuade it to exercise its power under Section 482 CrPC to quash such criminal proceedings, for that would prevent abuse of process of the court, and secure the ends ofjustice."

8. Per contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No.2, filed counter affidavit denying the averments made in the criminal petitions stating that on 22.11.2018, respondent No.2 was kidnapped and coerced transferring of shares of KRIA (a company valued at Rs.10O crores) to four part-time directors (Accused Nos.6,7,8 and 10). He further submitted that the kidnapping was orchestrated by accused Nos. 1, 2, and the four part-time directors, with the help of accused Nos.3 and 4-Police ofhcials. He further submitted that respondent No.2 lodged the present complaint after the arrest of accused No. 1, seeking investigation into the kidnapping, coercion, and financial losses. Therefore, learned 25 sr(s,J CrLP.No.5Ola ol 2024 d'rd. b(Itch counsel lor respondent No.2 prayed the court to conduct a rigorous, unbiased review of the orchestrated efforts made by all accused to trndermine financial stability and violation of legal rights through threats, coercion, anrl fraudu]ent activities.

8. 1. lrarncd Public Prosecutor and Assistant public Prosecutor filed cour-rter affidavit stating that ir-r December 2O18, accused No.2 owed 4 lakh KRIA shares of respondent No.2 valued at Rs.4O crores but delayed payme nt. Accused No.2 offered respondent No.2 a position at Goldfish with past dues in March 2O19. During thc tenure of responclent No.2 in Kria Company, four Part Time Directors uncovered legal issues and staf[ misconduct, prompting thei: departure. Thereafter. accused No.2 admitted his involvement in kidnapping respondent No.2 with accused No. 1-l)Cp Radha Kishan and lbur part-time directors and that ac,:used No.2 received an extra 10 r;rores for double-dealing. Accused No.2 threatened respondenr No.2 and their family, cit:rLg potential retaliation from DCP Radha Kishan. II 76 sxs,J CrLP.No.SOl8 oJ 2024 did tut h a.2. Learned Public Prosecutor and Assistalt Public Prosecutor further submitted that accused No.5, managed transactions of accused No.1 and participated in coercive mee trngs, supported intimidation efforts of accused No. 1, enforced illegal demands, and made threatening calls to respondent No.2, accused No.6 is a master litigator with influence, approved the kidnapping and accused No.8 is the partner of Naveen Yerneni, was part of the kidnapping plan. Therefore, Section 386 IPC applies to all the accused due. to kidnapping and transferred shares forcibly. He further submitted that the case is under investigation to determine the applicability of Section 386 of IPC. Respondent No.2 delayed in lodging the complaint due to fear of accused No.1, but gained conhdence after learning of his arrest. Therefore, the allegations against the petitioner are serious in nature, quashing of proceedings against the petitioner, at this stage, does not arise. Hence, he prayed the Court to dismiss the criminal petitions. g. In the light of the submissions made by the parties and a perusal of the material available on record, it appears that the there is a delay of five years in lodging the FIR lor the )', crLp.No-st t8 of 2rl24 "^o";llo alleged illegal ::cts. It is specifically contendec by the learned counsel for the petitioners that there was a fir,e_year delay in lodging the cornplaint due to life threats to respondent No. 2 and his family lrom accused No. i and that the settlement deed was obtained under threat, but its clarity and authenticitl- are disputed. On going through the said contentions, Lhc version of respondent No.2 is that there is a life threat to respondent No.2 from accused lrlo. l, as such, after the arrest of accused No. i in other case, respondent No.2 lodged the prescnt complaint, and therefore, there is a delay in lodging the complaint. In addition to that the shares were sold forciblv k; the pedtioners at a lower value. Admittedly, respondent No.2 received Rs. l,7O,0O,OO O/_ t.tr two lakh strares (face value Rs.10 each, but sold at Rs.gS F,er share).

10. Upon a meticulous examination of the :ecord and submissions madc by both parties, one of the contention of the pefitioner is that the offence under Section .3g6 of IpC rs not applicable to the accused. For an offence under Section 3g6 to be established, there must br: intentional inducement of I'ear of death or grievous hurt to c.ompel the (Extortion) 2a srs,J CfLP.No.SOl A ol2024 aad batch victim to deliver property or valuable securit5r. At this stage, it is pertinent to note Section 3g6 of IpC, which reads as under: "386. Extortion by putting a person in fear of death or grievous hurt.- Whoever commits extortion by putting any person in fear of death or of grievous hurt to that person or to arly other, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to hne." . 1 1 . However, there is no credible evidence indicating that the petitioners induced such fear to unlawfully obtain the shares of Respondent No.2. On the contrary, the records clearly demonstrate that RespondenI No.2 voluntarily transferred 2 lak]n shares for a substantial consideration of Rs. 1.7 crores, which translates to Rs. g5 per share (calculated by dividing the total consideration of Rs. 1,7O,0O,OOO by the total shares transferred, i.e., 2,0O,000 shares). This payment was made as part of a mutually agreed transaction, indicating a legitimate share transfer process rather than one made under coercion or extortion.

12. Furthermore, the alleged settlement agreement, which is claimed to have been signed under coercion, was neither _.] c 29 sr(s,J CrLP.No.sOlA o.f :2024 aftd. batch utilized nor registered with the Registrar of Companies, indicating that the accused did not attempt to exploit the document for any unlawful gain. The complainant'sl claim that the settleme nt agreement was signed unde r threat is unsubstantiated, particularly when the alleged agreement was never enforced or used to gain an unfair advarrtage. The complainant s inconsistent statements, where he initialiy claimed a voluntary share transler and later allegerd coercion, further weaken the reliability of his accusations. The absence of any evidence demonstrating inducement of fear of death or gnevous hurl to obtain property or valuable security makes it clear that the essential ingredients required to attract Section 386 IPC are completely absent. Therefore, the chztrges under this provision are liable to be quashed.

13. Howevcr, the allegations concerning the ortrer offences punishable under Sections 365, 341, and 120E} of IPC require thorough examination during a full-fledged inves tigation. At this stage, it is pertinent to note that while ex.ercising its powers under Sectio n 482 Cr .P.C., the High (lourt must recogoize its limitations and refrain from a'11ing as an appellate or revisional court. The Court should employ its I 30 srs,J CrLP-No-sOla of 2024 a/ril tutch I inherent jurisdiction judiciously, cautiously, and sparingly, avoiding premature decisions in cases where the facts are incomplete or unclear, the evidence is insufficient, or the issues are complex and require comprehensive scrutiny. Since there are allegations against the petitioners involving the kidnapping of Respondent No.2 and taking him to the office of accused No. 1, which is purportedly supported by CCTV footage and WhatsApp messages (though CCTV footage not filed before this Court), the allegations cannot be dismissed as vague or baseless. Therefore, the charges under Sections 365, 341, and 12OB of IPC require a full-fledged investigation to determine their validity and merit.

14. In view thereof, these Criminal Petitions are allowed in part quashing.of the proceedings against the petitioners for the offence punishable under Section 386 of IPC in Crime No.3O5 of 2024 of Jubliee Hills Police Station, Hyderabad. However, the Police are directed to conclude the investigation for the offences punishable under sections 365,341, and 12OB of IPC' Further, since the punishment prescribed for the remaining offences alleged against the petitioners is less than seven (07) years, this Court deems it appropriate to direct the petitioners 31 sr(s,J CrLP.No.SOla oJ 2024 o.^d brrtch to appear before the Investigating Ofhcer and in turn the Investigating Ofhcer is directed to follow the procedure laid down under Section 35 (3) of BNSS (previously section 4l,A of Cr.P.C.) and also the guidelines formulated t,y the Honble Supreme ClourL in Arnesh Kumar o. State of Bihar z scrupulously. However, the petitioners shall co.operate with the Investigating Officer as and when required by furnishing information and documents as sought by him in concluding the investigation. The petitioners shall lile all the documents u,hich he ought to file to prove that it do not corne under the criminal offences and the Investigating Officer shall consider the same before filing appropriate report before the Magistrate. Miscellaneous petitions, if any pending, shall also stand closed 8Azot4)8 1cc 213 I oT SD/. P. PADMANABHA DEPUTY REGI DDY TRAR //TRUE COPYII SECTION OFFICER Hyderabad. (OUT) 1 The XVll Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, at Na.rrpally, Hyderabad 2. The station House officer, Jubiree Hifls porice Station, Hyderibai District. 3. Two CCs to Public prosecutor, High Court for the State cf Telangana at 4. One CC to Sri Pillix Law Firm, Advocate [OPUC] 5. One CC to Sri Aruva Raghuram, Advocaie tOpUCI 6. One CC to Sri Gandham Durga Bose, Advocate lCieUCl 7 One CC to Sri Ch. Venkat Raman, Advocate tOpUCl B. Two CD Copies DL/PSLv I HIGH COURT DATED:17103t2025 COMMON ORDER CRLP.Nos.5018,573't and 8309 of 2024 lHE : IAr (. +o (-1 0 3 Ai,ii 2025 '-i< t t) I gA PI TC H c ) .4. ' ALLLOWING THE CRIMINAL PETITIONS \ W