The High Court · 2025

This Petition conring on for hearing, upon perusing the Mt:morandum of Grounds of Criminal Petition and upon hearing the arguments of Sri .S.Madan Mohan Rao, Advocate frlr the Petitioner and Sri M.Vivekananda Reddy, Assistant Public Prosecutor, High Court for the State of Telangana, Hyderabad on behalf of the Respondent Nos 1 & 2. and of Sri Pulla Rao Yellanki Ad r'ocate for the Respondent No.3. The Court made tho following: ORDER: a THE HONOURABLE SMT. JUSTICE K. SUJANA CRIMINAL PETITION No.5176 of 2o25 ORDER: This Criminal Petition is frled seeking to quash tJ'e proceedings against the petitioner in S.C.Spl.No.L22 of 2O24 on the frle of the Special Sessions Judge for Trial of Cases under SCs & STs (POA) Act - cum - VII Additional District and Sessions Judge, Khammam, registered for the offences punishable under Sections 294(b), 323 and 324 read with 34 of IPC and Section 3(l)(r)(s), 3(2)(Va) of SC/ST POA Act, 1989 and amendment Act, 20l5(1) of 2016.

2. The briel facts of the case are that on 26.05.2024 respondent No.2 I de facto complainant lodged a complaint before the police station stating that on the same day at about 2:15 PM, he attended the "Annaprasana" function of Racharla Nagendra's son at Amma Function HaIl, Peddamagudi. After the function, as he was leaving the venue, he noticed that Mallu Jyothibasu Thallapalli Raju Gowd, Shettipalli Pranaykumar, and Sk. Yakub, all residents of Hamali Colony, were physically assaulting Vallabaneni Shiva Prasad and Sajja 2 sr(t,J crl.P.No.s176 of 2025 Srinivasa Rao by beating and kicking them. Wren the complainant tried to intervene and questioned them, Jyothibasu br:came angry, abused him in filthy language, and insulted him ry referring to his caste in a derogatory rnanner. Further, Sk. Yakub attacked the complainant with :r stone, causing a bleeding injury near his right eye. While liompelli Veeraiah was tr5ring to take him to the hospital, Mallu Jyothibasu again hit him on his face.

3. Basing cn the said complaint, the Police registered a case in Crime No.1O5 of 2024 of Poloncha Rural Police Station, Khammam District, for the offences punishabl,: under Sections 294(t1,323 and 324 read with 34 of IPC and Section 3(1)(r)(s), 3(2)[t'a) of SC/ST POA Act, 1989 and amerrdment Act, 2015(1) <f 2016 and after completion of investigation, they filed charge sheet, uide S.C.Spl.No. l22 of 2024, before the Special Sessions Judge for Trial of Cases under SC:; & STs (POA) Act - cu:r - MI Additional District and Sessions Judge, Khammam. .A.ggrieved t-hereby, the petitioner/accused No. 1 filed the present criminal petition to quash the proct:edings against him. / / 3 sICs,., CrLP.lIo.s176 of2025

4. Heard Sri S. Madan Mohan Rao, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner as well as Sri M. Vivekananda Reddy, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf of the respondent Nos.l and 2 and Sri Pulla Rao yellanki, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No.3.

5. learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that t]re petitioner had lodged a complaint dated 26.05.2024 with the Station House Offrcer, Palvancha Rural, which was registered as FIR No.1O6 of 2024 for the offences punishable under Sections 294(bl, 323, and 506 read with Section 34 IPC against the 3.d respondent herein, one Shiva Prasad Vallabhaneni (LW-2],, and one Sajja Srinivas Rao (LW-3). He further submitted that after due 'nvesrigation the Station House Oflicer Iiled a charge sheet dated 13.O6.2O24 against accused Nos. 1 to 3 in the said case, wherein the 3.d respondent is arrayed as accused No.3 and that the II Additional Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Kothagudem, had taken cognizance of the said charge sheet as C.C. No.1193 of2024. 4 SI(s,J Crl.P.No.5176 of 2025

6. Leamed cr>unsel for tJle petitioner contended that that in the said case, including the 3'd tl.e accused p€rsons respondent, ad mitted their guilt and were accorcLingly convicted under Section 252 Cr.P.C. on 25.09.2024 and that the present casr: in S.C.Sp1.No.122 of 2024 is a counter to C.C.No. 1193 of 2024, and the conviction order tlated

25.09.2024 clea:{y establishes that the de facto compla:.nant in the present case is the aggressor and the petitioner is the victim. He furth sr contended that the contents of FIR No. lO5 of 2024, dated 26.05.2024, dong with the complaint and charge sheet fi ied tJrerein, clearly demonstrate that the petitioner had brcn attacked by the de facto complainant. It is submitted that there is no material to suggest any irltention or motive on the part of the petitioner to insult, intimidate, or abuse the 3rd respondent by referring to his caste nanre in public view so as to attract the alleged offences under Sec:ions 294{bl, 323, 32,+ read with Section 34 IPC and Sec ions 3(l)(r)(s), 3(2)(v-a1 of tlte SC/ST (POA) Act, 1989 as ermended by Act 1 of 2016. Therefore, he prayed the Court to quash the proceedings agaiast the petitioner by allowing this crinrinal petition. 7 1i 5 sKs,., crl.P.tlo.5176 of 2()25

7. In support of his submission, he relied upon tlle judgment of this Court in Derangula Kondaiah and Others v. State of A.P. 1, wherein in paragraph No. 16, it is held as follows: "16. It is crystal clear from the evidence of P.W. 4 that the deceased made preparations for constructing copying (chunchu) wall protruding on the site of A1 to see his reaction. There upon, the accused came to the scene and questioned the deceased for his constructing the copying (chunchu) wall protruding on the site of A1. On thorough analysis of the evidence placed on record, the trial court came to the conclusion that there was a free frght between the two groups. I have gone through the evidence of P.Ws. 4 to 8. ln the circumstances, the only reasonable conclusion that can be drawn is that the flght took place without pre-meditation, the sarne carr be said to be quite sudden one and by reason there of no unlawful assembly can be said to have forrned. It is wetl settled that in case of free fight each one is responsibte for his own act and no other can be held responsibte for the act of others by invoking the constructive liability- I am well supported by the decision of Apex Court in Ram Swaroop v. State of Haryana (31 1993 Supp (4) SCC 344 on this aspect." 'zoog (z) aLo (crt.) +sz (ap) 6 SI(s,J Crl.P.No.5 176 of 2025

8. He furl her relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Arun v. State of Maharashtra2, wtrerein in paragraph No 9, it is held as foUows: "12. Only question which needs to tre consiCered, is the alleged exercise of right of private defence. Section 96, IPC provides that nothing is :rn offen<:e which is done in the exercise of the right of private defence. The Secti,on does not define the It merely expre ssion tight of private defenc€'. indic,tes that nothing is an offence which is done n the erercise of such right. Whether in a particu)ar set of circumstances, a person legitimately acted in tie e xercise of the right of private defence is a question of fact to be determined on the facts and circurlslances of each case. No test in tie abstraot for de termining such a question can be laid down. ln det :rmining this question of fact, the Court mu st consicer all the surrounding circumstances. [t is not necessary for the accused to plead in so many words that he acted in self-defence. If the circufiLstances show t]rat t]re right of private defenr-'e was te {timately exercised, it is open to the Court to consider such a plea. In a given case the Court carl consid:r it even if the accused has not taken it, if the same is available to be considered from thr-' materi.rl on record. Under Se6tion 105 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short'the Evidence Act'), tht: burder of proof is on the accused, who sets up the plea of self-defence, and, in the absence of proof, it is not lrcssible for the Court to presume the tmth ol 'zoog (r) aro (crr.) ors (sc) / 7 sxs,J Crl.P.No.5176 of 2025 the plea of self-deGnce. The Court shall presume the absence of such circumstances. It is for the accused to place necessary material on record either by himself adducing positive evidence or by eliciting neaessary facts from the witnesses examined for the prosecution. An accused taking the plea of the right of private defence is not necessarily required to call evidence; he can establish his plea by reference to circumstances transpiring from the prosecution evidence itself. The question in such a case would be a question of assessing the true effect of the prosecution evidence, and not a question of the accused discharging any burden. Where the right of private defence is pleaded, the defence must be a reasonable and probable version satisfying the Court t]:at the harm caused by the accused was necessary for either warding olf the attack or for forestalling tlle further reasonable apprehension from the side of the accused. The burden of establishing the plea of selfdefence is on the accused and the burden stands discharged by showing preponderance of probabilities in favour of that plea on the basis of the material on record. (See Munshi Ram and Ors- v. Delhi Administration {AIR 1968 SC 702), State of Gujarat v. Bai Fatima (AlR 1975 SC 1478), State of U.P. v. Mohd. Musheer Khan (AIR 1977 SC 22261, and Mohinder Pal Jolly v, State of Punjab (AIR 1979 SC 577). Sections I00 to 1O1 define the ext€nt of the right of private defence of body. If a person has a right of private defence of body under Section 97, that right extends under Section lOO to causing death if there is reasonable apprehension that death or grievous hurt would be the consequence of the assault. The oft quoted 8 sKs,J Crl.P lto.s t76 of2025 obse.vation of this Court in Salim Zia v. State of U.P. (ArR 1979 SC 391), runs as follows: "lt js true that the burden on an accused person to establish t-l1e plea of self-defence is not as oner,)us as the one which lies on tl:e prosecution and Lhat, while the prosecution is required to prove its citse beyond reasonable doubt, the accused need not € stablish the plea to tJ.e hilt and may discharge his r,nus by establishing a mere preponderance of prob.rbilities either by laying basis for that plea in the ( ross-examination of the prosecution witnesses or b1 adducing defence evidence." The accused need not prove the existence of the right of privzLte deferLce beyond reasonable doubt. It is enough lbr him to show as in a civil case that the prep,rnderance of probabilities is in favour of his plea. ""

9. On the ot-her hand, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor and the lear:red counsel for respondent No.3 oppo sed the submissions made by the learned counsel for the p3titioner contending ttre petitioner's reliance on the convictioll in the counter case under the SC/ST (POA) Act cannot be a ground to seek quashing of the present proceedings. He further submitted that the present case is a Sessions case i:avolving serious allegzLtions against the petitioner, and his defence cannot be corrsidered or adjudicated at this preliminary stage without conrlucting a full-fledged trial. They further 9 SI(S,J Crl.P-fo.5 176 of 2025 submitted that mere admission of guilt in the counter case by the accused therein does not automatically render the present proceedings against the petitioner unsustainable. There are serious allegations against the petitioner, which requires tria-I, and therefore, they prayed the Court to dismiss the criminal petition.

10. In light of the submissions made by both the learned counsel and upon careful perusal of the material available on record, it appears that the primary contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that there was no intention to commit the alleged offtnces, as the incident arose suddenly during a social gathering, and the record does not suggest any premeditation or motive. The learned counsel further submitted that the accused in the counter case, i.e., C.C. No. 1193 of 2024, had admitted guilt and were convicted, which according to the petitioner, establishes that the de facto complainant is the aggressor and that the petitioner is innocent.

11. However, this Court is of the considered opinion that the question of whether the incident was a sudden quarrel

1.0 SI(s,J Crl.P.I{o.5 t76 of2O2S without intention, or whether the petitioner intelrtionally committed the offence, cannot be decided at this strrge in a quash petition. These are disputed questions of irct that require prop:r adjudication during the course r>f trial. Further, the :'ecord also discloses that both the parties ftled complaints a6,ainst each other, and tJ.e incident amc'unts to case and counter case. Although the accused in the counter case admitted guilt during lok Adalat proceedings, it cannot be a sole grc,und to quash the present proceedings. The judgments relied upon by the petitioner, in Derangula Kondaiah an,l Arun (cited supra), pertain to tJ.e :ight of private defence and free fight situations, and the principles laid down therein are not direcfly applicable to the present case at this s tage, as the factual matrix and the issue for considerrtion in a quash petition are different frorn those considered in those cases.

12. [t is u,el[ settled that in a petition under Sectirtn 482 Cr-P.C., the Court should not undertake a meb.culous examination ol the evidence or delve into disputed qu,estions of fact. The allegations against the petitioner include r;pecific accusations of abusing t}re de facto complainant in tler' name 11 sKs,J Crl-P- o-S 176 of2O2S l of caste in public view, which attract serious offences under the SC/ ST (POA) Act. These allegations require thorough examination during trial, and the petitioner has ttre opportunity to establish his deGnce, including the plea of private defence or sudden fight, before the trial Court.

13. It is also relevant to note that when there are case and counter cases, the proper procedure is for both cases to be tried simultaneously by the same Court to ensure a fair and comprehensive adjudication. However, in the present case, though the counter case was disposed of by the Magistrate, it appears that the concerned Court did not veri$, the history of the case before recording the admission. The trial Courts must exercise due caution and veri$ with the prosecution regarding connected cases before recording convictions, basing on admission especially in such circumstances. Further, the mere adrnission of guilt by the accused in the counter case does not by itself vitiate the proceedings in the present case nor can it be treated as conclusive proof that the petitioner is innocent, particularly when there are specific allegations under the SC/ST (POA) Act. I t L2 srs,.., Crl.P.lIc.5176 of 2(}25 n

14. In vie w of the above discussion, tJlis Court is of the opinion that the grounds raised by the petitioner are not sulficient to quash the proceedings at this stage. Th.e present petition is devoid of merit and the same is liable to be dismissed.

15. Accorrlingly, the Criminal Petition is dismissed. Miscel aneous petitions, if any pending, shall also stand closed. To, //TRUE COPY// Dt- K. ,3Hr\VANI SWAMY S"ANT REGIS I EC ION OFFICER

1. The Special Sessiors JudgeforTrial ofcases Under cum-Vll Additional District and Sessions Judge, at Khammam. s I Sl s (POA) Act -

2. The Sub-Divisional Police Officer, Palvancha Sub-Division of Bhadradri Kothagudem District.

3. One CC to Sri.S lvladan Mohan Rao, Advocate IOPUCI 4., One CC to Sri.Pulla Rao Yellanki, Advocate IOPUCI 5. One CC to the Pu.rlic Prosecutor, High Court for the State of Telangana, Hyderabad [OUT]

6. Two CD Copies 'gPSK /gh HIGH COURT DATED:09107 111025 ORDER CRLP.No.5176 ot 2025 1f'.E Y -) I I 2 I ,:Cl 65

1.''. ..,. ot.q.'., Tr -ri:c' _/ DISMISSED THI: CRIMINAL PETITION q