The High Court · 2025

Petitioners no.1 and 2 represented by their natural guardian/mother Beeravelli Deepthi, D/o Mr. Govinda Rao, Age:41 years, Occ: Employee in UK, R/o 44, Stddington Drive, Aylesbury, Buckinghamshire, England, United Kingdom HPlB 0UE. Presently residing at HNo.2-10-1415/17, Prime Residency-1, Jyothinagar, Karimnagar Rep- by her Special Power of Attorney holder [/r. Govinda Rao Beeravelli. ...Petitioners/Respondent AND Venkateswara Rao Chintapalli, S/o. late Kista Rao, Age: 45 years, Occ: private employee, R/o. H. No.7-2-674l1, Mankammathota, Karim Nagar District-505001. Presently residing at 35 Durdans Road, Southall, UB1 2RS UK.35 Durdans Road, Southall, UBl 2RS UK ...RespondenUPetitioner Petition under Section 15'l CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to vacate the order dated 03-05-2024 passed in CRP No.1453 oI 2024 ad dismiss the CRP.No.1453 ot 2024. Counsel for the Petitioner: Sri D.V. Seeta Rama Murthy, Senior counsel representing Sri Sudarshan Mulugari Counsel for the Respondents: Sri Raja Sreepathi Rao, Senior counsel representing Sri G. Aditya Goud The Court made the following: ORDER THE HONOURABLE SMT. JUSTICE K. SUJANA CTVIL REVISION PETITION No.1453 of 2024 ORDER: Challenging the order dated O3.O 1.2024 passed in I.A.No.331 of 2O22 in F.C.O.P.No.59 of 2O2l by the learned Judge, Family Court-cum-lV Additional District and Sessions Judge, Karimnagar, the present Civil Revision Petition is filed.

2. The brief facts of the case are that the respondents filed I.A.No.331 of 2022 in F.C.O.P.No .59 ot 2O2I before the trial Court seeking interim maintenance for them, the legitimate children of the petitioner and his wife, Beeravelli @ Chintapalli Deepthi. In the said petition it is stated that the parents of the respondents were married on 19.05.20O6, at Karimnagar, and their children were born in India and the UK. The mother of, the respondents claims that despite her efforts to mediate, the petitioner has refused to contribute to the children's maintenance, education, and weil-being. It is further stated that the petitioner earns significantly, having acquired British citizenship in October 2OO2 and working in the UK. I 2 SKS,J C.R-P.No.1453 of 2024

3. The petitioner filed counter in the said petition stating that he has been paying e6O,O00 (approximately Rs.6O lakhs) monthly for family maintenance in the UK. He claims that despite his u,illingness to continue supporting the children, his wife dislocated him from their family home. He also states that he purchased properties worth over Rs.2O crores in the name of his wife and provided her with gold and diamonds. The petitioner further asserts that he is willing to bear the education expenses of the children if they live u'ith him, but his wife refused. He claims that his wife works in the UK and that there is no merit in the petition.

4. The trial Court has examined the evidence presented by both parties, including Ex.Al to A16 and Ex.B1 to 827. After hearing both sides, vide order dated O3.01.2024 allowed the petition with a direction to the petitioner that the respondent shall pay interim monthly maintenance of Rs.2,12,5O0/- to the respondents from Ol .ll.2O2I , until the disposal of F.C.O.P.No.59 of 2021. The payment should be made on or before the Sth of every month, preferably through direct deposit into the bank account of the respondents. Purther, the respondents must file a memo providing their bank -J.-.r_.-..\r'..-.! 3 sKs,J C.R-P.No.1453 of 2024 account details to facilitate the deposit. The petitioner is also required to pay the arrears of interim monthly maintenance from O 1. 1 I .2021 , to the date of this order within two months. Agqrieved by the said order, the present civil revision petition is hled.

5. Heard Sri D.V. Seeta Rama Murthy, learned Senior Counsel, representing Sri Sudarshan Mulugari, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner as well as Sri Raja Sreepathi Rao, learned Senior Counsel representing Sri G. Adify; Goud, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents.

6. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner is challenging the interim maintenance order, stating that the Family Court made several errors. Firstly, the trial Court failed to consider the contention of the petitioner that the petition was not maintainable, as the parties are UK citizens governed by UK laws, specifically the Children Act, 1989 and the Child Abduction Act, 1984. He further submitted that the trial Court overlooked the permanent I residence of the petitioner and his children in the UK, their renunciation of Indian citizenship, and his acquisition of I 4 sKs,J C.R-P.No.1453 of 2024 British citizenship. The petitioner has been living in the UK since 2002 and obtained British citizenship in tl:.e year, 2072. The petitioner also asserts that the trial Court ignored the pendency of matrimonial disputes and ancillarv issues in UK Courts, which have jurisdiction over the parties. The UK courts have a-lready seized the matter, and an anti-suit injunction has been granted to prevent the ex-wife of the petitioner from pursuing maintenance claims in India.

7. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the petitionei claims that his ex-wife has mismanaged finances, suppressed material facts, and acted with malicious intentions. The petitioner also alleges that his ex-wife has failed to provide a conducive environment for their children, instead teaching them negative and harmful opinions about him. Therefore, learned counsel for the petitioner is seeking to set aside the interim maintenalce order, stating that the Family Court lacked jurisdiction and competency to adjudicate the matter. The petitioner believes that the UK Courts are better equipped to assess the hnancial conditions of the parties, needs, and expenses, and to provide an effective and efficacious remedy. 5 SI(S.J C.R.P.No,1453 of 2024

8. In support of his submissions, learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Surinder Kaur Sandhu v. Harbax Singh Sandhu I and another I , wherein in paragraph No. 10, it is held as under: lO. We may add that the spouses had set up their matrimonial home in England where the wife was working as a clerk and the husband as a bus driver. The boy is a British citizen, having been bom in England, and he holds a British passport. It cannot be controverted that, - circumstances, the English Court had jurisdiction to decide the question of his custody. The modern theory of Conflict of Laws recognises artd, in any event, prefers the jurisdiction of the State which has the most intimate contact with the issues arising in the case. Jurisdiction is not attracted by the operation or creation of fortuitous circumstances such as the circumstance as to where the child, whose custody is in issue, is brought or for the time being lodged. To allow the assumption of jurisdiction by another State in such circumstances will only result in encouraging forum-shopping. Ordinarily, jurisdiction must follow upon functional lines. That is to say, for example, that in matters relating to matrimony and custody, the law of that place must govern which has the closest concern with the well-being of the spouses and the welfare of the offsprings of marriage. The spouses in this case had made England their home where this boy was ' 1rssc1 : scc osa I I 6 SKS,J c.R.P.No.1453 of 2024 born to them. The father cannot deprive the English Court of its jurisdiction to decide upon his custody by removing him to India, not in the normal movement of the matrimonial home but, by an act which was gravely detrimental to the peace of that home. The fact that the matrimonial horne of the spouses was in England, establishes sufficient contacts or ties with that State in order to make it reasonable and just for t}Ie courts of that State to assume jurisdiction to enforce obligations which were incurred therein by the spouses. (See International Shoe Company v. State of Washington [90 L Ed 95 (1945) : 326 US 31O] which was not a matrimonial case but which is regarded as the fountainhead of the subsequent developments of jurisdictional issues like the one involved in the instant case.) It is our duty and function to protect the wife against the burden of litigating in an inconvenient forum which she and her husband had left voluntarily in order to make their living in England, where they gave birth to tlis unfortunatc boy."

9. Learned counsel further relied upon the .iudgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sondur Gopal v. Sondur Rajini2, wherein in paragraph No. 18, it is held as follows: '18. Rival submission necessitates examination of extent and applicability of the Act. Section 1(2) of the Act provides for extent of tlle Act. The same reads as follows: " l,Short title and extent.-(l)*** '? lzor:1 z scc azo 7 SKS,J C.RP.No-r4s3 of 2024 (2) lt extends to the whole of [ndia except the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and applies also to Hindus domiciled in the territories to which this Act extends who are outside the said territories." From a plain reading of Section 1(2) of the Act, it is evident that it has extra-territorial operation. '

10. Learned counsel further relied upon the judgment of the Bombay High Court in Sucheta Dilip Ghate aad another v. Dilip Shantaram Ghate3, wherein in paragraph No.6, it is held as follows: . "6. The order of the Family Court is based upon section 2O to hold that the petition of the appellants has to be instituted irl a Court within local limits of whose jurisdiction the defendant at the time of commencement of the suit, actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain, or where the cause of action, wholly or in part arises. Clauses (a), (b) and (c) of section 20 are independent of each other. Clause (c) of section 20 confers jurisdiction on a Court within local limits of whose jurisdiction the cause of action, wholly or in part arises. Whether the cause of action either wfrolly or in part arises in a suit would depend on the averments made in the suit or marriage petition for that matter. In other words, the cause of action for hling of the suit should be ascertained from the facts stated in the plaint/petition. The cause of action means the circumstances forming infraction of the right or immediate occasion for action. It is I2oo3 scc onLine Bom 316 I I 8 sKs,J C.R-P.Ito- 1453 of 2024 left to be determined in each individual case as to u'here the cause of action arises. The cause of action in suit/petition has no reference to the defence taken in the suit nor is it related to the evidence by which the cause of action is established. Keeping this settled principle of law in view, u.e would now like to examine the averments in the said petition. It seems from the body of the petition that the appellants in the circumstances mentioned in paragraphs 3 and 4 of the said petition were compelled to leave matrimonial house and reside separately at Ahmedabad itsetf. The circumstances further compelled the appellants to shift to Plrne where they started residing with the father of appellant No. 1. On the date of Iiling of the marriage petitioner i.e- sth August, 2000 they were residing at Pune. The petition is frled for maintenance with effect from 8th April, 1998 till Illing of the petition. It is true that till April 20O0 lhe appellants were residing at Ahmedabad- However. a(lmittedty they started residing at Pune since April 2OO0. Whether the appellants are entitled for maintenance or not would be decided by the Family Court. The facts itself undoubtedly indicate that the cause of action in part did arise at Pune. By no stretch of imagination it could be said that the cause of action arose only at Ahmedabad. As a matter of fact the circumstances forming infraction of the right of the appellants continues and eists at Pune. In other words the suffering of the appellants due to lack of means of maintenance continues in Pune and in view thereof we have no hesitation in holding that the cause of action also arose at Pune. The Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act has no provision regarding the jurisdiction of the Court to b 9 SKS,J C.R.P,!{o.1as3 of 2024 which the application for maintenance is to be presented. The provisions of Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act are beneficial and social legislation for the benelit of women and infirm old parents for their maintenance while in distress- It cannot be imagined by any stretch of imagination that such person in distress would have to run from piliar to post for relief under the provision of Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, if the husband or son keeps on changing his residence or prefers to reside in far away town from the town of wife or parents. In view of this we are of the considered view that taking recourse to clause (c) of section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the proceedings could be instituted at a place of residence of wife who is residing at different place than her husband. The Family Court at Pune, therefore, shall have jurisdiction to entertain the said petition frled by the appellants under the provisions of Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act and Special Marriage Act." 1i. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents filed counter denying the averments of the petitioner stating that the contention of the petitioner regarding jurisdiction is unfounded and devoid of merit. The Respondents, being Overseas Citizen of India (OCI) cardholders, are entitled to iegal protections under Indial law, including due process rights. The reliance of the petitioners on the fact that the parties are UK citizens is misconceived, as the OCI status of the respondents confers upon them the right to seek legal I 10 SKS,J C.R.P.No.1453 of 2024 remedies in India. He submitted that the relocation of the petitioner to India in August 2O2O ar,d the Respondents' subsequent visit to India established domicile in India, making the Family Court at Karimnagan the appropriate forum for the maintenance claim. The attempt of the petitioner to argue that the UK courts have jurisdiction over the matter is unfounded, as the Respondents have a legitimate claim to seek maintenance in India.

12. Learned counsel for the respondents contended that the ex-parte divorce decree of the petitioner from the UK court is unrecognizable under Indian law, as it was obtained without the contest of the respondents and on the principle of "no- fault divorce," which is not recognized in India. This decree is therefore not enforceable in India, and the reliance of the petitioner on it is misconceived. He further contended that the alti-injunction suit order of the English Court is incompatible with Indian laws and natural justice, restricting the rights of the respondents to seek legal remedies in India. This order is also in contravention of the principles of comit5z of nations and the doctrine of forum non conveniens ald that the assertions of the petitioner of bona fide intentions and love I I 1,1, SKS,J C.R.P.l{o.1453 of 2024 are contradicted by the report of the Child Arrangement Committee, which states that the child shali live with the petitioner. The deliberate omission of the petitioner of this critical information misleads the Court and obscures the true living arrangements and intentions of the parties involved. Therefore, he prayed the Court to dismiss the civil revision petition as there are no merits.

13. In support of his submissions, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents relied upon the Judgment of the Madras High Court in Kiran Kumar Chava v. Usha Kiran Annea, wherein in paragraph Nos.75 and 77, which are reads as follows: "75. As far as the ex parte orders of US Courts are concerned, though the foreign judgments are not conclusive and it is only a factor to be decided, the facts and circumstances would reveal that the reapondent as well as the twin children have taken a decision to reside at Chennai peacefully arrd they are not interested to retum back to United States as thel are terribly afraid of going back, since lirey have no trust on the revision petitioner. In the event of sending them back to United States, forcibly, they will be practically on the streets in United States and the conscious of this Court does not permit to take such a decision, since the rights 4 2023 scc onLine Mad 474 I 12 SKS,J C-R-P- o.1453 of 2024 ensured under thc lndian Constitution to the OCI Cardholders are to be protected.

77. ln view of the principles laid down by th<: Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, as elaboratelJ, discussed in the aforementioned paragraphs and considering the deposition of the l5 year old twin children before this Court and also the decision of the respondent to continue to reside at Chennai, India as Overseas Cardholder, this Court has no hesitation in arriving a conclusion that the respondent is entitled to institute and maintain matrimonial proceedings, DVC proceedings and any other proceedings under the relevant Statutes in Indian Courts having jurisdiction for appropriate reliefs. "

14. This Court has examined the submissions made by both the learned counsel and reviewed the material on record. The primary contention raised by the counsel of the petitioner concerns the jurisdiction of the Court, emphasizing that both parties are UK citizens. However, it is essential to note that the petition was filed while the minor respondents and the petitioner were in Karimnagar during the COVID,19 pandemic. The minor children were attending online classes from a UK school while residing in Karimnagar, and their school fees were being paid accordingly. The petitioner does not dispute being in India at that time. Instead, he obtained an ex-parte divorce from a UK Court subsequent to hling the ,i 13 sks,J C.R-P.t{o.1453 of2024 present petition. This raises questions about his sincerity in challenging the jurisdiction of the Indian Court. I

15. Furthermore, the petitioner admits to paying maintenance of S60,000 per month to the minor children in the UK. Given his acknowledgment of this financial responsibility, it is reasonable to expect him to comply with the maintenance order issued by the Pamily Court in Karimnagar. The petitioner repeatedly emphasizes that both parties are UK citizens and that the UK Court has better jurisdiction over the matter. He cites the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Surinder Kaur Sandhu (supra), which discusses the jurisdiction of courts in child custody cases. However, the facts of the present case differ signi{icantly from those in the cited judgment, as both parties are not contesting i t the custody of the minor child. The petitioner also objects to the adjudication of the proceedings in India, citing that both parties are British Citizens. However, this objection lacks merit, as OCI card holders are subject to Indian jurisdiction. Further, there is no averment in the counter that the petitioner is unfit to pay maintenance to the minor children, despite his financially stable situation. Given his.admission of - 1 14 SKS,J C.F-P.No.1453 of 2024 the relationship between the parties and his finalcial expenses, there is no illegality in the order of the trial Court. The triai court has passed a reasoned order, and therefore, there are no merits in the civil revision petition, making it liable for dismissal.

16. Accordingly, this civil revision petition is dismissed confirrning the order dated O3.01.2024 passed in I.A.No.331 of 2022 in F.C.O.P.No.59 of 2O2l by the learned Judge, Family Court-cum-lV Additional District and Sessions Judge, Karimnagar. There shall be no order as to costs. Miscellaneous applications, if any pending, shall stand closed. I I To, sd/- MoHD. I MAIL ASSISTANT REGI TRAR //TRUE COPY//

1. The Family Court-cum-lV Additional District & Ka rimnagar.

2. One CC io Sri Sudarshan lVlulugari Advocate [OPUC] 3. One CC to Sri G. Aditya Goud, Advocate [OPUC] 4. Two CD CoPies SECTION OFFICER Sessions Judge, at kan/l' l HIGH COURT DATED:0310312025 ORDER CRP.No.1453 of 2024 '1 t srAlt a) I !) $3 h?f ?[6 7 .:.J' O[ spAl c\' DISMISSING OF THE CIVIL REVISION PETITION tO