R.D. Goud v. The Telangana State Road Transport-Corporation

Heard Sri P.Venkateshwer Rao, learntld counsel behalf of the petitioner and Sri M. Ram learned Standing Counsel aplearing on appearang on Mohan Reddy, behalf of the respondents.

2. The oetition er aDDr oached this Cou rt seeki nq the Draver a s under: "...to issue a writ or order or directron rno e particularly one in the nature of Writ of Mandamus declaring : rat the action of the Respondents in not allowing the service frorr 18 09 1997 to 05.08.1999 (from the date on which the orde rs of Hon'ble High Court came into operation till the date ('f petitioner's reinstatement) is bad, arbitrary, illegal, unjust an'l consequently direct the respondents to count the interregnum ;ervice to the petitioner's service for alt the purposes and pa: s such other order... " 3 The case oftheD etitioner ents made in the affidavit filed bv the r,etitioner in in brief . _ls oer the s ort of theDresent Writ Petition is as undel i) The petitioner was appolnted as Conc uctor in the Respondent Corporation on 01.11.1987. Tht:-eafter, the petitioner was removed from the service by ar order dated t - & tE:€ffi$? 1 l ! i I I I SN,J wP 16t6t 2022 \ -

30.03.1992. The petitioner had challenged the said removal before the Additional Labour Court-cum-Additional Industrial ) Tribunal, and the Tribunal passed an award dated 19.10.1994 in LD. No.444 of 1993 dismissing the same. Aggrieved by the same, the petitioner approached this Hon'ble Court by filing W.P.No.22157 of t994 and this Court passed an order dated L9.6.1997 directing the respondent corporation to reinstate the petitioner into service within a period of three months as afresh conductor. But the Respondent Corporation delayed the petitioner's appointment ii) It is further the case of the petitioner that the petitioner submitted representations dated 09.11.1997,

03.08.1998, 06.12.1998 and 28.06.1999 requesting the respondents to implement the order of this Court dated L9.06.1997, but there was no response from the respondent corporation. The petitioner issued a legal notice dated 26.07.1999 for petitioner's reinstatement as per the Court Orders and finally on 05.08.1999 the Regional Manager issued posting orders to the petitioner as Conductor in BHEL Bus Depot. After the petitioner's reinstatement, the petitioner had submitted petitioner's representation to pay the salary and count the service from the date of implementation as directed by this Court l l 4 - to date of petitioner's joining. But there was no r:sponse to the representation oF the petitioner from the respordents. The ) \\'t, r6t6t l0l2 petitioner approached the Industrial Tribunal-I, llyderabad by filing M.P.No.17 of 2OO2 (old M.P.No.69 of 1999) lor the salary, in turn the Trilrunal passed an order dated 29.07:1003 directing the respondent corporation to pay the salary and )ther benerits to the petitioner for the period from 18.09.1997 t't 05.08.1999. However, the respondent corporation paid the sala'y but not the other benefits. Aggrieved by the same, the petitirner filed the present writ petition

4. PERUSED THE RECORD:- (A) The order dated 29.O7.2OO3 on the file of the Industrial Tribunal-I, ndhra Pradesh, Hvdererbad passed in M.P.No.17 ot 2OO2 (old M.P.No.69 of L999, the relevant Daras 14 to 16 are e racted hereunder:- "14. In a similar set of facts, his Lordship R.Rarranujam, J, the then held in Y.G.KRISHNA v. ADDITIONAL INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL.CUM-ADDITIONAL LABOUR COURT, HYDERABAD ( 1999 (4) ALD page 323) that the workmen is e-l.ltled to wages from the date of expiry of one month till th: date of re- instatement by the Management as the order ol re-instatement was not implemented even after expiry of one rronth from the date of puDlication ln the Gazette. It was furth,:' held that the f,lanagemen[ cannot plead that the workmen dic not apply for posting. SN,J wP t6l6l 2022 !r- x

15. Having regard to the facts and circumstances, and the order of the Hon'ble High Court referred to above, the Respondent-Management is liable to pay the salary to the Petitioner from 18.09.1997 i.e., the date on which the order came into operation till 05.08.1999 i.e., the date of re-instatement order (Ex.M1). Hence the point is answered accordingly. !

16. In ther sult- t ED€ no the ResDondent-Co rooration to Dav the salarv and other .L997 t tition is allo edd irecti rkman f h 1 NE NR oo9 after mr lzi nrr due calc r rlafi.iir h t he recei fr mth wt +hin order." (B) The averments of the co unter affidavit filed on behalf of the resDond ents 1to 3, in Darticular, DaraSis extracted here u nder: - *6. I respectfully state that the petitioner herein has approached Hon'ble Labour Court-I claiming a sum of Rs.92,452/- towards salary and other benefits for the period from 18.09.1997 to 05.08.1999. The Hon'ble Labour Court-I, after considering the rival submissions has directed the respondent management to pay the salary and other benefits to the petitioner from 18.09.1997, i.e., the date on which the order came into operation till 05.08.1999, i.e., the date of reinstatement order. However, the Hon'ble Labour Court has not commented anything about treating the interregnum period as service. The petitioner contention that he has deemed to be in service for all purposes is not correct. Further, the -F-l I d 5 SN.J wP t6l6 t 2021 n Challenge in the Writ Petition also not agair st the award passed by the Hon'ble Labour Court. Wh€ n once the Hon'ble Labour court after consi erinq l.he m terial on record directed the Resoond ent Cor 'poration to oav the am ounts and there is o soecific directioo to treat the said Deriod as continuitv of serv ice, it is not oDen to the Detitioner to cla im the same relief in the res n W tPe . The Writ Petitioner h as not filed a single representation before this Hon'ble COurt to show that he has approached the Respondent C()-poration. As such the Petitioner is not entitled for the relief sought for.,, DISC U SSION AND CONCLUJ SION:

5. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of _ re petitioner placing reliance on the Order dated 29.O7.2OO I passed in M.P.No.17 of 2OO2 (old M.P.No.69 of 1999) or rhe fite of Industrial Tribunal-I, Andhra pradesh, Hyderabad, directing the Respondent Corporation to pay the salary and oth€ r benefits to the petitioner for the period from 18.09.1997 to 05.08.1999 i.e., from the date on which the orders of the High CoL rt came into operation till 05.08.1999 i,e., the date of petitioner,s reinstatement, contends that the said orders datec 29.07.2003 had been partly implemented by the Respondent C( rporation by paying the salary to the petitioner, but however, the interregnum period of service was not treated as continuous s,r:rvice of the SN,J wP t 6161 2022 -- \q petitioner for all other benefits, inspite of petitioner's repeated representations to the respondents herein seeking to consider ! the services of the petitioner from 18.09.1997 to 05.08.1999 for all other benefits to the petitioner as indicated in the order dated 29.07.2003 passed in M.P.No.17 of 2002 (old, M'P.No.69 of 1999) on the file of Industrial Tribunal-I, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad, the same had not been considered and aggrieved by the same, the petitioner filed the present writ petition.

6. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondent Corporation placing reliance on the averments made in the counter affidavit filed on behalf of Respondents Nos.1 to 3 contends that the petitioner received all the benefits as indicated in the said order dated 29.07.2003 and in view of the fact that the Labour Couft after considering the material on record directed the respondent corporation to pay the amounts and further in view of the fact that there is no specific direction or stipulation in the said order to treat ihe said interregnum period as continuity of service, it was not open to the petitioner to claim the said relief in the present writ petition and therefore, the petitioner is not entitled for the relief as prayed for in the present writ petition and the present writ petition needs to be dismissed' t 7 SN.J wP t6t6t 2022

1. A bare perusal of the order dated 29.07.2033 passed tn M.P.No.17 of 2OO2 (old M.P.No.69 of 1999) orr the file of Industrial Tribunal-I, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderirbad clearly indicates that petition had been allowed c irecting the Respondent-Corporation to pay the salary and other benefits to the petitioner workman from 18.09.1997 to 05.i8.1999 after making necessary calculation within one month frorn the date of receipt of copy of the said order. It is the specifi. plea of the petitioner that in view of the fact that the petitioner was paid the amounts for the interregnum period i.€., 13.09.1997 to

05.08.1999 i.e., from the date on which the orde-; of the High Court came into operation till 05.08.1999 i.e., the date of petitioner's reinstatement to the said servic(|, the said interregnum period should be treated as continuaticn of service of the petitioner. But however, the same was rlenied to the petitioner in spite of several requests of the petitionrlr. e. This Court taking into consideration the fact as borne on record that the order dated 29.07.2003 passed in I\4.P.No.17 of 2002 (old M.P.No.69 of 1999) on the file of Industrial Tribunal-I, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad having not been challenged by the Respondent Corporation as on date and in view of t re fact which had even been admitted by the learned counsel i)ppearing on I -::&.*.\ -' -lm&&, ."{@tS. reKxf.':::-'::.,:::'-:::::l \ - I SN.J wP 16161 2022 behalf of the respondents that the petitioner admittedly received the salary for the said period i.e., from 18.09.1997 to

05.08.1999, this Court opines that the request of the petitioner for continuity of service also should be considered by the Respondent Corporation. 9 . This Court opines that the plea of delay on the part of the petationer approaching this Court and the reliance placed by the learned Standing Counsel on the Judgment reported in (2O1O) 12 Supreme Court Cases 471 in .SHIBA SHANKAR MOHAPATRA AND OTHERS V. STATE OF ORISSA AND OTHERS", and the Judgment dated L3.12.2O22 passed in W.A.Nos.1660 of 2018 and 593 of 2016 do not apply to the facts of the present case.

10. Th ex Court in the iudqment reDorted in 2O22 & Others Vs State SCC Onlin e SC 232 in Sunil Kumar of Biha r & Others dt 2L.O2.2O22 at Paras 7. 8, 10- 11. observed as under : Para 7 i Article 32 of the Constitution provides for a Fundamental Right to approach the Supreme Court for enforcement of the Fundamental Rights. The founding fathers contemplated that the very right to approach this Court when there is a violation of Fundamental Rights, should be declared as beyond the reach of Parliament and, therefore, it is as a part of judicial review that the right under Article 32 has been put in place and invoked from time to time. That in a given casef the Court may refuse to S N,J wl' t6t6t 202 entertain a petiuon under Article 32 of the Constitution is solely a part of self-restraint which is exi.rcised by the Court having regard to various consideratir)ns which are germane to the interest oF justice as also the appropriateness of the Court to interfere ir a particular case. The right under Article 32 of the Consti .ution remains a Fundamental Right and it is always open to a person complaining of violation of Fundamental Righ:s to approach this Court. This is, no doubt, subject to the power of the Court to relegate the party to other proceedir gs. Para B : At the heart of the Constitutio I lies certain principles which have, in Fact, been recogni:;ed as part of the basic: structure. Article 14 of the Cons[ituiion proclaims right to equality. The right against unfair State action is part of Article 14. Unequals being treated equally is tabooed under Article 14 of the Constituti:n. A person entitled to be treated as a member of Screduled Tribe under Article 342, cannot be treated on par auith a person who is brought in by an incompetent Body, I iz., the State in the manner done. Article 21 of the Constitution again is the fountain head of many rights which ar: part of the grand mandate which has been from t me to time unravelled by this Court giving rise to I te theory of unenumerated rights under the Constitution. While liberty is a dynamic concept capable of encompassi tg within it a variety of Rights, the irreducible minimum and at the very core of liberty, is freedom from unjustifiable r: tstody 19. W" may take up the first preliminary objection by the State, namely, that the petitioners have aplrroached this Court with considerable delay. The impugned \otification is issued in August,2016. A person cannot lt_. said to be aggrieved merely upon the issuance of an ins.:rument or of a law by itself. In fact, the Court may refusr: to examine the legality or the validity of a law or order on the basis that he may have no locus standi or that re is not an aggrieved person. No doubt, the Courts have recognized -public challenge to even a legislation at the handtr of a interest litigant. However, we may only indicale, ordinarily, the Court may insist on a cause of action and therefore, a person nrust be an aggrieved party to maintain a challenge. We must not be oblivious to [he far:t that based on the Notification, it appears that FIRs came to be lodged by persons claiming to be members of the Scl- eduled Tribe *rx*&*,a# = wP t6r6t 2022 community and seeking to invoke the 1989 Act. The FIRS lodged in the year 2020 occasioned the petitioners to approach Courts seeking protection under Section 438 of the Cr.P.C. Two of the petitioners have not secured such protection. Petitioner No. 1, it appears was not arrested. But even assuming for a moment, that the petitioners have come with some delay, we find reassurance from the opinion of this Court in the judgment reported in Assam Sanmilita Mahasanqha v. Unio n of India (2015) 3 SCC 1 wherein this Court has inter alia held as follows:-

32. ".....Further, in Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corpn., it has ow been conc lusivelv held that all fundam ntal riohts ca not be (at oara 29). Given these imoortant develoo ments in the law, the time has come for this Co rt to sav that at least when it comes to viol ations of the fundamenta I riqht to life and Dersona I libertv, delav or laches bv itself witho ut more would not be sufficient to shut the doors of the court on a nv Detitioner

11. Therefore, we do n think we should be o b the o bv its !f cannot b used as a weaDon to Veto an at del r icle 32 violati n n Frrnr{rrtr ental Ri aa ht< ic alar rl i, 2t ci.La 11 . This Court taking into consideration the view of the Apex Court in the judgment referred to and extracted above, opines that the petitioner is entitled for consideration of the request of the petitioner for counting the service of the petitioner during the interregnum period i.e., from 18.09.1997 to O5.O8.1999 as continuity of service of the petitioner for all other benefits, in accordance to law, within a reasonable period and the SN,J wP t6161 2022 said relaef cannot be denied to the petil ioner on the ground of delay. L2, Tak ln o into consideration:- (a) The aforesaid facts and circumr;tances of the case, (b) The submissions made by the le;rrned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner an<l the learned Standing Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, (c) The order dated 29.O7.2O03 on the file of the Industrial Tribunal-I, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderrabad passed in M.P.No.17 ot 2OO2 (old M.P.No.69 of 1999) referred to and extracted above, (d) The averments made in the coL nter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents (refr:rred to and extracted above), (e) The fact as borne on record that :he said order dated 29.O7.2OO3 passed in M.P.No.17 ,tt 2OO2 (old M.P.No.69 of 1999) on the file of Industr al Tribunal-I, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad having not be,:n challenged by the Respondent Corporation as on date and the said order having become final, ) t2 SN,J wP t6t6t 2022 (f) The fact as borne on record that the petitioner was paid salary by the employer for the period i.e., from 18.09.1997 to 05.09.1999 i.e. from the date on which the orders of the High Court came into operation till 05'08.1999 the date of petitioner,s reinstatement to the said service, the said interregnum period, (S) The observations of the Apex Court in the Judgment reported in 2022 SCC Online SC 232 in ..Sunil Kumar Rai & Others Vs. State of Bihar & Others,, (referred to and extracted above), The Writ petition is disposed of directing the Respondent Corporation to implement the order passed in M.P.No.17 of 2OO2 (otd M.p.No.69 of 1999) on the fite of Industrial Tribunal-I, Andhra pradesh, Hyderabad, in accordance to law duly considering the petitioner,s request for continuity of service of the interregnum period i.e., from 18.09.1997 to O5.O8.1999 and to count the said interregnum service to the petitioner,s service for all the purposes of promotion etc., and dury communicate the decision to the petitioner. However, there shall be no order as to costs. 7 Miscella neous petitions, it any pending. in this Writ Petition, sha ll stand closed. r\ I, 616 I 2022 \ To, //TRUE COPYII SD/- S. N]ALLIKARJUNA RAO ASsrsrtr{ REGISTRAR EECt ION OFFICER =1 1 The l\,4anaging Director, Telangana State Road Transpo t Corporation, Bus Bhavan, Musheerabad, T.S. 2

6. Ilg.lggi"lrt !/gnirOer, TSRTC, Secunderabad Regior:, JBS, ptCKET, iiecunderabad, T.S. The Depot Manager, TSRTC, BHEL Bus Depot, Hyderat ad, T.S. One CC to SRt p VENKATESWAR RAO, Advocate. [OpJC] One CC to SR! tVl RAM tMoHAN REDDY (SC FOR TSR] C) lopucl Two CD Copies BSK o * ---;:''!,&Tltl- --- _ r .r*r",* x**,.$**t+J HIGH GOURT DATED:1 110912025 I l I CC TODAY :rr- c iJ .s >+ $ l lt-i * u- ORDER WP.No.16161 of 2022 DISPOSING OF THE WRIT PETITION WITHOUT COSTS b b L&b