Ramana, J.) This case has a chequered history. The litigation between & Ors. v. Ujagir Singh[1]. He further submitted that merely because & Ors.

12. He further submitted that the findings recorded by this Court in its judgment dated 01.03.1999 passed in S.A. No. 689 of 1998, being in a suit for injunction and not suit for title, do not operate as res judicata so as to bar the present L.G.C., which is filed to declare respondent No.1 and its members as land grabbers. In support of this argument, he placed reliance on the judgment of the apex Court in Gram Panchayat of Village Naulakha v. Ujagir Singh & Ors.[1]. He further submitted that merely because respondent No.1 and its members obtained decree of perpetual injunction against petitioner, it does not mean that the petitioner is not entitled to initiate land grabbing proceedings against respondent No.1 and its members, who are grabbers of government land.

13. He submitted that since the apex Court by order dated

21.04.2003, passed in Civil Appeal No. 3607 of 2003, which arose out of the proceedings in the present L.G.C., directed the Special Court to decide the plea of res judicata as preliminary issue, the Special Court ought to have decided the same, and when it felt that the present L.G.C. is hit by the principles of res judicata, it ought not to have gone into other issues and decided the same on merits. In support of this argument, he placed reliance on the judgment of the apex Court in Abdul Rahman v. Prasony Bai[2].

14. He further submitted that the Special Court failed to consider the fact that respondent No.1 and its members are claiming the land in Sy. No. 129/11/paiki, which is non-existent, and in the guise of making claim to the land in the said survey number, they are claiming land in Sy. No. 403, which belongs to government. He further submitted that since Ex. C1 marked in L.G.C. No. 71 of 1991, copy of which is marked in L.G.C. No. 24 of 1991, as Ex. B27, is a product of fraud and mischief played by the officials of the petitioner, the Special Court, ought not to have placed much reliance on the same, so as to hold that there exists Sy. No. 129/11/paiki and that respondent No.1 and its members are in occupation and possession of the same. He further submitted that the Special Court committed a grave error in not considering Exs. A7 and A11, namely true copy of Town Survey Register and original map of Jubilee Hills Development plan, which show that the land in question belongs to government.

15. He further submitted that since respondent No.1 and its members are not party to the proceedings in L.G.C. No. 71, they cannot derive any benefit of the findings recorded by the Special Court with regard to the genuineness of Ex. C1 marked therein, and contend that the said findings operate as res judicata, against the petitioner, and in support of this argument, he relied on the judgment of the apex Court in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Anjuman Ara Begum[3]. He further submitted that the Special Court committed grave error in not considering the effect of Exs. A1 to A20, especially Ex. A1, A7, A11 and A20, relied on by the petitioner and negativing the case of the petitioner just relying on Exs. B2, B3 and B20 (copy of which is marked as Ex. B27, filed by respondent No.1 and its members, is illegal and arbitrary.

16. He further submitted that as respondent No.1 and its members filed applications seeking regularization of land in question, which is in their possession, it should be deemed that they have not disputed the title of the State to the land in question, and in support of this argument, he placed reliance on the judgment of the apex Court in Mahalaxmi Motors Ltd. V. Mandal Revenue Officer[4] and Mandal Revenue Officer v. Goundla Venkaiah[5].

17. He lastly contended that if at all this Court is not convinced and inclined to allow the writ petition, having regard to the nature of grounds raised by the petitioner, the matter be at least remanded to the Special Court, for consideration afresh. ARGUMENTS ADVANCED ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS

18. The learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents submitted that the petitioner having themselves subjected to the jurisdiction of the Special Court and having filed a joint memo for trial of all the issues framed in the L.G.C., now cannot contend that the Special Court ought to have decided the issue relating to res judicata as preliminary issue first, and that since it felt that the present L.G.C. is barred by the principles of res judicata, it ought not to have decided other issues on merits.

19. He submitted that this Court in exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction under article 226 of the Constitution of India can interfere with the order of a inferior Tribunal, only to correct errors of jurisdiction, in that, if it is demonstrated by the petitioner that the order impugned is without jurisdiction, not supported by any evidence, is based on inadmissible evidence and is in violation of the principles of natural justice. He submitted that the petitioner having neither pleaded any of the aforesaid grounds against the impugned order passed by the Special Court nor demonstrated the same, they are not entitled to writ of certiorari against the impugned order. He further submitted that this Court in exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction, cannot convert itself into a court of appeal and indulge in re-appreciation or re-evaluation of evidence. In support of this argument, he placed reliance on the judgments of the apex Court in Syed Yakoob v. Radhakrishnan[6] and State of A.P. v. Prameela Modi[7], and of a Division Bench of this Court in T. Surya Rao v. Dr. G. Ramakrishna Rao[8] and P. Vijayalakshmi Devi v. MRO, Shaikpet Mandal, Hyd.[9].

20. He submitted that the Special Court in the judgment passed in L.G.C. No. 24 of 1991 and this Court in the judgment passed in S.A. No. 689 of 1998, which confirmed the judgment in A.S. No. 209 of 1991, have consistently found and held that Sy. No. 121/11/paiki is in existence and that respondent No.1 and its members are in possession thereof, and the said finding having attained finality, the Special Court, did not interfere with the same, and considering the evidence placed before it in the present L.G.C., held that Sy. No. 121/11/paiki is in existence and that respondent No.1 and its members are in possession thereof, and that being so, it is not open for this Court, in exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction, to interfere with the same, and more particularly when it is not the case of the petitioner that the said finding recorded by the Special Court, is without jurisdiction, is perverse or is based on no evidence or has been made without affording opportunity of hearing to the petitioner.

21. He submitted that even though the Special Court in L.G.C. No. 24 of 1991, did not preclude the petitioner to initiate fresh proceedings against respondent No.1 and its members, the same is subject to proper enquiry with regard to genuineness of Ex. B27 marked therein, and respondent No.1 and its members being in possession of the land in Sy. No. 403 and not in Sy. No. 129/11/paiki, and no enquiry having been conducted by the petitioner with respect thereto, and no order having been passed by the Collector with respect to non-existence of Sy. No. 129/11/paiki, the present L.G.C. is not maintainable. He further submitted that no notice whatsoever was given to respondent No.1 and its members when the town survey was conducted, except the Tahsildar, and hence no credence can be given to the entries in the town survey register-Ex. A7, relied on by the petitioner to contend that the land is a government land.

22. He submitted that respondent No.1 and its members filed applications for regularization under protest, and in fact, pendency of litigation, is a condition precedent under G.O. Ms. No. 166, to file regularization application, and therefore, the action of respondent No.1 and its members, in making applications for regularization, cannot be treated as their admitting the title of the petitioner to the land in question. Hence, he submitted that no interference is called for with the impugned order, and prayed that the writ petition be dismissed.

23. Heard the learned Additional Advocate General for the petitioner-Government, the learned counsel for respondent No.1- Society and the learned counsel for unofficial respondent Nos. 2 to 34.

24. Having regard to the arguments advanced by the respective parties, the following questions do arise for consideration in the writ petition:

1. Whether the Special Court, having decided the issue relating t o r e s judicata as preliminary issue in the affirmative, committed an error in deciding the other issues on merits? 2. Whether the Special Court committed an error in holding that the present L.G.C. in view of the judgment dated 01.03.1999 of this Court in S.A. No. 689 of 1991, is hit by the principles of res judicata?

3. Whether the Special Court, was justified in holding that in view of its earlier order dated 29.12.1995, passed by it in L.G.C. No. 24 of 1991 and the judgment dated 01.03.1999 of this Court in S.A. No. 689 of 1998, the present L..G.C. is not maintainable?

4. Whether Sy. No.129/11/paiki is in existence, and if so, whether the land claimed by respondent No.1 is in Sy. No. 129/11/paiki, is a private patta land or formed part of land in in Sy. No. 403/part, which the petitioner contends is a government land?

5. Whether the Special Court by not giving credence to Ex. A11 and other Exs. namely A1, A7 and A20, and based on Ex. B27 marked in the present L.G.C., was justified in holding Sy. No. 129/11/paiki is in existence?

6. Whether respondent No.1 and their members, by filing applications before the Government seeking regularization of the land in their possession have conceded the title of the petitioner in respect of the land in question? and

7. Whether the petitioner has made out any ground to interfere with the impugned order passed by the Special Court?

25. Before we proceed to answer the above question, we may examine the scope and power of this Court to interfere with the order passed by an inferior Tribunal, in exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction under article 226 of the Constitution of India? PARAMETERS AND SCOPE OF CERTIORARI JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA

26. The petitioner invoked the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court under article 226 of the Constitution of India, to question the impugned order dated 02.03.2005, passed by the Special Court in L.G.C. No. 167 of 1999.

27. The parameters and scope of this Court to interfere with the order of an inferior tribunal in exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction under article 226 of the Constitution is very limited. This court while exercising certiorari jurisdiction, exercises only supervisory jurisdiction and not appellate jurisdiction. The writ Courts would issue writ of certiorari only in cases where it is demonstrated that while passing the impugned proceedings, inferior tribunal has acted without jurisdiction or has acted in excess of the jurisdiction vested in it, acted in contravention of the principles of natural justice, in that it has passed orders without issuing notices and without providing opportunity of hearing, committed an error apparent on the face of the record, or the conclusions/findings arrived at by it are based on no evidence whatsoever or the conclusions/findings arrived at by it, based on the evidence adduced by the parties, are perverse. The object of writ of certiorari is to keep the exercise of powers by the inferior judicial and quasi-judicial tribunals within the limits of the jurisdiction assigned to them by law and to restrain from acting in excess of their authority, by moving to the High Court the proceedings of the inferior court or tribunal for the purpose of quashing them.

28. What are the conditions that are necessary for issuing writ of certiorari was succinctly stated by the apex Court in Province of Bombay v. Kusaldas S. Advani[10] as follows: When any body of persons (a) having legal authority, (b) to determine questions affecting the rights of subjects, (c) having the duty to act judicially, (d) act in excess of their legal authority – a writ of certiorari may issue. Unless all these conditions are satisfied, mere inconvenience or absence of other remedy does not create a right to certiorari.

29. Thereafter, the question as to when a writ of certiorari can be issued by the High Court in exercise of its power under article 226 of the Constitution of India, came up for consideration before the apex Court in Syed Yakoob v. Radhakrishnan. The apex Court having considered the said question, answered as follows: A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals; these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can, similarly, be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. The jurisdiction of High Court to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercise it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior court or Tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error or law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. A finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot, however, be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding being within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, the points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. An error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari must be one which is apparent on the face of the record. Thus where it is manifest or clear that the conclusion of law recorded by an inferior Court or Tribunal is based on an obvious mis-interpretation of the relevant statutory provision, or sometimes in ignorance of it, or may be, even in disregard of it, or is expressly founded on reasons which are wrong in law, the said conclusion can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In all these cases, the impugned conclusion should be so plainly inconsistent with the relevant statutory provision that no difficulty is experienced by the High Court in holding that the said error of law is apparent on the face of the record.

30. Having regard to the parameters and scope of certiorari jurisdiction of this Court under article 226 of the Constitution of India, to interfere with the order of an inferior tribunal, as articulated by the apex Court in the afore-noted judgments, we shall proceed to notice whether the petitioner has made out any of the grounds of certiorari, enumerated therein, warranting interference by this Court with the impugned order passed by the Special Court. In re question No.1: JUSTIFICATION OF DECIDING OTHER ISSUES AFTER DECIDING PLEA OF RES JUDICATA AS PRELIMINARY ISSUE

31. It is the contention of the petitioner that since the Supreme Court, by order dated 21.04.2003, while setting aside the order dated

11.12.2000 passed by a Division Bench of this Court in W.P. No. 16097 of 2000 and allowing Civil Appeal No. 3607 of 2003, remanded the matter to the Special Court, with a specific direction to decide the plea of res judicata as a preliminary issue, the Special Court, having answered the plea of res judicata, in the affirmative, ought not to have proceeded further to answer the other issues framed on merits, and it committed a grave error in considering them. In support of this contention, the petitioner relied on the judgment of the apex Court in Abdul Rahman v. Prasony Bai, wherein it was held: For the purpose of disposal of the suit on the admitted facts, particularly when the suit can be disposed of on preliminary issues, no particular procedure was required to be followed by the High Court. In terms of Order 14 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a civil court can dispose of a suit on preliminary issues. It is neither in doubt nor in dispute that the issues of res judicata and/or constructive res judicata as also the maintainability of the suit can be adjudicated upon as preliminary issues. Such issues, in fact, when facts are admitted, ordinarily should be decided as preliminary issues.

32. There can be no quarrel on the proposition of law as propounded by the apex Court in the afore-mentioned judgment. But in the case on hand, the Special Court, admittedly, based on the rival pleadings of the parties, framed the following issues for consideration:

1. Whether the applicant/State is the owner of the application schedule property?

2. Whether the rival title set up by the respondents is true, valid and binding on the applicant?

3. Whether the respondents have perfected their title to the application schedule property by adverse possession?

4. Whether this LGC is maintainable in view of the judgment in LGC 24 of 1991 on the file of the Special Court under the A.P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act?

5. Whether this LGC is barred by principles of res judicata in view of the judgment in S.A. No. 689 of 1998 on the file of the High Court of A.P.?

6. Whether the respondents can be treated as land grabbers in respect of the application schedule land within the meaning of Act XII of 1982?

7. To what relief?

33. While the present L.G.C. was pending adjudication before the Special Court, respondent No.1 filed writ petition in W.P. No. 16097 of 2000 before this Court against the petitioner and 34 others to declare that the present L.G.C. No. 167 of 1999 is barred by principles of res judicata in view of the judgment of this Court in S.A. No. 689 of 1998. This Court, by order dated 11.12.2000, allowed the said writ petition. Questioning the said order, the petitioner filed S.L.P., and the Hon’ble Supreme Court, by order dated 21.04.2003 allowed Civil Appeal No. 6487 of 2001, directing the Special Court, as follows: Heard counsel. Leave granted. It is not disputed that the Special Court under the Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, (for short ‘the Special Court’) is required to consider and decide the plea of res judicata as a preliminary issue. In this case, we find that the plea of res judicata was raised and the same was not dealt with as a preliminary issue. On this short ground alone, we set aside the judgment under challenge and remit the matter to the Special Court. The Special Court shall, on receipt of the record, proceed to decide the plea of res judicata as a preliminary issue expeditiously. The appeals are allowed. There shall be no order as to costs.

34. Though the Supreme Court directed the Special Court to decide the plea of res judicata as a preliminary issue, the fact remains, the counsel for the applicant-petitioner Sri. N. Subba Reddy and Sri. Subramanyam Reddy, counsel for the respondents, filed a joint memo on 15.04.2004 requesting the Special Court to take up trial of the LGC and decide all the issues framed on merits. As both the counsel for the petitioner and the respondents requested the Special Court to decide all the issues framed on merits, the Special Court, apart from deciding the plea of res judicata, decided the other issues framed also on merits.

35. The doctrine of “approbate and reprobate”, which is a species of estoppel, squarely applies to the conduct of the petitioner. The law is well settled that a person cannot approbate and reprobate. The party that seeks the Court to render judgment on all the issues in a case so as to take advantage of the evidence let in therein, is disentitled to take inconsistent plea that the trial Court is erroneous in rendering judgment on all issues. The conduct of the party in making such a request to render the judgment on all the issues indicates that he wants to take advantage of the evidence let in by them, and once such request is acceded to by the Court, it is not open to the party to contend that the Court was not justified in giving its verdict on all the issues. The party to the litigation cannot be permitted to blow hot and cold.

36. In the case on hand, the facts of the case reveal that upon the matter being remanded by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the petitioner instead of seeking to decide the preliminary issue on the plea of res judicata as preliminary issue, some factual foundation was sought to be laid by both the parties to let in evidence on all the issues that were framed by the Special Court. Therefore, the parties cannot be permitted to approbate and reprobate having accepted to submit to the jurisdiction of the Special Court and taking advantage on that basis. One cannot be permitted to challenge the validity of such action. The apex Court had an occasion to deal with the above proposition of law in its judgment in R.N. Gosain v. Yashpal Dhir[11], and having dealt with the same, held as under: Law does not permit a person to both approbate and reprobate. This principle is based on the doctrine of election which postulates that no party can accept and reject the same instrument and that a ‘”person cannot say at one time that a transaction is valid and thereby obtain some advantage, to which he could only be entitled on the footing that it is valid, and then turn round and say it is void for the purpose of securing some other advantage”.

37. In this context, it would be relevant to note that after the amendment introduced in Order XIV Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, by way of Amendment Act, 1976, the Court is required to render judgment on all issues. The issue ‘res judicata’, requires letting in evidence on all issues, has to be determined by the trial Court. The apex Court, while deciding a case under Order XIV Rule 2 C.P.C., in its decision rendered in Lufthansa German Airlines v. VIJ Sales Corporation[12], held as follows: This Court has pointed out the undesirability of deciding a suit on a preliminary issue. This Court has also insisted that normally all issues should be decided while disposing of the suit. The amendment introduced in Order XIV Rule 2 of Code of Civil Procedure by Amendment Act of 1976, also provides that notwithstanding that a case may be disposed of on a preliminary issue, the Court shall, subject to the provisions of sub-rule (2) of Rule (2), pronounces the judgment on all issues. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 2 of Order XIV is an exception where a suit can be disposed of on the question of law only.

38. The question of res judicata, makes a question of law on facts, and it is a pure question of law, it does not require any evidence to prove that it can be treated as a preliminary issue and that too when the Court can dispose of its own decision. After the principles contained in Order XIV Rule 2(2) C.P.C. are satisfied, then only the issue of res judicata, is capable of being decided on the basis of undisputed facts emerging from the pleadings. Then in such case, it is only the duty of the Court to decide the same as a preliminary issue. In the case on hand, there is a dispute about the basic facts, as the Special Court was required to determine, whether the District Collector had made proper enquiry?, which is a condition precedent imposed in the earlier judgment, that was required to be satisfied by the petitioner to file the present L.G.C. As both the parties elected and submitted to the jurisdiction of the Special Court to render judgment on all the issues framed and renounced all their rights with regard adjudication of plea of res judicata as a preliminary issue, it is not open to the petitioner to take a stand inconsistent with the Memo filed by them. Accordingly, question No.1 is answered against the petitioner and in favour of the respondents. In re question No. 2: WHETHER THE PRESENT L.G.C. IS HIT BY THE PRINCIPLES OF RES JUDICATA IN VIEW OF THE ORDER OF THE SPECIAL COURT IN L.G.C. NO. 24 OF 1991 AND JUDGMENT OF THIS COURT IN S.A. NO. 689 of 1998

39. It is the contention of the petitioner that since the judgment dated 01.03.1999 in S.A. No. 689 of 1998, marked in the present L.G.C. as Ex. B3, is a judgment arising out of an injunction suit, the findings arrived at therein by this Court, which confirmed the judgment dated 16.01.1998 passed by the V Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, the certified copy of which is marked as Ex. B2, cannot be taken to decide title dispute involved in the present L.G.C., and as such, the Special Court committed a grave error in holding the findings arrived at by this Court in Ex. B3 operate as res judicata in the present L.G.C., filed by the petitioner to declare respondent No.1 and its members as grabbers of government land. The petitioner in support of this argument, placed reliance on the judgment of the apex Court in Gram Panchayat of Village Naulakha v. Ujagar Singh, wherein it was held: We may also add one other important reason which frequently arises under Section 11 CPC. The earlier suit by the respondent against the Panchayat was only a suit for injunction and not one on title. No question of title was gone into nor decided. The said decision cannot, therefore, be binding on the question of title. See in this connection Sajjadanashin Sayed v. Musa Dadabhai Ummer[13], where this Court, on a detailed consideration of law in India and elsewhere held that even if, in an earlier suit for injunction, there is an incidental finding on title, the same will not be binding in a latter suit or proceeding where title is directly in question, unless it is established that it was ‘necessary’ in the earlier suit to decide the question of title for granting or refusing injunction and that the relief for injunction was founded or based on the finding on title. Even the more framing of an issue on title may not be sufficient as pointed out in that case.

40. From the ratio laid down by the apex Court in the above judgment, it is clear that though the findings arrived at in a judgment delivered in a suit for injunction are not binding in a later suit or proceeding where title is directly in question, but the same would have binding effect in a later suit or proceeding for declaration of title, if it is established that there was necessity to go into the issue relating to title for grant of injunction. Therefore, it may be noticed whether respondent No.1, who pleaded that the judgment dated 01.03.1999 passed by this Court in S.A. No. 689 of 1998, which arose out of a suit for perpetual injunction, marked in the present L.G.C. as Ex. B3, would operate as res judicata in the present L.G.C., filed by the petitioner seeking to declare respondent No.1 and its members as grabbers of land, had demonstrated the necessity of this Court going into the issue of title in a suit for injunction.

41. Respondent No.1, admittedly, filed suit in O.S. No. 1615 of 1979 on the file of VII Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, seeking permanent injunction against M/s. Filmnagar Co-operative Housing Society Limited, Hyderabad, M/s. Indiranagar Weaker Section Hutsmen Association, Hyderabad and the State, wherein respondent No.1 pleaded that plots 1 to 49 form portion of land in Sy. No. 129/11/paiki, new Sy. No. 129/11 and 129/94 of Shaikpet village. The petitioner herein, as respondent No.3 therein, took a plea in the written statement that the property claimed by respondent No.1 herein was part of Sy. No. 403 of Shaikpet village. Thus from the respective stands taken by the petitioner and respondent No.1, it is clear that there was dispute as regards identity of the land, whether it is situated in Sy. No. 129/1/paiki as claimed by respondent No.1 or it was part of Sy. No. 403 of Shaikpet village.

42. The above suit filed by respondent No.1, by judgment dated

19.09.1991 of the VII Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, marked in the present LGC as Ex. B1, was dismissed. Aggrieved thereby, respondent No.1 filed appeal in A.S. No. 209 of 1991 on the file of V Additional Chief Judge, Hyderabad.

43. At that point of time, the petitioner filed L.G.C. No. 24 of 1991 on the file of the Special Court, to declare the respondents therein, including respondent No.1 herein, as grabbers of land in an extent of 1616 Sq. mtrs. in Sy. No. 403/part corresponding to T.S. No. 1/1/1, Block B, Ward No. 10 of Shaikpet village, Golconda Mandal, Hyderabad, which the petitioner contends is a government land. In L.G.C. No. 24 of 1991, the Special Court considered the question as to whether Sy. No. 129/11/paiki, in which respondent No.1, claims the land in question is situated and are in possession thereof, is in existence prior to 1964 or whether it is situated in Sy. No. 403/part, which the petitioner claims to be government land.

44. In L.G.C. No. 24 of 1991, respondent No.1 marked the certified copy of Jubilee Hills Development Plan as Ex. B27. Admittedly, the petitioner themselves, marked copy of Ex.B27-Jubilee Hills Development plan in L.G.C. No. 71 of 1991, as Ex. C1. The petitioner is also said to have marked the same in L.G.C. No. 121 of 1989. Upon perusing Ex. B27/Ex.C1, the Special Court found that in the upper portion thereof, two plots, adjoining the Jubilee Hills Development Plot Nos. 95 to 97 and part of 98, are shown as existing in Sy. No. 129/11/paiki. Having found so, the Special Court observed that there was inconsistency in the evidence adduced by the Government, in that on the one hand, they say that there is no Sy. No. 129/11/paiki and on the other hand, they filed copy of Ex. B27 in L.G.C. No. 71 of 1991 as Ex. C1, showing that there are two plots in Sy. No. 129/11/paiki apart from existence of Sy. No. 129/11. Believing Ex. B27 to be authenticated copy of Jubilee Hills Development Plan, which reflected the existence of Sy. No. 129/11/paiki in two plots, besides Sy. No. 129/11, and in the absence of any explanation tendered by the petitioner as to how Sy. No. 129/11/paiki came to be shown, as adjoining Jubilee Hills Development plots, and considering the fact that Exs. B11 and B12- certified copies of sale deeds dated 16.04.1964, executed by T.V. Ramachandraiah in favour of respondent No.1, reflected Sy. No. 129/11/paiki, the Special Court, came to the conclusion that existence of Sy. No. 129/11/paiki cannot be ruled out. Observing and holding so, the Special Court by order dated 29.12.1995, dismissed L.G.C. No. 24 of 1991, granting liberty to the petitioner to institute fresh proceedings against respondent No.1 herein and its members, if on proper enquiry it is established that Ex. B27 is not true and correct and that respondent No.1 and its members are in possession of Acs. 20.00 of land in Sy. No. 403 and not in Sy. No. 129/11/paiki. This finding arrived by the Special Court in its judgment dated 29.12.1995 passed in L.G.C. No. 24 of 1991, copy of which is marked as Ex. B4, attained finality, inasmuch as the petitioner, did not file any writ petition questioning the said finding or order.

45. After disposal of L.G.C. No. 24 of 1991 by the Special Court, the appeal in A.S. No. 209 of 1991, filed by respondent No.1 against the dismissal of their injunction suit by the VII Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, came up for trial and hearing before the V Additional Chief Judge, Hyderabad, came to be decided. In the appeal, the V Additional Chief Judge, framed two issues, namely (1) Whether respondent No.1 is having title and possession over the suit land? and; (2) Whether there was Sy. No.129/11/paiki of Banjara Hills (Shaikpet village) in existence? In the appeal, the certified copy of the judgment in L.G.C. No. 24 of 1991 was marked as Ex. A21 and certified copy of A.P. Gazette Part-II Extraordinary dated

09.09.1991, issued by the Special Grade Deputy Collector, Hyderabad, in respect of demarcation and identification of government and private lands of Banjara Hills, Hyderabad, inviting objections from interested persons, was marked as Ex. A24, wherein it is reflected that Ramulu and Narayana, the vendors of T.V. Ramachandraiah, the vendor of respondent No.1, are in possession of the land in Sy. No. 129/96 and Sy. No. 129/110 respectively. Considering the said exhibits, the V Additional Chief Judge, Hyderabad, held that Sy. No. 129/11/paiki was in existence by the date of purchase of purchase of land by T.V. Ramachandraiah, the vendor of respondent No.1, and further considering the oral evidence placed by the petitioner, came to the conclusion that respondent No.1, having purchased the land in Sy. No. 129/11/paiki from their vendor for valuable sale consideration, was in possession of the land. Holding so, by judgment dated 16.01.1998, allowed the appeal filed by respondent No.1.

46. Against the said judgment of the V Additional Chief Judge, Hyderabad, the petitioner filed second appeal in S.A. No. 689 of 1998. This Court in S.A. No. 689 of 1998 framed three substantial questions of law, and by judgment dated 01.03.1999, the certified copy of which is marked in the present L.G.C. as Ex. B3, on the first question, held that “the lower appellate court was right in holding that Sy. No. 129/11 was in existence on the basis of private documents when revenue records do not show that there was any such Sy. No. 129/11”; on the second question, held “that small discrepancy in road numbers in Banjara Hills, does not erase the other overwhelming evidence pointing to the identity of the suit land” and; on the third question, held “that even then, it is an admitted case that this land was assigned to one Ramulu and Narayana, and that it is the case of respondent No.1 land passed from Ramulu and Narayana to T.V. Ramachandraiah and from him to others, and thus, respondent No.1 and his predecessors-in-title bona fide came into possession of the property without being objected to by anybody, including Government, and that respondent No.1 exercised their legal rights of possession and enjoyment and also title by getting the land prepared into house plots and sold them to different persons, and that respondent No.1’s predecessors-in-title enjoyed the property for over several decade, and that Narayana and Ramulu, the vendors of the vendor of respondent No.1, were granted pattas under Exs. A8 and A9 marked in the suit, and that the injunction granted by the first appellate court in favour of respondent No.1 is sustainable in law. Admittedly, the petitioner did not file any S.L.P. or appeal questioning the judgment dated 01.03.1999 passed by this Court in S.A. No. 689 of 1998, which is marked in the present L.G.C. as Ex. B3 before the Supreme Court, and therefore, the findings arrived at therein by this Court in the said judgment attained finality.

47. Though the learned Additional Advocate General submitted that this Court in second appeal did not decide title when it said “I am of the view that there is no necessity to go into title of the land”, and as such, the present L.G.C. for declaration of respondent No.1 and their members as land grabbers, is maintainable and not barred by the principles of res judicata, the fact remains, immediately after the said sentence, this Court held that even then it is admitted case that the land was assigned to one Ramulu and Narayana. It would be appropriate to quote the findings arrived at by the learned Judge of this Court in S.A. No. 689 of 1998 dated 01.03.1999, which read as follows: This being a suit for perpetual injunction and in the light of the evidence adduced, I am of the view that there is no necessity to go into the title of the land. Even then, it is an admitted case that this land was assigned to one Ramulu and Narayana. It is the case of the plaintiff (respondent No.1 herein) that the land passed from Ramulu and Narayana to T.V. Ramachandraiah and from him to others. Thus, the plaintiff and his predecessors-in-title bona fidely came into possession of the property without being objected to by anyboy, including the Government. Further, they exercised their legal rights of possession and enjoyment and also title by getting the land prepared into house plots and sold them to different persons. Plaintiff’s predecessor-in-title enjoyed the property for over several decades.

48. There is no dispute that the judgment dated 01.03.1999 passed by this Court in S.A. No. 689 of 1998, admittedly, arose out of suit for perpetual injunction, and in a suit for injunction title cannot be decided, unless it is necessary to go into the title to arrive at prima facie satisfaction for grant of injunction. In the case on hand, having regard to the nature of dispute involved in the suit, i.e. with regard to identity of the property, so as to ascertain whether the property claimed by respondent No.1 is in Sy. No. 129/11/paiki or formed part of Sy. No.403/part, which the petitioner contends is a government land, did the V Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, in A.S. No. 209 of 1991, the certified copy of which is marked as Ex. B2 marked in the present L.G.C., consider as to who, whether the petitioner or respondent No.2, is having title to the property, and held that respondent No.1 and his predecessors-in-title were owners of the land in an extent of Acs. 20.00 in Sy. No. 129/11/paiki of Shaikpet village. This Court, in S.A. No. 689 of 1998, vide judgment dated 01.03.1999, certified copy of which is marked as Ex. B3 in the L.G.C., dismissed the second appeal confirming the findings arrived at by the first appellate Court, holding that the petitioner is not the owner of the land in an extent of Acs. 20.00 in Sy. No. 129/11/paiki of Shaikpet village and that respondent No.1 their predecessors-in-title have been in possession and enjoyment of the said property for over six decades and that they have traced their title since 1930.

49. As the petitioner in the present L.G.C. sought to declare that respondent No. 1 and its members as land grabbers and for recovery of possession, and having regard to the fact that the Special Court, earlier in L.G.C. No. 24 of 1991, filed by the petitioner against respondent No.1 and three others vide order dated 29.12.1995 marked in the present L.G.C. as Ex. B4, the V Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, vide judgment dated 16.01.1998 passed in A.S. No. 209 of 1991, filed by respondent No.2 against the petitioners and others, certified copy of which is marked as Ex. B2 and this Court in S.A. No.689 of 1998, filed by the petitioner, vide Ex. B3-certified copy of judgment dated 01.03.1999, have consistently held that respondent No.1 is the owner of the land in Sy. No. 129/11/paiki and that prior to him his predecessors-in-title were in possession were in possession and that they traced their title dating back to 1930 and that it does not form part of Sy. No. 403/part, which the petitioner contends is a government land, and the said finding arrived at by this Court in the said judgment having attained finality inasmuch as no S.L.P. or appeal is filed by the petitioner questioning the same before the Supreme Court, the Special Court felt that the said findings arrived at by this Court in Ex. B3-certified copy of judgment in S.A. No. 689 of 1998, attained finality. Accordingly, the Special Court, held that the findings arrived at by it in its order in the earlier round of litigation between the parties in L.G.C. No. 24 of 1991 and the judgment of this Court in S.A. No. 689 of 1998, would operate as res judicata in the present L.G.C., and no exception can be taken thereto. The facts of the present case being different from that of the facts appearing in Gram Panchayat of Village Naulakha v. Ujagar Singh, as noted above, the judgment rendered by the apex Court, in the said case, has no application to the facts of the case. Hence, it is held that the Special Court is justified in holding that the findings arrived at by it in the earlier round of litigation between the parties in L.G.C. No. 24 of 1991 and this Court in S.A. No. 689 of 1998 would operate a s res judicata. Accordingly, this question is answered against the petitioner and in favour of the respondents. In re question No. 3: WHETHER THE PRESENT L.G.C. IS NOT MAINTAINABLE IN VIEW OF THE ORDER OF THE SPECIAL COURT IN L.G.C. NO. 24 OF 1991

50. It is the contention of respondent No.1 that since the petitioner did not comply with the condition precedent prescribed in L.G.C. No. 24 of 1991 i.e. conducting an enquiry with regard to the genuineness of Ex. B27 and existence or otherwise of Sy. No. 129/11/paiki, the present L.G.C., is not maintainable. However, it is the specific case of the petitioner that since in L.G.C. No. 24 of 1991, the Special Court granted liberty to the petitioner to file fresh L.G.C. if it is found that Ex. B27 is not genuine and there does not exist Sy. No. 129/11/paiki, and having regard to the fact that the District Collector, Hyderabad, upon thorough enquiry with the assistance of the Deputy Director, Survey and Land Records, Hyderabad, based on the records available, found that Ex. B27 is not genuine and Sy. No. 129/11/paiki was never in existence, much less the same was assigned to any one, the present L.G.C., filed by the petitioner is maintainable, particularly when the relief claimed by the petitioner in L.G.C. No. 24 of 1991 is in respect of a small extent of land, while in the present L.G.C. the relief claims is in respect of an extent of Acs.

7.29 guntas.

51. When M/s. Filmnagar Co-operative Housing Society Limited, Hyderabad, M/s. Indiranagar Weaker Section Hutsmen Association, Hyderabad, tried to interfere with the possession, respondent No.1 filed suit in O.S. No. 1615 of 1979 on the file of VII Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, seeking perpetual injunction against the said Association and Society and the Collector, Hyderabad Urban and the Mandal Revenue Officer, Hyderabad. The said suit, on contest by the defendants, therein by judgment dated 19.09.1991 was dismissed, certified copy of which is marked as Ex. B1 in the present L.G.C. Questioning the said judgment, respondent No.1 filed appeal in A.S. No. 209 of 1991 on the file of V Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court. At the very same time, the petitioner filed L.G.C. No. 24 of 1991 to declare respondent No.1 and two others as grabbers of a piece of government land and that Sy. No. 129/11/paiki, in which respondent No.1 claims that their land exists, is not at all in existence and that if formed part of Sy. No. 403/part.

52. While appeal in A.S. No. 209 of 1991, filed by respondent No.1, was pending, the Special Court, dismissed L.G.C. No. 24 of 1991, by order dated 29.12.1995, copy of which is marked as Ex. B4 in the present L.G.C., holding that Sy. No. 129/11/paiki is in existence and that the land claimed by respondent No.1 did not form part of government land in Sy. No. 403/part. Admittedly, respondent No.1 marked copy of the judgment dated 29.12.1995 passed by the Special Court in L.G.C. No. 24 of 1991 as Ex. A21 in the appeal in A.S. No. 209 of 1991 filed by them on the file of V Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, against the order passed by the trial Court dismissing their suit for injunction. The V Additional Chief Judge, having regard to the order passed by the Special Court in L.G.C. No. 24 of 1991, observed that the petitioner themselves approached the Special Court to declare that respondent No.1 and other are encroachers of government land and for their eviction by filing L.G.C. No. 24 of 1991, and even though the same was dismissed, the petitioner did not file any appeal, and in view of that it is not open to the petitioner to contend that Sy. No. 129/11/paiki is not in existence and that the suit land formed part of Sy. No. 403/part, and observing so, dismissed the appeal by judgment dated 16.01.1998, certified copy of which is marked as Ex. B2 in the present L.G.C.

53. The second appeals in S.A. Nos. 574 and 689 of 1998 filed by M/s. Indiranagar Weaker Section Hutsmen Association and the petitioner herein respectively, questioning judgment dated

16.01.1998, passed by the V Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, were dismissed by this Court by judgment dated

01.03.1999, copy of which is marked as Ex. B3 in the present L.G.C. by confirming the findings arrived at by the V Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, in his judgment dated 16.01.1998 passed in A.S. No. 209 of 1998. The findings arrived at by the V Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, in his judgment dated 16.01.1998 passed in A.S. No. 209 of 1998, as confirmed by this Court in S.A. No. 689 of 1998, vide judgment dated 01.03.1999, that there exists Sy. No. 129/11/paiki, in which respondent No.1 claims that their land exists, attained finality, because no further appeal was filed by the petitioner before the Supreme Court.

54. As noted supra, the petitioner, earlier filed L.G.C. No. 24 of 1991 against respondent No.1 and three others. The judgment dated

29.12.1995 passed therein by the Special Court, was marked as Ex.B4 in the present L.G.C. In L.G.C. No. 24 of 1991, the contention of the petitioner was that Sy. No. 129/11/paiki, in which the respondents claim that their land is located, is not at all in existence, and that the land claimed by the respondent No.1 and its members is located in Sy. No. 403/part, which correlates to government land in T.S. No. 1/1/1. During the pendency of said L.G.C., the Special Court, to ascertain whether the schedule land is in Sy. No. 403/part or in Sy. No. 129/11/paiki, appointed a Commissioner, who having conducted an enquiry, filed his report stating that the land in an extent of 1160 Sq.mts. covered by L.G.C. No. 24 of 1991, is part of T.S. No.1/1/1/A, Block B and Ward No.10 corresponding to Sy. No. 403/part, and that the land claimed by respondent No.1, was nowhere near the schedule land and that it is at a distance of 515 metres from the schedule land. Based on the said report of the Commissioner, the Special Court in Ex.B4-judgment in L.G.C. No. 24 of 1991, held that the land in Sy. No. 129/11/paiki, claimed by respondent No.1 and others, is nowhere near the schedule land and that it is at a distance of 515 mts. from the schedule land in L.G.C. No. 24 of 1991 and that the land claimed by the respondents is in Sy. No.129/11/paiki.

55. From the above finding arrived at by the Special Court in L.G.C. No. 24 of 1991, it is clear that the land claimed by the petitioner is different from that of the land claimed by respondent No.1 and its members, in that the petitioner claimed that their land is in Sy. No. 403, the respondents claimed in Sy. No. 129/11/paiki. This finding arrived at by the Special Court in L.G.C. No. 24 of 1991 attained finality, inasmuch as no writ petition was filed by the petitioner questioning the same.

56. Be that as it may, though the Special Court in L.G.C. No. 24 of 1991, vide order dated 29.12.1995, recorded a finding that Sy. No.129/11/paiki is in existence and that the land claimed by respondent No.1 and the petitioner are entirely different, but having regard to the stand taken by the petitioner that Ex. B27 is a product of mischief and fraud played by their officials, observed that the said order will not preclude the petitioner from instituting fresh suit against respondent No.1 and its members if on proper enquiry it is established that Ex. B27 is not true and correct and that respondent No.1 and its members are in possession of Acs. 20.00 of land in Sy. No. 403 and not in Sy. No. 129/11/paiki as claimed by respondent No.1.

57. It is the contention of the petitioner that since the District Collector, Hyderabad, as directed by the Special Court in L.G.C. No. 24 of 1991, having conducting an enquiry, found that Ex. B27 is not genuine and that Sy. No. 129/11/paiki is not at all in existence, the present L.G.C. is maintainable. The Special Court considered this contention of the petitioner in the light of the evidence pLaced by the petitioner and held that the present L.G.C. is not maintainable. In arriving at such a conclusion, the Special Court noted that P.W.1- Mandal Revenue Officer, Shaikpet, in his evidence stated that the matter regarding the existence of Sy. No. 129/11/paiki was examined by the District Collector with the assistance of the Deputy Collector, Survey and Land Records, Hyderabad, based on the records available in the Collector’s office, and that he did not state about the compliance of the condition of conducting proper enquiry to file the present L.G.C. as directed by the Special Court in L.G.C. No. 24 of 1991. Though P.W. 1 stated that the District Collector, Hyderabad, found that Sy. No. 129/11/paiki was never in existence much less the same was assigned to any person, and that the survey staff, who surveyed the land, interpolated paiki after Sy. No. 129/11, which is evident from a comparison of the original layout i.e. ink signed copy, which does not contain the word paiki after Sy. No.129/11, the fact remains, the Special Court found that the petitioner did not produce the original Jubilee Hills Development Plan to demonstrate that Ex. B27, is not genuine. That the petitioner failed to produce any material to show that the District Collector, Hyderabad, has passed any orders stating that Ex. B27 is not genuine and Sy. No. 129/11/paiki is not in existence.

58. The Special Court, further upon considering the contentions of the petitioner and respondent No.1, found that though the petitioner disputed the genuineness of Ex. B27, the fact remains, they did not produce the original Jubilee Hills Development Plan. That Ex. B20, marked in the present L.G.C. is the certified copy of Ex. B27 that was marked in L.G.C. No. 24 of 1991, and that Ex. B27 is the certified copy of Ex. C1 that was marked by the petitioner themselves in L.G.C. No. 71 of 1991 and that Ex. C1 was filed by comparing with the original on

04.09.1992. The Special Court, having regard to the fact that Ex. C1 was filed by the petitioner themselves, observed that when the original of Ex. C1 was very much available with the petitioner on 04.09.1992, it must be presumed that the original Jubilee Hills Development Plan is in existence, and in the absence of producing the same, and no justification having been given by the petitioner for its non-production, in that, to show that the original was destroyed or accidentally burnt in fire, it cannot be said that the Ex. B27, which was filed after comparing with Ex. C1, filed by the petitioners themselves, is not genuine.

59. The Special Court also took note of the fact that though the petitioner contended that Ex. B27 is not genuine, and that it was brought into existence showing existence of Sy. No.129/11/paiki mischievously and fraudulently by officials of the State, the petitioner did not produce any material to show whether any enquiry, much less proper enquiry, was conducted to ascertain as to who is responsible introducing Ex.B27 by showing the existence of Sy. No. 129/11/paiki. Observing so, the Special Court held that practically there was no evidence whatsoever placed to show that on what basis the District Collector, Hyderabad, came to the conclusion that Ex. B27 is not genuine and Sy. No. 129/11/paiki was not in existence.

60. Before us, the learned Additional Advocate General relying upon the remarks of the District Collector, Hyderabad in the note file, sought to contend that since an enquiry, as directed by the Special Court in L.G.C. No. 24 of 1991, was conducted by the District Collector, Hyderabad, wherein he found that Ex. B27 is not genuine and Sy. No. 129/11/paiki is not in existence, the present L.G.C. is maintainable.

61. To appreciate and verify whether or not a proper enquiry as directed by the Special Court in L.G.C. No. 24 of 1991, was conducted by the District Collector, Hyderabad, with regard to the genuineness or otherwise of Ex. B27 marked therein, we have called for the original note file from the petitioner, because the Special Court in the impugned order recorded that the petitioner has not produced any material to show that the District Collector, Hyderabad, had conducted enquiry as directed by it earlier.

62. A perusal of the original file, produced by the learned Additional Advocate General, would disclose the District Collector, Hyderabad, did not conduct any enquiry, much less proper enquiry, as directed by the Special Court with regard to the genuineness of the Ex. B27. He merely, after holding discussions with his officers and after examining the revenue record available in his office, found that the record is fabricated and that no survey number 129/11/paiki is in existence and made an endorsement directing to file the present L.G.C. The petitioner, did not understand the spirit of the order of the Special Court, which directed conduct of proper enquiry with regard to the genuineness of Ex. B27. Admittedly, Ex. B27 marked in L.G.C. No. 24 of 1991, is certified copy of Ex. C1, marked by the petitioner themselves in L.G.C. No. 71 of 1991. No enquiry was conducted by the District Collector, as to the genuineness of Ex. B27. Though it was contended that Ex. B27 is result of fraud played by the officials, there is no material placed to show whether any notices were issued to the officer/s, who issued Ex.B27, which is certified copy of Ex. C1 and whether any action was taken against them. Further, the file does not contain any proceedings to show the District Collector, Hyderabad, has ordered an enquiry into the genuineness or otherwise of Ex. B27 and had passed orders stating that Ex. B27 is not genuine and Sy. No. 129/11/paiki is not in existence. Burden of proof lies heavily upon the petitioner by way of proper enquiry to prove that Ex. B27, which is certified copy of Ex. C1, marked by the petitioner themselves in L.G.C. No. 71 of 1991, is not genuine and that there does not exist Sy. No. 129/11/paiki. In the absence of any enquiry conducted by the District Collector, into the genuineness or otherwise and no order having been passed by the District Collector, Hyderabad, stating that Ex. B27 is not genuine and Sy. No. 129/11/paiki is not in existence, it cannot be said that the District Collector, Hyderabad, has complied with the condition precedent prescribed by the Special Court, to file fresh L.G.C.

63. At any rate, in the absence of any material placed by the petitioner to show that proper enquiry was conducted by the District Collector, Hyderabad himself, with regard to the genuineness or otherwise of Ex. B27, and the District Collector, Hyderabad, having not passed any orders, pursuant to the alleged remarks in the note file, stating that Ex. B27 is not genuine and that Sy. No. 129/11/paiki is not in existence, which is a condition precedent to be complied with by the petitioner, to file fresh L.G.C. Further having regard to the fact that the Special Court in L.G.C. No. 24 of 1991 based on Ex. B27, filed by respondent No.1, which is copy of Ex. C1 marked by the petitioner themselves in L.G.C. No. 71 of 1991, which was marked after comparing with the original, held that Sy. No. 129/11/paiki was in existence, and inasmuch as Ex. B20, marked in the present L.G.C., being the certified copy of Ex. B27, which is copy of Ex. C1 marked in L.G.C. No. 71 of 1991 by comparing with the original, and the petitioner having not produced the original of Ex. C1, and the said finding recorded by the Special Court in L.G.C. No. 24 of 1991, dated

29.12.1995, having been confirmed by the V Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad in A.S. No. 209 of 1991, dated 16.01.1998, and further confirmed by this Court in S.A. No. 689 of 1999, dated

01.03.1999, having attained finality, we are of the considered opinion that the present L.G.C. filed by the petitioner is not maintainable, even though it is the contention of the petitioner that L.G.C. No. 24 of 1991 was with respect to small extent of land and the present L.G.C. is with respect to a larger extent of Acs. 7.29 guntas of land, and no exception can be taken to the finding recorded by the Special Court that the present L.G.C. is not maintainable. Hence, we hold that the present L.G.C. filed by the petitioner is not maintainable, Accordingly, this question is answered in favour of the respondents and against the petitioner. In re question No. 4: WHETHER SY. NO. 129/11/PAIKI IS IN EXISTENCE, AND IF SO, WHETHER THE LAND CLAIMED BY RESONDENT NO.1 IN SY. NO. 129/11/PAIKI IS A PRIVATE PATTA LAND OR FORMED PART OF GOVERNMENT LAND IN SY. NO. 403/PART

64. The case of respondent No.1 is that they purchased the land in question from one T.V. Ramachandraiah under Exs. B16 to B18 registered sale deeds , who in fact, purchased the same from Narayana and Ramulu, who were given pattas by the surfekas under Exs. B47 an B49 in fasli 1340. When M/s. Filmnagar Co-operative Housing Society Limted, Hyderabad, M/s. Indiranagar Weaker Section Hutsmen Association and the Revenue Officials/State tried to interfere with the possession of respondent No.1, they filed suit in O.S. No. 1615 of 1979 on the file of VII Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, seeking perpetual injunction, and on contest, the same was dismissed, vide judgment dated 19.09.1991, the certified copy of which is marked as Ex. B1. Questioning the same, respondent No.1 filed appeal n A.S. No. 209 of 1991 on the file of V Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, and at the same time, the petitioner fled L.G.C. No. 24 of 1991 on the file of the Special Court, against respondent No.1 and two others to declare them as grabbers of a piece of land of the government. The said L.G.C. by judgment dated 29.12.1995, certified copy of which is marked as Ex. B4, was dismissed by the Special Court, holding that there exists Sy. No. 129/11/paiki and that the land clamed by respondent No.1 does not form part of government land in Sy. No. 403/part. Respondent No.1 marked the sad judgment as an exhibit in A.S. No. 209 of 1991 In the appeal, the Jubilee Hills Development Plan, which was marked as Ex. B27 in L.G.C. No. 24 of 1991, was marked as Ex. A22. The V Additional Chief Judge, having considered Ex. A22 and Ex. A24, namely the certified copy of the gazette marked therein, held that the facts before it established that Sy. No. 129/11/paiki was in existence by the date of purchase of land by the vendor of respondent No.1 and that respondent No.1 and their vendor were in possession and enjoyment of the said land. Holding so, the V Additional Chief Judge, by judgment dated 16.01.1998, marked as Ex. B2 in the present LGC, allowed the appeal. Assailing the said judgment, M/s. Indiranagar Weaker Section Hutsmen Association and the petitioner filed second appeals in S.A. Nos. 574 and 689 of 1998, and this Court having regard to the material evidence placed, namely Exs. A1 to A7, A10 to A12, held that the lower appellate Court was right in holding that Sy. No. 129/11/paiki was in existence, and that it is the admitted case of the petitioner that the land was assigned to one Ramulu and Narayana, who were in possession from 1930 to 1964 and sold the same to T.V. Ramachandraiah, who having been in possession from 1964 to 1969, in turn sold the same to others, and that respondent No.1 and his predecessors-in-title bona fide came into possession of the property without being objected to by anybody including the petitioner, and that respondent No.1 and their predecessors-in-title have been in peaceful possession and enjoyment of the same. Holding so, this Court, by judgment dated 01.03.1999, which is marked as Ex. B3, dismissed the second appeal. Admittedly, the judgment in L.G.C. No. 24 of 1991 and the second appeal in S.A. No. 689 of 1998 attained finality, as the petitioner did not file writ petition and appeal before the Supreme Court respectively.

65. This Court in S.A. No. 689 of 1998, basing on Exs. A1, A2 and A3 sale deeds the names of respondent No.1 and T.V. Ramachandraiah and the plan attached to Exs. A3 and Ex. A5 and Ex. A6 plan attached to it an Ex. A7, registered sale deed dated

10.12.1966 in favour of respondent No.1, held that the said documents show as to how the land of Acs. 20.00 out of Sy. No. 129/11/paiki of Shaikpet village passed on from the original pattedar to respondent No.1. the said lands were given house numbers. Exs. A10 to A12 showed that the layout plan in respect of Acs. 20.00 was got approve by T.V. Ramachandraiah. Based on these documents, this Court held that the said documents amply established that respondent No.1 an their predecessors in title have been in peaceful possession and enjoyment of the same.

66. After this Court, by judgment dated 01.03.1999 dismissed the second appeal in S.A. No. 689 of 1998 filed by the petitioner, the petitioner filed the present L.G.C. to declare the respondents as grabbers of government land. As the petitioner claimed that they are the owners of the land in question, the Special Court having regard to the provisions of Section 10 of the Act, held that burden was on the petitioner to prove that the petitioner had prima facie title to the petition schedule property. The case of the petitioner before the Special Court was that the land in question belonged to surfekas, which merged in Diwani in 1949 and stood vested with the Government under Surfekas Merger Regulation Act, 1358, while respondent No.1 claimed that surfekas was private estate of H.e.H. Nizam and predecessors-in-title, were granted pattas under Exs. B47 and B49, namely original patta certificate issued by the District Collector Atraf Balda Sarfekas Mubarak in the name of Narayana and original patta certificate issued in the name of Ramulu, which are in Urdu.

67. Though the petitioner contended that Ex. B27 marked in L.G.C. No. 24 of 1991, is manipulated, the Special Court disbelieved such contention of the petitioner having regard recitals in Exs. B11 and B12-sale deeds dated 16.04.1964, executed by Narayana and Ramulu in favour of T.V. Ramachandraiah, wherein the land sold thereunder, is shown to be existing in Sy. No. 129/11/paiki, and having regard to the fact that the petitioner themselves have marked copy of Ex. B27 marked in L.G.C. No. 24 of 1991 as Ex.C1 in L.G.C. No. 71 of 1991, the Special Court, based on the findings arrived at by it earlier in Ex.B4-judgment in L.G.C. No. 24 of 1991, came to the conclusion that Sy. No. 129/11/paiki was in existence prior to 1964 when Narayana and Ramulu under Exs. B11 and B12-sale deeds sold two plots to T.V. Ramachandraiah and that the property claimed by the respondents is located in Sy. No. 129/11/paiki and not in Sy. No. 403, as contended by the petitioner, and that the petitioner failed to make any effort to reconcile the discrepancy in Ex. B27, which shows the existence of Sy. No. 129/11/paiki.

68. Further though the petitioner disputed the genuineness of Exs. B47 and 49, the Special Court found that even though respondent No.1 marked the said documents, in O.S. No. 1615 of 1979 on the file of VII Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, as Exs. A8 and A9, the petitioner did not produce any evidence to disprove the same and that if really Exs. B47 and B49 were not genuine and forged, the petitioner ought to have taken steps to send the same to expert for opinion as regard the age of the paper, ink and writing, which they did not do. The Special Court having perused Exs. B47 and B49 found that they are very old and do not contain the seal of surfekas authorities.

69. The Special Court having perused Exs. B42 and B43 found that the ages of Narayana and Ramulu, were typewritten, and that on the reverse side of Exs. B42 and B43, the executant presented the document and that he was identified and that they admitted the execution of the documents. That the petitioner did not produce any evidence as to whether they cross-examined with respect to the genuineness of Exs. B42 and B43. As the petitioner did not advance any arguments with respect to ages of Narayana and Ramulu in the proceedings before the civil Court, appellate Court and this Court in second appeal held that it was not open to the petitioner to question the age of Narayana and Ramulu, and that if really Narayana and Ramulu were minors in the year 1930, the surfekas authorities would not have granted pattas to them.

70. The Special Court, having regard to the findings arrived at by this Court, in its judgment dated 01.03.1999 in S.A. No. 689 of 1998, which is marked as Ex.B3, held that respondent No.1 is the owner of land in an extent of Acs. 20.00 in Sy. No. 129/11/paiki of Shaikpet village and that respondent No.1 and their predecessors-in-title have been in possession and enjoyment of the land in question for several decades.

71. It is the case of the petitioner that though respondent No.1 claimed land in an extent of Acs. 20.00, in fact, on ground there exists only an extent of Acs. 7.29 guntas, while the remaining extent of land is covered by slum known as Indiranagar Slum, in respect of which the petitioner has granted pattas. May be on ground there exists only an extent of Acs. 7.29, but the fact remains, this Court in the second appeal in S.A. No. 689 of 1998 filed by the petitioner, the certified copy of the judgment in which is marked as Ex.B3, held that respondent No.1 and their predecessors-in-title were in possession of the land in Sy. No. 129/11/paiki. Ex. B3, is a common judgment, by which the second appeal in S.A. No. 574 of 1994, filed by Indiranagar Weaker Section Hutsmen Association, which claimed possession of the land, by way of pattas granted by the petitioner, along with the second appeal in S.A. No.689 if 1998, was also dismissed, holding that respondent No.1 and their predecessors-in-title were in possession of the land in Sy. No. 129/11/paiki. This finding arrived at by this Court attained finality, because neither the petitioner nor the Indiranagar Weakerr Section Hutsmen Association, filed any appeal before the Supreme Court. Having regard to the findings arrived at by this Court in Ex.B3, the Special Court held that respondent No.1 and their predecessors-in-title have been in possession and that respondents traced their title from

72. Further, the Special Court found that this Court in Ex.B3- certified copy of the judgment in S.A. No. 689 of 1998, dated

01.03.1999, relying on Exs. A10 to A12-layout plans marked therein, found that layout plans in respect of an extent of Acs. 20.00 was got approved by T.V. Ramachandraiah. The Special Court, also based on the evidence adduced by respondent No.1 in the present L.G.C. found that T.V. Ramachandraiah, the vendor of respondent No.1 herein received Exs. B12 and B13-notices from Assessor and Collector, Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad. That Ex. B12 is dated

23.07.1964 and Ex. B13 is dated 23.07.1964, reflect that the name of T.V. Ramachandraiah has been effected in the Assessment Register, and that they relate to land bearing Door Nos.8-2-269/1 and 8-2- 269/2. That Ex. B14 is letter dated 07.01.1965 addressed by the Assessor and Collector, Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad, to T.V. Ramachandraiah, showing that the plan marked as “A” and “B” have been allotted Municipal Nos. 8-2-269/1 and 8-2-269/2 respectively and that the said two plots stand in the name of T.V. Ramachandraiah in the Property Tax Assessment Register. Thus the Special Court found that even before the town survey was started and concluded, the name of T.V. Ramachandraiah was mutated in the municipal records in respect of the land in question, as is evident from Ex. B14, and held that even before 07.01.1965, the name of T.V. Ramachandraiah was entered in thee municipal records and as such, he is the registered holder even before town survey was started in the year 1965 and completed in 1971. Further, based on Ex. B15-correspondence certificate dated 18.01.1965, the Assessor and Collector, Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad to T.V. Ramachandraiah, the Special Court found that the said document certified that Plot Nos. 8-2-269/1 and 8-2-269/2 correspond to Sy. No. 129/11/paiki admeasuring Acs. 20.00.

73. As the name of T.V. Ramachandraiah was entered in the municipal records, the Special Court held that not giving notice under Section 9(2) of A.P. Survey and Boundaries Act is fatal to the stand of the petitioner that the land in question is government land. The Special Court further considering the evidence of P.W.2 with regard to conduct of town survey between 1964 to 1971, who deposed that survey was conducted based on possession and enjoyment of the property by the individual on the ground and based on pahanies, the correlation with old survey i.e. revision survey and initial survey of Shaikpet village was done basically in the office, observed and held that the town survey was not conducted by goIng to the ground or fields, but the correlation with revision survey and initial survey of Shaikpet village was done in the office.

74. The Special Court found that though P.W.2 in his evidence stated that Sy. Nos. 129/11 to 129/18, 129/20 to 129/22, 129/24 to 129/84, 129/86 and 129/87 are assigned lands, the petitioner did not produce any evidence to show that the said lands are assigned lands, and that the evidence of P.W.2 supported the case of respondent No.1 that the surfekas authorities assigned lands in Sy. Nos. 129/11. The Special Court thus held Sy. No. 129/11/paiki is in existence and that an extent of Acs. 20.00 was assigned to Narayana and Ramulu under Ex. B47 and B49 by the surfekas authorities out of Sy. No. 129/11/paiki. That P.W.2 in his evidence stated that surfekas assigned the lands during the years commencing from 1340 to 1346 i.e. 1930 to

1936. Under Exs. B47 and B49 assignment was made in Fasli 1340. That the evidence of P.W.2 surfekas assigned lands from 1930 to 1936 supports the contention of respondents that the surfekas authorities assigned lands to Narayana and Ramulu. 75 The petitioner, admittedly, did not question this finding and the judgment in the second appeal before the Supreme Court, which attained finality. Based on the above findings arrived at by this Court in second appeal, and considering the admitted stand taken by the petitioner that the respondents have been in possession and enjoyment of the land, the Special Court found that respondent No.1 their predecessors-in-title have been in possession and enjoyment of the property, as is evident from Exs. B47 and B49, namely original patta certificate issued by the District Collector Atraf Balda Sarfekas Mubarak and original patta certificate in Urdu, issued in the names of Narayana and Ramulu respectively, and that they have also perfected their title by adverse possession.

76. The Special Court further found that there is a pleading in the counter the respondents perfected title by adverse possession. That as respondent No.1 was held to be owner of the land and have been in possession of the property in an extent of Acs.

20.00 under Exs. B47 and B49 for several decades i.e. for more than 60 years. That respondent No.1 was in possession and enjoyment of the property basing on their title, and that even otherwise, Narayana and Ramulu sold the property to T.V. Ramachandraiah under Exs. B47 and B49 respectively in the year 1964, and that during the period 1964 and 1969, T.V. Ramachandraiah’s title and possession was recognized by the Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad, as shown in Exs. B12 to B15. That respondent No.1, who purchased the land from T.V. Ramachandraiah, has been in possession of the land from the date of purchase and that the petitioner also admitted that respondents in the present LGC have been in possession and enjoyment of the same. That the predecessors-in-title of respondent No.1 have been in possession of the property since 1930. That the petitioner has not produced any evidence when respondent No.1 grabbed the property. That P.W.2 in his deposition stated that the property correlates to revision Sy. No. 120/1.151 and 346/1. That there is no pleading to that effect, and without any pleading, any amount of evidence in respect of revision survey numbers is not admissible, particularly when there is evidence to show that revision survey was cancelled in surfekas ministry in 1353 fasli. The Special Court further found that the petitioner absolutely failed to prove that the land which respondent No.1 is claiming to be located in Sy. No. 129/11/paiki, is part of the land in Sy. No. 403 of Shaikpet village. That respondent No.1 proved that the land in question is in Sy. No. 129/11/paiki. In view of these findings arrived at by the Special Court, which are based on proper appreciation of the evidence on record, it is held that the Sy. No. 129/11/paiki does exists and the land claimed by respondent No.1 existing in the said Sy. No. 129/11/paiki is a private patta land and does not form part of government land in Sy. No. 403/part. Accordingly, question No.4 is answered against the petitioner and in favour of respondent No.1. In re question No. 5: WHETHER THE SPECIAL COUERT FAILED TO CONSIDER EXS. A1, A7, A11 AND A20 WHICH ALLEGEDLY ESTABLISH NON- EXISTENCE OF SY. No. 129/11/PAIKI AND WHETHER IT WAS NOT JUSTIFIED IN RELYING ON EX B.27 TO HOLD THAT SY. No. 129/11/PAKI IS IN EXISTENCE

77. The petitioner relying on Ex. A1-certified copy of judgment in L.G.C. No. 157 of 1996, dated 22.06.2004 and Ex. A11-purported original map of Jubilee Hills Development Plan, contended that Ex.B27-certified copy of Jubilee Hills Development Plan marked in L.G.C. No. 24 of 1991, the certified copy of which is also marked in the present L.G.C. as Ex. B20, is not genuine. The Special Court upon appreciation of the evidence placed by the petitioner, found that even though the petitioner marked Ex. 11, said to be original of erstwhile Jubilee Hills Development plan, but it was not their case that the petition schedule property is within the Jubilee Hills Development plan. That the petitioner filed Ex. A5-xerox copy of erstwhile Jubilee Hills Development plan. Ex. A12, which is attested copy of Ex. A11. Exs. A5 and A12 are copies of Ex. A11. The Special Court found that P.W. 1 obtained Ex. A11 from the office of the Collector, Hyderabad, and that when it is the case of the petitioner that Jubilee Hills Development Municipality was merged with Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad, then the Jubilee Hills Municipality must have prepared index, such as description of documents and handing over the same to a particular person of MCH. Then Ex. A11 must be with the MCH. The evidence is that in Ex. A19, it is stated that there were number of complaints claiming title in respect of the erstwhile Jubilee Hills Development plots and the Collector was entrusted to enquire into the genuine persons in whose favour Jubilee Hills Development plots were sold and Collector verified and found that only 41 plots were sold to 41 persons.

78. Though the petitioner contended that the Special Court did not consider Ex. A11, which does not reflect Sy. No.129/11/paiki, the fact remains, the Special Court found that petitioner did not produce Ex. A11-Jubilee Hills Development plan, in the earlier L.G.Cs. filed by them. That in Ex. A11, over and above the plots 85 to 93, there are some more plots which are not numbered, while in Ex. B20/B27/C1, the un-numbered plots over and above plots 85 to 83 are numbered as 94 to 102, and that over and above the northern side of plots 94, 95, 96, 97 and 98, there is Sy. No. 129/11/paiki. The Special Court further found that Ex. A11, and Exs. A5, and A12, which are copies thereof, do not contain plot Nos. 94 to 102, and that it was not the case of the petitioner that there are only 93 plots as mentioned in Ex. A12. The Special Court also found that Ex. A11 is signed only by the Executive Officer and that P.W.2 in his evidence stated that whenever the land is surveyed, the plan would contain the signature of the persons who surveyed the land and that Ex. A11 does not reflect as to who surveyed the land, when it was surveyed and how many plots the Jubilee Development plan contains, and that in the absence of details in Ex. A11 as to when the plan was prepared, by whom it was prepared and in the absence of the signatures of the persons who surveyed and prepared the plan as also the name of erstwhile Jubilee Hills Municipality, it was not safe to place any reliance on the same. The Special Court further took note of the fact that the petitioner themselves have marked Ex. C1 in L.G.C. No. 71 of 1991, the certified copy of which was marked by respondent No.1 in L.G.C. No. 24 of 1991 as Ex. B27 and the certified copy thereof in the present L.G.C. as Ex. B20, and that in Exs. C1/B27/B20, two plots, on the upper portion adjoining (Plot Nos. 94 to 96 and 98 part of Jubilee Hills Development plots), are shown as existing in Sy. No. 129/11/paiki. That Ex. A11 is not the original of Ex. C1, and that in the absence of the petitioner producing any documentary evidence to show that Ex. A11 is the original of Ex. C1, the certified copy of which was marked as Ex. B27 in L.G.C. No. 24 of 1991 and the certified copy of which is marked in the present L.G.C. as Ex. B20, held that Ex. A11 is not the original of Ex. C1. The Special Court further disbelieved the genuineness of Ex. A11, for the reason that Jubilee Hills Development Municipality was merged with the Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad, and when it was merged, the Jubilee Hills Municipality, should have prepared the index, such as description of the documents and handing over them to a particular person of MCH, and that being so, it held that that Ex. A11, must be with MCH, but Ex. A11 was obtained from the Collector’s office and not from the MCH. And in the absence of any documentary evidence produced by the petitioner to show that Ex. C1 marked by them in L.G.C. No. 71 of 1991 is not the copy of the erstwhile Jubilee Hills Development plan and in the absence of the petitioner producing the original of Ex. C1, the Special Court held that the petitioner failed to prove that Ex. A11 is the original plan of erstwhile Jubilee Hills Development plan. While holding that Ex. A11 is not genuine, the Special Court believed Ex. B20/B27 to be genuine, particularly when they are copes of Ex. C1, marked by the petitioner themselves in L.G.C. No. 71 of 1991, after comparing the same with the original

79. Insofar as Ex. A7, is concerned, admittedly, at the time of conducting town survey, no notice was issued either to respondent No.1 or their predecessors in title. The town survey was conducted behind the back of respondent Nos. and their predecessors-in-title The Special Court held that merely because the names of respondent No.1 are not found in TSLR it cannot be said that petitioner is the owner of the land in question. The petitioner marked certified copy of the judgment of the Special Court in L.G.C. Nos. 31 and 38 of 1991, as Ex. A19 in the present L.G.C. They filed the said L.G.Cs. against 22 persons and the respondents to declare them as grabbers of government land in Sy. No. 403. The Special Court in the said L.G.C. appointed Deputy Director, Survey and Land Records, Hyderabad, as surveyor as the petitioner failed to furnish the correlation statement as required in Form-I. The petitioner filed concise statement stating that once notification under Section 13 of the Survey and Boundaries Act, is issued, no further implementation of the proceeding under the town survey is necessary. The Special Court summoned and examined the Deputy Director, Survey and Land Records, Hyderabad, as a witness in the said case as C.W.1, who deposed that at the time of town survey the initial survey map was not available and that in the town survey proceedings allotment of Jubilee Hills plots were not noted. Even though the petitioner said witness was available, the petitioner did not examine him as a witness in the present L.G.C. This apart, the Special Court found that Ex. C1 filed through C.W.1 in L.G.C. Nos. 31 and 38 of 1991, is a map showing the topography of Sy. No. 403 which is originally marked in L.G.C. No. 118 of 1989 and Ex. C2 is not the original initial survey map of Shaikpet village of 1326 Fasli, that the ammonia print from Ex. C2 is not filed, and that in the absence of ammonia print, it is not safe to rely on the xerox copy. However, the Special Court held that town survey people are not competent to decide the title of the land under the Survey and Boundaries Act, and that non-giving of notice under Section 9(2) of the Survey and Boundaries Act either to respondent No.1 or their predecessors-in-title was fatal.

80. The petitioner relied upon Ex. A20-certified copy of order in Memo S.R. No. 3483 of 1988 in O.S. No. 1615 of 1979 filed under Section 7-A of the Act that the suit land comprising of Acs. 20.00 forms part of Sy. No. 403 situated in Shikpet village, Golconda Mandal of Hyderabad district, which falls within limits of Hyderabad urban agglomeration, is the land of government of A.P., and the same has been grabbed by the respondents. By virtue of sub-section (6) of Section 7-A, the same has to be transferred to the Special Court, upon commencement of the Act. Since respondent No.1 and others have taken stand that VII Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Hydereabad, has no jurisdiction under the Act, and the said memo having been rejected, the findings arrived in S.A. No. 689 of 1998, which arose out of the suit, are not binding. This contention of the petitioner cannot be accepted because, though the said memo was rejected, the fact remains, the same was filed when the suit was coming up for arguments, and after rejection of the memo, no C.R.P. was filed and as such, the suit proceedings continued and culminated in S.A. No. 689 of 1998 when this Court by order dated 01.3.1999, dismissed the same.

81. The petitioner produced Wasoolbaki Register prepared in 1349 i.e. 1939 to show the non-existence of Sy. No. 129/11/paiki. The evidence of C.W.1 in L.G.C. No. 31 of 1991 and 38 of 1991 is that original is produced and Xerox copy is marked. The initial survey Wasoolbaki is not available. The petitioner only produced copy of Wasoolbaki prepared in revision survey conducted in 1349 fasli i.e.

1939. In Ex. A19-copy of judgment in L.G.C. No. 31 of 1991 and 38 of 1991, the Special Court held that at the time of revision survey, it was discovered some influential revenue officers and big pattedars colluding with the settlement department got new survey numbers, entered in their names and having discovered this fraudulent action, it appears that minister for sarfekas by order No.18, dated 21st Azoor 1353 fasli, directed that revision notification dated 16th Theer 1353 fasli, was cancelled and the previous entries in initial survey have to be maintained. That when revision survey was cancelled and the petitioner did not produce Wasoolbaki Register of initial survey, In that view of the matter, it cannot be said that the Special Court, did not consider Exs. A1, A7, A11 and A20, and further having regard to the reasons assigned by this Court in answer to question Nos. 2, 3, 4 and 5, it cannot be said that the Special Court was not justified in holding that Sy. No. 129/11/paiki is in existence, merely basing on Ex. B27. Accordingly, question No.5 is answered against the petitioner and in favour of respondent No.1. In re question No. 6: WHETHER FILING REGULARIZATION APPLICATIONS BY RESPONDENT NO.1 AND ITS MEMBERS AMOUNTS TO ADMITTING TITLE OF THE PETITIONER TO THE LAND IN QUESTION

82. The contention of the petitioner that since respondent No.1 and its members filed applications for regularization of the land in their possession, it should be regarded that they have admitted and acknowledged the title of the petitioner to the land. The petitioner in support this argument placed reliance on the judgments of the apex Court in Mahalaxmi Motors Ltd. v. Mandal Revenue Officer[14] and Mandal Revenue Officer v. Goundla Venkaiah[15].

83. This contention of the petitioner cannot be accepted. It is the specific case of respondent No.1 and its members, namely the other respondent Nos. 2 to 34 that respondent No.1 purchased the land in question situated in Sy. No. 129/11/paiki of Shaikpet village, from T.V. Ramachandraiah, and that after purchasing the land, respondent No.1 converted the same into plots and sold them to respondent Nos. 2 to 34, and that their vendor, namely T.V. Ramachandraiah, had in fact, purchased the same from Narayana and Ramulu, the original pattedars. In fact, the Special Court in L.G.C. No. 24 of 1991, dated 29.12.1995, the Additional Special Judge-cum-V Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, in A.S. No. 209 of 1991, dated 16.01.1998 and this Court in S.A. No. 689 of 1998, dated

01.03.1999, have consistently held that it is not the petitioner, but respondent No.1 is the owner of the land in Sy. No. 129/11/paiki, and that their predecessors-in-title were in possession and enjoyment of the same. Considering the fact that all the Courts, including this Court in the earlier litigation had confirmed that respondent No.1 is the owner of the land in question, the Special Court also, by reason of the impugned order, held so.

84. Even though all the Courts, including this Court under Ex. B3- certified copy of judgment in S.A. No. 689 of 1998, dated 01.03.1999 had consistently held that respondent No.1 and its members are the owners of the land in question, which finding attained finality, in that no appeal has been preferred by the petitioner nor M/s. Indiranagar Weaker Section Hutsmen Association, it is the specific case of respondent No.1 that vexed with the continuous litigation, as a measure of abundant caution, submitted applications in the prescribed form, for regularization of the lands in their possession, without prejudice to their rights and contentions in the present writ petition. This stand taken by respondent No.1, is evident from the letter dated 17.04.2010, addressed by respondent No.1 to the Secretary the Government the Revenue (Assignment) Department, who while narrating the history of the case, made it clear the object of their filing applications for regularization as follows: It is submitted, the object of filing application for regularization is in the event the society and its members are unsuccessfully in the court of law, they will be constrained to take the benefit under the scheme of regularization, as there is no other alternative. Therefore, we once again bring forms/applications filed by us pursuant to G.O. Ms. No. 166, Revenue (Assignments) Department, dated 16.02.2008 are without prejudice to our rights either in pending W.P. No. 15174 of 2005 or any rights to be determined in the court of law. to your kind notice that all

85. Admittedly, the condition precedent for regularizing the land in possession of individuals by the Government in terms of G.O. Ms. No. 166, dated 16.02.2008, is that the pending litigation should be withdrawn by the individual. Admittedly, the present writ petition is filed by the Government, and during the pendency of this writ petition, respondent No.1 and its members, filed applications for regularization of the land in terms of G.O. Ms. No. 166 dated 16.12.2008, and it is the case of the respondents that on enquiry they were told, that until and unless the pending cases are decided either way, the Government will not take up their applications for regularization. That being so, the petitioner cannot contend that the respondents by filing applications for regularization of the lands in their possession, have admitted the title of the petitioner thereto. As noted supra, the present writ petition is filed by the petitioner questioning the order passed by the Special Court dismissing the L.G.C. filed by the petitioner to declare respondent No.1 and its members as land grabbers. Hence, the question of respondent No.1 and its members giving an undertaking to withdraw the writ petition does not arise.

86. The learned counsel for the petitioner in support of his argument when once application for regularization is filed it amounts to admission of title of the State to the land, placed reliance on the judgment of the apex Court in Mahalakshmi Motors Ltd. v. Mandal Revenue Officer, wherein it was held as follows: Pendency of an application for regularization of the land would not stand in the way of the State to initiate a proceeding under the Act. It is one thing to say that the question in regard to regularization of a portion of the land in question was pending before the Government in terms of the directions issued by the learned single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, but it is another thing to say that the Special Court had no jurisdiction to continue the proceeding which was otherwise validly initiated only because of pendency of such an application. Lawful entitlement on the part of a party to possess the land being the determinative factor, it is axiomatic that so long as the land grabber would not be able to show his legal entitlement to hold the land, the jurisdiction of the Special Court cannot be held to be ousted. The Tribunal being possessed of extensive jurisdiction, subject of course to fulfilment of the conditions precedent, for initiation of the proceeding, was entitled to go into all issues. Right to possess the land must be referable to the title of the land and not mere entitlement of its application for regularization to be considered. The application filed by the appellant before the State Government for regularization of the land although may not be determinative of the issue as to whether it is a land grabber or not could be taken into consideration for a limited purpose, namely, admission or acknowledgement on its part in regard to the title of the State. Once it had taken a specific stand knowing fully well that it has no right, title and interest in or over the land in question, it cannot in law turn round and contend that the same was not binding on it. Doctrine of estoppel in a situation of this nature would squarely apply.

87. The above judgment, does not assist the petitioner in any manner because in the said case, the appellant lost the case against the State all through and while the matter was pending, they made application for regularization, and in such circumstances, the apex Court held that filing of application for regularization amounted to accepting the title of the State to the land, but in the instant case, the facts are totally different, and as noted supra, all the courts have consistently held that respondents are not grabbers of government land in Sy. No.403/part and that the land claimed by them is in Sy. No. 129/11/paiki. This apart, even before issuance of G.O. Ms. No. 166, dated 16.02.2008, the Special Court, vide the judgment dated

02.03.2005, passed in the present L.G.C. held that respondent No.1 and its members are not land grabbers. Hence, merely because respondent No.1 and its members submitted applications regularization, it cannot be said that they have admitted the title of the State to the land in question. Accordingly, question No.6 is answered in favour of respondent No.1 and its members and against the petitioner. In re question No. 7: WHETHER PETITIONER MADE OUT ANY GROUND FOR INTERFERENCE WITH THE IMPUGNED ORDER

88. Though the petitioner contended that respondent No.1 and its members grabbed the land in Sy. No. 403/part claiming it to be in Sy. No.129/11/paiki, which is not in existence, the fact remains, the Special Court, upon appreciation of the evidence placed by the petitioner and respondent No.1, came to the conclusion that all the Courts have held that Sy. No. 129/11/paiki is in existence much prior to the vendor of respondent No.1 purchasing the property from their vendors, namely the original pattedars and that respondent No.1 and their predecessors-in-title were in possession of the land and that they traced their title way back to the year 1930 and that the petitioner failed to prove that Sy. No. 129/11/paiki is non-existent and that the land claimed by respondent No.1 and its members, formed part of Sy. No. 403/part. The findings arrived at by the Special Court being based on proper appreciation of the evidence placed by the respective parties, as discussed above, we shall notice what would be their effect in the light of the settled law. A Division Bench of this Court in Tadi Surya Rao v. Dr. G. Ramakrishna Rao, held that under Section 8(2) of the Act, the decision of the Special Court with regard to possession and title is final. Further another Division Bench of this Court in P. Vijayalakshmi Devi v. MRO, Shaikpet Mandal, Hyderabad, held that under Section 8(6) of the Act, every finding arrived at by the Special Court with regard to alleged act of land grabbing shall be conclusive proof of land grabbing and every judgment of the Special Court with regard to determination of title and ownership to the land, shall be binding on all persons.

89. Having regard to the settled law, that the findings and judgments of the Special Court with regard to possession and title, are final, and it not being the case of the petitioner that the findings arrived at by the Special Court are based on no evidence or inadmissible evidence or has failed to take into consideration admissible issues and the Special Court having adverted to the right issues, which issues were already decided by this Court, which attained finality, and the petitioner having not been able to pointed out any error apparent on the face of the order of the Special Court, the findings of fact reached by it cannot be re-opened or questioned in writ petition.

90. In State of A.P. v. Prameela Modi, the apex Court held that when there is no irregularity and infirmity and no error apparent on the face of the order of the Special Court and when the findings arrived at by it, are based on proper appreciation of the evidence of record, they cannot be re-opened or questioned in writ proceedings and that this Court cannot convert its power under article 226 of the Constitution of India, to that of a court of appeal and indulge in re-appreciation or evaluation of evidence. That being the law and it not being the case of the petitioner that they were not given opportunity to present their case properly, the findings arrived at by the Special Court, being based on proper appreciation of the evidence, and the petitioner having failed to point out any infirmities or irregularities in the impugned order passed by the Special Court, no interference whatsoever is called therewith and the findings arrived at therein with regard to title and possession of the land in question in the impugned order. Hence, we hold that the petitioner has not made out any ground for interference with the impugned order passed by the Special Court in exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.. WHETHER THE MATTER NEEDS TO BE REMANDED TO THE SPECIAL COURT FOR CONSDIERATION AFRESH

91. The learned Additional Advocate General submitted that if this Court is not convinced to interfere with the impugned order, at least remand the matter to the Special Court for adjudication afresh. The parties are litigating since more than 30 years. The core questions that are involved in the litigation between the parties are as to the existence of Sy. No. 129/11/paiki, if it is in existence, whether Ex. B27 is genuine and whether the land claimed by respondent No.1 is a private patta land located in Sy. No. 129/11/paiki or formed part of government land in Sy. No. 403/part. These questions have already been considered by the Special Court and this Court, more than once. Having considered them, the Special Court as well as this Court held that Sy. No. 129/11/paiki is in existence and that the land clamed by respondent No.1 and its members is located in Sy. No. 129/11/paiki and it does not form part of Sy. No. 403/part and that Ex. B27 is genuine. The said findings already attained finality. The petitioner except raising the very same contentions, which were considered by the Special Court and this Court in the litigation between the parties, did not raise any new grounds. This apart, even though the Special Court and the Supreme Court, have shown indulgence by affording opportunity to the petitioner to establish their case by conducting proper enquiry, the petitioner failed to make use of the opportunity. Further, the petitioner having not placed any new material, which would compel the Special Court or this Court to take a different view than the one arrived at by the Special Court in the impugned order, and having regard to the findings arrived at by this Court on the questions framed, as noted supra, we are of the opinion that there is no need to remand the matter, particularly when there is nothing new for the Special Court to consider. If the request of the petitioner is acceded to and the matter remanded to the Special Court for consideration afresh, no useful purpose would be served, except prolonging the litigation between the parties. Hence, the request of the learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the petitioner for remand of the matter the Special Court consideration afresh, is rejected.

92. For the foregoing reasons, we find no merit in the writ petition and the same is accordingly dismissed. No costs. ___________________ N.V. RAMANA, J. ________________ NOUSHAD ALI, J. Dated: 26TH November, 2010 KSR [1] 2000 (7) Supreme 102 [2] (2003) 1 SCC 488 [3] (2008) 17 SCC 303 [4] (2007) 11 SCC 714 [5] (2010) 2 SCC 461 [6] AIR 1964 SC 477 [7] (2006) 13 SCC 147 [8] 1996 (4) ALD 556 (DB) [9] 2007 (5) ALD 1 (DB) [10] AIR 1950 SC 222 [11] 1992 (4) SCC 683 [12] 1998 (8) SCC 623 [13] 2000 (3) SCC 350 [14] (2007) 11 SCC 714 [15] (2010) 2 SCC 461