The High Court · 2025

G. Srinivas, Son of Narsaiah, Aged about 59 years, Occ. Badli Filler, E.C.No.26279, Ri/o. Quarter No.D.633 ('1st Zone), Mandamarri, District Adilabad (Mandamarri is now in Mancherial District) ...RESPONDENT/PETITIONER lA NO: 1 OF 2024 Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to suspend the order dated 08-01-2024 passed in writ Petition No.12932 of 2011 pending disposal of the above Writ Appeal. lA NO: 2 OF 2024 Between: G. Srinivas, Son of Narsaiah, Aged about 59 years, Occ. Badli Filler, E.C.No.26279, Rl/o. Quarter No.D.633 (1st Zone), Mandamarri, District Adilabad (Mandamarri is now in Mancherial District) ..RESPONDENT HEREIN/PETITIONER THEREIN AND

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3. The Colliery Manac Ma ndama rii or"r, Tr3ip"1i]1,,..,,j,,io, rr?lUfl?li,fj;shnapu ra m 1 A lnctine, Rama krishnapur Area, Petition under Secti^on-1 ...APPELLANTS HEREIN/RESPONDENTS THEREIN 9l ..cPc praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit fired in suoport or *re peiitio'n, ir,"'irign court may be preased to ;:ijiirlffi rf!a; oranteo in ttre ;;;;;;i 'ti,it npp"ur No 280 or 2o24, Counsel for the Appellant: SRI p. SRI HARSHA REDDY (sc FOR SINGAREN| coLLtERlEs co LTD) Counsel for the Respondent: SRI PRABHAKAR CHIKKUDU The Court delivered the following: JUDGMENT i I THE HON'BLE THE ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE SUJOY PAUL AND THE HON'BLE SMT. JUSTICE RENUKA YARA WRIT APPEAL No.28O of 2024 JUDGMENT: (Per the Hon'ble the Acting Chief Justice Sujog Poul) Sri P.Sri Harsha Reddy, learned Standing Counsel for Singareni Collieries Company Limited, for the appellants and Sri Prabhakar Chikkudu, learned cou.nsel for the respondent.

2. With the consent of the learned counsel for the pa-rties, the writ appeal is heard finally.

3. In this intra Court appeal, the challenge is mounted to the order of the learned Single Judge passed in W.P.No.I2932 of 201i, dated OB.Ol.2024

4. Draped in brevity, the relevant facts are that the father of the respondent herein died in harness on i8.01.1989. The respondent, who is the writ petitioner, was given compassionate appointment as Badli Filler on i1.O9.1989. The respondent was re-empanelled as Badli Filler on 14.\2.1991. On 05.06.1992, an order rvas issued transferring the respondent from MandarygLri I 2 Area to Ramakrishnapur Area. As per the stancl of the employer, the respondent did not report at the tralsl-erred place and remained absent, despite the fact that the relieving ,rrder was issued on 08.06.1992.

5. The stand of the respondent was that he was falsely implicated in a criminar case and was arrested ir-r furtherance thereof. Learned counsel for the respondent submits thal the respondent was convicted by the trial court, but succeeded in an appeal in the year 1996. Thereafter, as per the respondent, he had undergone prolonged medical treatment for mental iilness from 15.03.1996 to 30.04.1999. Subsequently, afr:er recovery from his illness, he reported for duty, but he was not permitted to discharge his duties. The Workers, Union, b-r,, representation dated 17.08.1999, requested the employer to re,.,iew thr: case of the respondent and permit him to join the duty.

6. Since the respondent was not permitted to join the duty, W.P.No.l2932 of 2011 was filed by him on 22.04.20|, which came to be allo'*,ed by the impugned order dated 08.Ol.2024. \ I STAND OF THE APPELLANTS: 7 . Learned counsel for the appellants submits that in the writ petition, the respondent has nowhere mentioned about his date of arest. The respondent did not comply with the transfer order dated 05.06.1992, despite his relieving on 08.06' 1992. He did not apprise the appellants/employer about his handicappedness for not joining the duty. A representation was preferred by the respondent only on 14.ll.2OO9 (Ex.Pla). As per the said representation, the respondent was acquitted in the year 1994 ' Along with the representation, no medical documents were submitted to show that after acquittal, the respondent has undergone any medical treatment. B. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that the learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition by applying the principles of natural justice and by relying on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Gammon India Limited v. Niranjan Dasr and the judgment of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Delhi TransPort CorPoration v. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress2' I (1984) 1 SCC 509 2 i99l Supp (1) SCC 600 4 Learned counsel for the appellants further subrnits th:rt both the judgments and the principles mentioned therein cannot be pressed into service in a case of this natllre, because the respondent did not comply with the transfer orrler and remained absent from OS.06.1992 till 14.lI.2OOg. The rr:spondent remained absent for decades. This amoun ts to voluntary abandonment of service. By placing reliance on the judgment of the Supreme court in vijay S. sathaye v. Indian Airrines Limited3, learned counsel for the appellants subrrits that in view of the said judgment, the principles of naturai jrlstice cannot be pressed into service. It is a case of voluntary cessation of service and in this situation, the principles of natural jus;tice has no roie to play. In addition, learned counsel for the appellants placed reliance on a Full Bench decision of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in p.V.Narayana v. APSRTC, Hyderabqd+ and submits that although no statutory/constitutional limitation rs prescribed for filing the writ petrtion, the said writ petition can be entr:rtained if it is filed within a reasonable time. In the in{itant c:rse, the respondent remarned absent from the year 1992 and filed r:he u,rit r (20 1 3) 1O SCC 253 I 2013 SCC Online Ap 72!) I h 5 petition in the year 2011, much after his acquittal in the year 1994 (as mentioned in the representation)' Thus, there is art enormous delay in approaching the Court. On this score a1one, the writ petition should have been dismissed. The direction of the learned Single Judge to grant all consequential benefits was criticized, by contending that the said relief was not at a1l due to the respondent, more so, when there is an inordinate delay in approaching the Court. STAND OF THE RESPONDENT: g. Sounding a contra note, learned counsel for the respondent supported the order of the learned Single Judge. He submits that the fundamental rights flowing from Articles 14 and 2l of tll.e Constitution of India mandate that an employee cannot be terminated without following the principles of natural justice. Thus, the learned Single Judge has rightly followed the judgment of the Supreme Court in Gammon India Limited (supra) and the judgment of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Delhi TransPort CorPoration (supra)' 6

10. No other point rs raised by the learned counsel for the parties

11. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the record. FINDIN GS:

12. The facts are not in dispute in the instant ,:ase. Admittedly, the respondent had not performed his duties rafter 05.06.1992. The parties have taken a diametrically opposite stand belore us whether the respondent was permitted to join at the transferred place or not. The iearned counsel for the respondent submits that the respondent u'as not permitted to implement the transfer order, whereas the learned counsel for the appeilants/employer, by placing reliance on the counter filed in .the writ petition, stated that the respondent did not report for duty at Flamaknshnapur Area pursuant to the transfer order dated OS.O(j. 7992 and the relieving order dated Og.06.Igg2. There 15 no documentary evidence available on record to show that the respondent submitted his joining report at the transferred pracel If the respondent was not permitted to join the duty in .Iune, Ds2:G .'-1 E i 7 shouldhavepreferredarepresentationabouthisgrievanceand thereafter could have approached the Court with quite promptitude. The respondent, admittedly, did not avail any such remedy. He was acquitted in the year 1996, but did not promptly make any effort to join the duty and the delay is explained by making a bald statement that he was taking treatment for his mental illness. No documentary evidence for this purpose is also filed to show that he was undergoing arty such mental ailment' The order of the learned Single Judge shows that the interference wasmadebecauseoftheallegedviolationofprinciplesofnatural justice, The specific case of the appellants before the writ Court was that of "voluntary abandonment of service" by the respondent/employee. The learned Single Judge has not considered this argument/ stand of the appellants/employer in the analysis portion of the impugned order' The concept of voluntary abandonment of service is not unknown to service.jurisprudence' The Supreme Court in Vijay S' Sathaye (supra)' considered the previous judgment and poignantly recorded as under: 'L2. It is a settled law that an employee cannot be termed as a slave, he has a riqht to abandon the service any time voluntarily inins the by submitting his resignation and allernatively' not Io 8 duty and re maining absen t for lons. Absence from dutr. in the beginning may be a misconduct but when absence is for a very Iong period, it may amount to voluntary abandonment of sergice and in that eventuality, the bonds of service come to an end automatically without requiring any ord.er to be passed by the employer_

13. In Jeeuantat (1929) Ltd. v. Workmen [AIR 1961 SC 1567] this Court held as under: (AIR p. 1570, para 6) "6. ... there u,ould be the class of cases where lonE; unauthorised absence may reasonably give rise to an inferent:e that such service is intended to be abandoned by the employee." (See also Shahoodul Haquev. Regi_strar, Coop. So<:iettes t(197S) 3 SCC 108 : i974 SCC (L&S) 498 : AIR 1974 SC 189€,1 .) L4. For thc purpose of termination, tJ:ere has to be positive action on the part of the employer while aband onment of service is a conseouencc o[ unilateral action on beh alf of the em lovce and the employer has no role in it Such an act canno[ be terrned as "retrenchmen t" from servrce. (See Stafe of _Haryana v. Om Parkash I(1998) 8 SCC 733 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 2621 .)

15. xxx

16. In Sgndrcate Bank v. Staff Assn. [(2000) S Sr]C 65 : 2OO0 scc (L&s) 5t) 1l a-nd Arigarh Mustim [Jniuersitg t, . Mansortr Ari Khan[(2OOOl 7 SCC 529:2002 SCC (L&S) 965 : ArR 2000 SC 27831 this Court ruled that if a person is absent beyond the prescribed period for which leave of any kind can be granted, he should be treated to haue resigned. and. ceasesto be in senrice. In such a case, there is no need to hold an enquiry or to_qiv9,.anV notice as it would amount to useless formalities.\ \ -r- 9 similar view has been reiterated in Banaras Hindu Uniuersitg v. Shrikant 1120061 11 SCC 42 z l2OO7l 1 SCC (L&Sl 3271, Chief Engineer (Construction) v. Keshaua Rao [(2005) 1 1 SCC 229: 2OO5 SCC (1,&S) 8721 and Bank of Barodov. Anita Nandrajog [(2OO9) 9 SCC 462 : (2009) 2 SCC (L&S) 689]." [Emphasis supplied]

13. A plain reading of the relevant portion of the aforesaid judgments of the Supreme Court reproduced in paragraph 16 shows that in the case of voluntary abandonment of service, there is no need to hold an enquiry or to give any notice, in view of useless formality theory. Thus, the doctrine of useless formality was pressed into service in the case of voluntary abandonment of service. We find substantial force in the argument of the learned counsel for the appellants that the respondent's conduct of remaining absent from the year 1992 to 2OO9 shows his voluntarv abandonment of service. In that case, doctrine of useless t formality can be applied and the principles of natural justice cannot be made applicable. Thus, both the judgments on which the learned Single Judge has placed reliance w-ill not improve the case of the respondent. This being a case of volunta-ry abandonment of service, no fault can be found in the action of the IO appellants in not permitting the respondent to join back after decades. 14' The grant of a, consequential benefits by the rearned Single Judge to an employee who approached the Cou11 s11e1 nineteen years from the date of non_reporting of duty amounts to rnisplasscl sympathy and was totally uncalled for and unwarranted. 15. For these cumulative reasons, the impu5Jned order of the learned Single Judge passed in W.p.No. 1293i). of 2011, dated O8.O1.2024, is set aside and the writ appeal is allowed. No order as to costs. Miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, shall stand closed //TRUE COPY// SD/-K. SRINIVASA RAO Grs To, \ 3

1. One CC to SRt p. SF CO LTD) topuci ll HARSHA REDDY (SC FOR SINGARENI COLLTERTES i[:33 ITI:d*BHAKAR .HTKKUDU, Advocate ropuc] K)) o9 BS CER HIGH COURT DATED:0410212025 't JUDGMENT WA.No.280 ot 2024 '::a:':=- tE srAii 1 { ?( 1 i lll ?iz5 ALLOWING THE WRIT APPEAL WITHOUT COSTS \ gD