The Hon'ble Apex Court in Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy Othersl while referring to sever

Counsel for the Petitioner: Ms. Vedula Chitralekha Counsel for the Respondents: GP for Revenue (No Representation) The Court made the following: ORDER THE HONOURABLE DT. JUSTICE G.RADHA RANI CIVIL REVISION PETITION No.914 of 2O2l ORDER: This Civil Revision Petition is filed by the petitioner - plaintiff to set aside the order dated 26.10.2018 passed in I.A.No.1 of 2017 in I.A.No.320 of 2015 in O.S.No.738 of 2007 by the leamed Principal District Judge, Rangareddy District at L.B.Nagar.

2. The petitioner No.l died during the pendency of the revision and the pctitioners 2 to 11 were brought on record as legal representatives of deceased petitioner No.1 as per the orders in I.A.No.3 of 2021 dated 16.09.2022.

3. Heard Ms.Vedula Chitralekha, leamed counsel for the petitioner.

4. No representation by the leamed Govemment Pleader for Revenue for respondents 1 to 3. Notice was seryed on respondent No.4 through substitute service. But there is no representation for respondent No'4.

5. Leamed counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner No.l was the plaintiff. He filed O.S,No.738 of 2007 seeking declaration of his right and consequential injunction that he was the owner of the agricultural land admeasuring Ac.1-01 guntas in Survey No.247 situated at lnjapur Village, Hayathnagar Mandal, Rangareddy District. But the said suit was dismissed for 7l ,] I Dr.cRR, J crp_914_2O21 default on 28.09-2orr. Thereafter, the petitioner filed I.A.No.320 of 2015 on 07.04.2015 with a delay of l l95 days. However, the said petition was also dismissed due to non-representation on 10.06.2015. Thereafter, the petitioner filed I'A'No', of 2017 with a delay of 533 days to restore r.A.No.320 of 2015 and the said petition was dismissed by the leamed principal District Judge, Rangareddy District at L.B.Nagar. 5' l ' Leamed counsel for the petitioner further submitted that the suit underwent transfer from one court to another court between the years 2010 and 2011 twice' As such, no proceedings took place in the suit and not foflowed up by parties' There was no rack of diligence on the part of the petitioner in following up the same. Substantial rights of the petitioners were involved in the case and the interest ofjustice wourd warrant condonation of delay and prayed to restore the suit to its fire and to set aside the order dated 26.r0.2orgpassed in I.A.No.l of 2017 in I.A.No.320 of 2015 in O.S.No.73g of 2007 by the leamed Principal District Judge, Rangareddy District at L.B.Nagar.

6. Perused the record

7. As seen from the impugned order, there was delay of more than three (03) years in Ieading evidence in o.S.No.73g of 2007 by the plaintiff after framing of the issues on 30.07.200g resulting in dismissal of the suit and the petitioner filed restoration petition vide I.k.1{0.320 0f 201 5 with a deray of four (04) 3 ".r-T'r".?i years, but failed to pursue the matter. Due to which, the said petition was also dismissed for non-representation on 10.06.2015. The petitioner filed I.A.No.l of 2017 to restore I.A.No.320 of 2015 with a delay of 533 days and filed an affidavit stating that on account of Telangana agitation and due to his ill-health as he was suffering with Sugar and BP including heart-and lungs problem, the delay was caused. But as he failed to file.any medical evidence in support of the said illnesses cited by him, the leamed Principal District Judge, Rangareddy District at L.B.Nagar observed that "failure to represent the case on one or two occasions can be condoned but continuous absence and lack of due diligence cannot be condoned. The petitioner failed to give proper reasons for non prosecuting I.A.No.320 of 2015 and not filed any medical evidence to believe the version about his illness being the reason for delay", dismissed the petition as devoid of merits.

8. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy & Othersl while referring to several judgments rendered by the Court in the said regard, observed that:

10. In this context, we may refer with profit to the authority in Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Limited v. Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation and another (2010) 4 SCC 4591, where a two-Judge Bench ofthis Court has observed that the law of limitation is foirnded on public policy. The '(2013) t2 scc 649 ,1 : I I I 4 Dr.GRR, J crp_914 2021 legislature does not prescribe limitation with the object of destroying the rights ofthe parties but to ensure that they do not resort to dilatory tactics and seek remedy without delay. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a period Iixed by the legislature. To pur it differently. the law of limitation prescribes a period within which legal remedy can be availed for redress of the legal iqiury. At the same time, the courts are bestowed with the power to condone the delay, if sufficient cause is shown for not availing the remedy within the stipulated time. Thereafter, the leamed Judges proceeded to state that this Court has justifiably advocated adoption of liberal approach in condoning the delay of short duration and a stricter approach where the delay is inordinate. I l. In Improvement Trust, Ludhiana v. Ujagar Singh and others [(2010) 6 SCC 786], it has been held that while considering an application for condonation of delay no straitjacket formula is prescribed to come to the conclusion if sufficient and good grounds have been made out or not. It has been further stated therein that each case has to be weighed from its facts and the circumstances in which the party acts and behaves.

12. A reference to the principle stated in Balwatrt Singh (dead) v. Jagdish Singh and others [(2010) 8 SCC 685] would be quite fruitful. ln the said case the Court referred to rhe pronouncements in Union of India v. Ram Charan [AIR 1964 SC 2151, P.IC Ramachandran v. State of Kerala l(.1997) 7 SCC 5561 and Katari Suryanarayana v. I(oppisetti Subba Rao [(2009) 11 SCC 183] and stated thus:- "25. We may jqg that even if the term "sufficient cause" has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the i.i ..: 5 Dr.GR&J crp-9 l4-2021 concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the party conoemed' The purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce the concept of "reasonableness" as it is understood in its general connotation'

26. The law ol limilation is a substantive 'law and has deftnite consequences on the right and obligation of a party to arise' These principles should be adhered to and applied appropriately depending on the facts and circumstances of a given case' Once a valuable right has accrued in favor of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct' it will be unreasonable to take away that right on the mere asking of the applicant' particularly when the delay is directly a result ofnegligence' default or inaction of that Party " Justice must be done to both parties equatly' Then alone the ends ofjustice can be achieved' If a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies' it will be unfui, to deprive the other party ofa valuabte right that "qiutty has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly'" 13. Recently in Maniben Devraj Shah v' Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai (2012) 5 SC 1571' the leamed Judges referred to the pronouncement in Vedabai v' ShantaramBaburaoPatil[(2001)9SCC106]whereinithas been opined that a distinction must be made between a case where the delay is inordinate and a case where the delay is of few days and whereas in the former case the consideration of prejudice to the other side will be a relevant factor' in the latter ; ] 6 a-l Dr.GRR, J crp_914 2021 case no such consideration arises. Thereafter, the two-Judge Bench ruled thus: - "23. What needs to be emphasized is that even though a liberal and justice-oriented approach is required to be adopted in the exercise of power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and other similar stah,rtes, the courts can neither become oblivious of the fact that the successfirt litigant has acquired certain rights on the basis of the judgment under challenge and a lot of time is consumed at various stages of litigation apart from the cost.

24. What color the expression "sufficient cause" would get in the factual matrix of a given case would largely depend on bona fide nature of the explanation. Ifthe court finds that there has been no negligence on the part of the applicant and the cause shown lbr the delay does not lack bona fides, then it may condone the delay. If, on the other hand, the explanation given by the applicant is found to be concocted or he is thoroughly negligent in prosecuting his cause, then it would be a legitimale exercise of discretion not to condone the delay.', Eventually, the Bench upon perusal of the application for condonation of delay and the affidavit on record came to hold that certain necesszlry facts were conspicuously silent and, accordingly, reversed the decision of the High Court which had condoned the delav of morc than seven yearY - 7 Dr.cBR, J crp_9 l4_202 I

14. In B. Madhuri Goud v. B. Damodar Reddy [(2012) 12 SCC 6931, the Court referring to earlier decisions reversed the decision ofthe leamed single Judge who had condoned delay of 1236 days as the explanation given in the application for condonation of delay was absolutely fanciful.

15. From the aforesaid authorities the principles that can broadly be culled out are: i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice- oriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalize injustice but are obliged to remove injustice. ii) The terms "sufficient cause" should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact- situation. iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis. iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay bu! gross negligcnce on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of. v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation ofdelay is a significant and relevant fact. / i.. 8 Dr.GRR, J crp_914 2O2l vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure ofjustice. vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsule the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation. ix) The conduct, behavior and attitude ofa party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance ofjustice in respect of both parties and the said principte cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach. x) Ifthe explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation. xi) It is to be bome in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or 9 Dr.GR& J crp_914 2O2l interpolation by taking recourse to the techricalities of law of limitation. xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinized and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception. xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude.

16. To the aforesaid principles we may add.some more guidelines taking note ofthe present day scenario. They are: - a) An application for condonation of delay should be drafted with careful concem and not in a hatf hazard manner harboring the notion that the courts are required to condone delay on the bedrock ofthe principle that adjudication of a lis on merits is seminal to justice dispensation system. b) An application for condonation of delay should not be deatt with in a routine manner on the base of individual philosophy which is basically subjective. c) Though no precise formula can be laid down regard being had to the concept of judicial discretior! yet a conscious effort for achieving consistency and collegiality of the adjudicatory system should be made as that is the ultimate institutional motto. f,' Dr.GRR, J crp 914_2021 10 d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non-serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a non-challant manner requires to be curbed, of course, -within legal parameters.' g. Considering the aforesaid principles laid down by the Hon,ble Apex court while exercising discretion by the court in considering the applications for condonation ofdelay and there was an in-ordinate delay of 533 days in filing I.A.No. 1 of 2017 and I 1 95 days in filing I.A.No.320 of 201 5 for restoration of O.S.No.738 of 2007, which would show gross negligence on the part of the petitioner in prosecuting the matter and no justifiable or reasonable explanation was given by him to condone the said delay, this Court does not find any illegality in the order of the leamed principal District Judge, Rangareddy District at L.B.Nagar in dismissing the petition filed by the petitioner in I.A.No.1 of 2017 in I.A.No.320 of 2015 in O.S.NO.738 of 2007 dated

26.10.2018.

10. In the result, the civil Revision petition is dismissed confirming the order dated 26.10.2018 passed by the leamed principal District Judge, Rangareddy District at L.B.Nagar in I.A.No.r of 2017 in I.A.No.320 of 2015 in o.S.No.738 of2O07. No order as to costs 11 Dr.CR& J crp_914 2OZl As a sequel, miscellaneous applications pending in this petition, if any, shall stand closed SD/- V .KAVITHA ASSISTANT REGISTRAR //TRUE COPY// SECTION OFFICER To,

1. The Principal District Judge at L B Nagar' Ranga Reddy District' 2. Two CCs to GP for Revenue' High Court for the State of Telangana 3. One CC to Sri Vedula Chitralekha' Advocate [OPUC] 4 Two CD CoPies VH/PSI, t HIGH COURT DATED: 1310212025 ( q J t) rt{ E ST4 16 ) 7 oj5 ^+ 01 I'lpY 2UZ5 t O6's pa Icu;\) ORDER CRP.No.914 of 2021 DISMISSING THE CRP