Nampally, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad v. M/s. Hyderabad Race Club, Malakpet, Hyderabad

Judgment

IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF 1']:LANGANA AT HYDERABAD THE HONOURABLE SRI.IUSTICE P.SAM (OSHY AND THE HONOURABI,E SRI JUSTI(]I] SUDDALA CHALAPATHI RAO TREVC No.l68 OF 2010

23.12.2025 Between: '[he State of Andhra Pradesh Rep. by the State Representative trefbre STAT, D.No.5-4-404 to 408, Nampally. Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad ANI) M/s Hyderabad Race Club. Malakpet, Hyderabad,. ORDER, (per Hon blc Sri .Iustice l> Stur Koshy) . . Petitioner Respondent Heard Mr. Swaroop Oorilla, learned Special Govemment Pleader for the State Tax for the peritioner and peru; d the record.

2. In the light ol the common order passed b1,t Lis Bench on dated 13.11.2025 in TREVC Nos.60 of 2010 & batch, being dismissed of vide scparate common order, the preser tax revlsron 2 -If* case is also dismissed in terms of the aforesaid common order. There shall be no order as to costs. Consequently, miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, shall stand closed. sd/- MoHD. rsMArL DEPUTY REGISTRAR / /TRUECOPY/ / CTION OFFICER l I To,

1. The Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad. 2. The Appellate Deputy Commissioner (CT), Panjagutta Division, Hyderabad. 3. One CC to Sri Swaroop Orilla, ( SPL SC FOR CT) [OPUC] 4. Two CD Copies. (Note: Office to append a copy of the Common order dated 13.11.2025 in TREVC No.60/2010 & batch.) JCK/kam Y\- i HIGH COURT i DATED:Z3/72/2025 ]UDGMENT: TREVC.No.168 of 2010 Dismissing the T.R.E.V.C. without costs C ."CA S* \ i! lAt o o 09 8707fi z P * * ry ' -1I: I l i' '' IN THE HIGH COURT FORTHE STATE OF TELANGANA:: HYDERABAD *** TAX REVISION CA SE No.6O of 2O1O TAX REV sIoN CASE No.7 ol 2O1O TAX REV SION CASE No.10 of 201O TAx REVISION CASE No.106 of 2O1O TAX RE SION CASE No.116 of 2O1O AND TAX REVISION C E No.139 of 20 10 Between: The State of Andhra Pradesh, Rep. by the State Representative before STAT, D.No.5-4-404 to 408, Nampally, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad. VERSUS M/s. Hyderabad Race Club, Malakpet, Hyderabad. Petitioner Respondent COMMON ORDER PRONOUNCED ON: 13.11'2025

THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE P.SAM KOSHY AND THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE NARSING RAO NANDIKONDA 1 2 3 Whether Reporters of Local newspapers may be allowed to see the ludgments? : Yes Whether the copies of judgment may be marked to Law Reporte rsljourn a ls? Whether His Lordship wishes to see the fair coPy of the Judgment? Yes Yes P.SAM KOSHY, l X THE HON'BLE SRI ]USTICE P.SAM I:I ISHY AND THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE NARSING RAO N' NDIKONDA SION CASE No.6 Oof20 :o I q q 0 +TAX R TAX REVISIO N CASE No.72 of 20: TAX REVISION C SE No.1O5 of 2O1 TAX REVISION C SE No.1O6 of 20 I TAX REVISION CASE No. 16 of 20 t AND TAX REVISION C SE No.139 of 201l o/o 13.LL.2O25 # Between: The State of Andhra Pradesh, Rep. by the State Representative before STAT, D.No.5-4-404 to 408, Nampally, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad. l4ls. Hyderabad Race Club, Malakpet, Hyderabad. VERSUS Petitioner Respondent ! Counsel for petitioner : Mr. Swaroop Oorilla, learne J Special Standing Counsel for Commercial 'Lr: . ^Counsel for respondent : Mr. S.Ravi, learned Senior (lounsel appearing on behalf of Mr. CH. Pushya I Kiran. <GIST: > HEAD NOTE: ? Cases referred 31 SrC 522 1987 SCC Online AP B7 (1999) 3 SCC 346 (202r) 6 SCC 451 1993 SCC OnLine SC 10 2000 SCC Online AP 557 1978 SCC OnLine Gul 102 1987 SCC OnLine AP 558 2 3 4 5 6 ) 8 THE H ONOURABLE SRI ]UST C E P.SAM K OSHY AND THE HO OURABLE SRI J USTICE NARSIN G RAO NANDI KONDA TAX REV SION CASE No.6 of 2010 X REVIS EN .72 ot 2 TAX REV SION CASE No.10 of 2010 TAX REVISION CASE No.1O6 of 2O10 TAX REVISION CASE No.116 of 201O AND TAX REV sIoN CASE No.13 of 2O1O COMMO ORDER: (per the Hon'ble Srilustice P.Sam Koshy) Heard Mr. Swaroop Oorilla, learned Special Standing Counsel for Commercial Tax appearing on behalf of the petitioner - State; and Mr. S.Ravi, Iearned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of Mr. CH.Pushyam Kiran, learned counsel for the respondent.

2. These are six Tax Revision Cases filed by the State under Section 22(l) read with Rule 10 of the Andhra Pradesh Goods and Service Tax Rules (hereinafter referred to as 'APGST Rules') under the Andhra Pradesh Goods and Service Tax Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as 'APGST Act') challenging the orders passed by the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad (hereinafter referred to as the 'STAT'). The details of each of the case; like the Tax Revision Case number, assessment yea4 and the Tax Appeal number before the STAT along with c.l.e on which it was decided is reproduced below: sl. No. 1 2 3 4 5 6 TREVC. No. 60 of 2010 12 at 20lo 105 of 2010 106 of 2010 116 of 2010 139 of 2010 ASSESSM ENT YEAR 1995-1996 1999-2000 1994-1995 1998- r 999 7993-t994 7996'7997 IMPUGNE ) ORDER T.A.No.393 oF 2001, .'cided on 0r.10.2008 T.A.No.1093 of 2001,, .cided on 01.r0.2008 T.A.No.392 of 2001, I 'cided on 01.10.2008 T.A.No.396 of 2001. I 'cided on 01.10.2008 T.A.No.391 of 2001, I 'cided on 01,10.2008 T.A.No.394 0f 2001, I cided on 0i.10.2008 In all these since cases the point of contention i same, they have

3. been taken up and heard together and are decided by th: Common Order.

4. For convenience, the facts in Tax Revision Case \1.105 of 2010 are discussed hereunde r.

5. The facts of the case are that the respondent M,/ Hyderabad Race Club is an organization engaged in horse racing ac.r .'ities. During the assessment years in question, the Commercial Tax Offic('l examined various transactions undertaken by the club and determined th; t it qualified as a "dealer" under Section 2(e) of the APGST Act. The asses:;i lg authority found that the club was involved in multiple commercial activiti€: including the sale of food items to outsiders (Rs.1,90,975l-), sale of oat; to horse trainers (purchase value Rs.52,3O,405/-), sale of gunnies (Rs'. l,a73l-), sale of tender forms (Rs.4,930/-), and sale of scrap materials (Rs'1,29,10o/-)' Additionalty, tax was levied under Section 6A of the APGST Act amounting to Rs.2,66,3O2/- on works contract turnover. The respondent challenged the tax assessment arguing that as a club it should not be treated as a dealer and that several of these transactions should either be exempted or taxed at different ra tes.

6. According to the respondent, the classification and taxation of oats formed the largest component of the contested turnover. The assessing authority had classified oats as "General Goods" under the seventh schedule and levied tax on the purchase value of Rs.52,30,4O5/ -. The respondent stated that oats should be classified as "cattle feed" under Entry 80 of the First Schedute of the APGST Act, which would attract a lower tax rate of 47o (w.e.f. 01.04.1995) or Lo/o (up to 01.04.1995). The respondent submitted that the oats purchased were wild oats and not fit for human consumption and were exclusively used for feeding horses. Furthermore, the respondent maintained that even if taxable, the levy should be on the sale value of Rs.10,66,914/- (at which the oats were sold at subsidized rates to trainers) rather than on the purchase value, as Entry 80 stipulated taxation at the first point of sa le.

7. The petitioner filed these Tax Revislon Cases stat r q that the STAT has erred in its findings on two grounds: a) Firstly, holding that the sale of tender forms js rot exigible to tax, when such activity constitutes a business transact )n that attracts tax liability under the APGST Act. b) Secondly, treating oats as cattle Feed under Err ry B0 of the First Schedule at concessional rates, when it should r : taxed as general goods at applicable rates. _

8. Further the petitioner stated that the Hyderabad tl. ce Club's activities including the sale of tender forms, supply of oats to orse trainers, and other commercial transactions cannot be regarded as ir r ,dental or ancillary to its main charitable objectives, and therefore the Club c ualifies as a dealer whose transactions are liable to tax. Thus, the petitioner seeks to set aside the STAT's order dated 01.10.2008, and restore the t.rr liability on these transactions as originally assessed by the Commercial Ta)r ruthorities.

9. Learned Special Standing Counsel for Commercial I rx contended that the respondent qualifies as a "dealer" within the meanin 7 of Section 2(e) of the APGST Act. He argued that the definition of "dealer" s recifically includes clubs that carry on business activities, and the club's rperations clearly demonstrated commercial activities. He also pointed to the club's sale of food items to outsiders (Rs.1,90,975/-), supply of oats to horse trainers, sale of gunnies, tender forms, and scrap materials as evidence of business transactions. Further; he emphasized that the respondent was receiving income through sale of various items including drinks and food, and was engaged in purchase and resale activities, particularly with respect to oats purchased from outside the state and sold at subsidized rates to trainers. Accordlng to him, these activities constitute "carrying on business" and therefore bring the club within the ambit of the dealer definition, making all such turnovers exigible to tax under the APGST Act. 1O. Further, the learned Special Standing classification of oats where he had rejected respondent that oats should be classified as cereals under Entry 20 of the Third Schedule or as cattle feed under Entry 80 of the First schedule. HoweveL he submitted that oats should be treated as "General Goods" Counsel argued on the the contentions of the falling under the seventh Schedule as unclassified goods, thereby attracting tax at a higher rate. Thereafter, he argued that the tax should be levied on the purchase value of Rs.52,30,405/- as assessed by the Commercial Tax officer. Moreover, petitioner's position was that the classification as general goods was appropriate to the given nature of the transactions and the manner in which the club was conducting its busirl ss operations. The learned Special Standing Counsel contended that the ass :ssing authority had correctly applied the applicable tax rates after prope- examination of the nature of goods and transactions involved.

11. Lastly, on the other disputed items, the learne j Special Standing Counsel contended that with regard to the overall turnov :r under Section 6A of the APGST Act (Rs.2,66,302/-) and sale of gunnies (Rs.51,473l-), the respondent failed to produce documentary evidence shcv ing purchases from registered dealers, which would have entitled then to exemptions or concessional treatment. Further, he argued that in tr: absence of such evidence, the assessing authority was justified in levying ax on these overall turnovers and in allowing only discount of 2Oo/o on the o" rall turnover under Section 6A. For the sale of food items (Rs.1,90,975/-),1re respondent had been established as a dealer. Thus, the amount receive I from the sale of food items to outsiders was clearly exigible to tax und('r Section 5C of the APGST Act. Moreover, he supported the view that the I trden of proof lies with the respondent to establish entitlement to ar y exemptions or concessional rates, and in the absence of adequate I )cumentation, the original assessment orders were correctly passed and s'ruld be upheld by the STAT. L2. Per contra, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent contended that it should not be classified as a "dealer" within the meaning of Section 2(e) of the APGST Act. The learned senior Counsel argued that while the definition of "dealer" includes clubs, there is a crucial rider that the club must be "carrying on business." He submitted that as a club primarily is engaged in horse racing activities, its core function was not commercial in nature. The club's activities, including the sale of food and drinks in the canteen to both members and outsiders, supply of oats to trainers, sale of tender forms to participants, sale of gunnies, and disposal of scrap materials were Lo be merely incidental or ancillary to its main non -commercial objective of horse racing rather than constituting ,independent business activitles.

13. The learned Senior Counsel further emphasized that any sales or supplies made were subsidiary to its primary non-commercial objectives and therefore should not bring the club within the ambit of the dealer definition under the APGST Act, and consequently, these transactions should not attract liability to tax under the provisions of the APGST Act. L4. The learned senior counsel further emphasizing on the classification of oats, challenged the assessing authority's classification of oats as "General Goods" under the seventh schedule which resulted in taxation at 6%, half Page l0 of 42 percent, and 10olo surcharge. He argued that oats shou r be classified either as cereals under Entry 20 of the Third Schedule oL mc-e appropriately, as cattle feed under Entry BO of the First Schedule. Howet'r r, he acknowledged that the expression 'that is to say' in Entry 20 of tl r Third Schedule is exhaustive, limiting cereals to only three specified variel i rs i.e. Bazra, Kodon and Kutki and therefore, oats would not tall under this e t ry.

15. The learned Sen ior Counsel for the respondent llso relied upon a judgment of the SuPreme Court in the case of M/s. Shah Wallace & Tamil Nadu1, wli Company Limited vs. State of exhaustive expressions 'that is to say' should be giver effect only to the descriptions specified. Consequently, the oats squarely fl under Entry 80 of the First Schedule as 'cattle feed' since it is exclusive I' used for feeding h held that such horses and are not fit for human consumption.

16. The learned senior counsel for the respondent srt mitted substantial evidence to support the classification of oats as ca" e feed, including dictionary definitions and expert literature. According to the dictionary meaning presented, 'cattle' is deflned as beasts of DastLl r--CspellElly--oxen- bulls a d cows and a lso horses. sh eeD etc. This broac lefinition includes horses within the scope of cattle. He further cited a bc-lk about "Care & ' 37 src s2z Page LL of 42 [4anagement of Stabled Horses" which states that "Ponies an dHo es rn eeo in a fit. har -muscled reoular hard work need ad ditional food to condition In other words, thev need enerqv rather than fatness. This is rovided b t feed in o c ntrated fo usuall or'hard'feeds . of thls the best is oats, which can be bruised. crushed or rolled to aid dioestion". 1-7, According to the learned Senior Counsel, oats have always been considered the ideal cereal for feeding horses. The fibrous husk, covering the rich seed encourages chewing and helps prevent the horse from eating too quickly, which can seriously disrupt its digestive system. Furthermore, he argued that the wild oats purchased were exclusively fed to horses and were not suitable for human consumption. The horses in question are specifically breed and are maintained for the purpose of taking part in horse races conducted by the Race Club and consequently, the oats used to feed these horses to be classified as'cattle feed' within the meaning of item 80 of the First Schedule. Thus, the oats purchased and sold by the respondent are properly classified under Entry B0 of the First Schedule as cattle feed and shall be taxed at the rate prescribed there under. 18, Lastly, the learned Senior Counsel on the quantum of tax liability for oats contended that even if the oats were held to be taxable as cattle feed Page IZ of 42 under Entry 80 of the First schedule, tax should be levi d on the sale value rather than the purchase value. Further, he pointecl out that Entry 80 provides for taxation at the first point of sale, and the r ub sold the oats at subsidized rates to trainers for Rs.10,66,914/-, whereas the purchase value was Rs.52,30,405/-. Therefore, the taxable turnover s rould be limited to Rs.10,66,914/- and should be taxed at the rate appli: rble for cattle feed under Entry 80 (4o/o w.e.f. 01.04.1995 or lo/o up to 01.I1 1995) rather than the higher rates applied by the assessing authority on tht purchase value'

19. Having heard the contentions put forth on either s c : and on perusal of records, it would be relevant to take note of a few decisi ns of the supreme Court as welt as of the different High Courts on the subj€ ( matter'

20.. The Supreme Court in the case of Venkatarama 1 r Hatcheries Pvt' Ltd. vs. Commercial Tax Officerz has held as under: "The use of the word "includes" in the definition of I te expression "goods" in clause (12) of article 366 gives a clear ind;Lltion that the definition is not intended to be exhaustive. Lort before the Constitution of India was enacted, there were several sai-s tax laws in the country where "goods" was defined to mean all kit ts of movable property. Parliament was well aware of the several sal s tax laws in existence at the time the Constitution of India wt s drafted and adopted and it did not intend to restrict the meanir( of the word ' '1987 SCC OnLine AP 87 "good|" by using the expression "means" in the definition clause' Instead, it used the term "includes". Had the Parliament intended to restrict the meaning of the word "goods" only to inanimate obiects or things, nothing could have precluded it from stating so' Instead of doing that, the Parliament used the word "includes" in the definition clause thereby expressing its intention that the definition was not intended to be exhaustive. In construing a word used in a legislative entry we have to remember that the word should be given the widest meaning so as to comprehend all ancittary or subsidiary matters as Gwyer, C'l', had observed in tJnited Provinces v. Mst. Atiqa Eegum AIR 1941 FC 16 at page 2 5: "None of the items in the Lists is to be read in a narrow or restricted sense, and that each general word should be held to extend to all ancittary or subsidiary matters which can fairly and reasonably be said to be comprehended in it I deprecate any attempt to enumerate in advance all the matters which are to be included under any of the more general descriptions; it will be sufficient and much wiser to determine each case as and when it comes before this court. "" 2L. Similarly, in CIT vs. Kasturi & Sons Ltd.3, the Supreme Court in paragraph No.9 of its judgment reinforced the principle of strict construction of taxing statutes. Paragraph No.9 for ready reference is reproduced below: ' (1999) 3 scc a46 "9. The principle that a taxing statute should be str,( ly construed is well settled. In Principles of Statutory Interpretatiot )Y lustice G.P. ;ingh, 6th Edn., 1996, the law is stated thus: "The well-established rule in the familiar wor(t: ol LORD WENSLEYDALE, reaffirmed by LORD HALSBURv ind LORD SIMONDS, means: 'The subject is not to be t,:.: C without clear v,tords for that purpose; and also that e , ry Act of Parliament must be read according to ti natural construction of its words.'In a classic passage LOF ) CAIRNS stated the principle thus: 'If the person sought t( be taxed comes within the letter of the law he must 'e taxed, however great the hardship may appear to the.lL( cial mind to be. on the other hand, if the Crown seeking t ) recover the tax, cannot bring the subject within the Ietter ('- the law, the subject is free, however apparently within trt spirit of law the case might otherwise appear to be. In olt- )r words, if there be admissible in any statute, what ts dlled an equitable construction/ certainly, such a construct )n is not admissible in a taxing statute where you can sirnt t adhere to the words of the statute.' VISCOUNT SIMON q t )ted with approval a passage from ROWLATT, J. expr.: tng the principle in the following words: 'In a taxing Act ot e has to look merely at what is clearly said. There is no rot r t for any intendment. There is no equity about a tax. Tl t'e is no presumption as to tax. Nothing is to be read in, not ing is to be implied. One can only look fairly at the langua' e used.' Relying upon this passage LORD UPIOHN sat. 'Fiscal measures are not built upon any theory of taxation Page !5 of 42 22, Recently, the Supreme Court again in the case of Checkmate Services (p) Ltd, vs. CIT4 reaffirmed the strict Interpretation principles of tax statues in paragraph Nos.55 and 57 of its judgment. Paragraph Nos.55 and 57 for ready reference are reproduced below: "55. One of the rules of interpretation of a tax statute is that if a deduction or exemption is available on compliance with certain conditions, the conditions are to be strictly complied with' I See e.g., Eagte Flask Industries Ltd v. CCE, (2004) 7 SCC 3771 This rule is in line with the general principle that taxing statutes are to be construed strictlY, and that there is no room for equitable considerations. 57, The Constitution Bench, in Commr. of Customs v' Dilip Kumar & Co. [Commr. of Customs v. Dilip Kumar & Co', (2018) 9 SCC 1] endorsed as following : (SCC pp. 19 & 23-24, paras 24 & 34) "24. In construing penal statutes and taxation statutes, the Court has to apply strict rule of interpretation' The penal statute which tends to deprive a person of right to life and liberty has to be given strict interpretation or else manY innocents might become vicnms of discretionary decision- making. Insofar as taxation statutes are concerned, Article 265 of the Constitution ["265. Taxes not to be imposed save by authority of law.-No tax shall be levied or cotlected except by authoritY of law."l prohibits the State from extracting tax from the citizens without authority of law, It is axiomatic that taxation statute has to be interpreted strictly because the State cannot at their whims o (2023) 6 scc 4sl and fancies burden the citizens without authoritt 'f law. In other words, when the competent legislaturt: landates taxing certain persons/certain objects iI certain circumstances, it cannot be expanded/inter ) eted to include those, which were not intended by the legr. lature.

34. The passages extracted above, were qu: ed with approval by lhis Court in at least two lecisions betng CIT v. Kasturi & Sons Ltd. ICIT v. Kastur & Sons Ltd., ( 1.999) 3 SCC 3461 and State of W.B. v :esoram Industnes Ltd. [State of W.B. v. Kesoram Indus I es Ltd., (2004) 10 SCC 2O1l (hereinafter referred to a: lesoram Industnes case, for brevity). In the later decisron. t Bench of five Judges, after citing the above passage frcr Justice G.P. Singh's treatise, summed up the following L inciples applicable to the interpretation of a taxing statutc. '(i) In interpreting a taxing statute, ( luitable considerations are entirely out of place. A taxir,t statute cannot be interpreted on any presump. on or assumption. A taxing statute has to be interprel( I in the light of what is clearly expressed; it cann: imply anything which is not expressed; it canno: tmport provisions in the statute so as to supply any defi::ncy; (ii) Before taxing any person/ it must be showr, .hat he falls within the ambit of the charging section L r' clear words used in the section; and (iii) If the words are ambiguous and open o two interpretations, the benefit of interpretation is i ven to the subject and there is nothing unjust in a 1.(payer escaping if the letter of the law fails to catch him on account of the tegislature's failure to express itself clearlY. "'

23. The Supreme Court further in the case of Royal Hatcheries (P) Ltd' v. State of A.P.s dealing with the interpretation oF livestock in tax rules held as u nder: "5, Having regard to the relevance of the language employed in Rule 5(2)(xxvi), it would be appropriate to set out the same over again here. It reads : "Livestock, that is to say, all domestic animals such as, oxen, bulls, cows, buffaloes, goats, sheep, horses etc'" The clause opens with the word, 'livestock', but it does not stop there' Had it stopped there, there coutd be no doubt that day-old chicks or for that matter,olderchicksandchickenwouldhavecertainlyfallenwithinthe ambit of the expression 'livestock' and would have been taxable at purchase point. But the clause proceeds further and restricts the ambit of the expression "livestock" to domestic animals referred to therein That is the effect of the words "that is to say" The meaning and purport of the words "that is to say" is explained by this Court in Rajasthan Rolter Flour Mitls Assn. v. State of Rajasthan [1994 Supp ( 1) SCC 413 : lT ( 1gg3) 5 SC 1381 . TheY are words of limitation' In other words because of the use of the said words, the livestock contemplated bY the said clause becomes confined to the domestic animals referred to in the said clause' 'Livestock' is, ordinarily speaking, not confined to domestic animals. As held in Peterborough Royat Foxhound Show Society v. IRC [20 Tax Cases 249 : (1936) 1 All ER S13l the word'livestock'takes in'animals'of any description' But t t99g scc onLine sc 'lo the rule-making authority chose to limit the meaninu of 'ltvestock'in the said clause only to domestic animals mentioned tt ('ein. Yet aqain, the clause does not stop with the words "all domes ic animals". ft proceeds further and goes on to illustrate the i zaning of the expression "all domestic animals" by mentioning ! rme of them, namely oxen, bulls, cows, buffaloes, goats, sheep and I crses and then ends with the word "etc.". This could not have been wtt out a purpose. It could only be to indicate the type of domestic a; mals the rule- making authority had in mind. Why did the rule-maki', t authority not mention a single bird, while mentioning so many anii )ls? lt is true, the words "such as" indicate that what are mentione) theteafter are only illustrative and not exhaustive. The clause alsc .:nds with the word "etc.", which does mean that some more dom ) tic ,Tnimals in addition to those specifically mentioned therein an) also included within the meaning the words "all domestic animals". ttt t tha question still remains, whether day-old chicks were contemplat: d as included within the clause? In other words, whether chicks an be called 'domestic animals'so as to fall within the purview of the :aid clause?

79. We may now proceed to answer the question . ising for our consideration in the light of the decisions and other rr.'erial referred to above. We have hereinbefore analysed the clause r para 5. It is enough to reiterate here that clause (xxvi) of Rule 5(2) t oes not cover all "livestock". It covers only that 'livestock' whiclt answers the description "domestic animals". In popular and common , arlance, day- old chicks - or for that matter, chicks - are not t tferred to or understood as 'animals', though in its literal sense, tht' ,vord'animal' refers to any and every 'animate' object as distinct t' m inanimate objects. The wider interpretation placed upon tt t said word in Bridge v. Parsons [(1863) 32 UMC 95] must be unde stood having regard to the object and purpose of the enactment concerned therein viz., prevention of cruelty to animals. For that reason, cock-fights were held to be covered by the enactment. The principle of this decision cannot be applied mechanically to every situation, more so to a taxing provision like the one concerned herein. The several decisions cited by Shri C. Sitaramiah show that words of this nature are construed having regard to the context and the object underlying the enactment For example, in Casher v. Holmes [109 ER 1263 : (18j1) 2 B & Ad 592 (KB)l arising under an enactment levying duties on several articles, 'metals'were construed as not including gold and silver' It was held that gold and silver are popularly referred to as precious metals and not as'metals'. This brings to our mind another illustration' Diamonds are stones so are there several semi-precious stones used in carvings in marble. fhey are referred to as precious or semi-precious stones' When one speaks of stones, he does not mean to include the precious and semi-precious stones therein - unless, of course, the context drives him to do so. Coming back to the popular sense, chicks are referred to as'birds' - not as'animals'. That this is the sense in which the said word is used is borne out by the type of animals mentioned in the clause by way of iltustration' All of them are animals - domestic animals, to wit, oxen, bulls, cows, buffatoes, goats, sheep and horses' It is significant to notice that not one of them belongs to the birds' category. No doubt, the word 'etc.' follows the said words but then in the context, it woutd be reasonable and appropriate to say that while animals like dogs and cats - without trying to be exhaustive - may be covered by the said clause by virtue of the word "etc'", chicks cannot certainly be inctuded therein. To do so would be to depart from and ignore the ordinary poputar connotation of the words "domestic animals" besides doing violence to the spirit and structure of the clause. The use of the word "all" preceding "domestir not make any difference. It only means all domesti - type mentioned therein - all of which are quadrupe also included ir) the clause, the very purpose of giving disappears. Those words in the clause would beco', Such an interpretation ought not to be adopted ex. avoid an absurd result. For all the above reasor: agreement with the High Court, that the chicks sold by are not included wtthin clause (xxvi) of Rule 5(2) of tl Sales Tax Rules. " animals" does animals of the ts. If birds are he illustrations e suoerfluous. ,pt perhaps to we hold, in the appellants e A.P. General

24. Whereas, in the case of State of Andhra Pra iesh vs. Bhagya Lakshmi Hatcheries Pvt. Limited6, the unified Hi(l r Court of Andhra Pradesh took different views on whether poultry cons .itutes livestock in paragraph Nos.1O to 14. Paragraph Nos.10 to 14 of the ;aid judgment, are again for ready reference reproduced hereunder: "10. Apart from the Obiter dictum of the Supreme ( curt, we maY independently consider the question whether chicks tv tich belong to the category of poultry are livestock. There is abund,l't authoritY in the form of dictionaries, publications dealing with !ivestock and pouttry, statutory enactments concerning livestock, including the notifications issued under taxation statutes which procee I on the basis that poultry is livestock. We may refer to few of them' 11. tn the dictionaries, the following meanings of "livestc:k" are given: The Chambers 21st Century Dictionary defines "livestoc'< as under: u 2ooo scc online AP 557 Page 2l of 42 "Domesticated animals, especially sheep, cattle, pigs and poultry kept for the production of meat, milk, wool, etc., or for breeding purposes". Black's Agricultural Dictionary, II Edition, defines "livestock" to mean "domesticated animals such as cattle, horses, pigs, poultry, sheep, etc." +Here italicised. In Venkataramaiya's Law Lexicon with Legal maxims II Editrcn refers to the pubtication titled Legislative Drafting & Forms by Six Alison Russel, page 208 "livestock" is defined as under: "(a) Cattle, sheep, goat, swine, horses or poultry and for the purposes of this definition 'cattle'means cows. oxen, calves and 'poultry'means domestic fowls, turkey, goose or ducks. (b) Any creature kept for the production of food, wool, skin, fur or for the purposes of its use in the farming by man. Ltvestock includes horse, cattle, sheep, goats, swine, mules, donkey and poultry". In Ramanatha Aiyer's Law Lexicon, it is said that "livestock" is restricted in its meaning so as to include only something which is either a mammal or a bird". In the book 'The Livestock Industry in Less Developed Countries' published by the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations, poultry industry is also dealt with' In the Foreword to the book 'Indian Poultry Industry Year Book', TOth Edition pubtished by Government of India, it is stated that amonqst the tivestock-based vocations, poultry occupies a pivotal position. From the book "lndian Poultry Industry Year Book," it is seen that livestock census includes poultry population. In the book published by tndian Standards Institutto' "Standards on Poultry", day-old chicks is dealt with under the topic "lt\ tstock". 12. In the decision in Peterborough Royal Foxhouno ;how Society's case 20 Tax Cases 249; 2 K.B. 497, cited with )) oroval by the Supreme Cour t, it vvas observed as follows: "......The words 'livestock' are ordinarily and properls' L;ed in contrast with dead stock and include all live animals and birds 1e breeding of which is regulated by man." In the "Words and Phrases Legally Defined", by SaunLl's'livestock'is defined as "cattle, sheep, goats, swine, horses, or poL'l rY and for the purposes of this definition 'cattle means bulls, cows/ ) en, heifers or calves, 'horses' includes asses and mules, and 'a)ultrY' means domestic fowls, turkeys, geese or ducks". 13. In Wardhouqh (A.F.) Ltd. v. Mace (1952) 2 At, ER 28, Lord Goddard defined "livestock" as under: "Livestock generally means live animals. If the live anrt lead stock on a farm are advertised for sale, everybody knows what t\ )t means. The dead stock are implements; the livestock are the animl s on the farm and I should think that in the great majority of case: 1t any rate it would include and would be thought to include the L )ultry on the farm " - 14. These dictionaries, publications on the subjects of ivestock' and poultry and the judicial opinion, all go to show tha livestock is understood in a broad sense to refer to poultry as well, rhus, even in popu la r u n de rsta n d i n g, I ivestock i ncl udes pou ltry. "

25. In the case of Glaxo Laboratories (India) Ltd. v. state of GujaratT the Gujarat High court examined the meaning of cattle feed and poultry feed in the context of taxation entries and held as under: "70. According to Corpus Juris Secundum, Volume 36, page 631, the said word "as a noun is used as referring to articles to be fed to animals, particularty domestic animals". In Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary (Unabridged), at page 671, several meanings of the word "feed", when used as a noun, are given' The appropriate meanings, as appticable in the context of the use of the said noun in the entries in question, however, are as follows:"(1) food given to animals; fodder; pasture; (2) the customary amount of fodder given at one time; as, to carry on a journey two feeds of oats; and (6) a meal'" In the Oxford English Dtctionary, Volume IV, at page 730, various meanings of the word "feed" are given and out of them onlY the following meanings appear to be relevant:"(3) Food (for cattle); fodder, provender; (4) A meal; a sumptuous meal; a feast'" It would thus appear that etymologically the word "feed" means animal food or fodder. two entries in question, the word "feed" is used in 77. In the with another word, namely, "cattle" in entry 21 and conjunction "pouttry" in entry 25. Besides, in entry 27 there are words of inclusion as well as of exclusion fotlowing upon the word "cattle-feed"' Under these circumstances, it appears to us that the correct way of approaching the matter woutd be to read the expressions "cattle-feed" and "pouttry-feed" as a whole and to read the former expression in the context of the words which fotlow. When so read, one thing at least is ctear that the goods which are intended to be covered by both these ' 19ZA SCC Online Guj 102 expressions are those which are meant for consumptt. t by animals or birds, as the case may be, which are more often tlt. t not reared for commercial purposes-

72. The word "cattle-feed" has acquired a precise me'1 )ing in the field of live-stock farming and so also has the word "conc: ltrates". In the book entitled "Nutritive Values of Indian Cattle Feed;.1d the Feeding of Animals" by Shri K.C. Sen, which has been publish: i by the Indian Council of Agricultural Research, New Delhi, Chat er I, entitled "Nutrition of Animals", deals with the feeding stuffs ) animals. It is there pointed out that food is essential for the mainter'.1ce of life. The nutrients in a feeding stuff enable the animal body to r', )intain energy, to perform the vital processes of life and provide t,e material to replace the essential tissues breakdown which occt,r: in the body continuously. Food also provides the constituents .'t C the energy required for body growth. All feeding stuffs are camp 'sed of water, and organic and mineral matter. Organic matter r; composed of proteins, fats, crude fibre and soluble carbohydrat(: Besides the above, there are certain substances known as vitant,ls, which are considered to be essential for the proper nutrition of trm stock. Of these, the more important ones, from the point of iew of cattle nutrition, are vitamins A and D, because these have rc )e supplied to the animals through their feed; but vitamins B at d C can be synthesized in the ruminant body. The learned auth) proceeds to point out that the ration of an animal may be divided l. convenience into two parts, one for maintenance ration is that porri )n of the diet which lust enables the animal at rest to carry on t:he essential processes of life, such as breathing and circulation of I lood, without either gain or loss of weight. As, however, no animal is t ept in a farm in a state of non-production, the requirements for mat-enance form only a convenient basis for the calculation of rations for productive purposes. Whatever is supplied to the animal over and above its maintenance requirement is available for production, such as for growth or fattening, for production cf calf, for production of milk or for output of work. These observations contatned in a standard book published by the Indian Council of Agricultural Research establish two things : first, that in the context of live-stock, which is not intended to be kept in a state of non-production, food consi sts not only of that constituent which is essential for the maintenance of life but also of the other constituents which provide the energy required for production, be it the production of calf, or milk or output of work and, secondly, that vitamins are considered essential for the proper nutrition of farm stock and some of the vitamins like vitamins A and D have to be supplied to the animals through their feed. If this concept of cattte-feed is borne in mind, it would become immediately clear that the said expression is not understood by the people conversant with the rearing of ltve-stock as merely consisting of ration for maintenance but also as comprehending ration for production purposes. 24. It is true that the common parlance test was applied in the said decision and that to that extent the decision is in point. Hawever, beyond that no assistance can be derived from this decision for determining the meaning of the word "cattle-feed" or "poultry-feed". Foodstuff or food provision for human beings has a definite meaning in common parlance and it cannot possibly include articles like Limical which have special use and properties. One cannot possibly serve as foodstuff or food provision Limical to a guest at dinner or lunch. "Cattte-feed" and "pouttry-feed", however, are words which are used in the context of the mixed feed of lrue-stock and poultry, both of which are reared for production purposes not only domestically but also commercially. From what has been stated above, it be: 'mes clear that even in its poputar sense, that is to say, the sense i t whtch people conversant with live-stock farming and poultry rats ng and those dealing in cattle-feed or poultrY-feed would attribute l) those words, ration for productton, such as feed additives or s, Plements like proteins, minerals, vitamins, etc., would truly constilt e "cattle-feed" or "pouttry-feed", as the case may be. In such a conte.. and in view of the setting of the word "cattle-feed" in the compal' of the word "concentrates", it would be difficult to reach the conc, tsion at which the Tribueat arrived. The Tribunal's decision as to the t- e scope of the entries in question in the instant case, relying upon its ( lrlier decision, therefore, is obviously not correct in law."

26. Lastly, in the case of State of A.P. vs. Coroman( el Agro Products and Oils Limiteds, the erstwhile High Court of Andhra ) adesh dealing with the interpretation of vegetable oils in a tax entry has hel'l as under: "We need not go into the question of applicabilitY ( t Court decision or the Allahabad High Court decision ftt controversy in this case, because it can be decided on l, the entry itself. The entry relates to "vegetable oils" ,t oits mentioned therein are onlY illustrative The entry ::1 "vegetable oils" including those mentioned ttl( t circumstances, there is no warrant for placing the const' said entry relates only to those vegetable oils whict' appears from the facts of the case that cotton seed : cotton seed acid oil is the residue after the cofton see) i.e., what is known as "washed cotton seed oil" is ta* the Supreme resolving the e language of d the various ecifically says :in. In the tction that the zre edible. It ludge oil and oil is refined, n away. This I 1987 SCC OnLine AP 558 residue is usually sold and is used in the manufacture of soap as oil' The mere fact that it is a residue left after the refined cotton seed oil is taken away, or that it contains some residuary additives it does not cease to be "vegetabte oil". Having regard to the wide language used it is not possible to restrict it only to edible vegetable oils Apaft from this, groundnut oil which is also an edible oil is shown as a separate entry 24. This also negatives the contention that entry 128 relates to edible oils."

27. In everyday usage, there exists a clear distinction between horses and cattle. cattle specifically refers to domesticated bovine animals belonging to the Bos genus, including cows, bulls, and calves. Horses, on the other hand, belong to an entirely different biologlcal classification - the Equus genus and, which are classified as equids, not bovines. Under normal circumstances, horses are considered livestock but remain a separate group from cattle' Howeveri Indian law demonstrates that the classification of animals, including whether a horse qualifies as cattle, varies significantly depending on the specific statute and its context. This is precisely where the cattle Trespass Act, t871, creates a legal framework that expands the traditional definition. Section 3 of the Cattle Trespass Act, 1871, contains an interpretation clause that fundamentally broadens the scope of 'cattle'. The provision expllcitly states that: ""cattle" includes not only traditional bovines but tlso elephants, camels, buffaloes, horse, mares, geldings, ponies,6o'1 :, fillies, mules, asses, pigs, ramsl ewes, sheep, lambs, goats and ktds

28. This legal expansion finds support in certain ( i tionary definitions. While the Collins English Dictionary maintains th€ traditional narrow definition stating that cattle are simply cows and t ulls, However, the American English definition, particularly in biblical usa r e, acknowledges a broader interpretation. It defines cattle as bovine anim;r ; of the genus Bos/ but also extends to include "other domesticated qua; upeds, as horses, swine, etc." Therefore, while biologically and colloqui rlly horses remain distinct from cattle, the Cattle Trespass Act legally trair,; )rms horses into a subcategory of 'cattle' for purposes of that legislati)n. This statutory inclusion creates a legal fiction whereby horses are trr:ir ed as cattle under the law.

29. Having established that horses are legally classifiec is cattle under the Cattle Trespass Act, we can now understand why )ats are properly categorized as cattle feed. According to Stephen Boylr-.,, The Ohio State University & Ladon lohnson, North Dakota State Universitl held that: "Oats is lower in energy and more bulky than other common feed grains since it threshes with the hull intact. The hull commonly accounts for 24 to 30 percent of the weight of the oat kernel. Since oat grain yield and quality are highest under relatively cool growing seasonsl it is produced and fed primarily in the northern part of the Great Plains. Quality, as measured by bushel weight. commonly varies inversely with temperatures during the kernel filling and ripening period of the grain. A traditional pattern in movement of feed oats is for high-quality, heavy-test-weight horse" oats to move from northern producing areas to south and easterly directions. Energy content of oats varies directly according to bushel test weight, which in turn is dependent upon size of groat (whole seed minus the hull) and kernel plumpness."

30. With regard to growing and finishing cattle, it was held that: "Oats has earned the reputation of being a good "growing" feed but of having lesser value than corn, barley, grain sorghum or wheat when used as the major energy source in finishing rations. Oats is only worth about 85 percent the value of corn or barley per ton when fed as one-half or more of the grain diet for finishing cattle. Rations containing very high levels of oats or even rations with no roughage do not produce comparable gains to those of corn or barley. This is particularly true during the last 40 to 60 days of the finishing period. Good quality oats (35 pounds per bushel or heavier) can be used at levels up to one-third of the concentrate intake in finishing type rations without reducing rate of gain or markedly affecting feed efficiency. Oats may have a place in all-concentrate diets as a supplement for cereals which have low fiber contents."

31. The connection becomes clear through this logical chain that: 1) Horses are legally defined as.catfle, under the Cat Ie Trespass Act; 2) Oats are traditionally and practically used as feed;:r horses; 3) Oats are also used as feed for beef catfle (traditicr al bovines); and 4) Since horses are legally catfle, and oats Fe( ( both horses and traditional cattle, oats qualify comprehensively as , :atfle feed,,. This creates a unified category where oats serv€ as catfle feed not merely because they feed traditional bovines, but be: ruse they feed the entire legal category of 'cattre' as expanded by statutr, - including horses, which have been brought within that definition by rec i rative decree. The agricultural practice of using oats for both horses aD i traditional cattle therefore aligns perfectly with the legal classification, mr r ing .catUe feed, an accurate and comprehensive description for oats unde- the relevant regal fra mework.

32. Now we wourd rike to refer to certain provisions o' :he APGST Act for better understanding of the dispute. Firstly, Section 2(e) of the APGST Act which defines the term 'dealer,is reproduced hereunder, r i :., "dealer" means any person who carries on the busines of buying, selling, supplying or distributing goods or delivering qc.tds on hire purchase or on any system of payment by instalments, ar arnes on or executes any works contract involving supply or use of mtl )rial directly or otherwise, whether for cash, or for deferred payn lnt, or for Page 3L of 42 commtsston. includes. - remuneration or other valuable consideration, and a casual trader, as herein before defined; (i) local authority, a company, a Hindu undivided family or any society (including a cooperative society), club, firm or association which carries on such business; (ii) a society (including a cooperative society), ctub. firm or association which buys goods from, or sells, suppties or distributes goods to its members; (iii) (iii)(a) any person, who may, in the course of business of running a restaurant or an eating house or a hotel (by whatever name called). supply by way of or as part of any service or in any other manner whatsoever, of goods, being food or any other article for human consumption or any drink (whether or not intoxicating); (iii)(b) any person, who may transfer the right to the use of any goods for any purpose whatsoever (whether or not for a specified period) in the course of business to any other person; (iv) a commission agent, a broker, a delcredere agent, an auctioneer or any other mercantile agent, by whatever name called, who carries on the business of buying, selling, supptying or distributing goods on behalf of any principat or principats; Explanation-I:--- Every person who acts as an agent of a non resident dealer that is, as an agent on behalf of a dealer residing outside the State, and buys, sells, supplies or distributes goods in the State or acts on behalf of such dealer as - (i) a mercantile agent as defined in the Indan Sale of Goods Act, 1930 (Central Act III of 1930); or (ii)an agent for handling goods or documents of title retating to goods/ or i I (iii) an agent for the collection or the payment t r the sale price of goods or as a guarantor for such collection or pa)t )ent and every local branch of a firm or company situated outside th. State, sha be deemed to be a dealer for the purpose of this Act. Explanation-Il: - -- Where a grower of agriculturat , - horticultural produce sells such produce grown by himself or growr )n any land in which he has an interest whether as owner, usufrucltt y mortgageel tenant or otherwise, in a form different from the one i which it was produced after subjecting it to any physical, chemical t r any process other than mere cleaning, grading or softing, he shall b: deemed to be a dealer for the purpose of this Act; Explanation-Ill: - -- The Central Government or the St. t , Government whtch, whether or not in the course of business, buys, s: s, supplies or dtstributes qoods, directly or otherwise, for cash o- for deferred payment or for commission, remuneration or Lt )er valuable consideration shall be deemed to be deater for the purpojt s of this Act; Explanation-IV:--- For the purpose of this clause, following persans and bodies whether or not in the cours who sell or dispose ofl [Substituted 'each of the followir,, bodies who sell or dispose of by Act No.25 af 21.12.2OO2.1 any goods including unclaimed or c) unserviceable goods or scrap surplus, old, obsotete, material or waste products whether by auction or otherw.: through an agent for cash, or for deferred payment or I valuable consideration shall be deemed to be a dealer to such disposals or sales, namely:- each of the : of busine:ss persons and 2002, dated jfiscated or )r discarded ), directly or )r any other \e extent of (a) The Port Trust; (b) Municipal Corporation, and Municipal Councils, anL other local a uthorities; (c) Railway administration as defined under the Indian Railways Act, 1890; (d) Shipping, transport and construction companies; (e) Atr transport compantes and airlines; (f) Transporters, holding permits for transport vehicles granted under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 which are used or adopted to be used for hire; (g) The Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation; (h) Customs Department of the Government of India administering the Customs Act, 1962; (i) Insurance and Financial Corporations or Companies and Banks included in the Second Schedule to the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934; (j ) Advertising Agencies; (k) Any other Corporation, Company body or authority owned or set up by or subject to administrative control of the Central Government or any State Government.

33. Section 54 of the APGST Act which deals with levy of tax on turnover is also reproduced hereunder, viz., Section 5. Levy of tax on sales or purchases of goods:--- [(1) Save as otherwise provided in this Act every dealer shall pay tax under this Act for each year on every rupee of his turnover of sales or purchases of goods in each year irrespective of the quantum of his turnover at the rates of tax and at the points of levy pecified in the Schedules.l (2) For the purpose of this section and the other provi.;,.,ns of this Act, the turnover which a dealer sha be liabte to pe, tax shall be determined after makinq such deductions from his tot'? turnover, and in such manner as may be prescribed. (3) The taxes under thrs section shall be assessed, levie and collected in such manner, as may be prescribed: Provided that, - - - (i) in respect of the same transaction, the bu r r or the seller but not both, as determined by such rL)tt s as may be prescribed, shall be taxed. (ii) where a dealer has been taxed in respect o the purchase of any goods, in accordance with the rule:; -eferred to in clause (i) of this proviso, he sha not be ttxed again in respect of any sale of such goods effeded bt him.,,

34. section 5-C of the Apcsr Act which dears with tax i r respect of suppry of articles of food or drinks in restaurants or catering hor_::s or hotels is also reproduced hereundeq viz., [Section 5-C. Tax in respect of supply of artictes of f ,od or drink in restaurants or catering houses or hotels:--- very dealer runninq any restaurant or eating house or hotet (by wt, )tever name called), who supplies, by way of or as part of any ser /, :e or in any other manner whatsoever of goods, being food or any otl .r article for l I ; human consumption or any drink (whether or not intoxicating) and whether or not such goods have suffered tax under the Act. where such supply or service is for cash, deferred payment or other valuable consideration shall on the total amount charged by the said dealer for such supply, pay a tax at the rate of eight paise on every rupee on the aggregate of such amount realised or realisable by him during the year: Provided that no such tax shall be levied if the total turnover of the dealer including such aggregate during the year is less than Rs.2,00,000.1

35. Section 5-E of the APGST Act deals with tax on the amount realized in respect of any right to use goods is also reproduced hereunde[ viz., [Section 5-E, Tax on the amount realised in respect of any right to use goods:--- Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act,--, (a) Every dealer who transfers the right to use any goods for any purpose, whatsoever, whether or not for a specified period, to any lessee or licensee For cash, deferred payment or other valuable consideration, in the course of his business shall, on the total amount realised or realisable by him by way of payment in cash or otherwise on such transfer or transfers of the right to use such goods from the lessee or licensee, pay a tax at the rate of eight paise on every rupee of the aggregate of such amount realised or realisable by him during the year. (b) the transfer of right to use any such goods entered into by any dealer, shall be deemed to have taken place in this State whenever the goods are used within the State, irrespective of the place where the agreement whether written or oral for such transfer of right is made. Provided that no such tax shall be levied if the total turnover of the dealer including such aggregate is less than rupees two lakhs.l"

36. Other Sections of the APGST Act which have to be taken into consideration are Section 6 dealing with tax in respect ()t declared goods and Section 6-4 dealing with levy of tax on turnover rel: ing to purchase of certain goods. For ready reference, Section 6 arr Section 6-4 are reproduced hereunder, viz.,

6. Tax in respect of declared goods:--- Notwithstn contained in section 5, the sales or purchases of declir dealer shall be liable to tax at the rate, and only at the 1 purchase specrfied against each in the third Schedule or such sales or purchases for each year irrespective of the turnover in such goods; and the tax shall be assess collected in such manner as may be prescribed. ding anything :d goods by a oint of sale or tis turnover of uantum of his :d levied and [Provided that where any such goods on which a t.) Ievied are sold in the course of inter State trade or con r has been paid under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 ir sale of such goods in the course of inter State trade or tax so levied, ( shall be reimbursed to the person makt. the course of inter State trade or commerce,) in su(l subject to such conditions as may be prescribed.l has been so erce. and tax 'espect of the ommerce the t such sale in manner and [6-4. Levy of tax on turnover retating to purchas goods:--- Every dealer, who in the course of business,--- 2 of certain (i) purchases any goods (the sale or purchase of wli h is tiable to tax under this Act) from a registered dealer in circ tmstances in which no tax is payable under section 5 or under se:,ton 6, as the case may be, or. ( (ii) purchases any goods (the sale or purchase of which is liabte to tax under this Act) from a person other than a registered dealer, and (a) consumes such goods in the manufacture of other goods for sale or consumes them otherwlse, or: (b) dtsposes of such goods in any manner other than by way of sale in the State or. (c) despatches them to a place outside the Sfafe except as a direct result of sale or purchase in the course of inter State trade or commerce, shall pay tax on the turnover relating to purchase aforesaid at the same rate at which but for the existence of the aforementioned circumstances, the tax would have been leviable on such goods under Section 5 or Section 6.

37. Following this, reference is made to the First Schedule of the APGST Act which specifies the goods subject to single-point taxation under Entry 80 oF the said Schedule. For ready reference, Entry g0 is reproduced below: Sl.No. 1 Description of Goods Point of Levy 2 3 Rate of Tax 4

40. Poultry feed and Cattle feed At the point oF first sale in State 4 paise in the rupee

34. Next, attention is invited to the Third Schedule of the ApGST Act, which specifies the goods subject to single-point taxation under section 6. Entry 20 of this Schedule pertains to various type:, of cereals, and the corresponding point of levy and rate of tax are reprodu: ,d below: SI.No, D escfiption of Goods 1

20. 2 Cereals, that ts to say, !l), .b"j,- (Pennrsetum typhordeum t.) (ii) kodunlPa\ pdlum sere brcutatum L.) (flr) kutki (Panrcum L,mmarre L. ) (iv) bartey (Hordeum vutgare L.l Point of Levy 3 Rate of Tax 4 At the point of first s, r in the State 2 paise in the rupee 39' It is evident from the above definition and the erar rrate interpretation that the respondent does not Fa, within the defin t on of ,dearer, contemplated under section 2(e) of the Act. The respor r ent,s activities are undertaken sorery for charitabre purposes, and any incor ,e generated from the sare of oats is utirized excrusivery for furtherin; these charitabre objectives rather than for commercial gain or profit. The r ss€nc€ of being a 'dealer'under the ApGST Act presupposes carrying on bus ness with a profit motive or for valuable consideration in the commercia sense. Since the respondent's operations are driven not with profit intent i nd the funds are applied towards charitabre purposes, the respondent canr( t be crassified as a dealer within the meaning of the ApGST Act. This interpretation is consistent with the regisrative intent to excrude charitabre, ganizations from i ) I i I I I I i I I l the purview of commercial taxation when their activities are not conducted for profit.

40. Furthermore, it is important to note that the respondent sells oats to trainers who exclusively use it as feed for their horses. In examining the nature of horses within the legislative framework, reference must be made to the Cattle Trespass Act, L87 7, which explicifly includes horses within the definition of 'cattle'or'livestock'. The judicial pronouncements cited above, particularly the decision in Glaxo Laboratories (India) Ltd. (supra) and the analysis of livestock definitions across various statutory instruments and authoritative publications establish that livestock encompasses horses along with other domestic animals. The Supreme Court's observation that 'livestock' includes all live animals and birds and the breeding of which is regulated by man, leaves no room for doubt that horses constitute catfle for the purposes of livestock and cattle feed provisions. Consequently, oats supplied by the respondent to trainers for feeding horses must be regarded as cattle feed in its true legislative and it sense. 4L. The classification of oats as cattle feed is a matter of legislative interpretation that musi be guided by the principle that entries in taxing statutes should not be read in a narrow or restricted sense. It is well established that each general word in a legislative schedule should be held to extendable to all the ancillary or subsidiary matters /hich can fairly and reasonably be said to be comprehended within it.

42. In the present case, oats faI squarery within the mbit of Schedure 1 of Entry 80, which explicitly provides for.poultry feed I rd cattle feed,. This entry is broad enough to encompass all forms of feed rreant for livestock including oats commonly used as nutritional feed for hors :s and other catUe. Conversely, Entry 20 of Third schedule enumerates sp€ ( fic cerears such as bajra, kodon, kutki, and barrey, and does not incrude oa r within its purview. The absence of oats from this specific enumeration canr rt be construed as an exclusion from the broader category of cattle feed un: :r Entry B0 of First schedule. The legislative intent behind these entriei is to distinguish between cereals meant for human consumption or 3:nerar commerciar purposes and those which serve as cattle feed. Apply r g the principle of liberal interpretation, oats, when used as feed for horses ; rd other livestock, must be classified under Entry 80 of First Schedule. Th; interpretation is consistent with the judicial approach that taxing entries !r culd be construed in a manner that gives effect to their plain meaning anc purpose, without imposing artificial restrictions that defeat the legislative ot) ective. 43' Another aspect which comes in the mind of the Ber t r in the course of deliberation is that Entry 80 of First schedule purely refl r ted ,.poultry Page 4l of 42 and cat'e feed" both had to be given a wide and exhaustive interpretation. More so for the reason that the said schedures stood amende d vide Act No.27 of 1996, w.e.l 01.08.1996, and in the process Entry B0A and Entry 808 were introduced. For ready reference, Entry B0A and Entry gOB are reproduced hereunder: SI.No. 1 ao-A. Description of coods 2. XXX Point of Levy 3 Rate of Tax 4 At the point of first sale in State 8 patse in the rupee Feed supplements, nutrients, Mineral mtxfure, vttamrns, medicines, and any other category of food supplements which are used in poultry feed, F,sh feed, prawn feed and Feed For livestock. ao-8. Fish feed and prawn feed for livestock other than cattle At the point oF first sale in State 4 paise in the rupee A bare perusal of the aforesaid Entries would go to show that according to the Iaw, as it existed prior to 01.01.2000, aI those items which are refrected in the newry brought in Entry 80A and Entry g0B were a inclusive in the original Entry g0. This in other words also means that feed for livestock was not earrier there in any of the schedures and therefore feed for livestock also wourd automatica[y have to be brought within the ambit of cattle feed. If feed for rivestock was not part of cat e feed, the necessity of incorporating Entry 80A and Entry g0B was not necessary. This also means that if it had become necessary and hence it was segr rgated as a specific Entry, this itself forces this Bench to also consider that i was earlier part of cattle feed itself.

44. For this reason also the arguments advanced by .he learned Special Standing Counsel for Commercial Tax does not have ery strong ground to stand.

45. For all the aforesaid reasons, the Tax Revision C.se No.105 of 2OlO filed by the State being devoid of merit deserves to be and is accordingly dismissed. Consequently, the other batch of Tax Revisi: I Cases also stand dismissed.

46. As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions pending if anr,, shall stand closed However, there shall be no order as to costs. P.SAM KOSHY, J NARSING RAI] NANDIKONDA, J Date: 13.11.2025 Note: LR copy to be marked. (B/O)GSD