The High Court · 2025

Order

Challenging the order dated 1 1'03'2O24 passed in E.A.No.152 of 2023 in E.P.No.216 of 2023 in O S'No'1485 of 2OO2 by the learned Principal Junior Civil Judge-cum- Metropolitan Magistrate, Ranga Reddy District at L'B' Nagar' the present Civil Revision Petition is frled'

2. The brief facts of the case are that the respondent' a judgment debtor, frled a petition, vide tr A'No' 152 of 2023 ' under Section 47 read, with 151 of the Civil Procedure Code' challenging the maintainability of the execution petition fiied by the decree holder' The firm of the respondent' M/s' Srinivasa Steel Traders and Hardware, was a tenant in a property, and a suit u'as filed by the father of the decree holder for eviction. The matter was settled through a compromise, and a registered lease deed was executed for 15 years. The respondent claimed that the terms of the compromise had been fully discharged' and the contract of tenancy had merged into the lease deed' The respondent also t 2 sKs,., C.R.P.No.1il64 of 2024 r^) arguecl -hat the decree holder had no right to terminate the lease be for,: the lease period and that delivery of por;session could o :rlv be sought if there was a violation of tire lease

3. TlLe p etitioner/ decree holder hled a counter afhdavit before ,he trial Court, disputing the allegations of the respond:nt rrs false and fabricated. The decree holder claimed that thr e::rrcution petition was frled based on a Lol: Adalat award obtai-red by mutual consent. According to thc au.ard, the responrl:nt was required to hand over vacant por;session of the slLop to the decree holder by the end of July, 20!)3.

TlLe trial Court after hearing both sides and cor-.sidering the argr rmerlts and judgments relied upon by both parties ailowed tht: petition vide order dated 1 1 .O3.2O21 , oltserving that thr: e:ecution petition was not maintainable as the parties rad entered into a fresh registered lease dee<1, which superserled lhe earlier award. Since there were no vrolations of the k asr: terms, the decree holder could not seek eviction without issuing a notice under Section 106 of the Trzrnsfer of Propertl Act. Furthermore, the respondent had Illed a suit for specific pe:lbrmarce seeking renewal of the 1ease period, 3 sKs,J C.R-P.No.1364 of 2024 which was pending adjudication. In view of the decisions in Sudhir Kumar vs. Baldev Krishna Tapar and Mudra Gopala Krishna vs. M/s Matgadarsi Chit Fund Limited, the trial Court held that the compromise decree was not executable' Consequently, ttre execution petition was dismissed'

5. Heard Sri Aravind Kumar Agarwal, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner as well as Sri R A' Achuthanand, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent. tearned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the

6. impugned order is a gross miscarriage of justice, reflecting an illegal exercise of jurisdiction and determination of the dispute not in accordance with 1aw and that the order suffers from multiple flaws, including failure to consider the merits of the case, ignoring crucial documents and evidence, and misapplying the law. He further submitted that the executing Court erred in holding that the compromise decree was not executable, and its reasoning was based on incorrect assumptions and inapplicabie legal precedents and that the Court failed to address the contentions of the petitioners' neglected to consider the collective and conjoint reading of the 4 sxs,J C,R.P.No-1it64 of 2024 Lok Adalat Award and the registered lease dec:d, and overlooked the quintessentia-l facts of the case. Therc:fore, he prayed rhe (lourt to set aside the order of the triai ()ourt by allowing thrs, Civil Revision Petition.

7. In support of the submissions of learned counsel for the petition<'r, he relied upon the Judgments of the Hon'ble Suprern,: Court of relevant paragraphs are reads as follows: i. P. f. Thomas v. Thomas Jobr, 1f. In our opinion, the award of the Lok Adalar is hct onally deemed to be a decree of court and the -efore the courts have all the pos,ers in relation the-eto as it has in relation to a decree passed bv itself. This, in our opilion, includes the powers to cxt(:nd time in appropriate cases. In our opinion, th: arvard passed by the l,ok Adalat is the clecision of the court itself though a-rrived at by the simpler mcthod of conciliation instead of the process of argrrments in court. The effect is the same. In this coloection, the High Court has failed to note that by the award what was put to an end vr.as r-he appeal in the District Court and thereby the litjgations between brothers forever. The vierv taken by ,he High Court, in our view, will totally defeat thc object and purposes of the Legal Sen.ices Aut'rorities Act, 1987 and render the decision of the l,r: < Adalat meaningless. ' 1zoos1 o sc: azt 5 SKS,J C-R-P.I{o.1364 of2024 Award of Lok Adalat

20. The l,ok Adalat shall proceed and dispose the cases ald arrive at a compromise or settlement by following legal principles, equity and natural justice. Ultimately, the Lok Adalat passes an award, and every such award shall be deemed to be a decree of the civil court or as the case may be, which is hnal.

23. The High Court of Andhra Pradesh held that, irl Board of Trustees of the Port of Visakhapatnam v' Presiding Oflicer, Permanent, l,ok Adalat-cum- Secy., District Legal Services Authority [(20OO) 5 An L't 5771 tr]Le award is enforceable as a decree and it is final. On all fours, the endeavour is only to see that the disputes are narrowed down and make the firral settlement so that the parties are not again driven to further litigation or any dispute- Though the award of a Lok Adalat is not a result of a contest on merits just as a regular suit by a court in a regular trial is, however, it is as equal and on a par with a decree on compromise and will have the same binding efTect and be conclusive Just as the decree passed on compromise cannot be challenged in a regular appeal, the award of the Lok Adalat' being akin to the same, cannot be challenged by any of the regular remedies available under law' including by invoking Articte 226 of tJ'e Constitution and challenging the correctness of the award, on any ground. Judicial review cannot be invoked in such awards, especially on the grounds as were raised in the revision petition' 6 sxs,J C.R-P.No.1364 of 2024

24. The award of lok Adalat is frnal and permanent rvtri:h is equivalent to a decree executable, and rhe sat.e is an ending to the litigation among parties 11 K. N. Govindan Kutty Menon v. C.D. Shaji2, il6. From the above discussion, the folio\\dng prol)ositions emerge: (1) ln view of the unambiguous language of Section 21 c'f the Act, every award of the Lok Adalat shall be deorned to be a decree of a civil court and as sucti it is r:xecutable by that court. (2) 1'he Act does not make out arly such distinction belv,een the reference made by a civil court ald a crir inal court. (3) l'here is no restriction on the power of the Lok Ada at to pass an award based on the compromise arrived at between the parties in respect of cases rcf()red to by various courts (both civil and crirrinal), tribunals, Family Court, Rent Control Co r -t, Consumer Redressal Forum, Motor Acci:lents Claims Tribunal and other forums of similar nature. (4) F,ven if a matter is referred by a criminal cotrrt un(lor Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and by virtue of the deeming provisions, the r\\ ard passed by the Lok Adalat based on a conrpromise has to be treated as a decree capable of execution by a civil court. 11 Dil:shacl Hussain v. AIIoju Mallikarjun Rao3.: '1zorz1 z scc st 7 SKS'J C.RP.No.1364 of 2024

3. The E-P. was opposed by the petitioners, on the Bround that though the revised terms of tenancy were agreed, in the award passed by the l,ok Adalat, the consequence of the violation thereof, was not provided for. Through its order, dated 23.A.2OO7, the executing Court allowed the E.P., and issued a warrant for eviction of the petitione Rs. The same is challenged in this CRP.

4. Sri Ghanshyamdas Maadhani, learned Counsel for the petitioners, submits that the award passed by the trial Court, does not have any effect, more than extending the tenure of lease, and if the respondent is interested in evicting the petitioners, he has to institute separate proceedings, in accordance with law. He contends that the order passed by the executing Court cannot be sustained.

6. Tire relationship between the parties is not disputed. It is also a matter of record that the suit frled by the respondent, for eviction of the petitioners, ended in a compromise, through the medium of l,ok Adalat. The 1ease, which was il force upto l.l.2OO4, was extended till 31.12'2006' with enhanced rents. With the expiry of that period, t].e petitioners are under obligation to vacate the premises. Failure thereof, would naturally give rise to a right to the respondent, to seek execution of the award.

7. I,earrred Counsel for the petitioners places reliance upon the judgment of a Division Bench of the Orissa High Court in Khalli Rath v' Eppili Ramachandra, AIR 1953 Oi. 74. It is doubtful whether such judgment still holds the fie1d' All the 3 2oo8 scc onLine AP 93 8 SKS,J C.R-P. No.1354 of 2024 sarre, this Court is not at all inclined to adopt the vieq that a consent decree, in which the period of Iease is extended, cannot be executed, ard the pa -(ies have to institute sepa-rate proceedings. Such a clurse would render the adjudication, to an emtrty formality. Still worse is the case, where the parties themselves agreed upon certain terms, and on,r of them feels free to retract from it. Such a vieq, r,. ould, if at all, arm indiscriminate parties, to defcat th( orders or awards, which are passed with their con{lent. The trial Court has examined the matter frorr correct perspective, and this Court is not inclincd to interfere with the same. iv. Karumuri Sambasiva Rao v. Vysyaraju Suryanar:ayana Raju4,

2. 'I'he petitioner in RCC No. 2 of 2005 is the petilioner in this civil revision petition. The respondent is the owner of the propertlr, which is in occr pation of the petitioner. Litigation ensued bet$een the parties, which has led to passing of a cor,-r rromise award by the lok Adalat, Srikal<ulam vid,r alvard dated 24.\O.2OO7 in RCC No. 2 of 2005 an(l Lok Adalat Case No. 482 of 2007. Under the au,iu d, both the parties inter alia agreed for contrnuance of lease in favour of the petitioner till Fet,ruary, 2010 arld the petitioner agreed to vacate the premises without prior notice and further litiE:etion and that he shali handoyer the vacant poss:ssion on expiry of the lease period. As the petrtioner failed to handover the possession to the respondent, the latter has frled E.P. on 17.3.2010. 2011SCC Or Line t,p 51 ,) 9 sxs,J C.RP.No.1364 of 2024 As noted above, the Court below has issued warrant under Order XXI Rule 35 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short, 'CPCJ.

4. It is not in dispute that the petitioner has undertaken to deliver vacant possession of the property immedlately on expiry of the agreed lease period, which subsisted till the end of February 20lO. lnstead of delivering the vacant possession, the petitioner embarked upon further titigation by setting up oral lease ald hling a civil suit, which is pending in the Court of the learned Principal Senior Ci\ril Judge, Srikakulam. In this context, it is useful to extract Order XxI Rule 22 CPC. "22. Notice to show-cause certain cases:-( 1) Where execution is made- against execution in an application for (a) more than [two years] after the date of the decree, or (b) against the legal representative of a party to the decree [or where an application is made for execution of a decree filed under the provisions of Section 44-Al, [or] (c) against tlle assignee or receiver in insolvency, where the party to the decree has been adjudged to be an insolvent, the Court executing the decree shall issue a notice to the person against whom execution is applied for requiring him to show- cause, on a date to be fixed, why the decree should not be executed against him. Provided that no such notice shall be necessary in consequence of more tl.an [two years] having 10 SKS,J C.R.P-No.13,54 of 2024 elal)sed between the date of the decree and the application for execution if the application is made $'itllin [two years] from the date of the last order against the party against whom execution is appliecl for', made or.r any previous application for execution' or rn consequence of the application being made against the legal representative o{ the judgment- cleLtor, if upon a previous application for execution against the same person the Court has ordered execution to issue against him. (2 Nothing in the foregoing sub-rule shall be decmed to preclude the Court from issuing nny process in execution of a decree without issuing the notice thereby prescribed, if, for reasons to be recrrded, it considers that the issue of such notice $r)rrld cause unreasonable delay or would defeat t1-. e ends ofjustice. "

5. 'Vhile this Court refrains from giving a frnding on the tenability or otherwise of the plea of the petitioner raised in the suit hled by the petitioner as noled above, it is of the opinion that the facts make it an eminently fit case for invocation of the pr-cvisions of Order XXI Rule 22(2) of CPC, because tt,€ petitioner made the respondent to await expirl 01 he extended lease period under the compromise a'r,arrl and hled a suit by setting up the plea of oral lease obviously with a view to thwart the rt spondent's effort to recover possession of the t)r-()perty. Issualce of notice under Clause (1) of Rule 22 would dehnitely cause unreasonable dela1' an,i defeat the ends ofjustice. Therefore, the order unCer revision is not liable for interference and the cir.il revision petition is accordingly dismissed. 11 sKs,J C.R-P.No.1364 of2024 V Alla Venkata Krishna Reddy v' Goverament of Andhra Pradeshs,

33. In view of the above, therefore, we are unable to accept the contention that merely by an agreement of sale, any substantive right is created in favour of the tenant.

36. As contended by the learned Senior Counsel the tenant himself is not claiming his status as a tenant but claiming higher status as that of an agreement holder. As per the award of tok Adalat, the tenant has suffered eviction decree and pending execution of the said decree, he is continuing in possession beyond the permitted period- He is, therefore, a judgment debtor in al execution proceeding of an eviction decree and his status calnot be equated to that of a tenant holding over or a licensee. So far as the proclairned status as an agreement holder is concerned, the same is sub- judice and yet to be adjudicated by the civil Court- Under Rule 6(vi) of the Rules, therefore, it cannot be said that the tenant has any valid authorization to occupy the premises and use it for the purpose of running a bar and restaurant. It goes without saying that if the tenant succeeds in the suit for specific performance and if, ultimately, a sale deed is executed in his favour, he may become the owner of the property but till such time, we cannot proceed on the footing that he has a higher status as that of an agreement holder when the agreement itself is in serious dispute and in law, does not create any legal title. s 2013 SCC Online AP 465 L2 sKs,J C.RP.No.1364 of2024 V. Ramaswami Aiyengar v. Kailasa Thevar6,

9. lt seems to us that the High Court's approach to th: case has not been a proper one and the cr-rclusion it has reached cannot be supported in larv. The learned Judges appear to have overlooked 'lr, lact thal lhey were sitting only as an exer uring c,l -rrt and their duty was to give effect to the terms oi the decree that was already passed and beyoncl u t.ich they could not go- It is true that they were to interpret the decree, but under the guise of interpretation they could not make a new decree for tho parties. v11 Rajasthan Financial Corpn. v. Man Industria.I Corpn. Ltd.7, lrl We have considered the rival submissions. Tlrre can be no dispute to the proposition that the exccuting court cannot go beyond the decree. 'I'here czrn be no dispute that the executing court must tele the decree according to its tenor. Also as has becn set out in Greater Cochin Development A rlhority case [(2002) 2 SCC 573] when a decree is irl terms of an award/document then the terms oI t document have to be looked at. In this case the tL€ dec ree is in terms of the compromise deed. The dccree does not provide that the compromise deed or an1, of its terms have been varied. To be renrembered, that the decree is passed under Order 2i) Rule 3 of the Civil Procedure Code. Under this provision normally the court passes the decree in u 195t scc :99 '120031 z sr:c s:.: 13 SKS,J C.RP.ro.1364 of 2024 terms of the compromise. of course , the court can make a change. Howeve.r, if the court was making a change it would have had to record why it was making the change and what change it was making. It could not then provide that the decree was in terms of the compromise. If the court was not passing the decree in terms of the compromise then this opening portion of the decree could not have been there. The subsequent portion - is mere classihcatory in nature as to which of the options was to be exercised. This does not govern or detract from the main terms of the decree which is a decree in terms of the compromise. Clauses 2 and 7 of the compromise deed make it very clear that tlte appellants were entitled to charge interest on half- yearly basis, We see no substance in the submission that the "half-yearly rests" were to apply only if the rate of interest was to be decided by the appellants. These words clearly applied to both the options. In the classificatory portion the words "on half-yearly basis" have not been mentioned because the portidn is only clarifuing how i.nterest was to be ca-lculated. This portion thus does not detract from the fact that the decree is in terms of the compromise deed. Merely because some other minor changes, which appear to be inadvertent changes, have crept in do not aLso detract from the fact that the decree is in terms of the compromise deed. We aiso do not frnd any uncertainty in the decree. \ i I I I I ' i I I I I I 74 SKS,J C.RP,No.1ir64 of 2024 v111 B.rakewel Automotive Components (India) (P) Ltd. v. P.R. Selvam Alagappan8, 2 2 Judicial precedents to the effect thal the p',r rviet, of scrutiny under Section 47 of the Code qrrr a decree is limited to objections to its exoclrtability on the ground of jurisdictional irfirmity or voidness are plethoric. This Court, arr ongst others in Vasudev Dhanjibhai Modr v Raiabhai Abdul Rehman fVasudev Dhanjibhai Modi r.. ?ajabhai Abdul Rehman, (1970) 1 SCC 670 :AIR 1970 SC 1475 : (1971) 1 SCR 661 in essence erl rnciated that onJy a decree which is a nullity can b,: the subject-matter of objection under SectiorL 47 ol the Code and not one which is erroneous either ir law or on facts. The following extract from this "('. A court executing a decree cannot go behind the d,)cree : between the parties or their representatives it rnust take the decree according to its tenor. and crurnoL entertain ary objection that the decree was ircorrect in law or on facts. Until it is set aside b)- aD appropriate proceeding in appeal or revision, a dr:r:ree even if it be erroneous is still binding b,)1ween the parties. 7 When a decree which is a nullity, for irrstance . rvhere it is passed without bringing the legal relrresentative on the record of a person r,l'ho was do{Ld at the date of the decree, or against a ruling p,-ince without a certificate, is sought ro be e>:r'cllted an objection in that behalf may be raised ' 1zotz1 s s:c:z L 15 srts,"J C.R-P.I{o.1364 of 2024 in a proceeding for execution. Again, when t}re decree is made by a court which has no inherent jurisdiction to make it, objection as to its validity may be raised in ar execution proceeding if the objection appears on the face of the record : wtrere the objection as to the jurisdiction of the court to pass the decree does not appear on the face of the record ald requires examination of the questions raised and decided at the trial or which could have been but have not been raised, the executing court will have no jurisdiction to entertain an objection as to the validity of the decree even on the ground of absence of jurisdiction." tx- Rahul S. Shah v. Jinendra Kumar Gandhie,:

24. In respect of execution of a decree, Section 47 CPC contemplates adjudication of limited nature of issues relating to execution i.e. discharge or satisfaction of the decree and is aligned witl. the consequential provisions of Order 21 CPC' Section 47 is intended to prevent multiplicity of suits lt simply lays down the procedure and the form whereby the court reaches a decision For the applicability of the section, two essential requisites have to be kept in mind. Firstly, the question must be the one arising between the parties and secondly, the dispute relates to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree. Thus, the objective of Section 47 is to prevent unwanted litigation and dispose of all objections as exped itiouslY as Possible. ' (zozr) o scc ata I i t' l 1,. i' I I I 16 SKS,J C.R.P.No.13('4 of 2024

25.'lhese provisions contemplate that for execution of r1,:crees, executing court must not go beyond the decree. IIowever, there is steady rise of proceedings akir to a retrial at the time of execution causing failu re of realisation of fruits of decree and reLieI q'hir:h the party seeks from the courts despite there being a decree in their favour. Experience has sho\r.n that various objections are filed before the executing court ald the decree-holder is deprived of the [ruits of the litigation and the judgment debtor, in €buse of process of law, is allowed to bencfit froirr the subject matter which he is otherwise not enli -led to.

42.t. TLLe court exercising jurisdiction un<ler Se<1ion 47 or under Order 21 CPC, must not issue nolire on an application of third party claimrng riglts in a mecharical marner. Further, the court shorrld refrain from entertaining any such app;ication(s) that has already been considered b1' th( court while adjudicating the suit or rvhich rais,rs any such issue which otherwise could have becrr raised and determined during adjudication of suit if due diligence was exercised by the applicant. x Be,edam Reddappa Reddy v. Yellaboyina Vanil(,:

6. In this case, there is no dispute that \vith conr;ent of the petitioner and respondents, the matLer was relerred to lok Adatat, which passed an award and it is binding on the parties. If any doclrment is required for registration, as per the award. it shall be done according to law arrd thc're 10 2011sCC (,nLine AP 503 o 17 sKsl,J C.R P.xo.1364 of 2024 is no requirement of the Court sending the award of the tok Adalat for registration. Rajasthan State Industrial Development & XI Investment Corpn. v. Diamond & Gem Development Corpn. Ltd.11,: IV. Interpretation of the terms of contract

23. A party cannot claim anything more than what is covered by the terms of contract, for the reason that contract is a transaction between the two parties and has been entered into with open eyes and understanding the nature of contract. Thus, contract being a creature of an agreement between two or more parties, has to be interpreted giving literal meanings unless, there is some ambiguity interpreted giving the therein. The contract is to b€ actual meaaing to the words contained in the contract and it is not permissible for the court to make a new contract, however reasonable, if the parties have not made it themselves. It is to be interpreted in such a way that its terms may not be varied. The contract has to be interpreted without any outside aid. The terms of the contract have to be construed strictly without altering the nature of the contract, as it may affect the interest of either of the parties adversely. [Vide United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Harchand Rai Charrdan t'al [(2004) 8 SCC 644 : AIR 20O4 SC 47941and Polymat India (P) Ltd. v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. [(2005) 9 SCC 174 : AIR 2005 SC 2861 l. " 1zot:1 s scc +zo 18 sKs,J C.R.P.No.11164 of 2024

8. O r the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent submitt:d that after the decree was executed, a frer;h lease deed u as executed, which outlined specilic te rrns and conditio ns. He further submitted that the petitioner and respondont had also entered into a new lease agreemt:nt, and a suit lor srpe cihc performance of the sale lease dr:ed was already penrling. lrarned counsel argued that in light of the fresh le ese deed, the parties are bound by its terms and conditio rs, irnd therefore, the petitioner should file a sult for eviction rather than an execution petition. Thereibre, he requeste d t:re Court to dismiss the civil revision petitio n. 9 . Jn stqrport of the submissions made by thr: learned counsel for [he respondent, he relied upon the judgnrents of the Hon ble Supreme Court of relevant paragrapl'rs ar.e reads as under': M.P. Shreevastava v. Veenal2,;

5. Ilut it was said that the respondent could not mtrintain an application for recording adjustmenL of th,t decree under Order 21 Rule 2 CPC nor could sh: maintained an application for recording sa:isfaction of the decree for restitution of conjugal rigbts so long as the husbald did not applv to 12 1966 SCC Onlin( SC 27 19 sr(s,J c.R-P.Ito.1364 of 2024 execute ttre decree, or did not clairn a decree for divorce under Section 27 of the Special Marriages Act. Order 21 Rule 2 prescribes the procedure for recording payment of money under any decree or for adjustment of any decree to the satisfaction of the decree-holder. If any money payable under a decree of any kind is paid out of Court, or the decree is otlterwise adjusted in whole or in part to the satisfaction of the decree holder, the decree- holder is enjoined by Rule 2(1) of Order 21 to certi8/ such payment or adjustment to the court : the judgment-debtor may also inform the court of such payment or ad.justment, and it may be recorded after enquiry : Rule 2(2) of Order 21 In the present case, however, there is no adjustment Adjustment contemplates mutual agreement, and in the present case, there is no evidence of any consent on the part of the appellant who was never willing to take back the wife and resume conjugal relations Order 21 Rule 2 contemplates adjustment of the decree by consent - express or implied - of the parties : where there is no such consent, Order 21 Ruie 2 does not apply.

6. But Order 21 Rule 2 prescribes a special procedure for recording adjustment of a decree' or for recording payment of money paid out of court under any decree. However the plenary power conferred by Section 47 CPC upon the court executing the decree to determine all questions arising between the parties to the suit in which the decree was passed, and relating to execution' discharge or satisfaction of the decree' is not thereby affected. Whereas Otdet 2l Rule 2 deals with the procedure to be followed in a limited class ) 20 sKs,J C.RP.No.11164 of 2024 of cases relating to discharge or satisfaction of dt crees, where there has been payment of mone-v or adjustment or satisfaction of the decree b1 ccr sensual arrangement, Section 47 CPC deals u,ite the power of the court executing the decree.

7. ,lounsel for the appellant does not denl,' to the court executing the decree power to decide a1l qL€stions relating to execution, discharge or salsfaction of the decree arising between the parties to the suit in which the decree was passed, bLt contends t-hat since the power to recorcl dis<:harge or satisfaction of a decree is exercisable onl,, by the court executing the decree, no substantive pelition Iies at the instance of the per;on against whom a decree is passed to record adiustment or satisfaction so long as the decree hokler has not applied for execution. Counsel says thr11 the expression "Court executing the decree,, m(€ns the "Court which is executing the decree at the instance of the decree-holder" and in supporr of his contention relies upon the different expressions usc(1 in Order 21 Rules 1 and 2 CpC. He points out th.it under Order 21 Rule 1(1)(a) money payable unCer a decree may be paid into the court whose du:,\' it is to execute the decree. Similarly an apyrlication under clause (1) or clause (2) of Rulc 2 Orrl,;r 21 for recording payment of money ut-rder or adju stment of a decree has to be made to the court uhcse duty it is to execute the decree, u,hereas prct ibition against recognition of aI uncertified paJrrent or adjustment is imposed upon the catrrt executing the decree by sub-rule (3). There is no dorrlrt that the expression "Court whose duty it is to exec[te the decree, means a court which is under 21, SKS,J C.RP.No.1364 of 2o2zt the law competent to, and when requested bound to, execute the decree which is in law enforceable, and where an application is made under Order 2 1 Rule 1(1)(a) or under Order 21 Rule 2(1) or (2) there need be substantive application for execution pending. It also appears, from the terms of clause (3) of Order 2 1 Rule 2, that the prohibition is against the court executing the decree. But there is no warant for the argument that the expression "Court executing the decree" as used in Section 47 CPC meals a "Court which is se2ed of an application for execution of a riecree at the instance of the decree-holder". Section 47 enacts the salutary rule that all questions relating to execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree shall be determined not by a separate suit, but in execution of the decree. The power so conferred may not be limited by any strained or artiflcial construction of the words "Court executing the decree". The expression "Court executing the decree" has not been delined, and having regard to the scheme of the Code it cannot have a limited meaning, as argued by counsel for the appellant' The princi.ple of the section is that all questions relating to execution, discharge or satisfaction of a decree and arising between the parties to the suit in which the decree is passed, shall be deterinined in the execution proceeding, and not by a separate suit : it follows as a corollarlr that a question relating to execution, discharge or satisfaction of a decree may be raised by the decree-hotder or by the judgment-debtor in the execution depa-rtment and that pendency of an application for execution by the decree-hold.er is not a condition of its exercise An application made by the judgment-debtor which \ 22 SKS,J C.R.P.I{o,1i|64 of 2024 rairjes a question relating to execution, discharge or sat sfaction of a decree in a suit to which he, or the person of u,hom he is a representative, \,as a partl is rn application before the court executing the decree, and must be tried in that court. Srtdhit Kumar v. Baldev Krishna Thaparl3,

5. 'lhe question whether under the terms of the conrpromise the parties entered into a fresh lease or the decree-holders merely granted an extension oI tir--.r,: for delivery of possession of the premises rlenrised essentially depends on the intention of the par,ies who entered into the compromise as could be lathered from the compromise petition as well ;rs,.he compromise decree. It is necessary to note thar in the compromise petition, it is specificallv stated that the parties had agreed "that the de endants shall remain as lessees of Uttam Ta[]:ies, Residency Road, Jammu, on terms and corr,litions on which they previously held the said prr:rnises machinery furniture fittings, etc. up to 3l - .2-1962 and pay to the plaintiff rent at Rs 3O0O per-month from 1st January, 1959 il the follorving prol)ortion...." It is further stated therein that .the rest of the terms and conditions will be as conlained in the agreement a deed, dated 17th Assrrj 2011 registered on 18th Assuj, 2011"_ Rut the last clause in the compromise pelition reads: "it is therefore prayed that a decree may kindly be passred directing ejectment on 1st Januar5r, 1963 on terllLs and conditions contained herein". The cor-rpromise decree refers to the defendants as 'les,sees" and the compensation payable by them as " 1t9os1 : scc ott 23 SKS,.I C.R-P.No.1364 of 2024 "rent". At the same time clause (2) of the decree says that the defendants shall be liable to ejectment and shall vacate the premises on lst January, 1963 on the terms and conditions as stated above' The compromise and the compromise decree speak, so to say, in two voices: If we had been merely left with the specifrc terms incorporated in the compromise petition and the compromise decree without bringing in by reference the terms of the original lease as to matters not specifically covered in the compromise petition and the compromise decree' there would have been some difhculty in spelling out the real intention of the parties But by incorporating the terms of the old Iease, to the extent not covered by the new terms, the parties had agreed to incorporate into the new agreement the term relating to renewal found in the original lease. On an analysis of the terms of the compromise, it is seen that fJle lessors had granted a fresh lease of the cinema talkies demised; a monthly rental was frxed in respect of the same and the lessees were given an option to renew the lease at the end of the term fixed though that right is subject to certain conditions' Under these circumstances, the direction in the decree to vacate the suit premises at the end of the term fixed in the compromise in accordance with the terms of the compromise would amount to an ineffdctive direction. Such a direction cannot be considered as an ejectment decree. It is at best a declaration of the right of the lessors to eject the lessees at the end of the lease period if the lessees fail to get a renewal. t, t t' 24 sRs,J C.R-P.No.I 36+ of 2024 .) 111 Bibekananda Bhowal v. Satindra Mohan Debl', 12 Are the Debs entitled to evict the Bhorvals fronL lerd admeasuring 1 katha and 7 chataks as also tlLe building standing tlereon, in execution of the crunpromise decree of 10-5-1965? It is necessary to fir'srt cxamine the terms of the consent decree oI 10 5 I965. Clause A of the consent terms has been set ou1 earlier. It requires the Bhowals to give up possession of an area of7' x 7' in the south-western ccrner of the room in the suit property. The clause fu rLher provides: ''Lr the event of non-compliance with the terms cortained above for his default the defenclanl aJ,trrellant (Bhowal) will be liable to ejectmenl in execution of the decree passed in the suit in terms of the compromise.' Cl:,uly, therefore, if the Bhowals do not give up possession of this area of Z, " 2,, they can be t:jected from this portion in execution of the conrpromise decree.

13. The next part of the compromise decree deals l,i.lr possession by the Bhowals of the rest of the huilding located on 1 katha 7 chataks of land. Urcer clause C of the consent terms the Bhow.als arr: permitted to remain in possession of the rest of tht: building as monthly tenants of the Debs for a period of ten years from 1-5-1965 till 3O-4 1975 on pa./rnent of a rent of Rs 225 per month. Clause D prohibits the Bhowals from sub-letting or transferring any portion of the said premises. It 'o 1tsso1 s st c zsz ) l I I i I i 25 sxs,J C.R-P.No.1364 of 2024 further provides that on the expiry of the period of ten years the Bhowats will vacate and deliver possession of the said premises to the Debs. Clause I provides: "In the event of any breach of any condition mentioned above the defendant-appellant (Bhowals) will be liable to ejectment by appropriate action in a court of law." There is a striking difference in the language used in clause A relating to ejectment and in clause I relating to ejectment. Clause A clearly contemplates ejectment of the Bhowals in execution of the compromise decree if they do not hand over possession of an area of 7' x 7'- However, in respect of their tenancy relating to the rest of the building, if they commit any breach of any of the conditions stipulated in ttre compromise decree (which would presumably include the condition relating to handing over possession on the expiry of ten years) the Bhowals are 1iable to ejectment by appropriate action in a court of 1aw. This is in contradistinction to the ejectment in execution of the compromise decree contemplated under clause A' In this context, ejectment by apPropriate action in a court of law can only mean ejectment by taking action by fiIing a suit or taking any other proceeding in a courl of law. Clearly, the parties did not contemplate ejectment by execution of the compromise decree in relation to a breach of clause C. This difference in the phraseolory of clauses A and I is understandable because a tenant who rilay otherwise be liable to ejectment, may be protected by provisions of the Rent Act or by any other provision of law. This issue can only be adjudicated 26 SKS,J C.R-P.No.1 364 of 2024 pr'( perly in an appropriate proceeding and not in tL e execution of a decree. Had the intention been to alk[r. the Bhowals only permissive possession for a pcriod of ten years, and ejectment thereafter in e>ecution of the compromise decree, the decree rv,r.rld have so provided. It does not do so. Tlxrrefore, assuming that the tenancy of the Blrou,als has come to an end, the Debs cannot eject the Bhowals from the building in their possession witlout taking appropriate legal action by hling a sui- for ejectment or in any other manner as ma], be permissible in law; but not by applying for exe:ution of the compromise decree. lv. Krishna Kashinath Patil v. S. Mohandas Kama.thls,

17. The learned Counsel for the respondent further contended that the old house, which u.as the subject mater of the old lease deed and ttrat of old Sui- No. 2 of l97O no longer existed in vier.r, of its derrolition, with the result, old lease came to an enC. The new house was to be constructed by the resl)ondent under the compromise decree. The said ne,r irouse was the subject matter of the fresh lease. Based on these facts, he contended that the cornpromise decree worked itself out arrd as such it stccd extinguished. In his submission, compromise dei:ree stood superseded with the execution of fresh lease deed. The compromise decree thus no longer exists. The executing Court found that it could not be executed against the respondent. 18 The learned counsel for the respondent, based on the aforesaid submissions, further went on to 1s 2OO1 SCC (rnLine Bom 930 )7 sKs,J C.R-P. o.1364 of2024 submit that at the highest, even if it .is assumed that the period of lease agreed between the Parties expired on 31-12' 1984, as per the clause incorporated in the compromise decree, even then the same would have to be enforced by a suit for possession hled under ttre Bombay Rent Act. He submits that it will have to be enJorced in ttre same manner as any other contract is enforced' as the compromise decree being an agreement with seal of the Court.

20. The learned counsel for the respondent further contended that when fresh contract of lease was created, the Bombay Rent Act was in operation in that area, consequently, the relationship between the parties would be governed by the provisions of the said Act. The petitioner/ landlord thus cannot obtain possession of tenanted premises from the respondent unless tJ.e Court is satislied that a statutory ground for eviction of the respondent as a tenant exists. The respondent-tenarrt who is protected by the provisions of the Bombay Rent Act, cannot be evicted in execution of the decree in question, which in this submission, is non-est for the reasons alreadY canvassed.

19. The leamed counsel for the respondent faintly tried to contend that clause relating to handing over possession after expiry of 15 years, cannot be said to be in accordance with law as it would amount to cQntracting out of the statutory rights conferred on a tenant by the Bombay Rent Act He, therefore, contended that this part of the deiree could not be allowed to be executed in view of the judgrnent of the Apex Court in Gurupadappa v' Bibekanand, AIR 1996 SC 198. t6 SKS,J C.R.P.No.1il64 of 2024 Patdhiyar Prahladji Chenaji v. Maniben Jagmalbhair6, 2€. Norn,, so far as the submission on behalf of the p1,r ntiff that even if the plaintiff failed to get the decLaratory relief and relief for cancellation of regr stered sale deed and her suit for the said reliefs canre to be dismissed and the plaintiff is found to be in possession artd therefore, the only remedl, available to Defendant I would be to file a substantive suit to get back the possession is not:ced only to be rejected outright- It is the colLention on behalf of the plaintiff that once the plaintiff is found to be in possession, her posression cannot be disturbed except by due prot:ess of law and Defendant 1 though may be the trLr( owner has to file a substantive suit for re( c very of possession. 27 While considering the aforesaid submission, the der:ision of this Court in Maria Margarida Sequeira Ferrandes v. Erasmo Jack de Sequeira lMaria Margarida Sequeira Fernandes v. Erasmo Jack de Scrlr reira, (2ol2l 5 SCC 370 : (2Ot2) 3 SCC (Civ) 12tl is required to be referred to. What is meant by du,: process of law has been explained by this Corrt in para 79, which reads as under : (SCC p. 392i "79. Due process of law means that nobody oug,ht to r: condemned unheard. The due process of lanr, melas a person in settled possession will not be discrssessed except by due process of law. Due pro.ess means an opporlunity to the defendant to file pleadings including wdtten statement and " 1zozz1 rz scc tzrt n 29 SKSJ C.R-P.Io.1364 of 2024 documents before ttre court of law. lt does not mean the whole trial. Due process of law is satished the moment righls of the parties are adjudicated upon by a comp€tent court."

28. In the said decision in Maria Margarida [Maria Margarida Sequeira Fernandes v. Erasmo Jack de Sequeira, (21l2l 5 SCC 370 : (20721 3 SCC (Ci{ '1261 this Court has approved the following findings of the High Court of Delhi in Thomas Cook (India) Ltd. v. Hotel Imperial [Thomas Cook (India) Ltd. v. Hotel Imperial, 2006 SCC OnLine Del 36 : (2006) 88 DRJ 5451 : (Hotel Imperial case phomas Cook (Indial Ltd. v. Hotel Imperial, 2006 SCC Online De1 36 : (20061 88 DRJ 5451 , SCC Online Del para 28) "28. The expressions 'due process of law", "due course of law" ald "recourse to law" have been interchangeably used in the decisions referred to above which say that the settled possession of even a person in unlawful possession cannot be disturbed "forcibly' by the true owner taking law in his own hands. A1l these expressions, however, mean the same thing- -ejectment from settled possession can only be had by recourse to a court of law. Clearly, "due process of law" or "due course of 1aw", here, simply mean that a Person in settled possession cannot be ejected without a court of law having adjudicated upon his rights qua the true Now, this 'due process" or "due course' condition is satisfred the moment the rights of the parties are a judicated upon by a court of competent jurisdiction. It does not matter who brought the 30 SI(S,J C.RP.No.1 364 of 2024 action to court. It could be the owner in an action for enforcement of his right to eject the person in un awful possession. It could be the person who is s(rrght to be ejected, in an action preventing the or\rr1er from ejecting him. Whether the action is for erLfcrcement of a right (recovery of possession) or protection of a (injunction against disrossession), is not of much consequence_ What is imporLant is that in either event it is an action befrrre the court and the court adjudicates upon it. If that is done then, the "bare minimum,, req rirement of "due process" or.due course" of lar,r \\'(,rrld stand satished as recourse to law would have bee:r taken. In this context, when a party approaches a court seeking a protective remcd-\r suc[ as an injunction and it fails in setting up a go,rrl case , can it then say that the other partv must nol( institute an action in a court of larv for enf(,rcing his rights i.e- for taking back something fronr the first part5r who holds it unlau.fully, and, till su':h time, the court hearing the injunction action mrrsrt grant an injunction any-way? I woutcl think no-. In a:oy event, the "recourse to law" stipulation stards satished when a judiciat determination is made with regard to the first party's protective action. Thus, in the present case, the plaintiffs failure to make out a case for an injunction does nol mean that its consequent cessation of user of the r;aid two rooms would have been brought about $ithcut recourse to law." S. ;Saktivel v. M. Venugopal pilhirz, " 1zooo1 z sc: ro+ 31 sr(s,J C.R-P,No.1364 of 2024

5. l,earned counsel appearing for the appellant urged that the view taken by the High Court in decreeing the suit of the plaintiff was erroneous inasmuch as the settlees under Ext. A-1 got the suit property and by the subsequent oral arrangement, they agreed to work out their rights without varying or substituting the terms of Ext. A- 1 and, therefore, the High Court was not -right in not considering the oral arrangement as pleaded by the defendant-appellant. It is not disputed that disposition under Ext. A 1 in the present case is by way of grant and under the said disposition all the sons of Muthuswamy Piltai acquired rights- It is also not disputed that the setflement deed is a registered document and by virtue of alleged subsequent oral arrangement, the other sons of Muthuswamy Pillai were divested of the rights which they acquired under the settlement deed' Under such circumstances the question that arises for consideration is as to whether any Parol evidence can be 1et in to substantiate subsequent oral arrangement rescinding ot' modit/ing the terms of the document which, under law, is required to be in writing or is a registered document, namely, Ext. A-1. Section 92 of the Evidence Act reads as thus: "92. Exclusion of evidence of oral agreement - When the terms of any such contract, grant or other disposition of property, or arly matter required by law to be reduced to the form of a document, have been proved according to the last section, no evidence of any oral agreement or statement shall be admitted, as between t1'e parties to any such instrument or their representatives in 32 sI(S,..I C.R-P.No.1 364 of 2024 irt3rest, for the purpose of contradictirrg, varying. a<kling to, or subtracting from, its terms: Pr cviso (4f.-The existence of any distinct srrbsequent oral agreement to rescind or modili' an1. srL( h contract, grant or disposition of property, ma1, br' proved, except in cases in which such contract, grant or disposition of propert5r is by law required to bt in writing, or has been registered according to the law in force for the time being as to the reg stration of documents." A perusal of the aforesaid provision shorvs that n-lurt Section 92 provides is that when the terms of ar\ contract, grant or other disposition of propert],, or irnl/ matter required by law to be reduced in the folrr of a document, have been proved, no evidence of en1, oral agreement or statement is permissible fo: the purpose of contradicting, varying, adding or subtracting from the said written document. Ilcv,ever this provision is subject to provisos (1) to (6) but we are not concerned with other provisos exr:t:pt proviso (4), which is relevant in the present case. The question then is whether the defendant- apc.:llant carl derive any benefit out of proviso (4) to Se,--lion 92 for setting up oral arrangement arrir.ed at n the yeat 1941 which has ttre effeit of mccifying the written and registered disposition. Prt,r iso (4) to Section 92 contemplates three sitr.liltions, whereby: (i) The existence of aly distinct subsequent oral agre3ment to rescind or modify any earlier contract. grant or disposition of property can be proved. 33 SKlt"J C.RP.[o.1354 of 2024 (ii) However, this is not permissible where the contract, grant or disposition of proPerty is by law required to be irl writing. (iii) No parol evidence can be 1et in to substantiate any subsequent oral arrangement which has the effect of rescinding a contract or disposition of property which is registered according to t1.e law in force for the time being as to the registration of documents

6. In sum and substance what proviso (4) to Section 92 provides is that where a contract or disposition, not required by law to be in writing, has been arived at orally then subsequent oral agreement modifying or rescinding the said contract or disposition carr be substantiated by parol evidence and such evidence is admissible. Thus if a party has entered into a contract which is not required to b€ reduced in writing but such a contract has been reduced in writing, or it is oral, in such situations it is always open to the parties to the contract to modift its terms and even subltitute by a new oral contract and it can be substantiated by parol evidence. In such kind of cases the oraL evidence can be let in to prove that the earlier contract or agreement has been modified or substituted by a new oral agreement. Where under law a contract or disposition is required to be in writing and the same has been reduced to writing, its terms cannot be modihed or altered or substituted by oral contract or disposition. No parol evidence will be admissible to substantiate suctt aI oral contract or disposition. A document for its validity or effectiveness is required by law to be in writing and' therefore, no modifrcation or alteration or a 3t sKs,J C.R.P.No. 1:64 of 2024 su t stitution of such wdtten document is peraissible by parol evidence ald it is on15. bv a.other wdtten document the terms of earlier $'l il ten document can be altered, rescindecl or substituted. There is another reason why the delt ndant-appellant cannot be permitted to tet in parol evidence to substantiate the subsequent oral an-E ngement, The reason being that the setdement de,:rl is a registered document. The second part of proviso (4) to Section 92 does not permit leading of pa"ol ewidence for proving a subsequent oral agr€ement modi8ring or rescinding the register-ed inst-urnent. The terms of registered document can be altered, rescinded or varied only by subseqrrent regi!;tered document and not otherwise. If the oral arrangement as pleaded by the appellant, is altowed to te substantiated by parol evidence, it rvould mea: rewriting of Ext. Ar1 and, therefore, no parol evirl:nce is permissible.,

10. In thr: light of the submissions made bv both the learned couniel, a perusal of the material available on record and the law .aid down by the Honble Supreme Court in the aforesaid juciSlments, this Court observes that the execr ttion of decrees 1nc Lok Adalat awards is governed by s;pecific principler , u hich are essential for ensuring that the rit;hts of parties itre p.()tected and that the rule of law is upheld.

11. InitLall.r l,ok Adalat awards are deemed decrees oi-a civii court, making them executable and final, with the samr, effect ,.,.- T: - -.?:r!ta3Ftr'.. o 35 sKs,.r C.RP.Igo.l364 of 2024 as a decree passed by a Court. This rneans that the award is binding on the parties and can be enforced like any other decree. The scrutiny of a decree by the executing Court is limited to objections based on jurisdictional inhrmity or voidness, and not on errors of law or fact, unless the decree is a nullity. This is in line with the principles of finality and certainty, which are essential for the effective administration of justice. Once a decree is passed, it is considered frnal ald binding, and the parties must abide by its terms.

12. Further, the contracts, including those that form the basis of a decree or award, must be interpreted literally, giving actual meaning to its words, unless there is ambiguity. This means that the terms of the contract must be understood in their plain ald ordinary sense, without adding or subtracting alything. The intentions of the parties, as expressed in the contract, must be respected and enforced.

13. Fuithermore, the terms of a contract cannot be altered or modified by oral agreements or parol evidence, especially when the contract is a registered document. Section 92 of the Evidence Act prohibits the admission of oral evidence to contradict, vary, or add to the terms of a registered document. \ 36 SKS,J C.R.P.No.1364 of 2024 This is 1o In'event parties from attempting to altr:r or modify the ternrs cf a contract through orai agreements or parol evidence, which could lead to uncertainty and disputes. 1,4. A person in settled possession cannot be dispossessed except t,y ir court of law, following due process. This is a fundame ntrJ principle of law, which is essential for prttecting the righ ts of parties and ensuring that the rule oj law is upheld. TLLr: executing court must ensure that the d ecree is executec irL accordance with the terms of the conllact or agreeme rt, and that the rights of the parties are respected and enforced .

15. In additional to that Section 47 of the CPC errrpowers the exe< utirg Court to determine all questions related to executio r, clischarge, or satisfaction of the decree. This means that th: :xecuting court has the power to consider applica ti rn s from either the decree-holder or the juclgment- debtor, rnc to make orders as necessary for the ,.:ffective executiorr o[ the decree. The role of the executing Cor-Lrt is to enforce the decree in accordance with its terms, tvithout reinterpretinl3 or altering its substance. I \ r-, 37 sKti,J C.R-P.No.1364 of 2024

16. Therefore, the execution of decrees and Lok Adalat awards is governed by specific principles, which are essential for ensuring that the rights of parties are protected and that the rule of law is upheld. The executing Court must ensure that the decree is executed in accordance with the terms of the contract or agreement, and that the parties' rights are 'j respected and enforced. 17 . Reverting to the facts of the case on hand, the primary issue is whether the petitioner should hle an execution petition or a suit for eviction based on the terms of the lease deed and the Lok Adalat award in O'S.No. 1485 of 2OO2 - A perusal of the award reveals that the parties mutually agreed to specilrc terms, including a lOoh annual rent increase and the use of the prbmises for business purposes by the defendant. The award also stipulates that the defendant shall hand over vacant possession of the shop to the plaintiff after the lease period. However, the award further provides that in case of any violation of the lease terms, the plaintiff shall issue a notice to the defendant to rectify the vioiation. If the \ ) defendant fails to comply, the plaintiff may cancei the I compromise and evict the defendant. .,.L) at). . 38 sKS,.I C.R.P.No. 1364 of 2024 O

18. 'IlLis Oourt holds that the terms of the lease d,:ed and the Lok Adalat award clearly indicate that the due prf,cess of law for r esc,lr,ing disputes is through a suit for evir:tion, not an executio n 1t:tition. Although the Lok Adalat awarrl is an executalrle c ecree, the parties must follow the proced ure laid down b.. Lr.,v, which in this case requires filing a suit for eviction. k light of the above hndings, this Court uph,:ids the order of th,: trial Court order and dismisses the petition, as there is no illegality in the order of the trial Court and no merits ir th i ; petition.

19. Accorcrngly, this Civil Revision Petition is clir;missed confirnri rg Lre order dated 11.03.2024 passed in E.A No. 152 of 2023 ,n Il,P.No.216 of 2023 in O.S.No.1485 of 2OO2 by the learned Principal Junior Civil Judge-cum-Metropolitan Magislrate, Itanga Reddy District at L.B. Nagar. There shall be no orrier a.s to costs. Miscellaneous applications, if any pending, shall stand closed To, //TRUE COPY// ASS Sd/- MOHD. ISMAIL li.lf*, REGTSTRAR dEclror.r oFFrcER 1 The Principal Junior Civil Judge-cum-Metropolitan lt/lagi;trate, Ranga Reddy Dist'ict at. L.B. Nagar. One CC to fi,4r. /\rvind Kumar Agarwal, Advocate [OPUC] One CC to lri 11.A Achuthanand, Advocate TOPUCI Two CD Copies 2 J, 4 aK @1 HIGH COURT DATED:04102t2025 I I ORDER CRP.No.1364 of 2024 -a)t i ! tAf F ? 2 a I}2 ur'i ?t25 I OEs,, .o I DISMISSING OF THE CIVIL REVISION PETITION