In Basawaraj and another v. Special Land Acquisition officerr, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under

.. . Respondents/Plaintiffs/Defendants No.S & 6 4 5 6 R.Kennedy, S/o.R.Sailu, Aged 56 years, Occ. Electrician, R/o.Telkapally Village and Mandal, Nagarkurnool District Gaiula Pasha, S/o.Mahabub, Aged 71 years, Occ. Business, Rio.Telkapally Village and Mandal, Nagarkurnool District R.Linqaiah, S/o.Buchaiah, Aged 66 years, Occ. Agriculture, R/o.Telkapally Village and Mandal, Nagarkurnool District Respondents/Appellants/Defendants No.1, 2 & 4 _,-.€----y IA NO 30F20 24 Petition under section 151 cpc praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit fired in support of the petition, the High court may be preased to suspend the Judgment and decree dated- 15-12-2020 in AS No. 71 0f 201g passed by the rV Ariditionar District and sessions Judge (FTC) at Nagarkurnoor confirming the ju<igment and decree dated. 2.1_03_20.18 in OS No. 70 of 2006 passed by the Junior civir Judge at Nagarkurnoor pending disposar of the main appeal IA NO: 2 OF 2024 Petition under Section 5 of the lndian Limitation Act, 1963, praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit fired in support of the petition, the High court may be preased to condone a deray of 1120 days in firing the present Second Appeal in lhe interest of justice. Counsel for the Appeilant : SRl. GUMMALLA BHASKER REDDY Counsel for the Respondent No.1 : N BHUJANGA RAO The Court made the following: ORDER HON,BLE SRI JUSTICE LN(MI NARAYANA ALISHETTY I.A.No.2 of 2o24 InlAnd SECOND APPEAL No.154 OF 2024 COMMON ORDER: Tlris I.A.No.2 of 2024 is filed to condone the delay of 7120 days in filing the Appeal challenging the judgment and decree dated15.72.2020 in A.S.No.71 of 2018 passed by the IV Additional Disrrict & Sessions Judge (F.T.C), at Nagarkurnool which is filed against the judgment dated 21.03.2018 in O.S.No.7O of 2006 on the file of the Jur.riol Civil Judge at Nagarkurnool

2. Heard Sri G. Bhasker Reddy, learned counsel for appellant and Sri N. Bhujanga Rao, learned counsel for respondent No.1

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that respondent No.1 herein filed the suit in O.S.No.70 of 2006 on the file of Junior Civil Judge at Nagarkurnool against the petitioner and other respondents and the said suit was decreed on 21.03.2018. Aggrieved by the same, appellant herein along with respondent Nos.4 to 6 preferred the appeal in A.S.No.71 of 2018 on the file of the IV Additional District and Sessions Judge(FTC), at Nagarkurnool and the same was dismissed \ vide ordpr dated15.'12.2020. Aggrieved by the said dismissal, the PIeSentappealisfiledalongwithde1ayof1120days. -?/- 4 Learnerd coulsel for the appellant further contended that the '-a IA No 2 d )0)4 h1/And SA Nol 2 appellant was ,1ot aware of the dismissal of A.S.No.71 of 2018 and the counsel on rr-'ccrd also did not inJorm of the dismissal of the said appeal and the appr:llant carnc to know about the dismissal of the appeal only on 75.12.2020. 'l'herefore, delay of 1120 days occurred in preferring the Second Appeai. It is further contended that both the courts erred in decreeing the suit and rights of the appellants in immovable property are affected in vierv of the decree passed by the trial court in favour of the respondent;. Thercfore, prayed to allow the application

5. Per conbra, learned counsel for the respondent contended that except contending that appellant was suffering with illness and tl-rat his counsel on re<:ord did not inform about passing of the decree, the appellant hc,re ln did not offer sufficient reasons much less plausible reasons for tl.re inordinate delay of 1120 days. The petitioner along with the respondcni No.4 preferrecl appeal and the same was dismissed, therefore, the contention that he was not aware of the dismissal of the appeal is int:orrect. Hence, the application is devoid of merits and the same is liable to be dismissed as the approach of the appellant is very causal ir"r nature and has failed to explain the inordinate delay in filing the appeal. I .-rr-. i N, t,NA,J. lA.No.2 of2024 In/nntSA Not54 of2024

6. A perusal of the record would disclose that decree filed against 3 the appellant herein and respondent Nos.2 to 6 was decreed on

21.03.2018 and he along with respondent Nos.4 to 6 preferred appeal vide A.S.No.77 of 2018 and the said appeal was dismissed on

15.1,2.2020. Aggrieved by the same the appellant herein preferred this Second Appeal with a delay of1120 days. The only reason given by the appellant is that the counsel on record did not inform about dismissal of the appeal, therefore, the delay occurred in filing the present appeal.

7. It is apt to examine the principles and parameters to be considered for condonation of delay. The Hon ble Apex Court tn Union of India nnrl another a. lahangir Byranrii leejeebhoy (D) through his LR (SLP (Cioil) Na.21096 of 2019 dated 03.04.202Q, by referring the judgment of the same Court in Esha Bhattachariee a. Managing Conunittee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy €t Others [Q013) 12 SCC 649], held that "delay slnuld not be excused ns a matter of generosity. Rendering substantinl justice is not to cmne prejudice to the opposite party".

8. In Basawaraj and another v. Special Land Acquisition officerr, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under: '11. The expression 'suffrcient cause' should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inqction or lack oJ bona Jides cannot be *lputed to the parlA conceflLed, whether or not sufficient cause ' zor: 1ra1 scc ar € I 1l , .:. :

1.4 No.2 ot )0)4 ln/And SA Not 4 has bet:n furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case arrd no straitjacket formula is possible. (Vid.e Madanlal v. Shgamlal |2OO2) I SCC 535 : AIR 2OO2 SC 10Ol and Ro.m Nath Sao v. Gobardhan So.o [(2OO2) 3 SCC 195 : AIR 2OO2 SC l2oi] .)

12. It is a settled legal propositiorl that lau,of Lrnitation may harshly affect a partlcular party but it has to be applied with alt its rigorrr when thc statute so prescribes. The court has no power to el:lerd thc period of limitation on cquitable grounds. ,.A result flowing lrom a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no power lo ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation." The statutory provision may cause l.ardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the couri- h€rs no choice but to enforce it giving full effect [o the same. The egrLl maxim dura [ex sed lex r,vhich means ,,the lau, is harcl blrt it iri the larv", stands attractcd jn such a situation. It has consrstcntly been held that, "inconvenience is not' a decisive factor to be considered \ /hile interpreting a statute.

15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that wh€rc a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the .Lpplicant has to explain the court as to what was the "suffi,:ietrt cause" which means an adequate and enough reason whictr p|evented him to approach the court within lirnitatron. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for \,vant of bona fide on his pilrt in the facts and circumstances o{ the case, or found to have not acted.liligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justificd ground to condone the delay_ No court could be justilied in corrdoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only rvithin the pararneters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approrrch the court on time condoning the delay without any justificatjon, putting any condition whatsoever, alnounts to passirLg irn order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantarnoLrnts to shorving utter disregard to the legislatrrre." P *s. LNA,J, IA.No.2 oJ 2024 In/Ancl SA No I 54 of 202 4 G g. From a reading of the aforesaid observations, it is clear that the Hon'ble Apex Court at paras- 1 I and 12 of the judgment interepted te 5 expression "sufficient cause" and at para-15 summarized the law with regard to the issue of limitation. 10. In Postmaster General and others vs. Living Media India Limited and anotherz, Hon'ble Apex Court having considered catena of decisions, including Pundlik Jalam Patil (dead| by LRs' Vs' Executive Engineer, Jalgaon Medium Project and another3, wherein it was held that, '17....... The evidence on record suggests neglect of its own right for long time in preferring appeals. The court cannot enquire into belated and stale claims on the Sround o[ equity. Delay defeats equity. The court hetps those who are vigilant and "do not slumber over their rights". and observed that taking very lenient view in condoning the delay, particularly, on the part of the Goverr'ment and Government Undertaking, would not be proper and observed as under:- "2q. It needs no restatement at our hands that the object for hxing time limit for titigation is based on public policy fixing a lifespan for Iegal remedy for the purpose of general welfare. They are meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but avail their legal remedies promptty. Salmond in his Jurisprudence states that the laws come to the assistance of the vigitant and not of the sleepy'

30. Public interest undoubtedly is a paramount consideration in exercising the courts' discretion wherever conferred upon it by the relevant statutes. Pursuing stale clairns and multiplicity of proceedings in no manner subserves pubtic interest. Prompt and timely payment of compensation to the landlosers facilitating their 7 resettlement is equally an integral part of public \rchabilitation '? 1zorz1 : scc so: I 1zooe1 rz sc aaa lA.Lo 2 af)A24 la/,tkd SA Nol policy. Pu')lic interest demand" ,nU., ,n. State or the beneficialr of acquisitiorL, as the case may be, should not be allowed to indulge in any act t) unsetfle the settled legat rights accrued in law by resorting to avoidable litigation unless the claimants are guilty of derivingl benefit to which they are otherwise not entitled, in alty fraudulcllt manner. One should not forget the basic fact that what is acquired is not the land but the livehhood of the landlosers. These public rnterest parameters ought to be kept in mind b1.the courts rvhile e:<err:ising the discretion dealing with the application filed under Sectron 5 of the Limitation Act. Dragging the landlosers to courts of law years after the termination of legal proceedings would not sen/e any public interest. Settled rights cannot be lighdy interfered r,,,ith by condoning inordinatc delay ,,vithout there being any prol)er explanation of such delay on the ground of involvement of publc rerrenue. It serves no public interest.,, -L7. In Government of Maharashtra (Water Resources Department) rep.by Executive Engineer vs. Borse Brothers Engineers and Contractors private Limiteda, Hon,ble Supreme Court held as urrder: "63. ..... In a fit case in which a party has otheru,,ise acted bona fide and not in rr negligent manner, a short delay beyond such period can, in tlre (liscretion of the court, be condoned, always beanng in mind that th,r other side of the picture is that the opposite party may have acqlrireC both in equity and justice, what may now be lost by the first p.lrt..,s inaction, negligence or laches.,,

12. From the aforesaid judgments of the Hon,ble Apex Court, it is well settled that condonation of delay is not a matter of right and unless sufficient and plausible reasons are sho\rn, the delay cannot be condoned. tVhile conrioning the delay, the Courts should also see -2 "r'' o (zozt)e scc +oo " .e I LNA,J, IA.N,.2 of 2024 ln/Ah.l SA No 154 oJ 2024 the substantial rights accrued to the opposite party and also the passage of considerable time

13. The grounds offered by the petitioner are that he was not aware of passing of the decree and the counsel did not inform about the dismissal of the suit and that further due to illness he could not pursue the matter. The petitioner except blaming the counsel and il1 health has not offered any other reasons which clearly shows that the appellant was not diligent in pursuing the matter and is only trying to blame the counsel for disrnissal of the appeal.

14. Condonation of delay is not a matter of routine, more so when there is huge inordinate delay and, therefore, the petitioner ought to have offered detailed, cogent reasons, plausible explanation for such inordinate delay. The reasons stated in the afhdavit are vague, unsatisfactory and does not inspire the confidence of this Court, moreover, substantial rights have been accrued to the third party, therefore, it is not a fit case to condone the inordinate delay of 1120 days in filing the Second APPeal.

15. In view of the foregoing reasons and legal position and as no plausible and convincing reasons are shown for condonation of inordinate delay of 1120 days in filing Second Appeal, therefore, I.A.No.2 of 2024 is liable to be dismissed and accordingly dismissed' / I Consequent.l-y,, the Seco1 be no order as to costs. 8 td Appeal also stands dismissed There s lA ^a) ol)024 In/And 5,4 PendinlJ miscellaneous applications if any shali stand closeci I To, //TRUE COPY// "'- "iro,?#T..J,t}[i[ G- SECTION OFFICER '1. The tV Additionat Distr 2 rheJunior ci,,ir .,,.rJ:l::H;':;'Judse at (F r c), Nasarkurnoor 3. One CC to SR,. GUMM 4. one cc to sRr. * unr.]ot* 5. Two cD copies g- BHASKER REDDY Advocate [oPUcJ IANGA RAo Advocate toPucl .i ,. '.1,t HIGH COURT DATED:2510212025 COMMON ORDE R l.A.No. 2 OF 2024 IN / AND SA.No.154 of 2O24 -:-:-\\ --::1' i ii 3 J r;i;'-c i)..:\\ i 1t rtT ?ui ) </ * I t,. ,: l -'. /.. t -,:2' , /:, DISMISSING THE IA AND APPEAL -R-A**h