SRI D v. CHALAPATHI RAO

Judgment

THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE T. VINOD KUMAR M.A.C.M.A. No.656 0F 2014 .IUDGMENT: l. This Motor Accidents Civil Miscellaneous Appeat preferred aggrieved by the judgme nt, dt.2g.06.201 l. in O.p IS 26 of 2009, passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal_curn-lX Additional District Judge, Kamareddy (hereinafter refered to as 'the'l'ribunal') on thc ground that the'r-ribunar had crrcd in hording the Corporation jointly liable along with the owncr of the vehicle.

2. The appellants herein are respondent Nos. I and 2 in the O.p filed by respondent Nos.l to 4 herein.

3. The brief facts of the case are that, the Respondents No.1 is the wife, Respondent No.2 is the lather and Respondents No. 3 & 4 arc the minor children of the deceased Mr. Ashannagari Sathaiah. On 07.04.2009, the deceased along with one Mr. Tirumalaiah was travelling in an auto from Medak to Ramayampet. At 3.00 pm, they were on the outskirts of pathoor village, when an ApSRTC bus bearing No. APl23ltJ/9077 travelling at a high speed in a rash and negligent manner, ramrned into the auto from opposite direction. C)n accounr of the accident, the passcngers including the deccascd \ 2 received injuries and were rushed to Gandhi HosPital' Secunderabad. On 12'04'2009, the deceased succumbed to his n hile receiving trcatment at Gandhi Hospital' lnJ urles Secunderabad. The Respondents/claimants had filed the aforesaid OP claiming a compensation oi Rs'8'00'000/- for the death of the deceased.

4. The Tribunal, after considering the evidence' had held that the accident had occuned due to rash and negligent driving of the RTC bus hired by the Appellants' owned by Respondent No 5' insured with Respondent No 6 The Tribunal had then parlly allowed the petition, awarding a total compensation of Rs.3,75,700/-, along with Rs'20'0001 towards loss of consortium' along rvith proporlionate costs and interest @ 1'5% per annum lrorn the date of petition lt had atso held that the compensation was to be equalty paid by the Appellants and the Respondents No 5 & 6. Aggrieved by the same, the present appeal is preferred'

5. The Appellants contend that the Tribunal had erred in holding that the accident occurred due to the rash and negligent driving of the RTC bus' It is further contended that' the corporation had only hired the subject vehicle, and since the Respondent No'5 ./ f { 3 was the owner, Respondent No.6 i.e., the insurer of the vel-ricle, is solely liable to pay compensation. It is also contended thal the Tribunal erred in applying '15, as the multiplier when there was no proofthat the deceased was earning. It is finaily contended that the Iribunal had ened in taking the daily wage of the deceased as Rs. 100/-.

6. On the other hand, the Respondents No. I to 4 contend that the Tribunal had rightly held the Appellants jointly tiable along with the Respondents No.5 qnd 6.

7. Heard Mr. H. Vehugopal, learned counsel for the Appellants, Mr. D. V. Chalapathi Rao, learned counsel for the Respondent No.5 and Mr. A.V.K.S. Prasad, leamed counsel for the Respondent No.6, and perused the record.

8. The primary dispute in this appeal is with relation to the finding of the Tribunal, holding the Appellants jointty liable along with the Respondents No. 5 & 6. The position of law in this aspect is well seuled that person hiring a vehicle, squarely lalls within the definition of an owner under Section 2(30) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short 'the Act, 1988,) and is thus jointly tiabte atong with the owner of the vehicle and insurer. The Supreme Court in 1 the case of Mnnaging Direclor, I('S' R' ?iC' and Ors' Vs' New Inditr Assttrance Company Lrd' and Orsl' while dealing with the question of.loint liability of the insurer held as under: "31. In Uttar t'rartesh Statc Iload Transport Corporation v (ulsrrm and Ors tirji ii s iCc 142. rhis Court has considered lhe question ol vchicle give, orr iri."'Uy o*n"r. of the vehicle to UPSRTC with its cxisting and running i,r.rru,1."poti"y lt rvas held that the l-'l'>SttTC have bccomc the orvner ofthc arti"gifrc specificd period arrd vehicle havirrg been instrred at the ""fri.i. irr.run." of tflJ original owner, it rvou ld be deemed that vehicle was translerred irsu.o,ice policy to. UPSRl'C The insurer cannot escape the "i",rg*i,fr liabi"lity to pay the compensation The appeal prelerrcd allowcd. Tlre instant cascs are rnorc or less the same and the decision of this CourtinUPSRTCr'-Kulsum(supra)alsobuttressthesubmissionraisedby KSRI'C. This Couft has held as under: .by .UPSRTC -to 'otn n "., -relevant period' the 30. Thus' for all practical purposes' lor the Corporation had bccome the orvner of the vehicle for the specific p*lia. ff the Corporation had becomc the owner even for the lp".in. p".i.O and the vehicle having been insured at the instance of it will be dcemed that the vehicle was transferred o'.igin"l the Corporation and along with the insurance policy in existence thus the Insurrnce Compary would not be able to escapc its liabilitv to pay the amount of comPensation' .Jl. fhe lralrrlrtr to pa) cornpell\aliott is bascd^on.a slalutor) provisiun' Lorrput.o,y insurance'of thc vchiclc is meant for the benefit of the third p*iit f 'fr" liability of the orvncr to have compulsory insurance is only in i"gu.a a third parr! and not to the propenr' Ottcc tlte vehicle is insured' the owncr as wcll as any othcr person can use the vehicle with the consentolfheowller.sectionl46oftheActdoesnotprovidethatany p".# *fr" uses the vehicle indepen<Jently' a separatc insttrance policy should be takcn. The purposc of compulsory insurance in the Act has Leen cnacted ',vith an obleCt to advauce socialjustice' Jl. tn view of the decisiou in IIDFC Bank Ltd v Reshma and Ors (supra)' the i**". "rr""t escaPe the liabilit.v, when ownership changes due to the t ypottr".uii* agreenlcnt. [n the case of hire also' it canlot escape the liabilily' even if the orurrcrship changes Even though' KSRTC is treated as owner Undcr Section 2(30) of the Act of 1988, the r€gistered o$'ncr continucs to rcmain liable as pcr terms and conditions of lease agreement lawfully entered into u'ith KSRTC.

34.lnviewofthcafbresaiddiscussiotr,weholdthatregisteredowncr' insurer as wcll as KSRTC would be liable to make the payment of compensation jointly and severallv to the claimants ald the KSRTC in terms of thc lease agreelnent elltered into with the registercd owncr would be ' (2016)2scc-182 5 entitled to recover the amount paid to the claimants from the owner as stipulated in the agreement or from the insurer.,,

9. Therefore, the contention of the Appellants that they cannot be held liable as the Respondent No.5 is the owner of the bus, cannol be accepted. Further as this Court is not privy to the agreement between the Appellants and the Respondents No. 5 & 6, no fufther observation can be made with respect to recovery of the amount paid by the Appellants to the claimants from the Respondent No. 5.

10. As the Appellants . had raised an issue regarding the calculation of compensation, this Court after examining the same is of the view that, the'I-ribunal had not considered the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Sarla Verma antl Ors. Vs. Delhi Transport Corporation and Ors2 . I l. The just compensation according to this Court would be as fbllows. In calculating the income of the deceased, the Tribunal had erred in taking the wages ofa daily labourer to be Rs. 100/_. The wages as notifled by the govemment, at the relevant period are Rs. 175 per day. The claimant would also be entitled to 25o/o towards future prospects according to Nalional Insurance ' (:ooq) o scc r: t 6 Company Limited Vs. Prtnay Sethi and OrC. Thus, the monthly ..1 incorne of the deceased would be Rs. 5,687.50 Ps. (4,550 (175 x 26) + 1,137.50). Thereby, the annual contribution of the deceased to his family after I /4'h deduction for his personal cxpenses would be Rs. 51,187.50/-. The appropriate Multiptier to be considered according to column (4) of Sarla Vermu's case (supra) is '14' as the deceased was 45 years ol age. Therefore, the loss of dependency amounts to Rs. 7,16.(125l-. In addition to the same, the respondents No. 1 to 4 are also entitled to conventional heads of compensation as per Prunoy Sel/ri's case

12. However, since no Cross-Appeal or Cross - Objection was filed by the Respondents No.1 to 4 it is now perlinent to consider whether this Court has jurisdiction to grant just compensation in absence of a cross appeal by the clairnants

13. It is a settled position of law that the Tribunal/Courl is empowered to grantjust compensation to the claimant, though such compensation exceeds the amount claimed by the claimant. Furlher, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Nagappa Vs. Gurudayal Singh and Orsa, while consideling the provisions of the Act, 1988 '12otzy tc scc eso o (2oo3t 2 scc 2lq 7 I pafticularly sub section (4) to section 166 held that the 'l'ribunal has the power to treat any rcport given to it under section 158 as an application under section 168 of the Act, 1988. The relevant observations are as under: "7. Firstly, under the provisions of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, (hereinafter referred to as "the MV Act") there is oo restriction that compensation could bc awardcd only up to the amount claimed by the claimant. In an appropriate case where from the cvidence brought on rccord if Tribunal court considers that cleimant is entitled to get more compensation than claimed, the Tribunal may pass such award. Only errbargo is--it should be 'Just' compensation. that is to sa), it shoLrld bc ncither arbitrary, fanciful nor unjusrifiable lrom tlre evidence. This would bc clear by reference to the relevant provisions ol the M.V. Act. Scction 166 provides that an application for compensation arising out of an accident involving thc death of, or bodily injury to, persons arising out of the use o[ molor vehicles, or damages to any property of a third party so arising, or both. could be made (a) by the person who has sustained the injury; or (b) by the owner of the property; or (c) where death has resulted lrorn the accident, by all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased: or (d) by any agent duly authorised by the person injured or all or any of the lcgal rcpresentatives of the deceased, as the case may be. Under the proviso to Sub-section (l), all the legal representatives of the deceased who lrave not joined as the claimants are to be impleaded as respondents to the application for compensation. Other important part of the said Scction is Sub-section (,1) which provides that "the Claims Tribunal shall treat any report of accidents forwarded to it under Sub-section (6) of Section 158 as an aoplication for compensation under this Act." Hcncc. Claims Tribunal in appropriatc case ean treat the report forryarded to it as an application for compensation even though no such claim is made or no specified amount is claimed

9. [t appears that due importance is not given to Sub-section (4) of Section 166 which orovides that the Tribunal shall treat any report of the accidents forwarded to it under Sub-section (6) of Section 158, as an application for compensation u ndcr this Act.

10. Thereafter, Section 168 empoters the Claims Tribunal to "make an award determining the amount o[ compensation which appears to it to be iust". Thereforc, only req uirement for determinins the comoensation is that it must be'iust'. There is no other limitation or restriction on its t ower for awardins i ust com Densa tion." (emphasis supplied) 8 Therefore, it is clear that the Tribunal is empowered to grant just compensation to the victim/famity of the victim without any claim being made bY them.

14. Fufther. since the I lon'ble Supreme Coult in Ntrtional Insurance Co. Lltt. v. Naresh Kumtr ond Ors1, held that an appeal filed under Section 173 of the Act, 1988 is a regular first appeal undersectiong6oftheCodeofCivilProcedure,lg08(forshort 'the Code'), it is understood that the High Court can exercise its powers conferred under Order XLI of the Codc, particularly in view of the powers conferred under Rule 3 3 '

15. The Hon'ble Supreme Courl in Shtranammt and Ors' Vs' M.D., Divisional Contr. Nekrtci, by holding that the normal rules of appeal before the Fligh Court appty to an appeal filed under Section 173 andthat the entire case was open before the Appellate Court, reaffirmed the aforesaid position of [aw' The relevant observations are as under: A " l 3. When an ApPea I is filed under SectionlTl of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter shall be referred to as the'Act'), before tlre High Court, the normal Anneal also. Even ot herwise. A Court and bv ne cessarY lm olication. it can exerclse thereto in order to exercise that r)owcr effective lv fo re it is well urt a a settled DOSI tion o f law that when incidental all pow ers t lzooo; ro scc rse u lzot:; tt scc slz / -/ ,,/ a 9

14. A bare readins of Sectior 173 of the Act also reflects that there is no curtailment o1 limitations on the powers of the ADDe llate Court to consider the enlire case on facls and law-

15. It is well seftled thar the right of Appeal is a substantive right and the questions ol lact and law are at large and are open to Review by the Appellate Court. Thus such Dowers and dulies are neccssarilv to bc exercised so as to make thc provision of law effective

16. Generally, finding of fact rccordetl by Tri bunal should not be interfered with in an Auncal until and unless it is oroved that slarinp discreoancv or mistake has taken place. If the assessment olcompensation by the Tribunal was fair and reasonablc and the award of-the Trib unal u,as neither contrary nor inconsistent with the relevant f'acts as per tlre cvidence available on record then as mentioned hereinabove, the High Court would not interfere in the Appeal.,, (Emphasis supplied) 16. Further, the Hon'ble Supreme Courl in Dhangir and Ors. Vs. Madan Mohan and Ors7, while observing that the powers conferred under Order XLI Rule 33 of the Code were discretionary, held that the Appellate Court should not refuse to exercise its discretionary powers on 'mere tcchnicalities', if exercising them would render complete justice to the case

17. Thus, it is of signilicance to note the powers conferred on the High Couft under Order XLI Rule 33 of the Code. The said provision reads as under: Rulc 33: Porver of Court of Anoeal: The appellate court shall have power to pass any decrce and make tny order which ought to have been passed or made and to pass or make such further or other decree or order as the case may require, and this non,e r mav be exercised bv the court notwithstanding that thc a ppcal is as to pa rt onlv of the decree and ma be exerciscd in favour of all or an of the res ondents or ndents or arties ma not have filed an althou h such rcs 7 alR 1988 SC 54 : 1987 (Supp) SCC 528 l0 I eal or ob ection and may, where there have been decrees in cross- a suits or where two or more decrees are passcd in one suit, be exercised in respect of all or any of the decrees, although an appeal may not have been fi led against such decrecs Provided that the appellate court shatl not make an1'order under sectiotr 35a in pursuance ofany objection on which thc couft from whose decrcc the appeal is preferred has omitted or refused to make such order. (emphasis sapplied by this Court) From the language employed in the aforesaid provision it is clear that the High Court on considering the entire case has power to pass any order which ought to have been passed, even though the said appeal is only against a paft of the impugned order and the respondents had not raised a cross objection against it

18. On an objection being taken in the case of The APSRTC, rep. by irs General Manager and Ors. Vs. M. Ramatlevi antl Ors8, a two-judge bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court re.jected the contention that the High Court lacked porver to enhance compensation without the Claimant's Appeat.

19. Though a coordinate Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Courl in the case of Ranjana Prakash and Ors. Vs. Divisional Mantger and Or,e had held as under u (zoo8) : scc :zs ' lzort; r+ scc o:o / I

8. Where an appeal is filed challcnging the quantum of compensation, irrespeoive of who fites rhe appeal, ,h. ";;.-"p;l;" :;;.r"' i* ,n" High court is to examine rhe facrs and by appll,ing ,r," -r.".ri prin"ii-lef determine the just -i, compensarion. If the compensatiorr deterrrincd Uf i, frigfr". rhan the compensation awarded bv thc.Tribunal, the High Coun *iitt ,tto* the appeal, if it is by rhe claimanrs an.t dismis. rt," upp"ui, ,f"fi ir"Uy ?" owner/insurer. Similarly, if the courpensation^dcrernr ined'bf ,fl. Uig,r Crl," is lesser than rhe comperrsariorr awarded hr rhe lrihunal. rt,. Uign t o,in * lti j,rrls any appeal by the claimants fbr enhalcenrent, bui a ow ;;y ;;;;i';;"*ner/insurer for reduction. The High Court cannot obviously in"r"r." rt . in an appeal by owner/insurer for reriucing rh" ";.p"";;;;;, no.""un i, reduce the in an appeal by the claimant, ,""rirg enhancement of :::fl:yl compensatlon. 20. Hence, it becomes pertinent to note the subsequent decisions ol the Hon'ble Supreme Courr. -io.pensation

21. In Sanobunu Nazirbhai Mirza and Ors. Vs. Ahmedahad Municipal Transport Servicet|, the tlon,ble Apex Court had enhanced compensation without a claimant appeal noting that it was the statutory duty of the Tribunal and the Appellate Couft to award just and reasonable compensation.

22. ln Jitendra Khimshankor l,rivetli snd Ors. Vs. Kasam Daud Kumbhar and Orsl/, though compensation was enhanced by exercise of power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had reiterated the principle of law, that it was the obligatory on paft ol the Courts and Tribunals to award just, fair and reasonable compensation. The relevant observations are as under: 'o (2013 ) ro kc zrs '1 (2015) 4 scc 237 ..1 t2 ''13. The tribunal has awarded Rs. 2,24,0001- as against the same, claimants havc not filed any appeal. As against the award passed by the tribrrnal when thc claimants have not filed any appeal, the question arises rvltether the income ol the deceased could be incrcased and compensation could bc enhanced. In terms of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act. the cou rts/tribu nals are to Dass awards detcrmining the amount of com Densation as to be fair and porrer of tlre coLrrts in reasonable and accep ted bv the lesal standards. The awarding reasonable compensation was emphasized by this Court in Nagappa v. Curudayal Singh and Ors. MANU/SC/II}7 /2002 : (2003) 2 SCC 274' Orientat Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Mohd. Nasir and Anr- MANU/SC/0899/2009 : (2009) 6 SCC 280, and Ningamma and Anr. v. United India [nsurance Co. Ltd. MANU/SC/0802/2009 : (2009) 13 SCC 710. As asainst the award Dassed b\ the tribunal even thoush the claimants havc not filed aNY AD neal. as it is obliga torY on the Dart of cou rts/tribunals to award iust and reasonable compensation . it is aoorop riate to increase the comlrcnsatioJt.] (cmPhasis suPPlied)

23. Similarly, on an appeal being canied from the decision of Bombay High Courl in Surekha and Ors. Vs. Santosh und Orst), on a ground that just compensation was rejected as the claimant lailed to file an appeal, though taking an exception, a three - judgc bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated the principle that in compensation matters, the Couft should not take a hyper technical approach and ensure that just compensation is awarded to aff-ccted persons or claimants. 24 The aforesaid principle was yet again echoed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Janabai and Ors. Vs. I-C.I.C.L Lambord I nsurtnce Company Ltl 3. " vnruu/sc/d-Bo:/zozo '3 (2022) 10 scc 512 I3

25. Similar views were expressed by the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court through Justice Dipankar Dutta (as his lordship then was) in National Insursnce Co. Lld. Vs. Sulekha Das and Orsta, Lhe Division Bench of the Andhra pradesh High Court in The National Insurance Company Lrd. Vs. E, Suseelamma and Orst5, the Division Bench of the Madras High Court in Royal Sundaram Alliance Insuronce Co. LttI. und Ors. Vs. Vennila and Orsl6 and the High Court of Gauhati in The Future Generali India Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Boby Bora and orst '.

26. At this juncture, it would be appropriate to refer to the observations made by thc three-judge bench of the Hon,ble Supreme Court in Jagdish Vs. Mohan and Orst8. The Apex Court in the said case had held that compensation ought not to be a pittance, but rather an enforceable right intrinsic to human dignity. Though the said observations were made in relation to injury cases, they resonate more with cases of death. The relevant observations are as under: " MANU/wB/1 128/20u: 2o1B(1)cu(cAL)2a '5 2023:Apnc:2807 5 : MANU I Apl lzBZ/2023 '6 vnruufnv/32ssl20ts D MANU/cHloo59l2ozz '8 (20,,,Q) 4 scc 571 I .1 t4 ''l l- In making thc computation in the present case, the court rnust be mindful oI the fact thal the Appellant has sulfered a serious disability in rvhich he has suFfered a loss of the use of both his hands For a person engaged in tnanual activities. it requires no stretch of imagination to understand that a loss of hands is a complete deprivation of the abiliry to eam. Nothillg-at lcast in the f'acts ol this casc-can resiore lost hands. But the measure of compensation lnust reflect a to restore the dignity ol the being. Our vardsticks attempt of the law genu rne nensation should not be so abvsmal as to lead one to q uestion o[ com $,hethcr our law val ues human life. If it do es. as it must. it nlust provide a rcalistic recom nse for thc ain of loss and the traunra of su[[erin Awards of comPcnsa tion are not law's doles. In a discourse of rights. thev constitute cntitlements under larv. O rrr conversations about law must shift from a naternalistic subord ination of the individual to an assertion o[ enforceable rishts as intrinsic to human dicnitl." (emphasis supplied)

27. -fhercfore, from a conspectus of the aforesaid authoritative pronouncements in the light of the purporl of the Act, 1988, this Court is of the humble view that the High Court being the Court of First Appeal has power to enhance the compensation granted by thc Tribunal. even in the absence of thc claimant's Cross- z\ppeal/Objection. IIowever, as seen from the ratio in Sharanontma's case (supra), such discretionary powers ought to be exercised on satisfaction of the condition that there is a glaring discrepancy/mistake in the order of the Tribunal. 28 At the cost of repetition, as the Tribunal lailed to consider Strla Vermo's case (supra) while calculating just compensation ill the present case, this Court is of the view that it is just to exercise .; the discretionary powers vested in this Court. l5

29. Thus, the total compensation payable to the appellant is as Head of Cornpensation Loss of Eaming Loss of life, love and affection, etc Loss of Dependency Loss of Estate Enhancement by this Courl Amount (in Rupees) Compensation awarded by the Tribunal Amount (in Ru 700/- 3,60,000/- Loss of Consortium 20,000/- Funeral Expenses .|OTAL 1s,000/- 3,7 s,7 00t- 7,t6,62st-

16.500/- |,7 6,000t- 44,0001- x 4 r6.s00t- ) 9,25,625t-

30. Accordingly, this Motor Accident Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is disposed ofas under: i. The finding of the Tribunal that the Appellants along with the Respondents No. 5 & 6 are joinLly and severally liable is unaltered u. The compensation awarded by the Tribunal is enhanced from Rs. 3,75,7001- to Rs. 9,25,625l_ with an interesr of

7.5%o per annum from the date of the petition till realization. _^El l6 l 1V l'he Appcllants and thc respondents No' 5 & 6 are directed to deposit the enhanccd compensation within three (3 ) l onths fiom the date olthis order' Hor.r,ever. as the Respondents No' I to 4 have only claimed Rs.8,00,0001 in the original petition' they are directed to deposit the deficit court lee on Rs' 1'25'625l- before the 'fribunal. Ot.r such deposit, the Respondents No' I to 4 are pennittcd to withdraw the same atong with interest accrued' 3t. Necdless to say, that the interim order dated 30'07'2012 stands vacated Pending rtiscellaneous petitions if any' shall stand closed' No order as to costs Sd/- N. SRIHARI D PUTY REGISTRAR //TRUE COPY// ECTION OFFICER To,

1. The Chairman, Motor Accidents Claims tribunal -cum- lX Additional District Judge at Kamareddy ( with records ) . - - 2. one cc to sii H. VENUGOPAL, Advocate (oPUc) 5: o;; cc i.5nr. D. v. cHALAPATHI RAo, Advocate [oPUc] 4. One CC to SRl. A. V. K. S, PRASAD, Advocate [OPUC] 5. Two CD CoPies kul/PSL H 1 S1'A} i\+ t-) ?tr '|$t N15 C) Js * (,- Sp,.,.1-9- :\'i:1" HIGH COURT DATED:1410212025 + DECREE JUDGMENT MACMA.No.656 of 2014 DISPOSING OF THE MACMA WITHOUT COSTS 3\ IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA AT HYDERABAD FRIDAY ,THE FOURTEENTH DAY OF FEBRUARY TWO THOUSAND AND TWENry FIVE PRESENT THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE T.VINOD KUMAR M.A.C.M.A. NO: 656 OF 2014 Between: 1 The APSRTC, rep. by its Managing Director, RTC Cross Roads, It/usheerabad, Hyddrabab 2. The APSRTC, Rep. by its Depot Manager, Medak (Bus Bearing No Ap 23 U 9077) ...APPELLANTS/ Respondents 1 and 2 AND 'l . Ashannagari Laxmi @- {ankawa, wo sathaiah, Househord R/o H.No. 3-97, Bhagirthipaly Village of Bhiknoor M'andal, Dist. Nizamabad. Bhiknoor Mandal, Dist. Nizamabad.

2. Ashannagari Narsaiah, Sio Ramaiah, R/o H.No. 3_97, Bhagirthipaly Village of 3 A:lTl:g-q1 Rg1u, S.lo Sathaiah, aged .17 years, Occ: Student , Minor, urarmrng compensation .under the Guardianship of their mother naturar guardian and next friend.Rewondent No. 1. nlb H.f.fo S_g7, Anrgi;hiprly Village of Bhiknoor Mandal, Dist. Nizamabaa.. -

4. Ashannagari Mahesh, S/o Sathaiah, aged .14 years Occ: Student. Minor Claim ing compensation under the cu#aiansrriJ ot tf,eiirott'Jr-nltiiili-' guardian and next friend.Rewondent No. 1. nyb H.Nto. e_97; airJg,.tirlprrv Village of Bhiknoor Mandal, Dist. Nizamabad. - -

5. T. Maltaiah, S/o Narsaiah,.Major, Owner of bus bearing No. Ap 23 U gO7Z. (Hired with ApsRrc) R/o H.Nb. 12-12t1D., NGoaa;i6ry, siiiailLirra"o"k District.

6. The orientar rnsurance company Limited. Through its Branch Manaoer. BO Karimnagar, opp Colectoraie Comptex, npSFdpremis;;,-ii;;il;;U; "" RESPONDENTS/R3andR4 Appeal Under Sectir o ateo z a-bo-z o r r i, o- F r.r""l ;# f :? il.' Ll,ffi :X: YrY ff Motor Accidents craims tribunar -cum- rX Additionar District Judge ,t K;;r;;il; - t ;:'*::t # "t:; "?L This appeal coming on for hearing and upon perusing the Memorandum or nppi"ir, til! orders oiti" r-o*"t corirt and ihe material papers in the case' and upon hearing th" ;tg';;;L. or sti. H' Venuoooal ' Advocate for the Appellants and Sri o.v' dt"i"p"thi Rao' Advoc-ate ioi ttt" Respondent No' 5 and Sri A.V.K.S. p."tta","iill""t" toi the Respondent No' 6 and none afpea.ea for Respondent Nos' 1 to 4 ' This Court doth order and decree as follows:

1. That the Motor Accident Civil Miscellaneous Appeal be and hereby is disPosed of . 2. That the finding of the Tribunal that the Appellants along with the Respondents No' iif 6 are jointty and severallv liable is unaltered' be and hereby is 3. That the compens"-ti"i'''i'iJtia by the -Tri6unal enhanced f.o. R":;:i;,iriir7- ith"l g an interest ot 7 '5o/o '2s'625t'with from the date of the petition till realization' ;;;;;;;; 4. That the Appellantl 'iJ t"tp"'ia"nts.No' 5 & 6 are directed to deposit tt r"" (3) months from the date of the enhanced *;;;";ffi,rittrin this order' claimed Rs' 8'00'000/- in the s. iii"t ttt" Respondents No' i to 4 have only original petition, ti"V tt" ait""led^to de!:-sit the deficit court fee on Rs' 1,25,625t- ueto.e iil fribunal' On such. deposit' the Respondents No.1 to + ,r" p"tilitt"J-io withdraw the same along with interest accrued.

6. That the interim order dated 30-07-2012 stands vacated' i. f-f',rt tft"t" shall be no order as to costs in this appeal Sd/- N. SRIHARI PUTY REGISTRAR \ ECTIOO OSTICEP- 1 The Chairman, Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal -cum- lX Additional District Judge at KamareddY

2. Two C.D.CoPies W Kul/PSL , I HIGH COURT DATED:141O212025 DECREE MACMA.No.656 of 2014 DISPOSING OF THE MACMA WITHOUT COSTS 4 v{ j\ 1