The High Court · 2025

Counsel for the Respondent: SRI P. PRABHAKAR REDDY The Court delivered the following Judgment: THE IIONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE J. SRE,ENIVAS RAO CRIMINAL APPEAL No.1002 OF 2017 ORDER: This Criminal Appeal has been filed by the State, aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Special Judge for Trial of Cases under Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act-cum-I Additional Sessions Ju<lge, Warangal, in Spl.S.C.No.72 of 2015, dated 15.12.2015, whereunder respondent/accused was acquitted for the offences punishable under Sectic,ns 366 and 376(2)(n) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short 'IPC') and Sections 5(l) rlw 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act,2012 (for short 'POCSO Act').

2. The cime of prosecution in brief is that the victim, a minor aged 17 years, was n:siding opposite to the accused in the same locality. Prior to the complairrt, the accused used to follow and harass her, professing love. The victim r,vas studying Intermediate at Kakatiya Mahila Junior College, Hanamkondrl and staying in a hostel. on 17.07.2014, while she was at home due to illness, the accused visited and spoke to her. on 23.07.2014, the accused called her, asked her to come to Mahabubabad railway station, and threatened her with dire consequences when she refused. Out of fear, she went to the station, where the accused forcibly took her by train to Khammam. .,{.fter failing to secure shelter at a friend's house, he took her 2 to Vijayawada, where he forcibly married her at a church in Gunadala and rented a house. He kept her confined, threatened her, and su$jected her to sexual intercourse against her will. Later, the victim rn a neighbour, Suvartha, who alerted her relatives. With their help, she wa$ rescued and brought back.

3. Heard Mr.M.Vivekananda Reddy, leamed Assi$tant Public Prosecutor for the appellant and Mr.S.Surender Reddy, learned counsel for respondent/accused

4. Learned Assistant Public Prosecutor submitted that tlie trial Court, without properly appreciating the oral and documentary evidNnce adduced by the prosecution, erroneously acquitted the respondent/accused. He further submitted that as on the date of the alleged offence, ttfie victim was a minor, and the prosecution examined PW.14, the Headrflaster of the school, who specifically deposed that the date of birth of ttrJe victim was l4.O4.lgg7. In the absence of any contra evidence, thq trial Court disbelieved the evidence of PW.14 solely on the ground thalt there was a material alteration in Ex.P14. He further submitted that the trial Court acquitted the respondent/accused on the ground of delay ii1 lodging the complaint by PW.2. According to him, such delay cannot be a gro'und for acquittal. He further submitted that the prosecution proved thg case against the respondent/accused beyond reasonable doubt, and despite such T\ \ \ J evidence, ttLe trial Coum acquitted the respondent/accused. Therefore, the impugned judgment is liable to be set aside.

5. Per contra, leamed counsel for the respondent/accused vehemently contended trat the trial Court, after considering the oral and documentary evidence adduced by the prosecution, rightly concluded that the prosecution miserably failed to prove the charges against the respondent/accused beyond reasonable doubt. He further submitted that the trial Court has given specific findings on each of the contentions raised by the prosr:cution and has assigned cogent reasons. Therefore, there are no grounds to interfere with the well considered judgment of the learned Sessions Jurlge, and the appeal filed by the State is liable to be dismissed.

6. Havirrg considered the rival submissions made by the respective parties and after perusal of the impugned judgment, it reveals that, according to the allegations made in the complaint lodged by PW.2, PW.l had left tht: house along with the respondent/accused on 23.07.2014 lnitially, a case was registered as a "Girl missing" complaint, and subsequentl'y, the offences under Sections 366 and 376(2)t(n) of the IPC were added. The impugned judgment further reveals that PW.2 lodged the complaint on 06.08.2014, though the alleged incident took place on

23.07.2014. The trial Court specifically observed thar PW.t had been provided with a mobile phone by PW.2, and she could have contacted the 4 \ 'a ,.ei, ,i{ .-' . .-_' respondenUaccused. Though PW.2 stated that PW.1's phone ryas switched - off the trial Court disbelieved this version, particularly PW.1 returned home after 3Yz months, and PW.2 did not lodge ar]ry complaint during the interregnum period. The trial Court also hdld that the prosecution failed to establish that the respondent/accused ha{ taken PW.l :spondenq/accused to Vijayawada and stayed at the house of PW.8, without informiirg PW.8 that she had been brought forcibly. The trial Court further noted t\at PW.l and the respondent/accused had taken a house on rent and lived logether, and even then, PW.1 did not inform the owner that she had been $rought there against her will.

7. According to the prosecution, the respondent/accused a{rd PW.1 had solemnized their marriage in a church and even at that time, W.l did not d state to anyone that she had been forcibly brought or she had no intention to marry the respondent/accused. The trial Court, taking into lonsideration the documentary evidence, particularly Ex.Pl4, disbplieved the prosecution's version that the victim was a minor at the time of the alleged offence, on the ground that Ex.Pl4 contained material altepations. The prosecution has miserably faited to discharge its initial burdep of proving that the victim was a minor as on the date of the alleged ifrcident, and except for the evidence of PW-14, no reliable evidence has been produced. \ \ {\ \ 5 Consequently, the trial Court rightly rejected Ex.p14 on account of the material alteration. The trial Court rightly came to the conclusion that PW.l had accompanied the respondent/accused on her own accord as a companion. and the evidence of PW.l failed to establish that she was taken by the respondent/accused forcibly against her wish or will. The prosecution also failed to prove that the respondent/accused had sexual intercourse with Pw.1 against her consent, especially when the respondent/accused and PW.l had stayed together for more than three months. Th: trial Court also rightly pointed out that the prosecution failed to follow the procedure laid down under Section 154 of the Cr.p.C. while altering the offences to Sections 366 and376(2Xn) of the IPC and Section 6 of the PoCSo Act. The prosecution further failed to explain why a sepaiate catie was not registered despite the Police having endorsed the statement of PW.l. The Investigating Officer merely recorded the endorsement made by PW.l.

8. It is very much relevant to mention that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kunal Cthatterjee v. The State of laest Bengal and others,, held that marriage and the subsequent physical relationship between the two with consent would not amount to rape. This principle was established by the -*/ t StL lcrl; No.7004 of 2025, dt.2g.O1 .2025 6 Hon'ble Apex Court in Prithivirajan v. Statez, Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra3 and Maheshwur Tigga v. State of Jharkhant.

9. [n cases of acquittal, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Raui Sharma v. State (Government of NCT of Delhti) and anotfuers, held that while dealing with an appeal against acquittal, the appellant urt has to Qo consider whether the trial Court's view can be termed as a possr ble one, particularly when evidence on record has been analyzed. The reason is that an order of acquittal adds up to the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused. Thus, the appellate court has to be relatively slow in reversing the order of the trial court rendering acquittal.

10. ln Gharey Lal v. State of Uuar Pradesh6 the Hon'ble Supreme Court after.referring to several Judgments regarding the settled es of law and the powers of appellate Court in reversing the order of aoquittal, held at para 70, as follows: "70. In the light of the above, the High Court qnd other appellate Courts shouldfollow the well-settled principles crystallized by nttmber of Judgments if it is going to overuule or otherwise disturb the trial court's acquittal: '2025 SCC Online SC 696 'lzors;9 scc 608 o lzozol lo scc lo8 s 1ZOZZ7 8 Supreme Court Cases 536 61zOOS; l0 Supreme Court Cases 45 \ \ 7 I. The appellate court may only overrule or otherwise disturb the triul court's acqutttal if it has "very substantial and compelling reasoni" for doing so. A number of instances arise in which the appellate court would have "very substantial and compelling reasons" to discard the lrial court's decision. "Very substantial and compelling reasons" exist when: i) The trial court's conclusion with regard to the facts is palpably wronS: ii) The trial court's decision was based on an erroneous view of iii) The trial court's judgment is likely to result in "grave miscan'iage ofjustice ", iv) The entire approach of the trial court in dealing v,ith the evidence was patently illegal; 1 \ v) The trial court's judgment was manifestly unjust and unreasonable; vi) The trial court has ignored the evidence or misread the material evidence or has ignored material documents like dying declarations/report of tlte ballistic experl, etc. vii) This list is intended to be illustrative, not exhaustive,

2. The appellate court must always give proper weight and consideration o thefindings of the trial court.

3. If two reasonable views can be reached one that leads to acquittal, the otfur lo conviction the High Courts/appellate courts must rule in .favour <,f the accused. " ( ( I l. For the foregoing reasons as well as the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the judgments cited supra, the leamed Sessions Judge has r:ghtly acquitted the respondent/accused for the offences punishable urrder Sections 366 and 376(2)(n) of the IPC Sections 5(1) r/w 8 6 of the POCSO Act. Hence, this Court does not find an grounds to v interfere with the well reasoned Judgment of the learned Sessions Judge.

12. Accordingly, the criminal appeal filed by the State fails and is hereby dismissed. , Miscellaneous Petitions, pending if any, shall stand closed. SD/. N SRIHARI DEPUTY REGISTRAR 6 OFFICER //TRUE COPY// To,

1. The Special Judge for Trial of Cases Under Protection of hildren from Sexual Qffences Act -cum- I Additional Sessions Judge,

2. The Station House Officer, Dornakal Police Station, 3. Two GCs to Public Prosecutor, High Court for the State of 4. One CC to SRl. P. PRABHAKAR REDDY, Advocate IOPUCI 5. Two CD Copies flyderabad. (OUT) t. District. ana at Kul/PSL \ \ HIGH COURr DATED:2011112025 JUDGMENT CRL.APPEA[. .No.1002 ot ZO1T I S ? q JA}l 2026 () q * DISMISSING I-HE CRL.APPEAL \A