Joshi, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the v. Mallikarjuna Rao

THE HONOURABLE SMT. JUSTICE K. SUJANA APPEAL SUIT No.463 of 2O1O JUDGMENT: Challenging the order dared 17.I2.2OOg passed in O.S.No.8 of 2006 by the VI Addirional Senior Civil Judge, F.ast Track Court, Meclchal. Ranga Recidy District, thc prcsent appcal suit is filed.

2. The bricf facts ol thc case are rhar t-he plaintiffs filcd a suit against the defendant seeking partition and separate posscssiorr oi thcir half sharc itr the suit schedule properties, claiming thar the anccstral joint family consisrrng ol Shivaiah ancl his thrcc sons, Pochaiah f,apaiah, ancl Hanumaiah, cclntinuecl u,itliout p.rrtitlon. 'lhc1. argued rhat altcr the deaths of Pochaiah (u,ithour heirs) tr:rrl paparalt, ttre defendant (Papaiah's son) becamc thc pattr:clerr of the properties and relLsecl their demand for partition. Thc defcndanr contendcd that the properties were alreadl- partitioned in the year 1949 among Shi',,aiah's sons, making further piu-tition nntenable_ He claimcd exclusivc os,nership ol "A schecitrlc properlv," inhcrited from pochatair anc] sLtcported b_v docLrmentar-v-. 2 sxs,J 4.S. 0.463 of 20lO ( i i l evidencc, rncluding revenlrc rccords, titlc deecls, and judicial clc crce s

3. Basing on the above pleadings, the trial Court framed five issues and on behalf of the plaintitfs i.e., pWs.I to 3 were examined and trx.Al to AIS trrc marked. DWs.l to 3 are examined and trxs.B 1 to B4S u.ere marked on behalf of the defendants.

4. After exermining thc cvidencc, thc trial Court. urde order <lated 17. 12.2009, disrnissed the suit, holcling that partition had already occurred in tl-re .year 1949 ancl the dcle ndant was the absolute orvner of the ,,A schcdule propert1.., u,hile the plailr tiffs lailed to substantiatc thcir claims. Aggrievecl therebv, the prcsent appeal suit is filed.

5. Heard Sri Vadeendra .Joshi, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants as we ll as Sri K. V. Mallikarjuna Rao, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents.

6. I-earned counsel for the appellants subm j tted that thc jr-rdgment a.<I riccree of the trial court ar! contrary to raw, the SKS.J A.S. No.463 of20lO - \\reight of evidence, and the preponderance of probabilities and that the trial Court erred in dismissing the suit for partition and separate possession of the half share of thc appellants in the plaint schedule property. The trial Court incorrectly held, without substantial evidcnce, that the propcrties',r'erc divided in a prior partition in the year 1949, and that the respondent is in exclusive ownership of "A" schedule property following the death of Pochaiah in [he year 1964. He lurther submitted that Sivaiah and his three sons, Pochaiah, Papaiah, and Hanumaiah, constitutcd a Hindu joint famill' tvith "A" schedule property, u'hich rcmained undivided until the filiirg of the present suit. Hc contended that Pochaiah, as the eldest male member, hetd the properties in his name, and after his inlestate death withoul hcirs, the properties devolvcd jointly on the appellants and the respondent. The appellants refute the claim of the Court that thc rcspondent is the fosler son of Pochaiah and, as such, entitled to the entire propert-v-.

7. Learned counsel for the appellants furthcr contended that the absencc of <:vide nce of adoption or a will cxecuted by Pochaiah, underscoring their cnlitlement to hall share in the properties. He also challc-nged the reliance on documentzrry I l 4 i SKS,J A.S.Ilo.463 of 201() evidencc ol the trial Court sr,lbmittcd b_\, th( respondent, arguing thr,.t certain kel,exlribits u-erc impropcrlv disregarded or misinterpreted, such a s Ex.A I (Khasra Pahar,i for the year l()54 55). 1-he appellants maintain that the prr:sumption of loint ownership ol "A" schedule propert\r pcrsists in their favor and that thc suit for partrtion is valiri despite thc respondcnt's possession of the property. Hc [urther contenrled that the respondent's fostering b1' Pochaiah does not Ir.gally confer riglrts to flrcharah's propcriy. l,cerrne<l counsel for . the rrppellants [urtht--r' criljcizet] the lrial cour'1 [t>r ho].ling that the .ipl)ellants a pproarche <l the trial Court u,irl'r rrnr lean hands, asserting tltat the cviclcnce docs not supp()rt such a conclusion. 'lherefore, he prayed the Court to sr:t aside thc lrrclgment oI thc triaI Cr)urt by allou.ing this appeal suit.

8. In suppcrt of his submissions, lcantcd counsel lor lhc lrppcll:r:t! rc:li,.d trpon the _jr-rclgmen I of the l{on'l,le Supreme Court in Arshaoor Singh v. Harpal Kaur and Othersr, s'hcrein in paraglaph No.7 to 7.7, it is held as follou,s: "7. \\,ith rcspect to the first issue, it is thc admi ed positron that lncler Srngh had inhcritcd thc eniL.e '1zo:01 ta ssc +:e 5 SKS,J A.S-Ito.z163 of 201O suit property from his father Lal Singh upon his death. As per the mutation entr) dated 16-l-1956 produced b--l,- Re spondent 1, I-al Singh's death took place in 1951. Therefor,.. thc succcssion in this r:asc opencd in 195 I prior to the comrnencement o[ the Hinclu Sucr:cssron Act, 1()54) r,r,tren lnder Singh succeeded to his fathc. Lal s Singh's propert)' in accordance rvirh thc ol(1 Hin(lu Mitakshara law.

7.1. Mulla in his Commentar) on Hindu l,aw l22nd Edn.) has stated th(-' position u'ith respect to succession under Mitakshar-a lau irs [ollo$ s: "A son, a grandson rvhosc father is dead, and a great grandson rvhosc lhther and grandfather are both dead, succecd sim trltaneoush.- as single hcir to the separate or self-acquired property of the deceased $,ith rights of sun'ivorship. " "AIl propert-\' inheritetl b1 a maic IIindu from his father, fathcr's [ather or fathcr's father's lather, is ancestral propert-\', The essential feature of ancestral propertt' according to Mitakshara lau' is that the sons, grandsons and grcat grandsons of the person rvho rnherits it, acquire an interest, and the rights attachcd to such propert-v at the moment of their birth. A person inheriting propertl [rom his three immediate paternal ancestors holcls it, and must hold it, in coparccnan' $.ith his sons, son's sons. and son's son's sons, bul as regards other relalions, 6 SKS,J A.S. o.463 of2010 hc hokls it, and is entirled to hold it as hrs absolute l)r'operlv- -- (t'rnphasis su pplied) 7 2. ln Shlam Nalavan Prasarl r'. Krishtt;t Pr-asacl lShyam Nara_van Prasad v. Krishna Prasad, (2018) 7 SCC 646 ; (20t8) l] SCC (Civ) 7O2l , this Court has r'<:entl1, heJd that: (SCC p. 651. para l2) It is settted tlrat thc propert]' inheritcd l)\ .1 'll. rrrzrLe llindu lrom his father, fathets fathr'r or fittlrer's fathers fatlrer is an anccstral propr:rt-r The ('ssential feature of anccslral propert)', accordiig ro MrLarkshara law, is that the sons, grandsons, zrncl grcat grandsons of the person ['ho inhcnts it, acclrrire an intcrest and the rights attacherl Lo ;trch l)r.)Dertl at the moment of thcir birth. The slrare $lrich a coparcener obtains on partition o[ anccstral propcrt) is ancestral property as rcgards l)is ralc issue. After partition, the propcrt)' in the hanrls o[ th(: sor'I will continlle to be the ancestral prol)ert! ar(l the natural or adopted son of that son n,ill takc interesl in it and is entitled to it by sunivorshiP ' lcrn i)hasis supplied)

7.3. Under Mitakshara law, whenever a rnale ar)cestor inherits any property frorn an-y ol his pirtelnal ancestors up to threc degrees al>ove lrirn, thr:n his male legal heirs up to three degrces b( l()r' him. rvould gct an equal right as coparceners in rhat Prollertl' 7 SI(S,J A.S.No-463 of 20ro

7.4. In Yudhishtcr v. Ashok Kumar {Yudhishter r,. Ashok Kumar, (1987) I SCC 2041 this Court held thati (SCC p. 210, para l0) "10. Thrs question has becn considered b1 this Court in CWT v Chan<lt'r Sen [CWT t' Chancler Scn, (1986) 3 SCC 567 : 1986 SCC (Tax) tr4lj where one of us (Sab_\'asachi Mukharjr, J.) obsen,ed that under the Hindu la\r/, the moment a son is born, he gets a share in father's propert! ancl bccorres part of thc' coparcenary. His right accrlles to him not on the death of the father or inheritance from th(i [ath(]r but u,'ith the verv fact of his [>irth. Normallr', thereforc whenever th(] father gets a prop('rt-t frorn whatever source, from the grandfathcr or from arr-\- other source, be lt separated propcrty or not, hls son should have a share in that and it will becomc part of the joint l{indu fami\' o[ his son and grandson and other members uho lirnn joirrt Iiirrdu family with him. This Court obscrved that this position has been affected bl Scction 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and, therelbrc, after the Act, when the son inherited the propcrt-\ in the srtuation contemplated by Section 8, hc rlocs not take il as Karta of his og'n undivrded famih' but takes it in his individual capacity-" (emphasis supplied)

7.5. Alter the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 came into force, this position has undt:rgone a change. Post 1956, if a person inherits a self-acquircd propert-v from his paternal ancestors, the said property 8 SKS,J A.S.No.463 of 20lO I 1 l L)ecomes his self acquired propertl,, and does not rcInain coparcenan. property.

7.(). lf succession opened under the old IIindLl la\r i.c. prior to the commencement of the I Irndu Successron Act, 1956, the parties rvoulcL be govcrned b5 Mitakshara la$,. The propertt rnh(ri[ed l)\' a male Hindu from his patcrnal malc anccstor shall be coparr:enary propert) in his hands vis ;r vis lris male descendants up to three degrces tclou, lrirr. The nalure of propertv uill rr:mair as ( oDarcenary property even alter th(] conrrnencentent o[ lhe Hindu Succession Act, 1956. 7 7. ln the present case, the succcssiort openeri in lq5I on the death o[ tal Singh. TIre natrrre ol the propert\ inherited by his son Inder Singh u.as copitrcenary in nature. Even though Incler Singh [rad cflected a partition of the coparcenar_\ proF,:rt-\r arrongst his sons in 1964, thc nature ol thc propertf inhented by lncler Singh's sons r,roLrld r< rnain as coparcenary. propert-y qua their lnale rlt'sc,:ndants up to three degrees below thcm.

7.8. The judgrnent in Uttam v. Saubl.rag Singh ILltt.rm v. Saubhag Singh, (2O16) 4 SCC 618 : (2(t16) 2 SCC (Oiv) 5451 relied upon b_v the respondents rs n()t applicable to tho facts of the present t.asr: In UItam luttam v. Saubhag Singh, (2016) 4 SCC ()8 : l2Olitl 2 SCC (Civ) 5451 , the appellant therein r(as clirinring a share in the coparcenary propertv of his grirndfather, u'ho had died in 1973 before lhe appellant q,as lnrn. The succession opencd in l()73 afler thc Hindu Succession Act, 1956 came lnto 9 SKS,J A.S.No.463 of 201() force. The Court was concerned wrth the strare of the appellant s grandfather in the ancestrai property, and the impact of Section 8 of the Ilindu Succession Act, 1956. tn light of these facts, this Court held that after propcrt_\ is distributed in accordance with Section B of the tlindu Succcssion Act, 1956, such propert] ceases to bc joint famil\' property in the hands of thc various persons $,h() have succeeded to it. It was therefore held that the appellant was not a coparccner vis a vis the share of his grandfather. "

9. He further reiied upon the Judgment ol the Madras High Court in Jayaraman v. Rajendran and another 2 , wherein in paragraph No.9, it is hcld as follows "9. From a reading of the judgmcnt, it is well established that the plaintiff cannot be considercd as a cultivating tenant in thc eyes of laq,. 'I'hc verl. basis of getting the culti\aLing Len.u.lc]' riElht stand shattered on this aspect. Further, it is contendetl br the parties that the defendant was adopted I)) the said Pounammal on the contrary the plaioliff himself claims that hc is the foster son of the saiti Pounammal. This Court is unable to undcrstar)d as to how the foster son was given legal heir certificatc. It is well settled in lar{' that a foster son carnot inherit the property rights, but it is only the naturzrl legal heirs or the adopted son can inherit the property. The tlefendant claims that he was the adopted son. Even though no evidcnce q'as S.4.No.391 of 2014 and M. P. No. i of 2014, dated 09.09.2021 10 SKS,J A.S.t{o.463 of20IO pf()duccd, it is irrcumbent on the Tahsildar to Crrrluirc into the matter by issuing notice 1o all thc i)iu ties concerned. lt is also relevant to notc that thc lrl,Lintiil is nol thc ()nl] son but hehas brol hci-s and llrcir matcrnall atrnt Pounammal was mostly Jivrng \rrt11 hcr sist(r molher of the parties. In that event, tirt Tahsildar oughl to have issued notice to all the [)ilrlies lrrte]-esr-ed enquirecl and t]re same could llave rssLrecl tlre Iegal heir certrficate. It appears thal thu pl:rLntifi rrith the influencc of his post had obtrtined lcgal hcir- cerlificate q'ithout follorving thc proPer J)roredri|e. Ex.A5 is the transfer of patla in respect of S No..t75/ l6 in Iratta No.281 whereas thc dalC oI iir;,th of Pounammirl iras mentioned as 14.03.2004. I'l\ \6, the dcath certificate specifies the datr: of (l('iith ?rs 1.1.03.2002. Hence, it is very clear thal the cl.rtc ol- death merrtroncd in Ex.A5 is itlcorrect. It( sicics this in the evidence it is categoricaliy adnlittc(l that item No.3, the house propertr in S.\o.475/16 is not at all existirlg as it rvas rirliLpirlatcd onc. H(: $'ould further dePosc that no borh is irr possession of the property In that cvent, lhc clairn ol injunction without possession is irlso not susta r na ble. "

10. On thc olher hand, learncd counsel for the rcspondents submrtted th.rt therc is no illegality in the judgmelrt of the trial Court. FIe statc.l thal when the respondent was about five ycars old, his father passcd away, and as a resttlt, Pochaiah took c:rre oI thc respondent, nurtured him, and even arrangcd his m:rrriagr'. 'lhe rcspondent, in turn, took carc of Pocharah. 17 sr{s,J A.S. 0-463 of 2O1o Therefore, he argued that the respondent is entitled trr Pochaiah's share. He further submitted that the propertles wcre already partitioned long ago, and as such, Lhcrc is no question of a partition again. Hence, he prayed for the court to dismiss the appeal suit. 1 1. In support o[ his submissions, Iearncd counse I for the respondents rclied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in K.V. Muthu v. Angamuthu Ammal3, n'hcrcin in paragraph No.4, it is held as follows: "4. The appellant contested the application ancl raised the plea that Arunachala Bakthar $'as r)ot the natural son of the petitioner and consequelrth he rvould not be a 'member of the famil-\'" uithirl the meaning of Section 2(6 Al of the Act. 1'he petition. it was contended, was not maintainable and he rvas not liable to be evicted particularly as he had not committed wilful default in the payment of rent.

5. [t rvas found by thc Rent Controller that Arunachala Bakthar was the son of deccascd Thiruvannamalai Bakthar and, therefore, the petition was maintainable for the eviction of the appeltant lrom the premises in question on the ground o[ bona l]de need oI the resPondent hersclf and that of Arunachala Bakthar. He consequctrtl] '1tssz1 z ssc sl 1,2 SKS,J A.S.No.463 of 20lO .j .rllowed the petition on the ground ol bona fide rreecl, though it was found by him that the apl)cllant ha(l nor cornmitted uiltll default in payment of rent. 7 .llrr. r-espondcnt challenged this decrsion ur the IIi!1h Court u here a learned Singlc Judge (S. Mohan, .j.. :rs hc thcn was) doubted the decisron ir.t ll;rrhibudi Ananrlar v Covindan [(i981) 1 MI-l 25Ol , arrrl referrc<l the mattcr to a Division Bench lor clrr:rsiorr orr tht: clucstion whether a foster son $ould bc ir oreml>er of the farnilv oi the landlord rvithin the nrr':rning of Section 2(6 A) of the Act. The Di\,1sion lJcrclr rcr.r:rscd thc decision of the Single Judge and ircl(l tl)at ir'fostcr son" would br: a membt:r oi the frrrriY ancl, therelbre. the petition filed b1' the rcsponclcnl for thc eviction of the appellant from the I)r.ulses in qucstion lbr bona fide need of herself irn(l tlrat of her 'firstcr son" Arunachala Bakthar rtas rn;rintarnablc. It is against thls decision thal the at)p.llzrnt has come up Ln appeal before this Court. 8 'i hc lcarned counsel for tlre appellant has r:ontcnded thaL "family" has to be given the mearing rvhic h is commonly understood b_v an ordinary rnan r,.nt1. thercforc. 'famih" rvould include onlv natural sorrs anrl not lbste. son". The lcarned counsel for the |cspo!)dcnl, on the contrary, contends that sin('(' the dcfinition of "family" as set out in the Act is a;r arlilicial definilron. its natural or common neilnir)g cannot bc adopted. "Family", it cont, ndcrl, is a r,r'ord o[ grcat flexibitit-y and has to [)e ir]terprcted jn thc context of the Act with the reslrlr that not only those who are related bv blood or lr.ir!lagc, Lrut others also rvoul<l be included in it. \ 13 SKS.J A.S.No.z163 of 2O1O

9. Sectron 2(6 A) provides as under "2. (6-Al 'member of his familf in relation to a landlord means his spouse, son, daughtcr, grandchild or dependant parent," 1O. Apparcntl\', it appears that thc definition is conclusive as the word "means" has been used to speci[ the members, namely, spouse, son, daughtcr, grandchitd or dependant parent, lvho would constitute the family. Section 2 of thc Act ir'\ uhich various terms have becn delilred, opens u'iltr thc words "in this Act, unless the context otheru'ise requircs" rvhich indicates that the definitions, as lor example, that of "family", rvhich are Indicated to bc conclusrve maj- not be treated to be concluslve if it was otherwise required by the context. This implies that a defrnition, like any other word in a statute, has to be read in the light of the context an(l scheme of the Act as also the object for $'hich thc Act r('as made by the legislature.

33. ln view o[ the above facts and circumstances. Arunachala Bakthar was clearly a member o[ the family of the respondent's husband within the meaning of Section 2(6-A) of the Act and consequently, thc respondent could well file an application for- eviction of the appellant lrom tht: premises in question not only for her need but also Ior the need of her "FOSTER SON", Arunachalar lJakthar." l 1,4 SKS,J A.S.No.463 of 20lO

12. 1'hc points that arise for consideration in this appeal 1l U/lrether thcre r\as arl\. prior partition ol the suit s( lrcdule l)ropcrt\, iis coirtendcd b_v the delcndant, rn the ., c:rr 1949? \Vlrcther thc plainliff is entitled to a half share in the suit sc lredu Ic l)ropert_\. Wlrcttrer llte jLrdgrnent ()f the trial Corrrt rvar rants anv intcrfercnct.? Point Nos.i and ii:

13. In thc light o[ th(, sul)missrons made l)y both the learnecl c.\r-rnscl and a p(,rus.tl of the material ilvailable on record, the plainriffs assertecl that the joint famiJy properties had not bccrr partitioned and sought division ancl separate possession ot thcir allcgccl half share. However, the defendant collntered tltis b1 producing a substanti:rl body of docume ntarr' cvidence, inclrroing Exs.B i to Il4S, to demonstrate that partition occurred in the year 1949 and that "A" schedulc propert], was exclusi\rely owned b1 pochaiah, from u,hom r.itc defcndant claims to have inherited rl. 15 SKS,J A.S.No..+63 of 201O

14. A close scrutiny of the revenue records, parlicularly Ex.B 1 (sale deed in Pochaiah's name), Ex.B2 (Khasra Pahani for 1954-55), :tnd the subsequent pahanis up to 1999, rei,cals that the land u,as consistently recorded in the names o[ Pochaiah and Iater jointly with the defendanl. This long- standing documentary trail strongly suggests possession and ownershrp by Pochaiah and the defendant, unchallenged for dccadcs. Furthcr, lhe revenuc records show the defendant as the son of Pochaiah, indicating that for all practical and administrative purposes, he was treated as such, even i[ no formal adoplion deed exists.

15. Thc judgmcnt in Arshnoor Siugh (supra) rciteratcs that propcrty inheritcd belore the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, r.l.ould rctain its coparcenary character under Mitakshara lau'. Hor,r.ever, u,hcre the properly is acquired post-partition or is self-acquired, it would not be subject to claims of ol-her coparcencrs. In the present case, the evidence points to Pochaiah having purchased the property individually aftcr partition, and thus it constitutes his self acquired property. The plerintifls havc r-rot produced credible evidence ro rebut this position. 16 sKs,J A.S.No.z+63 of 2010

16. The plaintiffs reliance on the prcsurnption of joint family propeltv is mispltrct'd in light of the clc:rr demarrcat.ion of ounership rn rcvenLle reoords and l.rck of challcnge over the -"--ears. Furthr:r, the plaintil'ls failecl to cxplain thc omission of signifir:ant far:ts such as Surve-r, No.53, which snpports the inlcrcncc of prior partitlon.

17. 1'hc argument that a fosLcr sorr has no inhcritance righls is adclrcsscd by ttrc Supre mc Court in K.V. Muthu (suprzi), rvhicir ercknou,lcclgcs that ltr(' term "[amily" can be intcrllretc.l broadly dept'nding on thr: staLutor'.1 context. Although fostcring alonc rlocs r.rot cst:rblish lcgal heirship unde r- succession la',t's, iong standing trcatmcnl of the defendant as Pochaiah's scin ancl thc abscnr:e of anv competing heirship claims lrom Pochaiah's side lend credence to tht-' defendant's cl:rim, particularly in light of the Llnconte sted docume ntarv trail. l8- Additionallv, the plain rilTs' ou n n,irnesscs cor.rceded that the dcfcndant u,as ir-r posscssion and cultivation o[ the land for mo rt-- than:r decade, weakcning the plea of joint possession aud tht: need for partition. Thcir or-al evidencc failed to n 17 SKS,J 4.S.No..153 of 201O support thcir case, ar-rd key documents like Ex.A1 were shon'n Lo be inconsistent or questionable-

19. In vicu' thercof, thcre was a prior partition of the family properLies, and "A" schcclule property came to be owned by Pochaiah exclusivelr,. Further, the defendant, having been fostered by Pochaiah and recognized as his son in ofllcial records, has bccn in continuous possession of the said I property and is entirled to claim exclusive ownership. The plaintiffs lailecl to establish either joint ownership or entitlemen t to a share in the "A" schedule property. Point No.iii:

20. ln vieu ol thc zrbove discussion in point Nos.i and ii, there is no illegality in the judgment of the trial Court. The trial Court discusscd all thc issues and it is a well reasoned judgment and there arc no grounds to interfere in lhe judgment. 2).. In vieu, thcreof, this Appeal Suit is dismissed confirming the judgment and de cree date d 17 .12.2OO9 passed in 13 SI<S,J A S.l{o.463 of 2010 -l O.S.No.8 of 20O6 by the Vt Additiorral Scnior Civil 'Iuclge, Fast Track Court, Me dchal, Ranga Redcll District- Tlrere shall be no order as to costs. Miscclllrncous :tpplications, ii arlr" pcnding shall stand closecl To, //TRUE COPY// SD/- A.V.S. PRASAD DEPUW REGISTRAR SECTION OFFICER

1. The Vl Additional Senior Civil Judge, Fast Track Court, Medchal, Ranga Reddy District. (WITH RECORDS )

2. One CC to Sri VADEENDRA JOSH|, Advocate (OpUC) 3. One CC to SRl. K.V. MALLIKARJUNA RAO, Advocate [OPUC] 4. Two CD Copies kul/gh HIGH COURT DATED:18/06/2025 + DECREE JUDGMENT AS.No.463 of 2010 ( ,q \J (J '.::. i iIC J Te Trl 2 B JUN 206 '-:.'-:. \ "': DISMISSING'fHE APPEAL SUIT WITHOUT COSI'S 6lar .t,- -.}, .F-. :!/ - IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA AT HYDERABAD WEDNESDAY,THE EIGHTEENTH DAY OF JUNE TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE PRESENT THE HONOURABLE SMT JUSTICE K. SUJANA APPEAL SUIT NO: 463 OF 2010 Between:

1. Kudali Laxmaiah, S/o.Late Hanumaiah Agriculture R/o. Suraram Village, Quthubullapur Mandal and Muncipality, Ranga Reddy District.

2. Kudali Rukkamma, Wo. Venkataiah Housewife R/o. Suraram Village, Quthubullapur Mandal and Muncipality, Ranga Reddy District.

3. Kudali Raviander, S/o. Late Venkataiah Private Service R/o. Surarain Village, Quthubullapur Mandal and Muncipali!y, Ranga Reddy District.

4. Kudali Vinodh, S/o. Late Venkataiah Private Service R/o. Suraram Village, Quthubullapur Mandal and Muncipality, Ranga Reddy District. ...APPELLANTS/ Plaintiffs AND '1 . Kudali Pentaiah, S/o. Late Papaiah, Occ: Agriculture R/o. Suraram Village, Quthubullapur Mandal and Municipality, Ranga Reddy District. (Died per LRs R2 and R3)

2. Kudali Krishna, S/o.Late Pentaiah, Aged 56 years, Occ.Agriculture, R/o. H. No,2-070/5, Suraram Village, Qutubullapur Mandal and Municipality, Ranga Reddy District.

3. Kudali Papaiah, S/o.Late Pentaiah, Aged 42 Years, Occ.Agriculture, R/o.H.No.2-070/5, Suraram Village, Qutubullaopur Mandal and Municipality, Ranga Reddy District. ( C.T. amended in l.A.no. 3 of 2019 is Carried out as R2 and R 3 are LRs of deceased Rl in A.S.No 463 of 2010 vide C.O. dated 26-07-2019) .RESPONDENTS Appeal Under Section 96 of C.P.C. against the Judgment and Decree dated Vl 17 -12-2009 in O.S.no. 8 of 2006 on the file of the Court of the Additional Senior Civil Judge, Fast Track Court, Medchal, Ranga Reddy District. The appeal coming on for hearing, upon perusing the Memorandum of grounds filed in the Appeal, the Judgment and Decree of the Lower Court and the record in the case and upon hearing the arguments of Sri Badendra Joshi, Advocate on behalf of the Sri N. Vijay, Advocate for the Appellant and of Sri K.V. Mallikarjuna Rao, Advocate for Respondents. This Court doth order and decree as follows:

1. That the Appeal Suit be and hereby is dismissed. 2. fhat the judgment and decree dated 17-12-2OOg passed in O.S.No. 8 of 2006 by the Vl Additional Senior Civil Judge, Fast Track Court, Medchal, Ranga Reddy District be and hereby is ' confirmed and 3. That there shall be no order as to costs - //TRue coPy// SD/- A.V.S. PRASAD DEPUW REGISTRAR I SECTION Judge, Fast Track Court, Medchal, OFFICER To

1. The Vl Additional Senior Civil Ranga Reddy District.

2. Two C.D.Copies HIGH COURT DATED:18/06/2025 DECREE AS.No.463 ot 2010 DISMISSING THE APPEAL SUIT WITHOUT COSTS I b le(