The High Court · 2025

Judgment

i I ,i ,I I t: THE HONOURABLE SMT. JUSTICE K. SUJANA APPEAL SUIT No.SOS of 2OL2 JUDGMENT: challenging the judgment and decree dated 2o.ol.2ol2 passed in O.S.No.253 of 20/0/6 by the learned III Additional District and Sessions Judge (FTC), Ranga Reddy District, the present Appeal Suit is f-rled.

2. The brief facts of the case are that the plaintiff filed a suit for specific performance and possession based on an agreement of sale dated 06.10.2005, allegedly executed by defendant No.1, for a consideration of Rs.13,56,7501-, of which Rs.4,O0,0OOl- had been paid. The plaintiff relied on corroborative evidence, including oral depositions (P.Ws.1 and 2l and documentary evidence (Exs.A-1 to A-10), demonstrating both execution of the agreement and his continued readiness to perform. Defendant No.1 denied executing the agreement and contended the propertjr was ancestral. Defendant Nos.2 and 3, impleaded as legal representatives and co-sharers, reaffirmed that the property was ancestral and had been allotted to them in a previous 2 SKS,J A.S.No.SOS of ?Ol2 i '...1 partition suit vide O.S.No. 1 18.of 2006, finalized rhrough a Lok Adalat arvard. The trial Court held that while thr: execution of the agreement was proved, it was not enforceable against the full extent of the property as defendant No.1 lacked exclusive title. The trial Court observed that defendant No.l could alienate only his L /3,4 undivided share, particularly since the agreement did not purport to be executed by delendant No.1 as kartha or on behalf of other co-parceners. As such, the suit was decreed in part: specific performance was granted for the share of defendant No.1 alone, subject to :he plaintiff depositing the balance consideration of Rs.52,250 /- with L2oh interest. The prayer of the plaintiff for entire possession was declined; instead, he was granted liberty to pursue partition and allied remedies under Section 22 of the Specific Relief Act. I The trial Court thus balanced contractual obligations with coparcenary rights by limiting enforcement to individual share of defendant No.1. Aggrieved thereby, the present appeal suit is filed.

3. Heard Sri Vedula Srinivas, learned Senior Counsel representing Smt. Vedula Chithralekha, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant as well as Sri Police 3 SKS,J A.S.l{o.5O5 of 2OL2 Venkat Reddy, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents.

4. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court is contrary to settled legal principles, the weight of evidence, and the overall probabilities of the case and that the trial Court failed to take into consideration the amended pleadings brought on record through I.A.No.237 of 2OO8, specifically Paragraph Nos.S(a) and 5(b), and the additional relief sought therein, namely, the plea that the partition decree in O.S.No.118 of 2006 (Ex.B1) is a collusive one and not binding on the plaintiff. He further submitted that the trial Court, however, overlooked this crucial amendment and rendered findings without adjudicating that prayer, thereby vitiating the judgilent.

5. Learned counsel for the appellant argues that the agreement of sale in Ex.A- 1 unequivocally records that the first defendant was the absolute owner of the suit land at the time of execution, and the plaintiff acted upon this representation and that the defence now taken by the defendant No.l that the property was ancestral and hence 4 SKS'J A.S.No.SO-S of 2OL2 jointly o\ ined is not only an afterthought but also remains unsubstantiated, particularly since defendant Nrt.l chose not to enter the witness box. He further submitted that as per the law laid clown by the Hon'lcle Supreme Court in AIR 1999 SC I44L, such failure to testify mandates drawingl an adverse inference against him.

6. Learned counsel for the appellant conten<led that the alleged partition decree (Ex.B 1), passed subsequently in favour of his minor children through a compromise in the Lok Adalat, lacks probative value and that the nrinors were represented by their mother and were impleaded only later in the present suit. Their testimony after attaining majority cannot retrospectively validate the partition, especially when no documentary evidence has been liled to establlsh the joint famity nature of the property. Therefore, he submitted that the trial Court had no basis to limit the relief of specific performance to only 1/3rd of the property, particutlarly when all findings otherwise support the case of the plaintiff.

7. Learned counsel for the appellant further contended that the trial Court exceeded its scope by delving into the 5 sKs,J A.S.![o.SOS of 2Ol2 question of partitionability of the suit land, which was not necessary for determining the enforceability of the agreement of sale. The suit being one for specific performance, the limited role of the court was to examine the validity and enforceability of the sale agreement, which stood clearly proved through oral and documentary evidence. Therefore, he prayed the Court to set aside the judgment of the trial Court by allowing this Appeal Suit.

8. In support of his submissions, learned counsel for the appellant relied upon the judgments of the Honble Supreme Court are as follows: a. In the case of Vidhyadhar v. Manikraol, wherein in paragraph No. 17, it is held as follows r

17. Where a party to the suit does not appear in the witness-box and states his own case on oath and does not offer himself to be cross-examined by the other side, a presumption would arise r that the case set up by him is not correct as has been held in a series of decisions passed by various High Courts and the Privy Council beginning from the decision in Sardar t lrsss; 3 scc s73 6 SKS,J A.S.Ho.SOS of 2Ot2 GurbakLsh Singhv. Gurdtal Singh [AIR 1922 pC 23O : 32 CWN 1191 . This was followed b1. the Lahore High Court in Kirpa Singh v. Ajaipat Singh [AIR 1930 Lah 1: ILR 1l Lah 1421 and the Bombay High Court in Martand pandharinat,tt Chaudhari v. Radtwbai Krishnarao Deshmukh |AIR 1931 Bom 97 : 32 Bom LR 9241 . Thr: Madhya Pradesh High Court in Gutta Kharagjit rlarpenter v. Narsingh Nandkishore Rawat IAIR, .1970 MP 225 : l97O MPLJ 586l also foilowed the l'}rivy Council decision in Sard.ar Gurbakhsh Singh case [AIR 1927 PC 23O : 32 CWN 1t9l . T'he Allahabad High Court in Arjun Singh v. ltirendra lVafh [AIR 1971 All 29] held that it a party abstains from entering the witness-box, it would give rise to an adverse inference against him. Similarly, a Division Bench of the punjab arrd Haryana High Court in Bhagutan Dass r,. Bhishan Chand IAIR l9Z4 p&H Zl drew a presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence Act, 1872 against a party who did not enter the witness-box b. In tfre case of Arshnoor Singh v. Harpal Kaur 2 , wherein in paragraph No.7.3, it is held as follows:

7.3. Under Mitakshara law, whenever a male ancestor inherits any property from any of his paternal ancestors up to three degrees above him, then his male legal heirs up to three ' 1zozo1 14 scc 436 I ,i !r 7 sKs,J A.S.!to.5o5 of 2OL2 degrees below him, would get an equal right as coparceners in that property. c. In the case of Bhoop Singh a. Ram Singh Mqiof , 'wherein in paragraph No.13, it is held as follows:

13. In other words, tlte court must enqurre whether a document has recorded unqualified and unconditional words of present demise of right, title and interest in the property and included the essential terms of the same; if the document, including a compromise memo' extinguishes the rights of one and seeks to confer right, title or interest in praesenti in favour of the other, relating to immovable property of the value of Rs lOO and upwards, the document or record or compromise memo shall be compulsorily registered. In the case of Gram Panchayat of village NSulakha v. d. Ujagar Singh+, wherein in paragraph Nos.7 and 8, it is held as follows:

7. The law in England also appears to be the same, that no independent suit is necessary. In Spencer-Bouter and Turner on Res Judicata (2nd Edn., 1969) it is stated (para 359) that there are exceptions to the principle of res judicata. If the t (rggs) s scc 709 o (zooo) 7 scc 543 8 SKS,J rl.S.No.sOS of 2OL2 i \ party setting up res judicata as an estoppel has alleged all the elements of an estoppel (i.e:. ingredients of res judicata), it is still open to th,: latter (the opposite party) to defeat the estoppel by setting up and establishing certain affirmativr: iinswers. Of these there are four main classes -- liaud, cross-estoppel, contract and public policy The authors clearly say that no actiuc, proceedings for "rescissron' of the earlier judgment are necessary. They state (para 370) as follows: "'lhe avoidance of a judicial act on the ground of fraud or collusion is effected not onlg bg actiue proceedings rfor rescr'ssion ... but also by setting up the fraud as a defence to an action on the dccision, or as an answer to any case which, rvhether by way of estoppel or otherwise, depends for its success on the decision being trr:ated as incontrovertible." Thus, the law is well settled that no independent ,1 suit as a condition precedent is necessary.

8. Collusion, say Spencer-Bower and Turner (para 378), is essentially play-acting by two or more persons for one common purpose - a con.certed performance of a fabula disguised as a judicium - an unreal and frctitious pretence of a contest by confederates whose game is the same. As stated by Lord Selborne, L.C. in Bosutell v. Cooks [(1894) 6 Rep L6T :86 LT 36Sn (HL)] : 9 sKs,J A.S.No.SOS of 2Ol2 There is no Judge; but a person invested with the ensigns of a judicial office, is misemployed in listening to a fictitious cause proposed to him, there is no party litigating ... no real interest brought into question and to use the words of a very sensible civilian on this point, fabula non judicium, hoc est; in scena, non in foro, res agitur. That, in our view, is the true meaning of the word "collusion" as applied to a judicial proceeding. [n the case of Angadi Chandranna Versus Shankar e. and Otherss, wherein in paragraph No.17, it is held as follows: L7. lt cannot be disputed that the properties divided among Defendant No. 1 and his brothers through partition deed dated 09.05.1986, are joint family properties. However, as per Hindu J Iaw, after partition, each party gels a separate aTd distinct share and this share becomes their self-acquired property and they have absolute rights over it and they can sell, transfer, or bequeath it as they wish. Accordingly, the properties bequeathed through partition, become the self-acquired properties of the respective sharers t zozs scc online sc877 10 SKS,J A.S.No.SOS of 2OL2

9. On the other hand, learned counsel for tht: respondents submitted that there is no illegality in the judgment and decree pztssed by the trial Court from any legal infirmity and is in accordance with settled principles of law and that the suit property is a joint family propert5r, and therefore, defendant No.1 alone did not have the authority to unilatereLlly enter into an agreernent of sale in respect of the entire propert5r. He further submitted that in his written statement, defendant No.1 had categorically denied the execution of tLre agreement of sale as alleged and had also clearly contested the 1egal notices issued bv the appellant and that the trial rlourt rightly appreciated the evidence on record, and instead c,f dismissing the suit in its entirel5r, as was warranted, extended equitable relief by granting specilic performance only to tl:re extent of l/3ra undivided share of defendant No.l. He "orpt"rd.d there is no credible evidence from the appellant r-o rebut the joint family character of the suit property, and the execution of the agreement by defendant No.1 cannot bind the shares of the other co-parceners. Therefore, as there are r.o merits in the appeal, he prayed the Court to dismiss the appeal suit. TL SKS,J A.S.No.SOS of 2OL2

10. In support of his submissions, learned counsel for the respondents relied upon the Judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and this Court are as follows: a. In the case of Rohit Chauhan v. Surinder Singh, wherein in paragraph No.7 to 14, it is held as follows:

7. The relevant portion of the judgment of the lower appellate court reads as follows: "13. In the light of abovesaid precedents it can be readily concluded that only when the property which is received by a person from his ancestors by survivorshiP can be held to be ancestral/coparcenary property and any other property which although, might have been received from the ancestors by means of will or consent decree or a father partitioned the property, will lose its character as that of il coparcenary property and will become self- acquired property in the hands of the person receiving it. Applying these precedents to the facts of the present case, this Court will conclude that approximately 96 kanals of land was received by Gulab Singh from his father Budhu on the basis of consent decree or on the basis of will and not by survivorship and this property lost the character of coparcenary property and was self-acquired property of Gulab Singh. The version of the plaintiff-Respondent 1 in the present case is that rest of the property t2 sKs,J A.S.IIo.5O5 of 2Ol2 was acquired by Gulab Singh with the funds originated from joint Hindu family property arLd the said property also assumed the character :f joint Hindu family property, also cannot trc sustained because the major chunk of land in the hands of Gulab Singh has been held to L,e non-ancestral property and rather self-acquired property of Gulab Singh.

14. Once the property involved in the suit has been held to be self-acquired property of Gulalt Singh then Gulab Singh was having every right lo deal rvith the same in any manner he likerl and no embargo can be put on the rights of tlulab Singh as rvell as his rights to alienate the suit property are concerned and thus neither- release deed nor sale deeds executed by Gulat Singh can be questioned by anyone much less try son of Gulab Singh...." A.ccordingly, the lower appellate court allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment and I decree of the trial court and dismissed the suit.

8. The plaintiff, aggrieved by the same, preferred st:cond appeal and the High Court dismissed [Ilohit Chauhan v. Suinder Singta RSA No. 1992 ol'2OI1, order dated 4-5-2011 (P&H)l the second appeal in limine and, while doing so, observed as follows: "... Finding of the lower appellate court that the suit land is not proved to be ancestral or 73 SKS,J A.S.No.SOS of 2OL2 coparcenary property is fully justified by the documentary evidence and admitted facts...." This is how the plaintiff is before us. Leave granted.

9. Mr L. Nageswara Rao, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant-plaintiff submits that at the time when the plaintiffs f,ather Gulab Singh got the property in partition, it was his separate property vis-d.-vis his relations but after the birth of the plaintiff on 25-3-1982, the plaintiff acquired interest in the property as a coparcener. Mr Satinder S. Gulati, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent-defendants, however, submits that once the property fell into the share of the plaintiff s father Gulab Singh, it lost the character ofa coparcenary property and the said status will not change on the birth of the plaintiff. He points out that even if plaintiff Rohit Chauhan was born at the time of partitiong between Defendant 2, his father and brothers, the plaintiff would not have got any share under Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act. 1O. In support of the submission Mr Rao has placed reliance on a judgment of this Court in Bhanwar Singh v. Puran [(2008) 3 SCC 87 : (2008) 1 SCC (Civl 7791, and our attention has been drawn to the following passage from the said judgment: (SCC pp. 9O-91, para 13) 74 sKs,J ,l.S.Ito.SOS of 2OL2 "13. Section 6 of the Act, as it stood at the relevant time, provided for devolution of interest in the coparcenary property. Section 8 lays down the general rules of succession that the property of a male dying intestate devolves according to the provisions of the Chapter as specified in Clause (1) of the Schedule. In the Schedul: .appended to the Act, natural sons anrl ,laughters are placed as Class I heirs but a grandson, so long as father is alive, has not beerr included. Section 19 of the Act provides that in l.he event of succession by two or more heirs, they will take the property per capita and not per' sltripes, as also tenants-in-common and not as joint tenants." l. 1. We have bestowed our consideration to the rival submissions and we find substance in the submission of Mr Rao. In our opinion coparcenary property means the property which consists of ancestral property and a coparcener w'ould mean a person who shares equally *t,n,, others in inheritance in the estate of common ancestor. Coparcenary is a narrower body than ttre joint Hindu family and before the commencement of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, only male members of the family used to acquire by birth an interest in the coparcenary property. A coparcener has no dehnite share in the coparcenary property but he has an undivided interest in it and one has to bear in mind that it enlarges by deaths and diminishes by births in the family. It is not stzrtic. We are further of the opinion that so long, 75 sKs,J A.S.No.SOS of 2Or2 on partition an ancestral property remains in the hand of a single person, it has to be treated as a separate property and such a person shall be entitled to dispose of the coparcenary property treating it to be his separate property but if a son is subsequently born, the aiienation made before the birth cannot be questioned. But, the moment a son is born, tJre property becomes a coparcenary property and the son would acquire interest in that and become a coparcener.

12. The view which we have taken f-rnds support from a judgment of this Court in M. Yogendrav. Leelamma /V. [(2009) 15 SCC l8a: QOO9) 5 SCC (Civ) 602l in which it has been held as follows: (SCC p. 192, para29l "29. lt is now well settled in view of several decisions of this Court that the property in the hands of a sole coparcener allotted to him in partition shall be his separate property for the same shall revive only when a son is born torl him. It is one thing to say that. the property remains a coparcenary property but it is another thing to say that it revives. The distinction between the two is absolutely clear and unambiguous. In the case of former any sale or alienation which has been done by the sole surrrivor coparcener shall be valid whereas in the case of a coparcener any alienation made by the karta would be valid."

13. Now referring to the decision of this Court in Bhanwar Singh [(2008) 3 SCC 87 : (2OO8) 1 SCC t6 sKs,J A.S.No.SOS of 2012 (Civl 7791relied on by the respondents, the sanre is clearly distinguishable. In the said case ttre issue '"vas in relation to succession whereas in the present case we are concerned rvith tLe status of the plaintiff vis-a-vis his father who got property on partition of the ancestral property.

14. A person, who for the time being is the sole surviving coparcener as in the present cas,l Gulab Singh was, before the birth of the plaintiff , ''vas entitled to dispose of the coparcenarl' property as if it were his separate property. Gulab Singh, till the birth of plaintiff Rohit- Chauhan, was competent to sell, mortgage and cleal with the property as his property in the manner he liked. Had he done so before the birth of plaintiff, Rohit Chauhan, he rvas not competent to object to the alienation made b-v his father before he was born or begotten. But, in the present case, it is an admitted position that the property which Defendant 2 got on partition was an ancestral property and till the birth of the plaintiff he was the sole surviving coparcener but the moment plairitiff was born, h)e got a share in the father's property and became a coparcener. As observed earlier, in view of the settled legal position, the property in the hands of Defendant 2 allotted to him in partition was a separate property till the birth of the plaintiff and, therefore, after his birth Defendant 2 could have alienated the property only as karta for legal necessitf. It is nobody's case that Defendant 2 executed the sale deeds and release deed as karta for any legal necessity. 17 sKsi,J A.S.Xo.SOS of 2OL2 Hence, the sale deeds and the release deed executed by Gulab Singh to the extent of entire coparcenary property are illegal, null and void. However, in respect of the property which would have fallen in the share of Gulab Singh at the time of execution of sale deeds and release deed, the parties can work out their remedies in appropriate pioceeding. b. In the case of S. Kondaiah v. C. Sreenivasa Rao, wherein in paragraph No.9, it is held as follows:

9. The appellant tried to overcome the situation by pleading that the 3rd respondent figured as a witness, and since the u,hereabouts of the 2nd respondent were not known, as on the date of the agreement, his wife too joined as a witness. It does not need any effort to maintain the distinction between an executant on the one hand, and the witness, on the other hand. The terms of the agreement are binding on thei executant, and none else. The role.played by the wjtness is nothing, but the one, connoting his or her presence at the time of the transaction. At the most, one can attribute knowledge of the transaction, to the witness. The terms of a contract are not binding on every one who knows the transaction. By no stretch of imagination, a witness can be treated, or become a party to the transaction, nor would he be bound by the terms of the contract. 18 SKS,J ,{.S.t{o.SOS of 2OL2

10. It is only when the executant ol' an agreement pleads that he has the consent of the persons, who figured as witnesses, that a situation may emerge, lvhere the witnesses neeC to explain their stand. In the instant case, the specific plea of the lst respondent was that he intended to sell his share of the property, and not the entire property, covered by Ex. 82. Ther,: did not exist any necessit5r for the respondents 1l :and 3, to extricate themselves from the transaction, because they were never party to it. c. In the case of Kammana Sambamurthy v. Kalipatnapu Atchutamma, wherein in paragraph No.23, it is held as follows:

23. ln Kartar Singhv. Harjinder Singh [(1990) 3 SCC 517] this Court was concerned with a case u'here vendor brother and a sister had each half- share in the suit properties. The agreement for the sale was executed by the brother concerning ttre suit properties in which the sister had half- share. The sister was not executant to the agreement; rather she refused to accept the agreement. The question for consideration before this Court was whether the agreement could be enforced against the vendor brother to the extent of his half-share. This Court considered Section 12 and held as under: (SCC pp. 520-21, paras 5- 6) 79 sKs,J A.S.I[o.SOS of 2Ol2 "5. We are, therefore, of the view that this is not a case which is covered by Section 12 of the Act. It is clear from Section 12 that it relates to the specific performance of a part of a contract. The present is not a case of the performance of a part of the contract but of the whole of the contract so far as the contracting party, namely, the respondent is concerned. Under the agreement, he had contracted to sell whole of his property. The two contracts viz. for the sale of his share and of his sister's share were separate and were severable from each other although they were incorporated in one agreement. In fact, there was no contract between the appellant and the respondent's sister and the only valid contract was with the respondent in respect of his share in the property.

6. As regards the difficulty pointed out by the High Court, namely, that the decree of specific performance cannot be granted since the property will have to be partitioned, we are of the view that this is not a legal diffrculty. Whenever a share in the property is sold the vendee has a right to apply for the partition of the property and get the share demarcated. We also do not see any diffrculty in granting specific performance merely because the properties are scattered at different places. There is no law that ' the properties to be sold must be situated dt one place. As regards the apportionment of consideration, since admittedly the appellant and the respondent's sister each have half-share in the properties, the consideration can easily be 20 sKs,J ,{.S.{p.SOS of 2OL2 reduced by 5O per cent which is what the fir,st appellate court has rightly done." 1 1. The points that arise for consideration in this appeal are:

1. ll. Whether the trial Court erred in granting specific performance only to the extent of one-third sherre of deferidiiAt No.1, despite allegations that the subsequent partition decree in O.S.No.1 18 of 2O06 was collusive and not binding on the appellant? Whether the execution of the agreement of sale by defendant No. 1, who represented himself as, the absolute owner and accepted a part of the sale consideration, could be enforced in full against the entire property, or only against his individual strare. L2. Having regard to the submissions advance,l by both the learned counsel and upon a careful perusal of the material placed orr fecord, it appears that the appeal cleallenges the partia:Fi*ecr€e-passed in O.S.N o.253 of 2f/06, wherein the trial Court acknowledged the execution of the agreement of sale dated 06.10.2OO5 by defendant No.1 and receipt of Rs.4,O0,0OOl- towards sale consideration, and also upheld the issuance of legal notice by the plaintiff. 2L SKS,J A.S.No.SOS of 2Ol2

13. However, the trial Court declined to enforce the agreement beyond the I /3,4 undivided share of defendant No.l on the ground that the suit schedule propert5r was ancestral in nature, forming part of a partition decree in O.S.No.118 of 2006, finalized through a compromise in a Lok Adalat. The trial Court reasoned that the terms of the contract were binding only on the executants, defendant No.1, and not on defendant Nos.2 and 3, who were not parties to the agreement.

14. The appellant rightly contends that the amendment sought through I.A.No.237 of 2OO8, particularly the plea that the partition decree is collusive, was not adjudicated by the trial Court. In the case of Gram Panchayat of Village Naulakha (cited supra), the Honble Supreme Court observed that collusion in judicial proceedings can be raised as a defense without requiring a separate suit. The failure of defendant No.1 to disclose the pre-existing agreement of sale in the partition suit significantly taints the decree, thereby lending weight to the appellant's claim of collusion. Therefore, decree in partition suit is nothing but a collusive suit to cause loss to the appellant herein, said decree cannot be a ground to 22 sKs,J .l.S.Ito.SOS of 2OL2 refuse the relief in the present suit. The trial Court erred in not considering this aspect.

15. Further, reliance placed by the aopellant on Vidhyadhar (cited supra) supports the contention that the trial court ought to have drawn an adverse inference against defendant..No.l for failing to enter the witness bo>l and submit to cross-examination. The silence of defendants, especially after accepfting consideration and executing the: agp6sment, ; undermines the credibility of the defence raised in the written statement.

16. Furt.hermore, the contention that the suit propert5r is ancestral also stands on fragile ground. The rel.Lance of the respondents on Rohit Chauhan and S. Kondaiah (cited supra) is well-noted, but in the present case, no credible documenterry evidence has been produced to es[ablish that the property remained joint family properer at the time of execution gf the agreement. on the contrary, it is clear that ::i defendan,,,Ho.l represented himself as the absolute owner, received consideration, and never disclosed the transaction in "i 23 sxs,J A.S.No.SOS of 2012 the subsequent partition proceedings, thereby creating an equitable estoppel.

17. However, in view of the settled position in Kartar Singh (cited supra), a contract by one co-sharer can be specihcally enforced at least to the extent of his share, even if other sharers are not parties. Therefore, this Court is of the holds that there is no illegality in the decision of the trial Court to confine the relief to one-third share of defendant No. 1. Yet, giveri the admitted execution of the agreement and receipt of consideration, defendant No.1 cannot now escape performance of his obligation.

18. In view of the above discussion, the judgment of the trial Court is modilied to the extent that defendant No.l is directed to execute a registered sale deed in favour of the plaintiff for the alleged property as follows: l. The appellant/plaintiff shall deposit the balance sale consideration of Rs.52,250/- in the trial Court within a period of one month from the date of receipt of a copy of the order. 24 sKs,J A.S.Nq.SOS oI2Ot2 It Itr. Upon such deposit, defendant No. I shall execute and register the sale deed within a period of one rrtonth, with defendants Nos.2 and 3 joining for effective cor.rveyance. If defendant No. I fails to execute the sale deed, the plaintiff is permitted to have it executed th.rough the Court process. 19' -Ia vi,ew -thereof, this Appeal Suit is arowed in part. There shall be no order as to costs. Miscellaneous applications, if any pending, shall. stand closed NOTE: This Judoment is amended as per the Court order datei 21_ol_2o2s i. r e]v" .1 of 2s by modifying ,,suit property" with ,,alleged in the Paragraph No.1g, f_in" f.fo.i."" This amended Judgment substitutes the earlier Judgment cJespatche d on 2g_Ol_2025. property,, !-Ofe:^f!f Jr,rdgment and decree is amended as per C"odt.03/11t2025 in t.A f.fo.Z of ZAiiOV modifying the OS No.253 of ZOOOJnstead of OS No.253 of 2008. This amended judgment and decree substitutes the eartier irOir"ni lni'o".r"" dispatched on 19-09_2025 //TRUE COPYII To, 1 Sd/- K. SRINIVASA RAO JOINT REGTSTRAR / Sd/- K. SRINTVASA RAO JOINT REGISTRAR SD/. K. SRINIVASA RAO JOTNT REq|STRAR SECTION OFFICER ru "-,ll:l1',}Jiil ?i.'J',[i:l o';fl ,i"'" io n s J udse ( Frc), Ra n g a Red dy Distri ct at

2. One CC to Smt. Vedula Chitralekha, Advocate [OpUC] 3. One CC to Sri Police Venkat Reddy, Advocate tOpUCl 4. Two CD Copies n / 4 A. x\ $tt N8 ,1 HIGH COURT DATEDi 2610612025 2110 03/1 12A25 \ \ AMENDED .'UDGMENT AS.No.505 of 2012 PEAL SUIT LLOWING IN PART WITHOUT GOSTS m ]N THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA AT HYDERABAD THURSDAY, THE TWENTY SIXTH DAY OF JUNE TWO THOUSAND AND TWENry FIVE PRESENT THE HONOURABLE SMT JUSTICE K. SUJANA APPEAL SUIT NO: 505 OF 2012 Between: N. Murdf,dharffao S/o. Bala Rao, aged about 69 years, Occ: Business, Fi/o. H.No. 2-7, Street No. 2, Habsiguda, Hyderabad - 7 ...APPELLANT/PLAI NTIFF AND

1. Nacharam Yadagiri S/o. Late \arasimha, aged about 49 years, Occ: Agriculture, Rl/o. Godumakunta, Keesara Mandal, Ranga Reddy District. 2. Nacharam Swetha D/o. Nacharam Yadagiri, aged about 24 years, Occ: Student

3. Nacharam Sandeep S/o. Nacharam Yadagiri, aged about 23 years, Occ: Student (All R/o. District). H.No. 2-77, Godumakunta Village, Keesara Mandal, Ranga Reddy I ...RESPONDENTS/DEFENDANTS Appeal{iled under section 96 of CPC against the Judgment and decree dated 20-1-2012 in OS No. 253 of 2006 on the file of the Court of the lll Additional District and Sessions Judge (FTC), Ranga Reddy District at LB Nagar. This appeal coming on for hearing and upon perusing the grounds of appeal, the Judgment and Decree of the Lower Court and the material papers in the Petition and upon hearing the arguments of Sri Vedula Srinivas representing Smt. Vedula Chitralekah, Advocate for the Appellant and of Sri Police Venkat Reddy, Advocate This Court doth order and Decree as follows:

1. That the Appeal Suit be and hereby is allowed in part; 2. That the appellanUplaintiff shall deposit the balance sale consideration of Rs. 52,25Ot- in the trial Court within a period of one month from the date of receipt of a copy of the order;

3. That upon such deposit, defendant No.1 shall execute and register the sale deed within a period of one month, with defendants Nos;. 2 and 3 joining for effective conveyance;

4. That defendant No. 1 fails to execute the sale deed, the plaintiff is permitted to ' ha,re it executed.lhrough the Court process; and

5. That there shall be no order as costs. NOTE: This Judgment and decree is amended as per C.O dt.O3l11l2125 in l.A No.2 oI 2025 btJ modifying the OS No.253 of 2006 instead of OS No.253 of 2008. This amended judgment and decree substitutes the eadier judgment and Decree dispatched on 1 9-09-2025 To, //TRUE COPY// . sd/- K. sRrNrvAsA RAo JOINT REGISTRAR SD/. K. SRINIVASA RAO JOINT REGISTRAR t SECTION fi, ICER

1. The lll Additional District and Sessions Judge (FTC), Ranga Reddy District at LB Nagar. 2. TwoCD Copies HIGH COURT DATED: 2610612025 0311112025 AMENDED DECREE AS.No.SO5 of 2012 t APPEAL SUIT ALLOWING IN PART WITHOUT COSTS