Gurbakhsh Singh v. Gurdial Singh

Judgment

TIIE HONOURABLE SMT. JUSTICE K. SUJANA APPEAL SUIT No.SOS of 2Ol2 JUDGMENT: Challenging the judgment and decree dated 20.Ol.2OI2 passed in O.S.No.253 of 2008 by the learned III Additional District and Sessions Judge (FTC), Ranga Reddy District, the present Appeal Suit is hled.

2. The brief facts of the case are that the plaintiff hled a suit for specific performance and possession based on an agreement of sale dated 06.10.2005, allegedly executed by defendant No. 1, for a consideration of Rs.13,56,750/-, of which Rs.4,OO,OOO/ had been paid. The plaintiff relied on corroborative evidence, including oral depositions (P.Ws.1 and 2\ and documentary evidence (Exs.A- 1 to A- 10), demonstrating both execution of the agreement and his continued readiness to perform. Defendant No. 1 denied executing the agreement and contended the property was ancestral. Defendant Nos.2 and 3, impleaded as legal representatives and co-sharers, reafhrmed that the property was ancestral and had been allotted to them in a previous 2 sI{s,J A.S.No.5OS of 2012 partition suit vide O.S.No.118 of 2006, fiia],lzed -hrough a Lok Adalat ,rward. The trial Court held that while t re execution of the agr:ement u'as proved, it u.as not enforceable against the full ext,:nt of the property as defendant No. 1 la< ked exclusive title. T-re trial CourL observed that defencla rt No. 1 could alienatt orrly his 1 / 3ra undivided share, particrLlzLrly srnce the agreem,rnl did not purport to be executed b1' 61,-Lr,.1^nt No.1 as karlha or on behalf of other co-parceners. As such, the suit was der:reed in part: specihc performance vvas il:anted for the share rf clefendant No. I alone, subject to lhe plaintiff deposit:ng the balance consideration of Rs.52,250/ - w,ith l2oh interest. The prayer of the plaintiff for entire possession was declinert; instead, he was granted liberty to prrrsue partirion and alli:d rcrncdies undcr SecLior-r 22 of Llne Spc:iiic Reliel Act. The trirrl Court thus balanced contractual olrliqations u'ith coparcenary rights by limiting enforcement to rrtlividual share of deferdant No.1. Aggrieved thereby, the presrnt appeal suit is firled.

3. Heard Sri Vedula Srinivas, learned Sr:;-rior Counsel representing Smt. Vedula Chithralekha, learrred counsel appeari rg on behalf of the appellant as well as Sri Police 3 sKs,J A.S.No.5O5 of 2012 Venkat Reddy, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents

4. karned counsel for the appellant submitted that the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court is contrary to settled legal principles, the weight of evidence, and the overall probabilities of the case and that the trial Court failed to take into consideration the amended pleadings brought on record through I.A.No.237 of 2008, specificaliy Paragraph Nos.S(a) and 5(b), and the additional relief sought therein, namely, the plea that the partition decree in O.S.No.118 of 2O06 (Ex.B1) is a collusive one and not binding on the plaintiff. He further submitted that the trial Court, however, overlooked this crucial amendment and rendered findings without adjudicating that prayer, thereby vitiating the judgment.

5. karned counsel for the appellant argues that the agreement of sale in Ex.A-l unequivocally records that the first defendant was the absolute owner of the suit land at the time of execution, and the plaintiff acted upon this representation and that the defence now taken by the a"f"rra".rt No.l that the property was ancestral and hence 4 SI{S,J A.S.No.SOS of 2012 jointly rwned is not only an afterthought but rilso remains unsubs[antiated, particularly since defendant lr{o.1 i:hose not to enter the 'witness box. He further submittecl rlat zls per the larv laic dovr.n by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in AIR 1999 SC 1441, l,uch failure to testify mandates dran-irrg an adverse inferen<:e against him.

6. L :arned counsel for the appellant cont c rLcled that the alleged partition decree (Ex.B 1), passecl sut,seque ntl]' in far.our of his minor childrcn through a compror:risc irr the Lok Adalat, lacks probative value and that the tninors rvcre represe rted by their mother and were impleade c[ onl1. later in the prr sent suit. Their testimony after attaIr ing majoriff cannot relrospectively validate the partition, c,s:ccially rvhen no docrrmentary evidence has been filed to esl: biish the joint family nature of the property. Therefore, he s;r-rbmit.ted that the tria I Court had no basis to limit the rclie I of specihc performance to oniy 1/3ra of the property, partrcularly when all findings otherwise support the case of the plrrintiff.

7. I;:arned counsel for the appellant furtlrer contended that th,: trial Court exceeded its scope by delving into the 5 SKS,J A.S. o.5O5 of 2012 question of partitionability of the suit land, which was not necessary for determining the enforceability of the agreernent of sale. The suit being one for specihc performance, the limited role of the Court was to examine the validity and enforceability of the sale agreement, which stood clearly proved through oral and documentary evidence. Therefore, he prayed the Court to set aside the judgment of the trial Court by allowing this Appeal Suit.

8. In support of his submissions, learned counsel for the appellant relied upon the judgments of the Hon'icle Supreme Court are as follows: a. In the case of Vidhyadhar w. Manikraol, wherein in paragraph No. 17, it is held as follows

17. Where a party to the suit does not appear in the witness-box and states his own case on oath ald does not offer himself to be cross-examined by the other side, a presumption would arise that the case set up by him is not correct as has been held in a series of decisions passed by various High Courts and the Privy Council beginning from the decision in Sardar '(r.gsg) g scc sz: 6 sKs,J A.S.No-5O5 of2012 Gurbakhsh Singh v. Gurdial Singh [AIR 1927 PC 23O : 32 CWN 1 191 This was followed bv the Lahore High Court in Kirpa Singh v. Ajaipctl ^Singh [AIR 1930 lah 1 : ILR 11 La]r 142j and the Bombay High Court in Martand Pandhair',ath Chaudhai v. Radhabqi Kishnarao Deshrn,tkh [AIR 1931 Bom 97 : 32 Bom LR 924] 'lhe Madhya Pradesh High Court in Gut[a Khoragjit Carpenter v. Narsingh NandkisLare Rcurat IAIR 1970 MP 225 : l97O MPLI 5861 also followed the Irrivl' Council decision in Sqrdar Gurbakhsh Singh case [AIR 1927 PC 23O : 32 CWN 1l9l . 'lhe Allahabad High Court rn Arjun Singh v. VirerLdra Natlr [AIR 1971 Atl 29] hetd that if a l)artv abstains from entering the witness-bo:;, rt rvould give rise to an adverse inference agair-st him. Similarly, a Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Bhaguan Das:; r'. Bhishqn Chand IAIR 1974 P&H 7l dreu a presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence Act, 1872 against a party who did not enter tre rvitness-box b. Lr Lhe case of Arshnoor Singh v. Harpal Kaur 2 , whereirr in paragraph No.7.3, it is held as follo\ rs:

7.3. Under Mitakshara law, whenever a rr a-le ancestor inherits any property from any of his paternal ancestors up to three degrees above him, then his male legal heirs up to three ' 1zozo1 u scc +ze 7 sKs,., A.S.No.5OS of2012 degrees below him, would get an equal right as coparceners in that property. C In the case of Bhoop Singh a. Ram Singh MajoF, wherein in paragraph No. 13, it is held as follows:

13. In other words, the court must enquire whether a document has recorded unqualifred and uncondilional words of present demise of right, title and interest in the property and included the essential terms of the same; if the document, including a compromise memo, extinguishes the rights of one and seeks to confer right, title or interest in praesenti in favour of the other, relating to immovable property of the value of Rs 1O0 and upwards, the document or record or compromise memo shall be compulsorily registered. d. In the case of Gram Panchayat of Village Naulakha v. Ujagar Singha, wherein in paragraph Nos.7 and 8, it is held as follows:

7. The law in England also appears to be the same, that no independent suit is necessar5r. In Sperrcer-Bouer and Tumer on Res Judicata (2nd Edn., 1969) it is stated (para 359) that there are exceptions to the principle of res judicata. If the ' lrsss; s scc zoe o (zooo) z scc s+: 8 sKs,J A.S.No.5OS of 2012 party setting up res judicata as an estoppel has alleged all the elements of an estoppel ii c. ingredients of res judicata), it is still open to t1e Iatter (the opposite party) to defeat the estoF,pel by setting up and establishing certain affirmafive answers. Of these there are four main classer; fiaud, cross-estoppel, contract and public policrl . The authors clearly say that no ac ue proceedings for "rescissiorf of the earirer judgment are necessary. They state (para 370) as follows: 'The avoidance of a judicial act on the grounr'l of froud or collusion rs effected not onLll bA actiue proceedings for rescission... but also by setling up the fraud as a defence to an action on t1e rlecision, or as an answer to any case which, \\.hether by way of estoppel or otherwise, depends for its success on the decision bcing treated as incontrovertible . " Thus, the law is well settled that no lndependent suit as a condition precedent is necessary.

8. Collusion, say Spencer-Bower and Turner (para 378), is essenti.ally play-acting by tu,o or rnore persons for one common purpose -- a concerted performance of a fabula disguised es a judicium - an unreal and fictitious pretence l)1 a contest by confederates whose game is the sarnc. 1\s stated by l,ord Selborne, L.C. in Bosuell v. Coaks [(1894) 6 Rep 167 : 86 LT 365n (HL)] : 9 SI{S,J A.S.No.5O5 o€2012 There is no Judge; but a person invested with the ensigns of a judicial ofhce, is misemployed in listening to a hctitious cause proposed to him, there is no party litigating ... no real interest brought into question and to use the words of a very sensible civilial on this point, fabula non judicium. hoc est; in scena, non in foro, res agitur. That, in our view, is the true meaning of the word "collusion" as applied to a judicial proceeding. e In the case of Angadi Chandranna Versus Shankar and Others s , wherein in paragraph No. 17, it is held as follows

17. It cannot be disputed that the properties divided among Defendant No. 1 and his brothers through partition deed dated 09.05.1986, are joint family properties. However, as per Hindu law, after partition, each party gets a separate and distinct share and this share becomes their self-acquired property and they have absolute rights over it and they can sell, transfer, or bequeath it as they wish. Accordingly, the properties bequeathed through partition, become the self-acquired properties of the respective sharers s 2025 sCC Online SC 877 10 sI{s,J A.S.No.505 of 2012

9. Cn the other hand, learned counsel for ttre respondents submitt.ed that there is no illegality in the jr-rdgment and decree rassed by the trial Court from any legal infirmity and is in accordance with settled principles of law and that the suit propert/ is a joint family property, and therefore, defendant No.1 al,rne did not have the authority to unilaterally enter into an agroement of sale in respect of the entire property. He further sr-Lbmitted that in his written statement, defendant No.1 hrLd categorically denied the execution of the agreement of sale as allegecl and had also clearly contersted the legal notices issued by the appellant and that the trizLl Court rightly appreciated the evidence on record, and insteatl r:f dismissing the sui , in its entirety, as was warranted, exte:nded equitable relief b y, granting specihc performance only tc the extent of i/3.4 undivided share of defendant No.l. He contended that there is no credible evidence from the appellant- to rebut the joint fa nily character of the suit property, and the execution of the agrcement by defendant No.1 cannot bind the shares of the other co-parceners. Therefore, as there a-re no merits in the appeal, he prayed the Court to dismiss the a.ppeal suit. 11 SI(s,J A.S.No.SOS of 2012 i0. In support of his submissions, learned counsel for the respondents relied upon the Judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and this Court are as follows: a. In the case of Rohit Chauhan v. Surinder Singh, wherein in paragraph No.7 to 14, it is held as follows:

7. The relevant portion of the judgment of the lower appellate court reads as follows: "13. In the light of abovesaid precedents it can be readily concluded that only when the property which is received by a person from his ancestors to be by survir.orship can be held ancestral/ coparcenary property and any other property which although, might have been received from the ancestors by means of rvill or consent decree or a father partitioned the property, will lose its character as that of coparcenary property and will become self- acquired property in the hands of the person receiving it. Applying these precedents to the facts of the present case, this Court will conclude that approximately 96 kanals of land was received by Gulab Singh from his father Budhu on the basis of consent decree or on the basis of will and not by survivorship and this property lost the character of coparcenar5r property and was self-acquired property of Gulab Singh. The version of the plaintiff-Respondent 1 in the present case is that rest of the property 1-2 sKs,J A.S.No.5OS of 2012 was acquired by Gutab Singh with the fu::rds originated from joint Hindu family property and l.he said property also assumed the characler of joint Hindu farnily property, also cannot be sustained because the major chunk of iand in the hands of Gulab Singh has been held to be rlon ancestral property and rather self-acquired t)roperty oi Gulab Singh.

14. Once the property involved in the suit has l>een held to be self-acquired propert_v of Gulab Srngh then Gulab Singh was having every right lo deal lvith the same in any manner he tiked and no embargo can be put on the rights, of Guiab Singh as well as his rights to alienate the suit property are concerned and thus neither r-elease deed nor sale deeds executed by Gutab Sirgh can be questioned by anyone much less by son of Gulab Singh...." t\ccordingh', the lo$'er appellate court allou.ed the appeal and set aside the judgment ard decree of the trial court and dismissed the suit

8. The plaintiff, aggrieved by the same, preferred second appeal and the High Court dismissed lRohit Chauhan v. Suinder Singh, RSA No. 1992 of 2011, order dated 4-5-2011. (P&H)l the second appeal in limine and, while doing so, observed. as follows: '... Finding of the lower appellate court that the suit land is not proved to be ancestral or 13 SKS,J A.S. o.5O5 of 2012 coparcenary property is fully justified by the documentary evidence and admitted facts...." This is how the plaintiff is before us. Leave granted. 9, Mr L. Nageswara Rao, Iearned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant-plaintiff submits that at the time when the plaintiffs father Gulab Singh got the property in partition, it was his separate property vis-A-vis his relations but after the birth of the plaintiff on 25 3 l9A2, the plaintiff acquired interest in the property as a coparcerer. Mr Satinder S. Gulati, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent-defendants, however, submits that once the property fell into the share of the plaintiffs father Gulab Singh, it lost the character of a coparcenary property and the said status will not change on the birth of the plaintiff. He points out that even if plaintiff Rohit Chauhan was born at the time of partition between Defendant 2, his father and brothers, the plaintiff would not have got arry share under Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act. 1O. In support of the submission Mr Rao has placed reliance on a judgment of this Court in Bhanutar Singh v. Puran l(2OO8l 3 SCC 87 : (20081 1 SCC (Civ) 7791 , and our attention has been drawn to the following passage from the sald judgment: (SCC pp.90-91, para 13) 1,4 SXS,J A.S.No.50S of 2012 "13. Section 6 of the Act, as it stood at the relevant time, provided for devolution of intcresL il the coparcenary property. Section 8 lays dou.n the general rules of succession that the propert-v of a male dying intestate devolves according to the provisions of the Chapter as specified in Clause (1) of the Schedule. [n the Schedule appended to the Act, natural sons ertld daughters are placed as Class I heirs bul a grandson, so long as father is alive, has not beeil included. Section 19 of the Act provides that in the event of succession by tlvo or more hcirs, they will take the property per capita and not per stripes, as also tenants-in-common and not ils jcint tenants,"

11. We have bestowed our consideration to the rival submissions ald rve find substance in the submission of Ivlr Rao. [n our opinion coparcenary property means the propert]' wh(r] consists of ancestral property and a coparce ler rvould mean a person who shares equally uith others in inheritance in the estate of comn()n ancestor. Coparcenary is a narrorver body thrLn the joint Hindu family and before ihe commencement of the Hindu Successron (Amendment) Act,2005, only male members of the family used to acquire by birth an interesl in the coparcenary property. A coparcener has no derrnite share in the copa-rcenary property but he has an undivided interest in it and one has to bear in mind that it enlarges by deaths aLnd diminishes by births in the famiiy. It is not static. We are further of the opinion that so iong, sKs,J A.S. 0.505 of2012 on partition an ancestral property remains in the hand of a single person, it has to be treated as a separate property ald such a person shall be entitled to dispose of the coparcenary property treating it to be his separate property but if a son is subsequently born, the alienation made before the birth cannot be questioned. But, the moment a son is born, the property becomes a coparcenary property and the son would acquire interest in that and become a coparcener.

12. The view which we have taken finds support from a judgment of this Court in M. Yogendra v. Leelamma N. [(2009) 15 SCC 184 : (2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 602l i.n which it has been held as follows: (SCC p. 192, para 291 "29. It is now well settled in view of several decisions of this Court that the property in the hands of a sole coparcener allotted to him in partition shall be his separate property for the same shall revive only when a son is born to him. It is one thing to say that the property remains a coparcenary property but it is another thing to say that it revives, The distinction between the two is absolutely clear and unambiguous. In the case of former any sale or alienation which has been done by the sole survivor coparcener shall be valid whereas in the case of a coparcener any alienation made by the karta would be valid."

13. Now referring to the decision of this Court in Bhanluqr Singh [(2008) 3 SCC 87 : (2008) 1 SCC L6 SRS,J A.s.No.sos of 2012 lciv) 7791relied on by the respondents, the same is clearly distinguishable. In the said case :he issrte was in relation to succession r,vhereas in the present case we are concerned with Jre status of the plaintiff vis a vis his father $'ho gct property on partition of the ancestral property.

14. A person, who for the time being is the sole sun-iving coparcener as in the present cilse Gulab Singh was, before the birth of the plaint-i[f, $,as entitled to dispose of the coparcenrr-v property as if it were his separate propert)'. (iulab Singh, ti the birth of plaintiff Rchit Chauhan, was competent to sell, mortgagc a,rld deal with the property as his property in il.tc rnanner he liked. Had he done so before iire birth of plaintifi, Rohit Chauhan, he nas rot competent to object to the alienation made iry his father before hc was born or begotten. ELrt, in the present case, it is an admitted position that the property r','hich Defendant 2 got on partition was an ancestral property and till ihe birth of the plaintift he rvas the sole sun,ir-,-rg coparcener but the moment plaintiff was trorn, he got a share in the father's propert!, tilrd became a coparcener. As observed earlier, ir-r vies- of the settled legal position, the propert] in the hands of Defendant 2 allotted to him in partition was a separate property till the birth of the plaintiff and, therefore, after his birth I)efendart 2 could have a-lienated the property only as karta for legal necessity. It is nobocll's case that Defendant 2 executed the sale deeds and release deed as karta for any legal necessity. 17 SKS,J A.S.No.5OS of 20l2 Hence, the sale deeds and the release deed executed by Gulab Singh to the extent of entire coparcenary property are rllegal, null and void. However, in respcct of the property u'hich would have fallen in the share of Gulab Singh at the time of execution of sale deeds and release deed, the parties can work out their remedies in appropriate proceeding. b. In the case ofS. Kondaiah v. C. Sreenivasa Rao, wherein in paragraph No.9, it is held as follows

9. The appellant tried to overcome the situatlon by pteading that the 3rd respondent figured as a witness, and since the whereabouts of the 2nd respondent were not known, as on the date o[ the agreement, his wife too joined as a witness. It does not need an-l' effort to maintain the distinction between an executant on the one hand, and the lvitness, on the other hand. The terms of the agreement are binding on the executant, and none else. The role played by the witness is nothing, but the one, connoting his or her presence at the time of the transaction. At the most, one can attribute knowledge of the tlarrsaction, to the witness. The terms of a contract are not binding on every one who knows the transaction- By no stretch of imagination, a witness can be treated, or become a party to the transaction, nor would he be bound by the terms of the contract. 18 SKS,J A.S.No-5O5 of 2012

10. It is only rvhen the executant ol irn agreement pleads that he has the consent ol t re l)ersons, lvho figured as $itneSSes, thrll a situation may emerge, where the witnesses r1 :'ld lo pxplain lheir stand. ln the instant ,as . r'e specific plea of the lst respondent was th.rt re in[c'nded to sell his share of the propcrtv, i.rrd rrot the entire propertj,, covered b1 Ex. []2. lhcre did not exist any necessity for the respondt nrs 2 lrnd 3, to extricate themselves from :r1e lr.rnsaction, Lrt.cause the) lvere nercr part! to i . c. Ir1 thc case of Kammana Sambamurthy \'. Kalipatnapu Atchutamma, u,hcrein in paragraph No.2l3. tis helcl as fol[ows:

23. ln Kartar Singlt v. Haryinder Srnglt [( l9!)( ) .] SiCC 5171 this Court rvas conccrncd r\ith . ( rsL' ri here vendor brother ancl a sister had each h rll share in the suit propertres. The agrcemenl lor lhc sale rvas executed by the brothcr conccrnirrq the suit properties in $,hich thc sister had Ir rll share. The sister $as not executanl to -ltc irgreement; rather she refused to accept 'hc ilgreement. The question for consideration l),tlore this Court was whether the agreement could lte t:nforced against the vendor brother to the extr)nt of his half-share. This Court considerecl Scoti()n 12 and held as under; (SCC pp. 520-2I, paras 5 (, 19 sl{s,J A.S.ro,5OS of 20l2 "5. We are, therefore, of the view that this is not a case which is covered by Section 12 of the Act. It is clear from Section 12 that it relates to the specific performance of a part of a contract. The present is not a case of the performarce of a part of the contract but of the whole of the contract so far as the contracting part5r, namely, the respondent is concerned- Under the agreement, he had contracted to sell whole of his property. The two contracts viz. for the sale of his share and of his sister's share were separate and were severable from each other although they were incorporated in one agreement. [n fact, there was no contract between the appellant aJld the respondent's sister and the only valid contract was with the respondent in respect of his share in the property.

6. As regards the difhculty pointed out by the High Court, namely, that the decree of specific performarlce cannot be granted since the property will have to be partitioned, we are of the view that this is not a legal difficulty- whenever a share in the property is sold the vendee has a right to apply for the partition of the property and get the share demarcated. We also do not see any difficulty in granting specihc performance merely because the properties are scattered at different places. There is no law that ttre properties to be sold must be situated at one place. As regards the apportionment of consideration, since admittedly the appellant and the respondent's sister each have half-share in the properties, the consideration can easily be 20 SKS,J A.S.Ho.505 of 2O12 reduced by 50 per cent u.hich is what the first appellate court has rightly done." 1 1- T -ie points that arise for consideration in this appe a1 are: whether the trial Court erred in granting speciitc performance only to the extent of one-third share of clefendar-rt No.1, despite allegations thaI the subsequent partition decree in O.S.No. 118 o1 2006 ri.as collusive ald not binding on the appellan tl) Whcther the execution of the agreement of sale b} rlefendant No. 1, r,vho represented himself ;rs the absoiute owner and accepted a part of the sale <:onsideration, could be enforced in full agaitrs;t thc entire property, or only against his rndividua.l share.

12. H aving regard to the submissions advancecl b1' both the learned counsel and upon a carefui perusal ol the material placed on record, it appears that the appeal chailenges the partiai lecree passed in O.S.No.253 of 2OO8, s.llerein the trial Court zrcknowledged the execution of the agre(lment of sale dated 06.10.2OO5 by defendant No.1 an.c1 receipt of Rs.4,OC,O00/- towards sale consideration, ald also upheld the issuanc:e of legal notice by the plaintiff. 27 sKs,., A.S.No,5OS of2012

13. However, the trial Court declined to enforce the agreement beyond the 1/3rd undivided share of defendant No. 1 on the ground that the suit schedule property was ancestral in nature, forming part of a partition decree in O.S.No. 118 of 2006, fir,altzed through a compromise in a Lok Adalat. The trial Court reasoned that the terms of the contract were binding only on the executants, defendant No.1, and not on defendant Nos.2 and 3, who were not parties to the agreement.

14. The appellalt rightly contends that the amendment sought through I.A.No.237 ol 2OO8, particularly the plea that the partition decree is collusive, was not adjudicated by the trial Court. In the case of Gram Panchayat of Village Naulakha (cited supra), the Hon'bie Supreme Court observed that collusion in judicial proceedings can be raised as a defense without requiring a separate suit. The failure of defendant No. 1 to disclose the pre-existing agreement of sale in the partition suit signihcantly taints the decree, thereby lending weight to the appellant's claim of collusion. Therefore, decree in partition suit is nothing but a collusive suit to cause loss to the appellant herein, said decree cannot be a ground to 22 SKS'J A.S.No.505 of 2012 refuse the relief in the present suit. The trial tlourt erred in not conr;idering this aspect

15. F rrther, reliance placed by the appellant on Vidhya,lhar (cited supra) supports the contelltion that the trral Court ought to have drawn an adverse inference against defendant No.1 for failing to enter the witness box and submit to cros s-examination. The silence of defendaets, especially after ar:cepting consideration and executing th e agreement, underrr inr:s the credibility of the defence raised ir-r the $'ritten statem( nt

16. Furthcrmore, the contention that the suit property is ancestral also stands on fragile ground. The reliance of thc responrlents on Rohit Chauhan and S. Kondaiah (cited supra) is well-noted, but in the present case, no credible docum<:ntaqr evidence has been produced to t:stablish that the propertv remained joint family propertj' rrl the time of executi rn of the agreement. On the contrary, it is clear that defendzmt No.l represented himself as the absolute owner, receiverl consideration, and never disclosed the l,ransaction in SKS,J A-S-No-5OS of 2O12 the subsequent partition proceedings, thereby creating an equitable estoppel 1,7. However, in viern of the se ttled position in Kartar Singh (cited supra), a contract by one co-sharer can be specifically cnforced at least to the extent of his sharc, cven if other sharers are not parties. Therefore, this Court is of the holds that [l'rere is no illegality in the decision of the trial Court to confine the relief to one-third share of defendant No.1. Yet, given the admitted execution of thc agreement and reccipt of consideration, defendant No.1 cannot now escape performance oi his obligation.

18. In view of the above discussion, the judgment of the t trial Court is modihed to the extent that clefendaht No.l is directed to execute a registered sale deed in favour of the plaintiff for the alleged property as follows The appetlant/ plaintiff shall deposit the ba-lance sale consideration of Rs.52,25O /- in the trial Court within a period of one month from the date of receipt of a copy of the order. 24 SKS,J A.S.No.5OS of 20I2 II Upon such deposit, delendant No.1 shall execrtte ancl registcr the sale deed within a period of onc mol-h, rviLh defendants Nos.2 and 3 joining for cffcctive con!evancrt. lf delendant No. 1 fails to execute the sale cleccl, thc plaintifl is pcrmittcd to have it cxecuted throulh tlre Court process.

19. Lr vierv thereof, this Appcal Suit is aliowed in parL Tl'rcre snall lre no ordcr as to costs IViiscellaneous applications, il any pendiLr'q, shzrli sterncl closed Sd/. K. SRINIVASA RAO JOINT REGISTRAR NOTE: This Judgment is amended as per the Court order dated 21-O8-2O25 in I.A.No..l of 25 by modifying "sr it property" with ''alleged property" in the Paragraptr No.18, Line No.4. This amerded Judgment substitutes the earlier Judgment despatched on 29-07 -2025. //TRUE COPYi/ /. K. SRINIVASA RAO \ JOTNT REGTSTRAR r SECTION OFFICER To, '1 . The lll Aclditional District and Sessions Judge (FTC), Ranga Reddy District at LB Nagar. (with records, if any)

2. One CC t: Smt. Vedula Chitralekha, Advocate [OPUC] 3. One CC tr Sri Police Venkat Reddy, Advocate [OPUC] 4. Two CD Oopies W VH/PSL HIGH COUIRT DATED: 21i10612025 21t08t2025 l

1.. : \ / ':...\ 19 sEP 2025 -t ., ., .-i ..-,/ AMENDE]) JUDGMENT AS.No.505; o12012 APPEAL SiUIT ALLOWINIG IN PART WITHOUT COSTS e 1 1X