The High Court · 2025

Order

Heard Sri N. Sreedhar Reddy, learned counsel for petitioner and learned Government Pleader for Labour on behalf of resPondents. This Writ Petition is filed challenging the 2. proceedings in Crl.M P No ' 1722 of 2023 on the hle of Court of Hon,bleXllAdditionalMetropolitanMagistrate,Hyderabad, initiatcd by the 2'd respondent under Section 33-C (1) of Industrial Disputes Act, 7947 and consequently to quash the same by declaring them to be illegal' arbitrary and without jurisdiction lt is the case of petitioner that it came into 3. existence by virtue of the orders passed by this Court dated 01-09-2015 in Company Petition Nos' 175 to 178 of 2O15' whereby a Schemc of Arrangement of Demerger was sanctioned' Under this Scheme, M/s Maheshwari Megaventures Limited was the demerged company and M / s Kshitij Infraventures Private Limited was the resultant entity' It is further stated that M / s Maheshwari Megavcntures Limited itself came into \ t 2 existence bv virtue of the Ordcrs of Amalgamation passed by this Court dated 22-03-2005 in Company Petition i'los. 2O1, 2O2 and 203 of 2004 concerning the amalgamation o[ M/s Ashish Developers rrnd Builders and M/s RKM Builders Private Limited. It is stated that M/s Diwan Bahadur Ramgopal Mills (referred to as 'DBR Mills') commenced its operations in l92O at Tank Bund Area in Hlvderabad after entering into a lease deed with landowners. namely Chenai family. The land in question eventually dcvolved upon Mrs. Khorshed Shapoorchenai, vendor oI petitioner, pursuant to a Compromise [)ecree dated 20-10-1967 in Civil Surt No. 38 of 1967 instituted by Mrs. Freny Rashid Chelrai, mother-in-law of Mrs. Khorshed Shapoorchenai, on the file of the Chief .Judge, City Civil Court, Hyd,:rabad. It is further stated that subsequertly, the mill became fin:rncially unsustainable, was declared a sick unit under Section 15(l ) of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985, and failed to remit lease r entals to the landowner, Mrs. Khorshed Shapoorchenai. This lerl to initiation of eviction proceedings for recovery of possession :rnd damages. Eventually, the dispute culminated in a comprornise, wherein

petitioner came to bc impleaded as Plaintiff No.2 jn O.S.No. 69 \ ) , -.aql!. J of 2003, filed for eviction and damages, and facilitated a settlement between the original landowner and tenant DBR Milts. Under the terms of compromise, Mrs' Khorshed Shapoorchenai agreed to retain Acs'6'00 and relinquished her rights over Acs.16.00 in favour of the tenant, M/s DBR Mills' in dispute' It is averrcd that M/s DBR Mills, in turn, executed a Development Agreement with petitioner for the development of Acs.16.OO of the land. F'urther, petitioncr's predecessor' amicably resolve M/s Ashish Deve lopers and Builders, entered into an Agreement of Sale dated O3-12-1998 with Mrs' Khorshed Shapoorchenai for purchase of the entire extent of Acs 22'5 by paying full sale consideration. It was based on this Agreement petitioner was impleaded as Plaintiff No.2 in O'S No 69 of 2OO3' Petitioner asserts that, while functioning as M / s Maheshwari Megaventures Limited, it entercd into a Development Agreement dated 15-03-1999 u'ith M/s DBR Mills Ltd for development of the land admeasuring Acs i6 0O on which mill wds situated' In consideration thereof, petitioner undertook the responsibility to settle the monetary claims payable to workers of DBR Mills' However, the said compromise entered into among petitioner' 1.--/ ) .f 4 DBR Mil1s and landou'ner Mrs. Khorshed Shapoorchenai could not be effe<:tualed ancl stood frustrated due to the conduct of DBR Mills, rendcring it null and void and incapzrble of bcing enforced. Conscquently, DBR Mills continued a:r a tenant at sufferance, and the ownership of the entire leasehold propcrty reverted to Mrs. Khorshed Shapoorchenai. It is also mentioned that, out of the total land admeasuring Acs.22.00, registered conveyancc deeds were cxccuted by Mrs. Khorshed Shapoorchenai rn favour of petitioner in respcct of Acs.6.O0 under Documenl Nos. 1349 of 2OO9 and 135O of 2OO9, executed on 27 0 2006 zrnd 2A-70-2006 respectively. During the subsistencc of the said <;ompromise and under the understanding amonr3 the parties, petitioner, acting as developer of Acs.16.00 for n,hich DBR Mills held leasehold rights, entered into an arrangemcn - for payment mill's workmen. I t is stated that on 07 -O3-2O17 , six Worker:;' Unions of M/s DBR Mills entered into an agreement u,ith petitioner company, under which they undertook to pay tls.7,O0,0OO/ - (Rupees Seven Lakhs only) to each workman as 'u11 and final settlemcnt of all arrears of salary, back wages, an,1 other due s. \ iFF- 5 This agreement was recorded as a Memorandum of Settlement under Section 12(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act' 1947' and Rule 6O of the Telangana State Industrial Disputes Rules' 1958' ald was arrived at in the presence of thc Conciliation Ofhcer' It is stated though the said agreement was entered into, the same cannot be construed as a valid and binding settleme nt under Section l2(3) of the 1947 Act' in strict legal terms. Petitioner contends that it is mere ly a Developmen I Agreement Holder and not thc employcr of the said workmen' and hence, not amenable to proceedings under the Industrial Disputes Act in such capacity lt is stated that prolonged disputes were pending before various Courts involving petitioner and management of M/s DBR Mills lt is further stated that there was no authentication or hnalization of list of workers who were empioyed at the time when DBR Mills ceased operations' and due to this reason, petitioner was unable to effect any payments under the agreement dated 07 -O3-2O17 ' Meanwhile,someworkerspurportedlyfiledApplicationsbefore the 2^d respondent, who, without verifying the maintainabilrty of issued Certihcate of Recovery and the claims under the Act, forwarded the same to the Hon'ble Court of XII Additional I 7 6 Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad, in Crl.M.P.No. 7722 of 2023, seeking to recover a sum of Rs.30,38,0(t,00O/ - from pe[itioner.

4. Learned counsel for petitioner - subrrits that a settlement under Section l2(3) of Lhe 1947 Act, can or-rly be executed between an employer and its employecs /u'orkmen in the course of an industrial dispute and not with :. third party, such as petitioner, who is mercly a Developmet't Agreement Holder. Therefore, it is submitted that the 2"d respondent acted u,ithout jurisdiction in issuing Certihcate of Recovcry and refcrring the matter under Section 33-C( 1) cf the Act. It is also argued that, assuming without admitting, even if any terms of the Agre e ment dated 07 -O3-2O17 wcre violated, the only rcmedy availabie to the affected parties u,ould bc to approach thc competent Civil Court lor appropria e relief, and not to invoke the coercive mechanism availab|: undcr the Industrial Disputes Act. Learned counsel drar,vs attr:ntion of this Court to Section 33-C(1) and contends that the srrid provision does not empower the 2"d respondent to issue Recovery Certificate against a third party who is not an ernployer, and especially in the absence of a valid empklrer-cmployee I 7 relationship under the Act' Section 33-C(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 reads as under:: " Where any money is due to a rvorkman from al employer under a settlement or an Award or under the provisions of Chapter V-A, the workman himself or any other person authorized bY him in writing in this behalf or in the case of the death of the workmar' his assignee or heirs may, without prejudice to anl' other mode of recovery, make an application to the appropriate Government for the recovery of the money due to him and if the appropriate Government is satished that arty moncf is so due, it shall issue a Certificate for that amounttotheChiefJudicialMagistrateortheChiefMetropolitan Magistrate having jurisdiction and the Chief Judicial Magistrate or the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, as the case may be' shall procced to realDe the money as if it t'ere a fine imposed by such Magistrate Provided that every such application shall be made \\'ithin one ycar from the date on which money became duc to the workman from the emPloYer. Provided further that any such application may entertained after the expiry of the said period of one year tf appropriate Government is satisfied that the applicant had sufltcient cause for not making the application within thc said period" Learned counse I submits that a plain reading of the relevant provision reveals that jurisdiction of the Chief Judicial Magistrate or the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate' as the case may be, to recover money under the Act is circumscribed by the existence of a due amount payable to the rvorkman by the employer under either a settlement or an award or under the ;l 8 provisions ol Chapter V-A of the said Act. It q'as co-rtended that, in the prescnt case, petitioner is not the emplov,:r w-ithin the meaning of the Act. The settlcment in question is :r.lcged to hzrve been entere<l into belween the workmen unions arld petiLioner. However, it is submitted that it is a developmctrt agreement holder and cloes not fall within the definition of 'employer' as per thc Act. It vvas further contended that Application filed by the workmen or their rcpresentatives was made aft r r a lapsc of more than three years from the date of the allegcC settlcment. Therefore, it was urged thal proceedings in Crl.M.P. No. 1722 of 2O23, initiated beforc the Court of the Hon'ble ).ll Adclitional Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad, should have reen rejected at the thre shold on the ground of limitation. lt rvas further contended that thc Magistrate entertained the Application and took cognizirnce of the matter without proper zrpplication of mind and mechanically, issued notice to petitioncr based on the reference macle by lhe 2"d respondent. Learned counsel further submitted thal. definition of 'industrial clispute' under Section 2(k) and 'settl( ment' under Section 2lp) of tinc 1947 Act are applicable only in cases involving employer and employe es or between e mployer and \ \ 9 workmen or even between workmen and workmen inter se. It was asserted that a third party like petitioner, who is merely a development agreement holder with no control or nexus with the functioning of the industry, cannot be brought within thc fold of the said definitions. Therefore, it was submitted that the alleged settlement dated 07.03.2O17 between petitioner and workmen unions cannot be treated as a settlement under the 1947 Act, particularly not one lalling under Section 12(3). Accordingly, petitioner contends that jurisdiction exercised by the 2"4 rcspondent and the subsequent action of the criminal court in Crl.M.P. No. 1722 of 2023 are wholly untenable and without legal basis. Such a matter cannot be adjudicated under the scheme of the Act, nor under the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code in the manner presently undertaken. It is thus asserted that Cr1.M.P. No. 1722 of 2023 pending before the Hon'ble XII Additional Metropolitan Magistrate at Hyderabad is liable to be quashed in its entirety. Additionally, learned counsel submitted thal even assuming without admitting that any enforceable right arises out of the agreement dated 07.O3.2017, the propcr remedy available to workmen or their unions would be to seek redressal L l0 under the gcneral civil law and not through invocation of criminal jurisdiction or proceedings under the 794T Act. It is not the emlrloyer and has no privity u,ith the industrial establishment for the purposes of attracting the al,plicability of the Industrial Disputes AcL, 1947 . Further, it u,:: s submitted that referen< e application was hled before the Court only on lO.Ol.2O23, rvhich is more than hve years after th(r date of the agreement, i.e. O7.03.2017. Therefore, it is contcncled that procecdings before the Hon'ble XII Additional Metropolitan Magistrate, llyderabad, uide Crl.M.P. No. lZ22 r{ 2023 are barred by limitation and are unsustainable. Learned counsel submits that pe1 itioner had already hled Writ Petitions No. 1956 and 2Ol1 of 2024 before this Court, challer-rging the order dated 22.09.2023 passed in LA. No. 13 of 2021 in M.P. No. 5 of 2019 and I.A. No. 12 of 2027 in M.P. No. 4 of 2019 on the fite of the Additionzrl Industrial Tribunal-cum Additional Labour Court, Hyderabad. In Lhc said order, the petitioner was directed to deposit an arnount of Rs. 49,OO,OOO/- c:rch in both cases to the credit of the respective proceedings. [t was further brought to the notice o[ this Court that upon Irearing petitioner, the impugned orders were \ suspended and writ petitions are pending hnal adjudication. In addition, petitioner placed reliance on the fact that M/s DBR Mills also filed Writ Petition No. 33361 of 2O23 before the Hon'ble High Court, in connection with the same or similar - subject matter, wherein the Hon'ble Court was pleased to grant an interim order on 11.12.2023, directing all the parties to maintain status quo in all respects until further orders. The petitioner submits that the present criminal proceedings are sought to be continued in contravention of the status quo order granted in W.P. No.33361 ot 2023.

5. In the counter filed on behatf of the 2nd rcspondent, it is stated that petitioner deliberately and willfully refrained from impleading the management of M/s DBR Mills Limited and the Joint Action Committee of DBR Mills, which represents six trade unions and employees with whom petitioner had entered into a Memorandum of Settlement under Section 12(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. On this ground, the maintainability of the writ petition is questioned. It is further stated that petitioner executed a Memorandum of Settlement on behalf of the management of M/" DBR Mills Limited, pursuant to the Development \ \ I t2 F"! Agreement dated 15-O3-1999, which was entered i"-rto in favour of M/ s Ashish Developers and Builders Private Limited. This entit5r r,r,as later merge d with M / s Maheswari l\,legaventures Limited by virtue of the orders of the Hon'ble High Court dated 22-O3-2OO5 in Company Petition Nos. 201 , 2O2, and 203 of 2OO4, and is presently knou,n as M/s Kshit4 Infraventures Private Limited, i.c., the present petitioner. According to the terms of the said agreement, before any developm:nt activities could be initiated, the claims of the workers wcre to be settled either by the management of DBR Mills or by the ,leveloper. In the event that the dcveloper settled the claims, it u,,tuld be done the accollnt of M/ s DBR Mill:; Limited. The counter furthcr avers that, in accordance with thc terms of the Developnrent Agreement and having regard to tl're prolonged suffering ol thc workcrs due to pendini; litigation, M/s Mahesu-ari Megaventures Limited (now M/" Kshitg Infraventures Pvt. Ltd.), by virtue of the said agrc3ment dated 15-03-1999, had given an undertaking to the Commissioner of Labour to settle the workers' ciaims subject to mulually agreed terms and conditions. \

1. It is asserted that out of a total extent of Acs. 26.00 possessed by DBR Mills Limited, an extent of Acs. 6.00 of land fell to the share of M/s Maheswari Megaventures Limited, now M/s Kshitij lnfraventures Pvt. Ltd., by virtue of a compromise that attained hnality before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Petitioner acquired absolute rights of ownership and possession over the said land and is free to deal with it. When petitioner commenccd development works over this land, objections were raised by the Joint Action Committee representing various trade unions and workers which led to law and order issues and demands for settlement in accordance with the Development Agreement. To avoid further litigation, petitioner entered into a Memorandum of Settlement under Section 12(3) read u'ith Rule 6O of the Telangana State Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958. The management of DBR Mills then filed Writ Petition No. 33361 of 2023 to quash Crl.M.P.No.l722 of 2023 and upon failing to obtain relief, colluded with petitioner to hle the present Writ Petition to avoid compliance with the workers' settlement. Hence, the 2"d respondent contends that Writ Petition is liable to be dismissed as devoid of merit. 1 14 The 2"d respondent further states that in view of the terms of thc Development Agrcement and continut ng suffering of workers due to the prolonged litigation, L4 / s Kshitij Infraventures Pvt. Ltd. informed the Commissioner ()f Labour of their underta king to settle the claims of the work ers of DBR Mills Ltd. subject to mutually agreed terms. Thcrefore, they cannot now deny its joint and several liability and rt:sponsibility on account ol the management's failure to fulfil its obligations. The counter also details that land bearing Survey Nos. 157/ 1 to 3, 158/1 & 2, t59 11,28, 160/1 to 28, and \61 13 to 7, measuring Acs. 34.00, situatcd at Elchiguda, Baka -am Village, had fallen to the share of Mrs. Khorshed Shapoor Chenoy by virtue of a cornprornise decrcc dated 20-10-7967 in O.S. No. 38 of 1967 on the [rle of thc Chief Judge, City Oivil Court, Hyderabad. lt is further stated that prior to the serid r;ompromise decree, an cxtent of 26 acres forming part of thcsc survey numbers was leased to M/s DBR Mills Ltd. under r; Iease deed dated 17th Aban 1328 Fasii (corresponding to thc ycar 1918 A.D.). In 1994, M/s DBR Mills stopped paying rents :Lnd claimed ownership under the Inams Abolition Act, prompting Mrs. K.S. \ l5 Chenoy to hle O.S. No. 1201 of 1995 for eviction and damages. During pendency of the suit, Mrs. Chenoy entered into an agreement of sale dated 03- 12- 1998 with M/ s Ashish Developers and Builders Pvt. Ltd., which was subsequently merged with M/s Maheswari Megaventures Ltd. under orders of this Court daLed 22-03-20O5 in C.P. Nos. 2Ol, 2O2, and 2O3 of

2004. The said company then came on record as plaintifi No. 2 in the eviction suit. The counter further narrates that after prolonged litigation, the issue rclating to mill land attained finality upon dismissal of SLP Nos. 1363O-1363312OO5 and SLP No. 194461 2005 by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Thereafter, Mrs. Chenoy executed two registered documents conveying 6 acres of land in favour of M/s Maheswari Megaventures Ltd. through Document Nos. 1349 l2OO9 daled 27-10-2006 and 1350/2009 dated 28-I0 2006. One of the conditions (Condition No. 26) of these documents specifically states that the second party (the developer) will settle and compromise with the landlady, and this compromise was filed on 17-03-1999. These documents were registered pursuant to the directions in Writ Petition No. 25181 of 2OO5 dated 01-02-2OO7 and Contempt Case No. 829 of 2OO9 dated O8-O4-2O09. Accordingly, in respect t t6 of this 6-acrc land, M/s Maheswari Megaventures L.-d. (now M/s Kshitij Infraventures Pvt. Ltd.) possesses absolute rights of ou,nership and possession and is free to deal rvith the samc. It is linally stated that pursuant to the offer made by M/ s Maheswari Megaventures Ltd., which was accellted by the workers of the erstwhile DBR Mills Ltd. in the pr:sence of all parties and their represen tatives, a statutory settlement was recorded under Section l2(3) of the Industrial t'isputes Act, 7947, on mutually agreed terms and conditions in order to bring about a fair and amicable resolution of thc longstanding dispute. It is stated in the counter that although petitioner is a party to the Certihcate for Recovery Amount, *,hich stems from a Statutory Agreement and is binding cn him, thc employees originally belonging to M/s DBR Mills Limited werc treated as tl-re employees of petitioner. This treat rrent formed the basis for execution of a Memorandum ol Set tlement. The said settlement continued the employer-employee relationship until final scttlement of dues was made in full. P:titioner had stepped into the picture by virtue of the Developmelrt Agrcemcnt with M/s Ashish Developers and Builders Private Limited, a \ \ 1 i : i I I 17 company that was subsequently merged into M/s Maheshwari Megaventures Limited, which has since changed its name and is now known as Kshitij Infraventures Private Limited, writ petitioner. The counter further clarihes that one of the clauses in the said Development Agreement expressly allowed M/s Ashish Developers and Builders Private Limited the liberty to enter into any Statutory Agreements required for the smooth operation and completion of the project. Following completion of the project, the procedure for recovery of hne amounts imposed by Criminal Courts is governed by Section a2l$) of the Criminal Procedure Code which mandates that Court shall issue a warrant for levy of such amounts by attachment and saie of any immovable property belonging to the offender. All parties who have a share or interest in the said property are to be made parties to the proceedings to thc extent of their respective shares. In this context, the execution of ttre Memorandum of Settlement with the Joint Action Committee of M/s DBR Mills Limited was done in good faith and in conformit5r with statutory procedure. Petitioner, as per the counter, is bound to honour the same and complete all pending and remaining transactions I l8 {l The counter further states tha.t as Memorandum of Settlement dated 07 -O3-2O1 was not implemented in its entirety, the competent autho:i[,, i.e., the Conciliation Ofhcer under the Industrial Disputcr; Act, 1947, who also holds the post of Joint Commissioner of Labour, Tu'in Cities, was within his statutory right to issue a rlertihcate of Recovery. Accordingly, the said matter was referred to the Court of the XII Additional Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyde:-abad, under Section 33C(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, lor cffe ctuating the terms of the Memorandum of Settlement datctl 07-03-201. Petitioner is under a continuing obligation to settlo the dues of workers, as per the terms of the Memorandum oi Settlement. While full payments have been made to some worllers, balance amounts are yet to be paid to others.

6. In the reply frled by petitioner, it is denied that rights of management of M/s DBR Mills Limited or the Joint Action Committee representing six trade union s n ould be affected by any order in the writ petition, as tl.ey were not parties to the criminal proceedings initiated by the second respondent. It is stated, it trecame the owner of Acsr.6.00 of land through a registered sale deed executed by Mrs. Khorshed 1 'i' i itl l9 Shapoor Chenai, pursuant to orders from this Court in Writ Petition No. 2518 1 of 2006 and Contempt Case No. 7344 of

2007. Petitioner asserts that it did not step into the shoes of M/s DBR Mills Limited and acquired the land independently, and any settlement with labour unions could only be enforced through a Civil Court, not under Section 12(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Additionally, M/s DBR Mil1s Limited filed objections before the Joint Commissioner of Labour, stating that petitioner had no rights to se[tle workers' dues. Petitioner argues that any settlement entered into with labour unions cannot be treated as a settlement under the Industrial Disputes Act, and the 2"d respondent lacks jurisdiction to invoke Section 33C(1) based on such a settlement. 7 . The key issue in this writ petition is whether petitioner, as a development agreement holder, can be held liable for the workers' claims under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and whether the 2.4 respondent acted within its jurisdiction in issuing the Certificate of Recovery lnder Section 3s-c(1).

8. The record discloses that petitioner entered into a Memorandum of Settlement dated 07-O3-2017 wit}:. the six ,l / I 20 registered workers' unions of M/s DBR Mills Lirnited in the presence of the Conciliation Officer, under Section 12(3) of the 1947 Act and Rule 60 of the Telangana State Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958. A settlement arrived at during conciliation proceedings before a Conciliation Officer in terms of Section 12(3) is binding not only on the parties to tLLe settlement but also on all workmen employed in the establir;hment. The contention that peti[ioner is not an 'employer' under the Act is inconsequenlial in the light of the admitted fact th at pctitioner voluntarily undertook liabiliff to pay workmen as part of the compromise and further participated in the concili:Ltion process leading to the settlement.

9. It is not in dispute that M/s Ashish Developers and Builders Pvt. Ltd. (predecessor of petitioner) executed Development Agreement dated 15-03 i999 with DEIR Mills Ltd., under which petitioner undertook to settle the morletary 'claims of workmen, subject to mutually agreed terms. ClzLuse 6 of the said agreement provides that repayment of liabilities, including workers' dues, was a pre-condition for commencement of any development activity. Petitioner, having derived commercial henefit and development rights under the said agreement, \ 2t cannot now disclaim the obligations that form an lntegral part of such commercial arrangement. Petitioner's plea that l2(3) settlement is not legally-binding on it, is contrary to the record for they participated in the conciliation. proceedings and executed the settlement in the presence of the Conciliation Officer. Once such a settlement is reached, its enforceabilit5r is not contingent upon the petitioner's classification as a statutory employer under Section 2(g\ or 2(kl of the Act. The doctrine of estoppel would apply to preclude petitioner from challenging a settlement it voluntarily entered into ald acted upon.

10. Section 33-C(1) of the Act empowers the Labour Commissioner to issue a Certificate of Recovery for amounts due to workers, which are determined by an industrial adjudication or settlement. In the present case, petitioner entered into a settlement under Section 12(3) of the Act with the workers' unions, agreeing to pay the workers a specified sum in full and hnal settlement of their claims. The settlement was binding, and petitioner, having voluntarily undertaken responsibility for the settlement, cannot deny its obligations on the basis that it is not the employer. The core purpose of the Industrial Disputes Act is to ensure that workers are protected and their claims are \ I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 27 : .t ,i :-t' enforced in a timely manncr. The Act recognizes the principle of justice and fairness for workers, even if the claimrs arisc from complex contractual relationships, as in this case where petitioner entered into the settlement as part of its 'levelopment agreement. Pctitioner's claim of being a third party or not an employer is. therefore, not sufficient to absoh'e it of its obligations under the Act. They are not merely a passive third par[r but a central participant in the proces:i, assuming responsibilitlr for the workers' claims in exchange for the development rights granted by DBR Mills'

11. It is pertinent to observe that petitione: cannot reiy on thd notion that it was not directly involved in tlre employer- employee relationship, as the settlement was designed to address workers' dues directly with petitioner ta king on the responsibility of making payments. Petitioner thus assumed the obligations of t-he employer in this context and the workers were entitled to seek recovery from the party responsible for the settlement. The recovery certificate issued by the 21Id respondent is referable to Section 33-C(1), which allows recovery of money due to a u,orkman under a settlement. The e>:istence of a binding 12(3) settlement suffices to trigger the provisions of (- 23 Section 33-C( 1). The contention that petitioner is not an employer is irrelevant once it is established that they voluntarily accepted liability and undertook to make payments under a statutory settlement. The Authority acted within its jurisdiction in initiating recovery proceedings based on the settlement' Further, petitioner has not implcaded either

12. management of DBR Mills or the Joint Action Committee representing the workers' unions, despite their direct involvcment in the matter. This suppressron of necessary parties renders Writ Petition tiable to be dismissed on the ground of non-joinder. Moreover, petitioner's conduct, including development activities undertaken on the land and negotiations with the workers, belies the claim of being a mere third party' The contention that workers must pursue a civil suit is untcnable. Section 33-C(1) is a complete statutory mechanism for enforcing monetary claims under a settlcment The availability of a civil remedy does not oust the jurisdiction of statutory authorities to act under special legislation designed for the benefit of workmen. In that view of the matter, petitioner, despite not 13. being the direct employer of the workers, undertook ! I t 24 ,( responsibilit-\' for their claims under the settlemen I and cannot escape liabilit), on technical grounds. The settlenrent entered into rvas binding and the Labour Commissioner's issuance of the Certificalc of Recovery was well within the statlltory powers granted undcr Section 33-C(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The Writ Petition therefore, must fail.

14. costs.

15. I I I Tl're Writ Petition is accordingly, dir;missed. No Oonsequently, the interim order datecl 14.03.2024 shall stand clrssolved aut-omatically. //TRUE COPY// To, -ci Hvderabad [OUT]

1. One CC to SRI N. SREEDHAR REDDY' Advo i. il; dc.io FoR LABoUR ,Hish court for 3. Two CD CoPies t BM BS SI \ .P. GOWRI SHANKAR DEPUTY REGISTRAR : SECTION OFFICER OF,UC] State of Telangana at ,,:.,:, . , HIGH COURT DATED:2910412025 e 1Hl: SrA 14: o( { t.}. i_) !.) 0 6 JUr,l [E ((\(' z r-r Oc * ORDER WP.No.6754 of 2024 DISMISSING THE WRIT PETITION WITHOUT COSTS b