The High Court · 2025

RESPONDENTSi/DEFENDANTS 2 TO 4 l.A. NO: 1 OF 2006(ASMP. NO: 1489 OF 2006 Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased To stay the execution of the Judgment and decree dated 02 03.06 in OS.No.19/02 on the file of Senior Civil Judge, Siddipet, Medak District pernding disposat of the appeal. l.A. NO: 1 OF 2009(ASMP. NO: 1 257 0F 2009) Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in tht: circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Cou rt may be pleased to direct the '1st respondent herein to deposit the monthly rents accrued from the suit schedule properties from the date of decree i.e,02-0:,-2006 till date at the rate of Rs. 6,5001 per month in O.S.No. 19 of 2002 on the lile of the Court of the Senior Civil Judge at Siddipet, pending disposal of the above A.S.No. 446 of 2006. Counsel for the Appellant(s) : SRI. N PRAVEEN REDT)Y Counsel for the Respondent No.4 SRI SHERI PRASAI) Counsel for Respondent Nos. 5, 6, 7,9, 10, 12, 13 &14 SRI KIRAN REDDY MALLARAPU The Court delivered the following: JUDGMENT HONOURABLE SMT JUSTICE K. SUJANA APPEAL SUIT No.446 OF 2006 JUDGMENT: The present Appeal Suit is hled challenging the judgment arld decree dated O2'03'20O6 passed in o'S'No' 19 of 2OO2 on the hle of the Senior Civil Judge' Siddipet The defendantNo.linthesuithaslrledthisappealagainstthe plaintiff and defendant Nos'2 to 4'

2. For the sake of convenience, the parties herein are referred to as arrayed in O.S'No' 19 of 2OO2 '

3. The brief facts of the case are that the plaintiff filed a suit seeking partition and separate possession of the suit schedule property, asserting her 1/6th share The disputed property originally belonged to late Yakub Ali' who passed away in the year 1993, leaving behind four children' defendantNo.l,isthesonandthreedaughters(Plaintiffand Defendants No.2 to 4). Another daughter predeceased him' as didhiswifeintheyearlggg.Theheirsinheritedtheproperty, but disputes arose regarding its partition and ownership' 2 However, a portion of the property, specifrcally House No.S- 1-6 at Sahirpura, Siddipet, was sold in the year 2100 1, and the sale proceeds were shared among the heir:;. The plaintiff alleged tl'rat lhe remaining suit schedule prop.r'ty was jointly possessed and managed by Defendant No.1 <>n behalf of all heirs. However, Defendant No.1, after shifting.-rs residence to / the rear portion of the property, allegedly began acting against the intere sts of the co-sharers by misusr ng documents obtained with their consent. The plaintilf f,rrther accused Defendant No.1 of dodging monthly rent paym,rnts and falsely claiming sole ownership based on a release rleed allegedly executed in the year 2OO 1 .

4. That the Defendant No. 1, in his wrll trrn statement, admitr-ed the family relationships and acknou.ioclged the death of wife of Yakub Ali and predeceased daughLt:r. However, he contended that the property had already berrr:. subjected to partition, with the plaintiff and Defendants No.-2 to 4 opting to receivrl monetary compensation instead of zr share in the property. He relied on an affidavit dated 07.1Cr.1999, signed before a notary, stating that the plaintiff and ttefenclants No.2 to 4 had consented to the mutation of the property in his ,o 3 name. He further conte nded that a mediation by elders resulted in passing of an Award on 22.O9.2OO0 which allocated the property exclusively to him, with the plaintiff and other heirs accepting monetary compensation-. .

5. That the Defendant No.2 supported the claim of Defendant No.1, asserting that the property was exclusively allotted to him in partition, and that the other heirs had executed an affidavrt consenting to its mutation, contending that the suit be dismissed. Meanwhiie, Defendants No.3 and 4 aligned with the plaintiff, contending that the property remained undivided and was still jointly possessed by the heirs as tenants in common under the management of Defendant No. 1.

6. After hearing both sides and considering the submissions made thereof, the trial Court framed five key issues for adjudication, which read as under: Whether the property was jointly possessed and managed by Defendant No. 1? Whether the sale of House No. 8-1-6 was properly executed by all heirs? I i I 4 Wtrether the plaintiff and Defendants No.:] and 4 had executed a release deed on 02.O5.2001 ') Whether the plaintiff was entitled to parti i()n into six equal shares ard allotment of her I/6tLL t;hare? To what reliel? 7 . During triaI, oral and documentary e\, idence were presenred by both parties. The trial Court observed that while the sale transaction of House No.S- 1-6 had been properly executr:d, the crucial documents relied upoD kr}, Delendant No.l-lfx.B1 reiated to the sold-out property and Ex.B18 - al alleged release deed were unregistered. Further, oiting Section 17(1)(bl of the Registration Act, 1908 the trial (lc,urt observed that any document creating or extinguish n g rights in immova.ble propgrty valued at more tharl Rs 1OO/- must be compuisorily registered to be legally enforceable Additionally, several judicial precedents were cited, including cases such as Satish Kumar v. Surender Kumarl and Lachman Das v. Ramlal2, which established that unregistercd documents extinguishing rights in immovable property are inadmissible. Given the lack of valid registration, the trial Cc u rt concluded ' lntR rszo sc sr:1 '1atR rsas sc rsz:1 o 5 that Ex.B18 could not be considered as evidence of relinquishment, and in the absence of legally valid release documents, the trial Court concluded that the suit schedule property remained jointly possessed by all heirs as tenants in common. Consequently, the plaintiff was deemed entitled to partition and separate possession of her 1/6th share, with Defendant No.1 receiving 2/6th shares as per Mohammedan Law, thereby, the suit was decreed with costs, directing partition of the property into six equal shares. Aggrieved thereby, this appeal is hled by defendant No. 1 .

8. Heard Sri N.Praveen Reddy, learned counsel for appellant/defendant No.1, Sri S.Prasad, and Sri Kiran Reddy, learned counsel for respective respondents.

9. karned counsel for appellant submitted that the impugned judgment passed by the trial Court is fundamentally flawed due to several critical errors. Firstly, that the trial Court misinterpreted the nature of Ex.B1 award, wrongly concluding that it was not a partition deed or a document related to partition, despite its contents clearly indicaling otherwise. He contended that such I I I I i I i i I I I I I i I I l : i i 6 misinterpretation stems to be failure to look ber.ond the nomen<:lat ure of the document ald instead con s ider the true intentic,ns of the parties involved, as evidc r.lced by the contenl s of the document. He lamen ted that t r,.: trial Court erred ir' holding that the relinquishment of right r under Ex.B 1 did not affect the rights of the parties to the oroperty, and pointed out that the said finding is contrary lr-', t.he principles of propertv law. He reiterated that the observ ,r 1.ions of trial Court dernonstrate a lack of understanding rf tl-rc legal implicalions of relinquishment of rights in l,he context ol partitio n.

10. Addrtionally, he contended that the trial Court incorre<:tl1 ruled that Ex.B1 and Ex.B18 c ould not bc considered due to lack of registration, and th:r.- this ruling ignores the well-established principle that unregistered documc nts can be looked into for collaterai purl):)ses, such as, establishing the division of status among partic s. He averred that thr: fzrilure of the trial Court to apply this grrinciple has resultec[ in an incorrect interpretation of the documents and their implir:ations for the case. He asserted that 1.he trial Court misappl.ied relevant legal precedents, including ltre judgments j I t I I 7 passed in ttre cases of Pallapothu Naga Prasad and others Versus Pallapothu Venkata Krishna Rao and others3 and Adapaka Sriramulu and others Versus Adapaka Bapi Naidua, which clearly establish that unregistered awards can be considered for collateral purposes. 1 1. l.earned counsel for appellant incessantly contended that the hndings of the trial Court in respect of possession and entitlement to shares in the plaint schedule property are fundamentally flawed. He specifically averred that the trial Court erred in deeming the parties tenants in common under the management of Defendant No.l and in awarding 1/6th share to the plaintiff and defendant Nos.2 to 4, and that such frndings demonstrate lack of understanding of the rights of parties and interests in the property. Therefore, he prayed this Court to allow the appeal, setting aside the impugned judgments dated 02.03.2006 passed in O.S.No. 19 of 2OO2.

12. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondents, vehemently opposed the submissions made by learned counsel for appellant, and contended that there is no illegality t zoo: (r)aro zst zooa 1r1nlo ses o I l I I I I i i l i I I I I I I I I I Lq i :. -.i r' I I in the impugned judgment and that the trial CoLrrt has rightly decidecl the matter. Therefore, while advocating t hat there are no merits in this appeal, he prayed this Court to dismiss the same.

13. Having regard to the rival submissions rnade, and on going l.hrough the material piaced on recorrl, the points determined lor consideration by this Court are: I Whether the suit schedule proper1tr. is enjoyed by the plaintiff and defendants as, tenants in common ? II Whether the plaintiff, D3 and D4 l-:rve executecl deed of release dated 02.05.2001 ? III Whether the plaintiff is entitled for partition of suit schedule propert5r ? IV. Whether the judgment of trial Court. needs any interference ? To what extent ? I I I o 9 POINT Nos.I to V :

14. Upon careful examination of the pleadings, oral and documentary evidence, and having regard to the legal submissions made by both the parties, it clearly reflects that a family arrangement had been entered into among the legal heirs of late Yakub Ali, under which the plaintiff and defendant Nos.2 to 4 had relinquished their respective rights in the suit schedule property and accepted monetary compensation in lieu of any further claims. This understanding was reduced to writing under Ex.Bl, and the subsequent conduct of the parties, including the mutation of the property in the name of Defendant No.1 and the acceptance of compensation by the plaintiff and other heirs, substantiates the arrangement.

15. The Honble Supreme Court, in the case of Kale and others v. Deputy Director of Consolidations, has held that even a person with a plausible or potential claim in a propert5r may enter into a valid and binding family arrangement. Such arrangement, if arrived at voluntarily and in good faith to ' (rgu o) : scc rrg l I I I i I .i -i]}i:: .ir , r_1::1.: I I 10 settle disputes, is enforceable even if unregister:r<1, provided it merely records an already concluded oral se tl.le ment. The relevant portion i.e., paragraph No.13 of the rzrid judgment read as under: "t3. In Sahu Madho Das v. Pandit Mukand Rarn [(1955) 2 SCR 22, 42-43 : AIR 1955 SC 4811 this Court appears to have amplified the doctrine of validity of the family arrarlilement to th(' farthest possible extent, where Bose, J., speal:irg for the Court. observed as follows: "It rs well settled that a compromise or family arrangement is based on the assumption that th::re is an antecedent title of some sort in the parties ix')d the agreement acknowledges and def,rnes what thal 1:it1e is, each party relinquishing all claims to property ottrcr than that falling to his share and recognising the ngrt of the others, as they had previously asserted it, to the pcrtions allotted to them respectively. That explains $hy no conveyance is required in these cases to pass lhe title from the one in whom it resides to the person rer:eiving it under the family arrangement- It is assumed thal the titte claimed by the person receiving the property u:rder the arrangement had always resided in him or her r;o far as the property falling to his or her share is concern::d and therefore no conveyance is necessaql. But, in our opinion, tl.e principle can be carried further and so strongly do the courts lean in favour o:- family arrangements that bring about harmony in a farily ard do justice to its various members and z.r,:rid in alticipation, future disputes which might ruin th3m all, and we have no hesitation in taking the next step (fraud 11 apart) and upholding an arrangerlent under which one set of members abandons all claim to all title and interest in all the properties in dispute and acknowledges that the sole and absolute title to all the properties resides in only one of their number (provided he or she had claimed the whole and made such an assertion of title) and are content lo take such properties as are assigned to their shares as gifts pure and simple from him or her, or as a conveyance for consideration when consideration is present.""

16. Reverting to the facts of the case on hand, it is seen that defendant No.1 has been in settled and exclusive possession of the property post such arrangement, and none of the other heirs have asserted possessory rights thereafter. Therefore, the propert5z stood exclusively allotted to Defendant No. I under a binding and valid family arrangement, and the conclusion of the trial Court in treating the parties as tenants in common is erroneous and liable to be interfered with.

17. That being so, it can be said that the [rial Court committed a legal error in discarding Ex.B18 on the sole ground that it is an unregistered document. It is well settled iegal principle that documents such as Ex.B18, though unregistered, may be considered for collateral purposes, such I , .i:i L2 as derrron strating the conduct of parties, relirLc uish ment of claims, and mutual recognition of exclusive right s.

18. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, as well as various High Courts, hirve repeatedly affirmed that a famill, :rrrangement need not be registered if it is not intended to operate as a conveyernce, but merely records a past oral se|,1crnent, as was the case here. The evidence on record, includrng the cross- examinrrtion of the plaintiff and defendant IJos.3 and 4, reveals that they had accepted hnancial con:;i,leration, as recorded irr Ex.B1, and thereafter acquiesced to the cxclusive enjoymont of the property by Defendant I{o. 1. Their particip,ltion in the mutation proceedings and tl-rt:jr silence for a consi,lerable time period strongly supports l.h e inference that they had relinquished their rights in the propr:rty.

19. Ttie t:ontention that they were unaware of the contents of Ex.B t8 is not tenable, particularly in the abs::nce of any allegation or proof of fraud or misrepresentation Hence, this Court hr>lds that the plaintiff, along with defendant Nos.3 and 4, had voluntarily relinquished her share in the ;r.rit schedule property, and Ex.B18, when read with Ex.Bl arrcl supported i I I 13 by the conduct of parties, is sufficient to establish such relinquishment

20. Having found that the plaintiff and other co-heirs had relinquished their rights and accepted compensation under a valid and binding family arrangement, the question of the plaintiff being entitled to seek partition of the suit schedule property does not arise. Once parties to a family settlement have accepted its terms and acted upon it, they are estopped from asserting rights contrary to that arrangement.

21. The Honble Supreme Court in Sahu Madho Das v. Mukand Ram6 afhrmed the binding nature of family settlements, even in cases where some parties had imperfect or disputed claims. The doctrine of estoppel clearly applies in the present case, where the plaintiff and defendant Nos.2 to 4 not only accepted the benefits under the arrangement but also failed to object when Defendant No. I was put in exclusive possession and the property was mutated in his name. The trial Court, while holding that the plaintiff was entitled to I / 6ft share, failed to apply the principles of estoppel and " ntR tgss sc +81 74 instead adopted a rigid interpretation focu.,;t:d on non- registration, thereby disregarding the settl.rrl law that recognizes and protects oral and infc rrral iamily arrangements. Thus, the plaintiff, having re)irrquished her share and accepted consideration, cannot norv:;rlek partition, and her claim in that regard is untenable.

22. Teat being so, this Court is of the hrm ',,iew lhat the judgment and decree dated 02.O3.2006 passed [r1 the learned Senior ,3ivil Judge. Siddipet, in O.S.No.79 of '2ttO2 is tegally flawed and merits interference. The trial (]r r-: rt erred in mechanically applying Section 17 of the Regis, r:rtion Act to Exs.B1 and B18, ignoring the lega1 distin,:tion between documents that create rights and those that rrerely record existing arrangements. The trial Court a. so failed to apprecizrte the legal principles laid down in kr l:: and other landmark cascs, including Ram Charan Das v. Girjanandini DeviT and Maturi Pullaiah v. Maturi Narasin:.ham8, which uphold the validity of family settlements reacht:cl voluntarily and in good faith. The admissions made <lr,rring cross- examination by the plaintiff and defendant lios.3 and 4, ' tges : scn gat ' nrn 196e sc tg36 I i 15 wherein they conceded the receipt of frnancial consideration and acknowiedged Defendant No. l's enjoyment of the property, were not given due weight. These lapses led to a fundamentally incorrect conclusion by the trial Court, necessitating reversal of the decree in appeal.

23. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court hnds that the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court is not sustainable in law or on facts. The plaintiffs suit for partition is based on a right that she had already relinquished under a family arrangement which is binding and enforceable. The fact that she, along with defendant Nos.2 to 4, received consideration and permitted Defendant No. I to retain I I exclulive possession of the property confirms the existence of such arrangement.

24. This Court, therefore, holds that t]le suit schedule property stood settled under a bona hde and binding family arrangement, and Defendant No. 1 is entitled to exclusive ownership thereof. The doctrine of estoppel precludes the plaintiff and defendant Nos.2 to 4 from resiling from the said settlement. In view thereof, this appeal is liable to be allowed, 15 and the impugned judgment of the trial Court is liable to be set aside .

25. Acr:ordingly, this Appeal Suit is allowed sert ns aside the judgment and decree dated 02.03.20O6 passed in O.S.No.19 of 2OO2 on the lrle of the Senior Civil Judge, Siclc iyret_ There shall be no ordcr as to costs. Miscellaneous applications, if any pendinl;. shall also stand closed. Sd/- K.SHYLESI JOINT REGISTRAR //TRUE COPY// I ECTION OFFICER I To,

1. The Senicrr Civil Judge, Siddipet (With records' if any) 2. One CC to SRl. N PRAVEEN REDDY Advocate [OPUt.) 3. One CC to SRI SHERI PRASAD Advocate [OPUC] 4. One CC to Sri Kiran Reddy Mallarapu, Advocate (OPU(I) 5. Two CD Copies (r -fl , HIGH COURT DATED:0710712025 JUDGMENT AS.No.446 of 2006 /4 /t: 'i -' t; a-) ) TP 'i_- \\ r -', rlir (' l.\. t ?$6 t 1i '.'...t:; .. ': . , -.:' ALLOWING THE APPEAL l* I q )-5- THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA AT HYDERABAD MONDAY, THE SEVENTH DAY OF JULY TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE PRESENT THE HONOURABLE SMT JUSTICE K. SUJANA FIRST APPEAL NO: 446 OF 2006 Between: MOHD. HAFEEZ ALI , BABA, S/o.Late Yaqoob Ali Rl/o.H.No.B-'l-21, Subash Road, Siddipet Town, Medak District AND 1 . NASEEIV SULTANA, Wo.Basheeruddin Household F/o.H. No. 1 2-3-1 03/2, Khaderpura, Siddipet Town, Medak District APPELLANT/DEFENDANT RespondenUPlaintiff No.1

2. Nayeemunnisa Begum,, W/o.Asnuddin Household Fl/o.H.No.B-1-21 , Subash Road, Siddipet Town, Medak District a. (Died per LRs 5 to 14 and dismissed for default vide C.O.dt.1 2.3.2015) b. 2 Respondent restored as per C.O. d1.17.11.2022.

3. Raufunnisa Begum,, Wo.Late Kaleeluddin Household R/o.H.No.1 0-1 -63, Baraimam, Siddipet Town,

4. Saleemunnisa Begum,, W/o.Abdul Rahman Household Rl/o.H.No.2-3-5318, Sajithpura, Siddipet Town,

5. Shaik Rafiuddin, W/o. Late Shaik Hasnuddin, Aged about 50 years, Occu. Business, cJo.12-4-9011 14, Naseer Nagar, Siddipet.

6. Shaik Fasiuddin, S/o. Late Shaik Hasnuddin, Aged about 48 years, Occu. Business, No.12-4-901114, Naseer Nagar, Siddipet.

7. Shaik Shafiuddin, S/o. Late Shaik Hasnuddin, Aged about 46 years, Occu. Business, tr.Jo.12-4-901114, Naseer Nagar, Siddipet.

8. Shaik Zaki Uddin, S/o. Late Shaik Hasnuddin, Aged about 44 years, Occu. Business, P./d.12-4-9011 14, Naseer Nagar, Siddipet.

9. Shaik Raziuddin, Wo. Late Shaik Hasnuddin, Aged about 42 years, Occu. Business, tr.Jo.12-4-9011 14, Naseer Nagar, Siddipet.

10.Shaik Samiuddin, S/o. Late Shaik Hasnuddin, Aged about 40 years, Occu. Business, P.Jo.12-4-901114, Naseer Nagar, Siddipet.

11. Shaik Afsaruddin, S/o. Late Shaik Hasnuddin, Aged about 38 years, Occu. Business, eJo.12-4-901114, Naseer Nagar, Siddipet. 'l2.Azeemunnisa Begum, D/o. Late Shaik Hasnuddin, Age d about 36 years, Occu. Household, R/o.12-4-9011/4, Naseer Nagar, Sid(iipet.

13.Shaik Azr-.emuddin, S/o. Late Shaik Hasnuddin, Aged at,out 34 years, Occu Tutor, R/r:.12-4-90/114, Naseer Nagar, Siddipet.

14. Nazia Begum, D/o. Late Shaik Hasnuddin, Aged about 32 years, Occu. Househo,d, Rlo.12-4-901114, Naseer Nagar, Siddipet. (Responclent Nos. 5 to 14 are brought on record as LRs ofdeceased Respondent No.2 as per C.O. daled 17.11.2022 in lA.l'lc, 3 of 2022 in A.S.No.446 of 2006 and appeal against respondent l.lo.2 is restored against the order dt. 1 2.3.201 5). RESPONDENTSIDEFENDANTS 2 TO 4 Appeal fi ed under Section 96 Order 41 Rule 1 of C o C., aggrieved by the Judgment and Decree, dated 02.03.2006 passed in O.S.No ' 9 ol 2002 on the file of the Senior Civil .Judge, Siddipet. ORDER: This appeal coming on for hearing and upon perrusing the grounds of appeal, the Judgment and Decree of the Lower Cou( and thr: nraterial papers in the Petition and upon hearing the arguments of Sri N. Praveen Rc:ddy, Advocate for the appellanUdefendant No.1 and of Sri Sheri Prasad, Advocate frrr Respondent No.4 and Sri Kiran Reddy Mallarapu for Respondent Nos. 5, 6, 7, ll, 10, 12, 13 & 14. This court doth Order and Decree as follows '1 . That this Court the appeal set asides the judgment anrl rlecree of the Lower Court.

2. That the suit schedule property stood settled under a b:rna fide and binding family arrangement, and the Defendant No.1 is entitlerj to exclusrve ownership thereof.

3. That the doctrine of estoppels precludes the plaintiff anl defendant Nos.2 to 4 from resiling from the said settlement.

4. That there shall be no order as to costs. Sd/. K.SHYLESI JOINT REGISTRAR ' r SECTION OFFICER //TRUE COPY// To '1 . The Senior Civil Judge, Siddipet,

2. Two CD copies. n^_ YY HIGH COURT DATED:0710712025 DECREE AS.No.446 of 2006 ALLOWING THE APPEAL ( I+ a \,