Hyderabad High Court · 2025

M/s. Sri Lakshmi Agencies, At C-9 and 10 units, lndustrial Estate, Autonagar, Vijayawada, Andhra Pradesh Also at - M/s. Sri Lakshmi Agencies, E-32, 100 Ft. Road, Autonagar, Vijayawada, Andhra Pradesh. Also at - M/s. Sri Lakshmi Agencies, D 23-8-1 lA, Adiseshaiah Street, Satyanarayanapuram, Vijayawada- 1'1 , Andhra Pradesh, B.Sudhakar, Partner, M/s. Vaishnavi Chemicals, At C-9 and 10 units, lndusrtrial Estate, Autonagar, Vijayawada, Andhra Pradesh. Also at. [\r1r. B.Sudhakar, S/o. Shri Subharamaiah, Flat No. D-3, lllrd Floor, K.G.B. Apa(ments, Near Gupta Kalyan Mandap, Close to Bunder Road, Vijayawada- 10, Andhra Pradesh. Mr. Kanuparthi Shiva Rama Gopala Krishna Murthy, S/o Sri Kanakaiah, R/o. Thirumalapuram, W.G. District, Adhra Pradesh, Also at. Mr. Kanuparthi Shiva Rama Gopala Krishna Murthy, S/o. Sri Kanakaiah, E-21,1OO Feet Road, Auto nagar, Vijayawada-7, Andhra Pradesh. Mr. Kanuparthi Ramchandra Rao,S/o Shri Krishna Rao, R/o. Thirumatapuram, W.G. District, Andhra Pradesh. Also at. Mr. Kanuparthi Ramchandra Rao, S/o. Shri Krishna Rao, E-32, 100 Feet Roas, Autonagar, Vijayawada-7, Andhra Pradesh.

5. The State of Telangana, Rep. by Public Prosecutor, High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad. ...Respondents/Accused Nos.1,2,6 and 7 ...RespondenURespondent CRIMINAL APPEAL NO: 592 OF 2018 Criminal Appeal filed under Section 378(4) of Cr.P.C., against the Judgment dated 08.02.2017 passed in CC.No.82 ot 2013 on the file of the Court of the lll Special Magistrate, Hyderabad. Between: M/s. Rallis lndia Limited, Rep. by its authorized person Mr. Krishnamurthy Sudarsan S/o Late T.V.Krishnamurthy, aged 63 yrs, Regional Office - D.No. 23-11-1O1, N.R.P. Road, Satyanarayanapuram, Vijayawada-1 1. ...AppellanUComplainant AND 1 M/s. Sri Lakshmi Agencies, At C-9 and 10 units, lndustrial Estate, Autonagar, Vijayawada, Andhra Pradesh Also at - Mis. Sri Lakshmi Agencies, E-32,1OO Ft. Road, Autonagar, Vijayawada, Andhra Pradesh. Also at - M/s. Sri Lakshmi Agencies, D 23-8-llA,Adiseshaiah Street, Satyanarayanapuram, Vijayawada- 11, Andhra Pradesh. 2 r) 4 B.Sudhakar, Partner, M/s. Vaishnavi Chemicals, At C-9 and 10 units, Indusrtrial Estate, Autonagar, Vijayawada, Andhra Pradesh. Also at. Mr. B.Sudhakar, S/o. Shri Subharamaiah, Flat No. D-3, lllrd Floor, K.G.B. Apartments, Near Gupta Kalyan Mandap, Close to Bunder Road, Vijayawada- 10, Andhra Pradesh. Mr. Kanuparthi Shiva Rama Gopala Krishna Murthy, S/o Sri Kanakaiah, Rl/o. Thirumalapuram, W.G. District, Adhra Pradesh, Also at. Mr. Kanuparthi Shiva Rama Gopala Krishna Murthy, Sio. Sri Kanakaiah, E-21 , 100 Feet Road, Auto nagar, Vijayawada-7, Andhra Pradesh. tVlr. Kanuparthi Ramchandra Rao,S/o Shri Krishna Rao, Fl/o. Thirumalapuram, W.G. District, Andhra Pradesh. Also at. Mr. Kanuparthi Ramchandra Rao, S/o. Shri Krishna Rao, E-32, 100 Feet Roas, Autonagar, Vijayawada-7, Andhra Pradesh.

5. The State of Telangana, Rep. by Public Prosecutor, High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad. ... Respondents/Accused Nos.1,2,6 and 7 ...RespondenURespondent CRIMINAL APPEAL NO: 627 OF 2018 Criminal Appeal filed under Section 378(4) of Cr.P.C., against the Judgment dated 08.02.2017 passed in CC.No.83 ol 2013 on the file of the Court of the lll Special Magistrate, Hyderabad. Between: M/s. Rallis lndia Limited, Rep. by its authorized person Mr. Krishnamurthy Sudarsan S/o Late T.V.Krishnamurthy, aged 63 yrs, Regional Office - D.No. 23-1 1 -1 0 1, N.R. P. Road, Satyanarayanapuram, Vijayawada-1 1 . ...AppellanUCom plainant AND '1 . M/s. Sri Lakshmi Agencies, At C-9 and 10 units, lndustrial Estate, Autonagar, Vijayawada, Andhra Pradesh Also at - M/s. Sri Lakshmi Agencies, E-32, 100 Ft. Road, Autonagar, Vijayawada, Andhra Pradesh. Also at - M/s. Sri Lakshmi Agencies, D 23-8-11A, Adiseshaiah Street, Satyanaraya napuram, Vijayawada- 1'1 , Andhra Pradesh.

2. B.Sudhakar, Partner, M/s. Vaishnavi Chemicals, At C-9 and '10 units, lndusrtrial Estate, Autonagar, Vijayawada, Andhra Pradesh. Also at. Mr. B.Sudhakar, S/o. Shri Subharamaiah, Flat No. D-3, lllrd Floor, K.G.B. Apartments, Near Gupta Kalyan Mandap, Close to Bunder Road, Vijayawada- '10, Andhra Pradesh.

3. Mr. Kanuparthi Shiva Rama Gopala Krishna Murthy, S/o Sri Kanakaiah, Ft/o. Thirumalapuram, W.G. District, Adhra Pradesh, Also at. [Vlr. Kanuparthi Shiva Rama Gopala Krishna Murthy, S/o. Sri Kanakaiah, E-21 ,100 Feet Road, Auto nagar, Vijayawada-7, Andhra Pradesh.

4. Mr. Kanuparthi Ramchandra Rao,S/o Shri Krishna Rao, R/o. Thirumalapuram, W.G. District, Andhra Pradesh. Also at. Mr. Kanuparthi Ramchandra Rao, S/o. Shri Krishna Rao, E-32, 100 Feet Roas, Autonagar, Vijayawada-7, Andhra Pradesh.

5. The State of Telangana, Rep. by Public Prosecutor, High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad. ... Respondents/Accused Nos.1,2,6 and 7 ...RespondenURespondent Counsel for the Appellant in all CRLAs :Sri N Naveen Kumar Counsel forthe Respondent Nos.1 & 2 in all CRLAs : Padamutham John Mathewcaleb Counsel for the Respondent Nos.3 & 4: _ _ _ Counsel for the Respondent No.5 : Public Prosecutor The Court delivered the following: Common Judgment HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE K.SURENDER CRIMINAL APPEAL Nos.523, 59t,592 and 627 OF 2018 COMMON JUDGMENT: 1. Criminal Appeal No.523 of 2018 is filed by the appellant, aggrieved by the acquittal of accused vide judgment in C.C.No.81 of 2013 dated 08.O2.2O17. Criminal Appeal No.59 I of 2018 is filed by the appellant aggrieved by the acquittal of accused. vide judgment in C.C.No.84 of 2Ol3 dated 08.02.201.7. Criminal Appeal No.592 of 2018 is filed by the appellant aggrieved by the acquittal of accused vide judgment in C.C.No.B2 of 2Ol3 dated Oa.O2.2Ol7, and Criminal Appeal No.627 of 2018 is filed by the appellant aggrieved by the acquittal of accused vide judgment in C.C.No.83 of 2013 dated 08.02 .2017. Since parties in all the appeals are one and the same, they are being heard together and disposed off by way of this Common Judgment.

2. The appellant company herein is the complainant before the learned III Special Magistrate, Hyderabad. A private complaint was filed to punish the respondent/accused for the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The complainant company is a public limited company and the lst respondent/ lst 2 accused is a partnership firm represented by its partners A2 to A7. A3 is the signatory of the cheques in question, in all the cases. According to the complainant, all other accused, i.e., A2, A4 to A7 were responsible for the day to day activities of Al partnership ftrm and are jointly liable.

3. Briefly, the case of the complainant company in all the cases is that the complainant company's products, which are fertilizers, chemicals, and pesticides, supplied to re spondents / accu sed ona regular basis as part of a business understanding. The proclucts were delivered by the complainant company and accepted by the accused firm. Towards payment of the outstanding amounts for the products supplied, cheques 1n question were issued. The following cheques, when presented for clearance, were returned unpaid on the ground of, "payment stopped by drawer", and in Crl.A.No.627 of 2018, the reason for return of the cheque is, "insufficient funds". Crl.Appeal number Against CC No. Parties names Cheque No.& amount Crl.A.No.523 of 2018 Against CC No.81 of 2013 M/s.Rallis Limited. M s.Sri India Lakshmi Two cheques bearing No.382872, 382873, dt.31.03.2004 for Crl.A.No.59 1 of 2018 Against CC No.84 of 20r3 Crl.A.No.592 of 2018 against CC No.82 of 20t3 Crl.A.No.627 of 2018 against C.C.No.83 of 20r3 3 Agencies & others India M/s.Rallis Limited. M/s.Sri Agencies & others Lakshmi India M/s.Rallis Limited. M/s.Sri Agencies & others M/s.Rallis Limited. M/s.Sri Agencies & others Lakshmi India Lakshmi Rs.15,00,OOO/- each were issued Three cheques bearing Nos.382881, 382882, 382883 of Rs.15,00,000/- each for a total amount of Rs.45,00,000/- were issued Two cheques bearing Nos.382874, 382875 for 15,00,000/- each were issued A cheque No.382876 dt.30.04.2004 5,00,000/- issued. bearing

4. The learned Magistrate examined witnesses on behalf of the complainant and the documents marked by them. Heavy reliance was placed on Ex.Pl1, MOU dated 31.03.2OO4, to substantiate the outstanding to be paid by the accused to the complainant company. Learned Magistrate, having considered the evidence on record, acquitted the accused on the following grounds: 1) As per the MOU dated 31.03.2004, it is not clear whether the cheques were issued towards the liability of the 4 complainant firm or towards the liability of another firm namely M / s.Vaishnavi Chemicals 2) The MOU is in between the complainant company and two firms, namely M/s. Sri Lakshmi Agencies (A1) and another hrm M/s.Vaishnavi Chemicals, and both were represented by A2. B.Sudhakar. 3) Ex.P6, which is a photocopy of the partnership deed dated O1.O4.I998, shows that A2 and A3 are not partners of Al firm. In the complaint cause title, A2 is sh<twn as partner in M/s.Vaishnavi Chemicals and A1 firm is not shown to have been represented by any partner 4) In Ex.P11, the complainant failed to show that A.2 is partner of A1 firm or that the MOU dated 31.03.2004 was executed by partner of A1 firm. As per Ex.Pl2 partnership deed, ,{4 to A7 are partners with equal shares and all rights, but A4 is shown as the person responsible for the management of A1 firm, and A5 to A7 are not given any rights to look after the business of A1 firm 5) P.W.2 admitted that he is not aware whether the outstanding is towards A1 lirm or M/s.Vaishnavi Chemicals 5 (which is not an accused) since the MOU does not contain a specihc clause regarding whether the cheques were issued towards the loan of A1 hrm or M/s.Vaishnavi Chemicals. In the said circumstances, it cannot be assumed that the cheques were towards the liability of Ai firm only. 6) No reason is given as to why M/s.Vaishnavi Chemicals was not made a party. 7) The existence of the MOU dated 3 l.O3.2OO4 was not spoken to by P.W.2 and also, there is no mention of the MOU in the compiaint. 8) The complaint lacks the speci{ic details of the supply of material to the accused 9) Ex.PlO-Special Power of Attorney, executed by the complainant in favour of Kishore Kumar Mundada, Ex.Pl1 dated 31.03 .2OO4, and Ex.P12 partnership deed dated

01.04.1998, are all photocopies. The conditions laid down under Section 65 of the Indian Evidence Act, for acceptance of secondary evidence are not complied with, to rely on the contents of Exs.Pl0, P11, and P12. 6 10) No notice was given to the accused to produce the original documents, nor is it the claim of the complainant in the complaint that the originals are in the possession of the accused 1 1) According to clause 7 of the MOU, trvo originals were prepared, however, the complainant company failed to file the original documents that were in their possession 12\ No specific role is attributed to A2, A4 to A7, to make them vicariously liable under Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

5. Learned counsel appearing for the appellar-rt would submit that once the signature on the cheque and its issuance are admitted, presumption is raised under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, and the accused failed to rebut the presumption by any admissible evidence. The learned Magistrate had committed an error in finding the accused not guilty, though there was no dispute regarding the issuance of the cheques.

6. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the respondents/accused argued that the findings of the learned 1 Magistrate needs no interference since they are based on record and reasonable.

7. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in K.S.Mehta v. M/s.Morgan Securities and Credits Private Limitedl, held as follows: "16. This Court has con-sistentl!! held that non execuliue and independent director(s) cannot be held liable under Section 138 read ulith Section 141 of the NI Act unless specific allegations demonstrate their direct inuoluement in affairs of the compang ot the releuant time. 16-1. This Court in National Smoll Industies Corpn. Ltd. u. Harmeet Singh Paintal & Anr., (201O) 3 SCC 33O obserued.: "13. Section 141 is a penal prouision cre.ating uicaious liabilitg, and tuhich, as per settled lau, must be stictly construed. It is therefore, not suffrcient to make a bald arsory statement in a complalnt that the Director (arraged as an accttsed) is in charge of and responsible to the compang for the conduct oJ the business of the company uithout anlJthing more as to the role of the Director. But the complaint should spell out as to hou and in tuhat manner Respondent 1 uas in charge of or u)as responsible to the accused Compang for the conduct o/ its business- ?his is in consonance with stict interpretation of penal stotures, especiallg, uhere such statutes create uicaiou s liability.

22. Therefore, this Court has distinguished the case of persons who are incharge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the compang at the time of the offence and the persons utho are merely holding the post in a company and are not tn charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the compang. Furrher, in order to fasten the uicarious liability in accordance uith Section 141 , the auernent as to the role of the Directors concemed should be specific. The desciption should be clear and there should be some unambiguous allegations as to hou the Directors concemed were alleged to be in charge of and were responsible for the conduct and affairs of the compang.

39. From the aboue discu.ssion, the follotDing pinciples emerge: (i) The pimary responsibilitg is on the complainant to make speciJic auerments as ore required under the lcnu in the complaint so as lo make the acatsed uicariouslg liable. For fastening the ciminal liability, there is no presumption that euery Director knows about the transaction. (ii) Section 141 does not make all the Directors liable Jor the offence. The ciminal I Arising out of SLP (criminal) No.4774 of 2024, dated 04.03.2025 8 liability can be fastened only on tLtosc u.tho, at the time of thc commission of thc offence, were in charge of and tuere responsiblc for the conduct of the business of the company. (iii) Vicaious liabilitg can be infered against a companA registered or incorporated under tLLe Compan[es Act, 1956 only if the requisite statements, tthich are requ[red to be auerred in the complaint/ petition, are made so as ,o make the accused therein uicaiously liable for olfence committed bA the companq along uith auerments in the petition containing that the accused tuerc in charge of and responsible for the busine.ss of the compang ancl ltg uirtue of their position theA are liabte to be proceeded wilh. (iu) Vicaious liability on the part of a person must be pleaded and proued ond not inferred. (u) If the accused is a Managing Director or a Joint Managing Director tlaen it is not necessary to make specific auerrnent in the complaint and by ulnuc of thcir position they are liable to be proceeded with. (ui) If the accused is a Director or an oJficer of a compang u-tho signed the cheques on behalf of the companA then also il is not necessary to make specifi.c ouerment in the complaint. (uii) The person sought to be made liable should be in chargc of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the conpany at the releuant time. This has to be auerced as a fact as there is no deemed liabilitg of a Director in such cases. " 16.2. In N. K. Wahi u Shekhar Slngh & Ors., (2OO7) 9 SCC 481 this Court in Para 8 obserued.. "To launch a prosecution, against the alleged Dtrectors thcre mltst be a speciftc allegalton in the complaint as to the part plaged b! tlrcm in the transaction. There should be clear and unambiguous allegalton as to hoLU the Directors are in-charge and responsible for the concluct of lhe business of the compang. The desciption should be clear. It is true that precise uords from the proutsions of the Act need not be reproduced and the coutl can aluays come to a conclusion in facts of each case. But still, in the abscnce of ang auerment or specirtc euidence the net result LDoLLld be that complaint would not be entertainable." 16.3. 1n S.M'S-. Pharmaceuticals Ltd u. Neeta Bhalla & Anr., (2005) 8 SCC 89, this Courl laid down that mere designation as a director is not suffi.cient; speciJic role and responsibilitg must be establishcd in the complaint.

16.4. In Pooja Rauinder Deuid.asani u. State of Maharaslttrtt & Anr., (2014) 16 SCC 1, this Court u-thile taking into conslderation that a non execu.tiue director plags a gouernonce role, they are not rnuoh'ed in lhe daily operations or financial management of the compan11, held that to attract liabilitg under Section 141 of the NI Act, the accusad must haue been actiuelg in cLlarge of the companAt business at the rcleuant time. Mere directorship does not create automatic liability under tlLa Act. The knu has consistently held that only those uho are responsible lbr the day- to- daA conduct of business can be held accountable.

16.5 In Ashok Sheuakramani & Ors. u. State of Andhra Pradesh & Anr., (2023) 8 SCC 473, this Court held: "8. After hauing considered the submissions, u)e are of the t'icut that thcre is non-compliance on the part of the second Responclent tuith the 9 requirements of Sub-section (1) of Section 141 of the NI Act. We maA note here that ue are dealing uith the Appellants Luho haue been alleged to be the Directors of the Accttsed No. 1 cornPanA. We are not dealing with the cases of a Managing Director or a tuhole time Director. The Appellants Houe not signed the cheques. In the facts of these three cases, the cheques haue been signed by the Managing Director and not bg ang of the Appellants." 16.6. In Hitesh Verma u. M/s Health Care At Home India Put. Ltd. & Ors., Crl. Appeal No. 462 of 2025, this Court held: "4. As the appellant is not a signatory to the cheque, he is not liable under Section 138 of the 1881 Act. "As i, is only the signatory to the cheque uho is liable under Section I38, unless the case is brought within the four corners of Section 141 of the 1881 Act, no other person can be held liable...."

5. There are tuin requirements under sub-Section (1)of Section 141 of the 1881 Act. In the complaint, it must be alleged that the person, uho is sought to be held liable bg uirtue of uicaious liabilitg, at the time uhen the offence uLas committed, u.tas in charge of, and uas responsible to the compang for the conduct of the bustness of the company. A Director uho is in charge of the compang and a Director uho tuas responsible to the companA for the conduct of the business, arc tl!)o different aspects. The requirement of law is that both the ingredtents of sub-Sectton (1 ) of Section 141 oJ the 1881 Act must be incorporated. in the complaint. Admittedly, there is no assertion in the complaints thot the appellant, at the time of the commission of the offence, u.tos in charge of the business of the compang. ThereJore, on a plain reading of the complaints, the appellant cannot be prosecuted u.tith the aid of sub-Section (1) of Section 141 of the 1881 Act."

17. Upon pentsal of the record and -submisslon.s of the parties, it is euident that the Appellant(s) neither issued nor signed the dishonoured cheques, nor had ang role in their execution. There is no material on record to suggest that theA uere responsible for the issuance of the cheques in question. Their inuoluement in the company's affairs LUos purely non- exeantiue, confined to gouernance ouersight, and did not extend to financial d.ecision- making or operational managemenL

18. The complaint lacks speclrtc auerments that establish a direct nents betueen the Appellant(s) and the financictl transactions in question or demonstrate their inuoluement in the compang's financial affairs. Additionally, the CGR(s) and ROC records unequiuocallg confirm their non- exeoitiue status, underscoring their limited role in gouemance u.tithout ang executiue decision-making outhoritA. The mere fact that Appellant(s) attended boord meetings cloes not suffi.ce to impose financial liabilitg on the Appellant(s), as such attendance does not automat[callg translate into control ouer financial operations. " 10

8. The hnding of the trial Court can be reversed by the appellate Court only when the appellant makes out a case to show that the trial Court has omitted to consider the evidence on record or that the hndings are contrary to the evidence adduced by the complainant. Unless compelling reasons are shown, the question of reversing an order of acquittal does not arise.

9. In Ravi Sharma v. State (Government of NCT of Delhif and another2, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that, while dealing with an appeal against acqulttal, the appellate court has to consider whether the trial Court's view can be termed as a possible one, particularly rvhen evidence on record has been analysed. The reason is that an order of acquittal adds up to the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused. Thus, the appellate court has to be relativell. slow in reversrng the order of the trial court rendering acquittal.

10. In Ghureg Lal v. State of Uttar Prad.esh', the Horr'ble Supreme Court, after referring to several Judgments regardtng the settled principles of law ancl the powers of appeliate Court in reversing the order of acquittal, held at para 70 as follows: 'z(2022) 8 Supreme Cou Cases 536 '12OOs1 10 Srpreme Court Cases 450 11 "7O. In the light of the aboue, the High Court and other appellate Courts should Jollou.t the well-settled pinciples crystallizerl bg number of Judgments i,f it is qoing to ouemtle or othenuise dis.turb the tial courT's acquittal:

1. The appellate coutt maA onlg ouerrule or otheruise disturb thc tial court's acquittal if it has 'uery substantiol ond compelling reasons" for doing so. A number of instances arise in which the appellate court uould haue "uery substantial and compelling reasons" to discard the tial courl's decision. "Very substantial and- compelltng reasons" eist uhen: i) The trial court's conclusion tuith regard to the facts is palpably turong: ii) The tiat court's decision wos based on an erroneous uieu of lau.t; iii) The tial court's judgment is likely to result in "graue miscarriage of justice"; iu) The entire approach of the tial court tn dealing with the eutdence Laas patentlA illegal; u) The tial court's judgment was manifestlg unjust and unreasonable; ui) The trial court has ignored the euidence or misread the mateial euidence or has ignored mateial documents like dging declarations/ report of lhc ballistic expefl, etc. uii)This tist is intended. to be lllustratiue, not exhaustiue. 2. The appellate courl must ahuags giuc proper tueight and consideration o the f;.ndings of the tial courl. If tuo reasonable uieu.ts can be reached- one that leads to acquittal, the other to conuiction-the High Courts/ appellate coutls must t-ule in fauour of the accused."

11. In the case on hand, even according to the complainant, the transactions were over a period of time and the material was supplied and payments were also received. However, the outstanding, according to the MOU stood at more than Rs.4.00 Crores. Only for the reason of the issuance of cheques and signatures being admitted, the Court cannot lose sight of the transactions in between the parties, to come to a conclusion 72 regarding the outstanding and liability against the cheques issued The transactions in between the parties are to be looked into in its entirety, and the Court cannot place reliance only on the fact that the cheques were issued. The burden that shifts onto the accused can be discharged by the preponderance of probability. Once the accused places before the Court, either by producing any evidence or on the basis of the oral and documentary evidence of the complainant that there is no outstanding, the Court can consider the evidence on record ar-rd acquit the accused. Once it is found that the complainant stated that there was sufficient evidence to prove the outstanding, however, could not prove the documents on record by admissible evidence, the complainant fails to prove its case against the accused. Only on the ground that the issuance of cheques was admitted, the same cannot be made basis to convict the accused since the complainant failed to prove the outstanding, as discussed. ).2. Learned Magistrate found that the very basis for launching prosecution is the MOU dated 31.O3.2OO4, which is inadmissible for the reason of there being no clarity regarding the liability of A1 hrm 13 Further, there was no proof of supply of material and there was no evidence that the cheques 1n question were issued to pay any existing outstanding. In the present facts, when there are no specific averments to implicate A2, A4 to A7 by making them vicariously liable, or reflecting their involvement, and also the MOU has not been proved by complying with the requirements of secondary evidence,'there ts no infirmity in the hnding of the learned Magistrate. There are no compelling reasons to interfere with the said frnding.

13. Accordingly, all the Criminal Appeals are dismissed //TRUE COPY// SD/- K SHYLESHI JOINT REGISTRAR SECTION OFFICER To, The lll Special Magistrate, Hvderabad Two ccs to the public pro."Jr"tJr, iigh court for the State of relangana at Hvderabad [OUT] lrl"" #i; i;n i{"'""n Kumar' Advocate [oPUC], one CC to Sri Padamutnu' Jonn Mathewcileb' Advocate [OPUC] Two CD CoPies 1 2 3 4 5 w ADK HIGH COURT DATED:1210312025 COMMON JUDGMENT CRLA.Nos.523, 591, 592 and 627 of 2018 . 5 I-;{ } (' o( a {',i' c r\ill 2015 3 , --t ) S.SPnTCY\ c0 DISMISSING ALL THE CRLAs 6qsa +"c'