Smt.Saleema G.Rattansey v. Vice Chairman

respectively on or before 22-04-1996 in view of the issuance of G.O.Ms.No.51 dated 5-2-1996 for which she sent a reply, and in spite of that reply informing the 1st respondent that the said G.O.Ms.No.51 does not have retrospective operation and since she made the application well before the issuance of the said G.O., she need pay the rates that prevailing earlier only, respondents are not considering her application and so she filed this petition to declare that the demand for payment of development charges by the 1st respondent in pursuance of G.O.Ms.No.51 M.A. dated 5-2-1996, for consideration of her application, is illegal and without jurisdiction.

The case of the respondents, as disclosed from the counter affidavit filed by the Secretary of the 1st respondent, is that after the petitioner was directed to pay Rs.24,010/- towards development charges along with documents referred to therein she filed an application seeking extension of time for payment till the end of December, 1995 on the ground that CCCA No.211 of 1992 is pending in this Court between her vendor and the Mandal Educational Officer, and subsequently through her letter dated 25-12-1995 she sought further extension till 22-04-1996 for payment of the development charges, and accordingly time was extended. But in the meanwhile rates of development charges were enhanced through G.O.Ms.No.51, dated 5-2-1996 and since the application of the petitioner without payment of development charges cannot be considered as a valid application in view of Section 14(2) of the Act read with the A.P. Urban Development Authority (Hyderabad) Rules, 1975, (for short ‘the Rules’) she was directed to pay Rs.2,40,019/- towards development charges consideration of her application.

The main contention of Sri Soma Konda Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioner is that in view of ratio in G.Pochaiah and another Vs. Govt. of A.P.Municipal Administration and Urban Development Department and another () the date of application only is relevant to decide the quantum of development charges payable and since G.O.Ms.No.51 M.A. dated 5-2-1996 came into force long subsequent to the date of submission of the application of the petitioner and since petitioner was granted extension of time for payment of development charges till 22-4-1996, the coming into force of G.O.Ms.No.51 on 5-2-1996 has no relevance for deciding the development charges to be paid by the petitioner.

The contention of Sri Niranjan Reddy, learned Standing Counsel for the 1st respondent is that in view of Section 14 of the Act read with Rule 15(1) of the Rules, application of the petitioner, not accompanied by the receipt showing payment of development charges, would not be a valid application and so merely because petitioner was granted time till 22.4.1996 she cannot take shelter under the said order granting extension of time and so she has to pay the development charges as per G.O.Ms.No.51 dated 5-2-1996, for the 1st respondent considering her application.

In my considered view, ratio in G.Pochaiah’s case (1 supra) has no application to the facts of this case, because the petitioner in that case, after she made an application on 10-06-1993 for according charge of land user was asked to pay Rs.2,65,046 towards development charges, green belt charges and processing charges, had complied with that demand on 24-11-1995 i.e. well before the coming into force of G.O.Ms.No.51. Thereafter through proceedings dated 7-5-1996 she was asked to pay an amount of Rs.7,35,138/- towards difference in development charges in view of issuance of G.O.Ms.No.51. In those circumstances, taking into consideration Section 14 of the Act and Rule 15(1) of the Rules it was held that the date of application only is relevant for arriving at the development charges payable and inasmuch as a valid application was subsisting even by the date of coming into force of G.O.Ms.No.51, she cannot, by invoking the said G.O., be asked to pay charges as enhanced in the said G.O.