Learned counsel relied on the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ajmal v. State of Keralar wherein it was held as follows

Sri P Vamsheedhar Reddy Counsel for the Respondent Sri Arun Kumar Dodla Additional Public Prosecutor The Court delivered the following Judgment : \ THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE K.SURENDER AND THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE K. SARATH CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 838 0P 2017 DGMENT: (per Hon'ble Sri Justice K.Surender) This appeal is filed by appellant/sole accused aggrieved by the judgment, dated 18.07.2017, passed in S.C.No.5O4 of 20t2 on the frle of I Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge at Hyderabad, convicting the appellant for the offence punishable under section 302 of Indian penal Code (for short 'tpC).

2. Heard learned counsel for the appellant arrd learned Additional Public prosecutor for respondent_State.

3. Briefly, the case of the prosecution is that the appellant was convicted for murder of one Iqbal(deceased) on 24.08.201 1, by stabbing him on his chest. The said incident happened when pWl and others went to mobile shop situated at Falaknuma Railway Bridge. pWl used to visit the said mobile shop regularly. At around 12:30 p.m., PWI went to the mobile shop and asked the appellant to return his mobile which was given for repair in the shop. However, the appellant was angry at the insistence of pwl i I 2 KS.J&SK.J Crl A No 818 of20l7 and beat PWl with hands. Then PWl called his friends namely Nizamuddin (PW9) and Iqbal (deceased). All three of them at around 3:OO p.m., confronted the appellant. There was a quarrel between them during which PWI and his friends beat the appellant with hands, At about 3:15 p.m., the appellant took out a knife and stabbed on chest of Iqbal/deceased and fled the scene. Iqbal/deceased received bleeding injuries. PW1 informed PW8/father of deceased. PW8 went to the spot and taken deceased to the hospital. Complaint/Ex.Pl was filed at 3:45 p.m., on very same day. The said complaint is an English.written complaint.

4. Initially, deceased was taken to Owisi Hospital and therea-fter, the deceased was shifted to Osmania General Hospital. While undergoing treatment in Osmania General Hospital, deceased died at 7:35 p.m., on the very same day.

5. PWll received telephonic message from Osmania General Hospital regarding the death of deceased. PWl1 went to the scene of offence and examined witnesses. After \ the inquest proceedings were concluded, the body was sent for postmortem examination and the same was concluded by Pw7 on 25.08.2011. PW7 found the following injuries: ,,_ -l 3 KS,J&SK,J Crl A.hwo 818 of 2017 '1. A sutured wound over the middle of the anterior chest wall on the right side 1 c.m. Away from the mrd line, measuring 4 cms with four sutures. The wound has penetrated the right lung through III right inter costal space making a stab wound of 2 x I x 1 c.m. Srze / 4OO ml of bloorl stained fluid in the right plural space.

2. Abrasion over the left anterial chest wail 1 x 1 cm." l,earnecl Sessions Judge found the appellant guilty on 6 the basis of evidence of pWs.l, 2 and. 9 who are eyewitnesses to the incident. 7 . Learned counsel appearing for the appellant would submit that PWl admitted that .he does not know how to read or write English. However, complaint/Ex.pl was scribed in English. The scribe of the complaint was not examined. Though the complaint/Ex.pl was filed at 3:45 p.m., the complaint/Ex.p1 reached the concerned Magistrate at 3:2O a.m., on 25.O}.2OL1, with a d,elay of 12 hours from time of lodging the complaint.

8. l,earned. counsel further argued that the initia_l \\ version was suppressed by the prosecution. According to PW12, the statement of pWl was recorded by pWlO under Section 161 Cr.p.C. However, the same was not forwarded to the Court and the statement was not even available 4 KS,'&SK,J Crl.A.No.E3E of20l7 when PW12 deposed before the Court. The police v/ent to the scene, however, at panchanamm a/Ex.P2, panchas did not find aly evidence the scene of offence at the scene to show that the incident of stabbing happened. For the said reason, it creates doubt whether the scene of offence as projected by the prosecution is correct. PW 1 1 / investigating officer did not examine any witnesses who attended to the deceased at Owisi Hospital and also at Osmania General Hospital nor zuly medical records were collected. The suppression of records and non examination of doctors shows that the earliest version was suppressed. g. Alternatively, learned counsel submits that PWl and his friends went to the shop of the appellant. Thereafter an altercation took place at around 12:OO p.m., ald at about 3:00 p.m., PW1 called his friends PW9 and deceased. Again altercation ensued between them and after 15 minutes it is alleged that the appellant stabbed once on the chest of thei\ deceased. For the said reason, the offence may fall under Section 304 of IPC and not under Section 302 of IPC' B t' ,) 5 I\S,J&SK,J C.l.A.No.8l8 of20l7 1 0. Learned counsel relied on the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ajmal v. State of Keralar wherein it was held as follows: "1 1. The question of whether in a given case, a homicide is murder punishable under Sectiorr 3O2 IPC, or culpable homicide, of either description, punishable under Section 3O4 IPC has engaged the attention of Courts in this country for over one-and-a-half century, since the enactment of IPC; a welter of case law, on this aspect exists, including perhaps several hundred rulings by this Court. The use of the term "likely" in several places a in respect of culpable homicide, highlights the element of uncertainty that the act of the accused may or may not have killed the person. Section 3O0 IPC which dehnes "murder", however refrains from the use of the term likely, which reveals absence ol' ambiguity left on behalf of the accused. The accused is for sure that his act will definitely cause death. It is often difficult to distinguish between culpable homicide and murder as both involve death. Yet, there is a subtle distinction of intention and knowledge involved in both the crimes. This difference lies in the degree of thd act. There is a very wide variance of degree of intention and knowledge among both the crimes.

12. The decision in State of A.P. v. Rayavarapu Punnayya notes the important distinction between the two provisions, and their differing, but subtle distinction. The Court pertinently pointed out that: (SCC p. 386, paras t2-13) '72. "culpable In the scheme of the homicide" is genus and Penal Code, "murder" its I 1zozz1 s scc taa 6 KS,J&SK,J Crl.A.No 818 of20l7 specie. All "murder" is "culpable homicide" but not vice versa. Speal<ing generally, "culpable homicide" sans "special characteristics of murder", is "culpable homicide not amounting to murder". For the purpose of fixing punishment, proportionate to the gravity of this generic offence, the Code practically recognises three degrees of culpable homicide. The frrst is, what may be called, "culpable homicide of the first degree". This is the greatest form of culpable homicide, which is defined in Section 300 as "murder". The second may be termed as "culpable homicide of the second degree". This is punishable under the first part of Section 3O4. Then, there is "culpable homicide of the third degree". This is the lowest type of culpable homicide and the punishment provided for it is, also, the lowest among the punishments provided for the three grades. Culpable homicide of this degree is punishable under the second part of Section 304.

13. The academic distinction between "murder" and "culpable homicide not amounting to murder" has vexed the courts for more than a century. The confusion is caused, if courts losing sight of the true scope and meaning of the terms used by the legislature in these sections, allow themselves to be drawn into minute abstractions. The safest way of approach to the interpretation and applicAtion of these provisions seems to be to keep in focus the keywords used in the various clauses of Sections 299 and 3OO.

13. The considerations that should weigh with courts, in discerning whether al act is punishable as murder, or culpable homicide, not amounting to murder, were outlined it Pulicherla Nagaraju u. Stote of A.P. This Court observed that: (SCC pp. 457-5a, para29l \\ 7 KS,J&SK,J Crl.-A No 318 of20 t7

29. Therefore, the Court should proceed to decide the pivotal question of intention, with care and caution, as that will decide whether the case falls under Section 3O2 or 3O4 part 1 or 3O4 part IL Marry petty or insignificant matters plucking of a fmit, straying of cattle, quarrel of chiidren, utterance of a rude word or even an objectionable glalce, may lead to altercations and group clashes cuiminating in deaths. Usual motives like revenge, greed, jealousy or suspicion may be totally absent in such cases. There may be no intention. There may be no premeditation. In fact, there may not even be criminality. At the other end of the spectrum, there may be cases of murder where the accused attempts to avoid the penalty for murder by attempting to put forth a case that there was no intention to cause death. It is for the courts to ensure that the cases of murder punishable under Section 3O2, are not converted into offences punishable under Section 304 part I/ II, or cases of culpabie homicide not amounting to murder are treated as murder punishable under Section 302. The intention to cause death can be gathered generally from a combination of a few or several of the following, among other, circumstances: (l) nature of the weapon used; (ii) whether the weapon was carried by the accused or was picked up from the spot; (iii) whether the blow is aimed at a vital part of the body; (iv) the amount of force employed in causing injury; (v) whether the act was in the course of sudden quarrel or sudden fight or free for aJl fight; (vi) whether the incident occurs by chance or whether there was any premeditation; (vii) whether there was any prior enmity or whether the deceased was a stranger; (viii) whether there was any grave and sudden provocation, and if so, the cause for such provocation; (ix) whether it was in the heat of passion; (x) whether the person inflicting the injury has taken undue advantg. o. has acted in a cruel and unusual -.rr.,"ri-(*r) l 8 KS,J&SK,J Crl A.No.838 of20l7 whether the accused dealt a single blow or several blows. The above list of circumstances is, of course, not exhaustive and there may be several other special circumstances with reference to individual cases which may throw light on the question of intention." 1 I . Learned counsel also relied on the judgment of Hon'lrle Supreme Court in Maior Singh u. State of Puniab and. Another2 where it was held as follows: "15. Intention plays a vital role in criminal jurisprudence. An offence may not be said to be committed if the prosecution fails to prove the intention to commit that crime. Intention is pivotal to decide whether the accused has committed culpable homicide amounting to murder or culpable homicide not amounting to murder. Along with intention, knowledge and the degree of crime, i.e., how the deceased was killed, plays an important role in deciding."

12. On the other hand, learned Public Prosecutor argued that the evidence of eye witnesses account PWs.1, 2 arrd 9 is suffrcient to infer that it was the appellant who had stabbed the deceased. There is no reason why PWI and others would speak against the appellant. If the sequence of events are look into, the stabbing had taken place at 'z 2022 SCC Online SC 1443 9 K!,J&SK,J Crl A N, 838 of20l7 3:00 p.m., ald the deceased was taken to the hospital and the deceased died at around 7:35 p.m.

13. The complaint was lodged at 3:45 p.m., however, FIR reached the Court at around 3:2O a.rn. No reasons are given as to why there was a delay in sending the complaint to the Court. Further, PWIO recorded the statement of PW1. However, the same was suppressed, as admitred by PW12. The doctors at Owisi and Osamina General Hospitals were not examined nor any medical records were collected from the said Hospitals. The earliest version apparently is suppressed by the prosecution i.e., the version given to the doctors at Owisi and Osamina Generai Hospitals. Further, the statement of PW 1 at the earliest point of time recorded by PW1O is also suppressed. The suppression of medical records, statement of PWI and the complaint reaching the Court with a delay of 12 hours casts doubt regarding the correctness of the prosecution case. There is no reason why the documents which were .. available were suppressed by the prosecution, unless the prosecution subsequently came up with a different version. Though PWlO stated that FIR was immediately dispatched, l0 KS,J&SK,J Crl.A.No.El8 of20l7 the delay of nearly 12 hours is not explained' The police station and the Court are within the city limits'

14. This Court concludes that the earliest verslon 1s suppressed by the prosecution which entitles benelit of doubt to the appellant. Discussion regarding alternative submission by learned counsel is not necessary' since this Court finds that the appellant is entitled for acquittal

15. Accordingly, Criminal Appeal is allowed and the conviction and.sentence imposed against the appellant in S.C.No.5O4 of 2Ol2 on the file of I Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge at Hyderabad, is hereby set aside' Their bail bonds shall stand cancelled' //TRUE COPY// Sd/. K. SRINIVASA RAO JOINT REGISTRAR sEc N OFFICER To, 1 The lAdditional Metropolitan Sessions Judge at Hyderabad (with records' if any)

2. The Superintendent, Central Jail, Chanchalguda' Hyderabad 3. The Station House Officer, Chandrayangutta PS' Hyderabad District 4. Two CCs to the Public Prosecutor, HQh Court for the State of Telangana' Hyderabad [OUT]

5. One CC to Sri P Vamsheedhar Reddy, Advocate [OPUCI 6. Two CD CoPies VA/gh YY HIGH COURT DATED:0910112025 JUDGMENT CRLA.No.838 of Z01T ALLOWING THE CRLA qoofqoA Ek s\a, (. ( Ir U[ ! ri Zffi a .L * D E S pa tot\ cg ,r \