Ramidi Parushuram Reddy v. Adibatla Village Ibrahimpatnam (M)

The petitioners challenge the order of the learned Joint Collector, Ranga Reddy District, whereby and whereunder, the appeal filed by them under Section 24 of the A.P. (Telengana Area) Abolition of Inams Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) was dismissed.

The facts in brief are as follows.

The writ petitioners claim that they are possessors of different extents of land in Survey Nos.643 and 644 of Adibatla village, Ibrahimpatnam Mandal, Ranga Reddy District. Common case of the writ petitioners and the contesting third respondent is that these are inam lands and are governed by the Act, which postulates grant of Occupancy Rights Certificate (ORC) to various categories of persons, who are found in possession, as on the date of vesting i.e., 01.11.1973. The writ petitioners contend that they were initially granted ORC with reference to Acs.12.25 guntas of land by the Competent Authority under the Act (Revenue Divisional Officer) on 31.08.1979. It is further alleged that the third respondent had also applied for grant of ORC and he was granted the same with reference to Acs.3.35 guntas of land in Survey No.643 and Acs.1.02 guntas in Survey No.644 under the orders of the Revenue Divisional Officer dated 11.03.1993. The writ petitioners contend that in fact, the grant of ORC to the third respondent in Survey No.643 was not justified and they alone are entitled to the said grant in view of the fact that they were in possession of total extent of Acs.16.34 guntas in Survey No.643 for over 30 years. According to the writ petitioners, the third respondent is not in possession of total extent of Acs.4.37 guntas in Survey Nos.643 and 644. Therefore, they contend that the grant of ORC in favour of the third respondent by the Revenue Divisional Officer is not in accordance with law.

Since they were not parties to the aforesaid proceedings of the Revenue Divisional Officer, they have obtained a certified copy of the order, dated 11.03.1993, which was issued to them on 12.07.1993 and have filed an appeal before the Joint Collector, second respondent herein, on 16.08.1993. The said appeal filed under Section 24 of the Act has been entertained by the second respondent and notices were issued to all the parties. The contesting third respondent has filed counter and it appears that the writ petitioners as well as the third respondent have filed written arguments and thereafter, the learned Joint Collector heard and determined the appeal after perusing the records of the primary authority, and passed the impugned order dismissing the appeal on two grounds, namely, (1) that the crucial pahani for the year 1973-74 is wrongly recorded and as such, the impugned order of the Revenue Divisional Officer granting ORC to the third respondent on the basis of physical occupation was held justified and (2) that the appeal preferred by the writ petitioners on 16.08.1993 against the impugned order, dated 11.03.1993, is barred by time. Questioning the aforesaid order, the writ petitioners approached this Court by this writ petition.

I have heard Sri V.Venkataramana, learned counsel for the writ petitioners, and Sri A.Pulla Reddy, learned counsel appearing for the contesting third respondent.

The learned counsel for the writ petitioners, at the outset, has pointed out that under Section 24 of the Act, an appeal can be filed within 30 days from the date of decision or within such extended time as allowed by the authority, for sufficient cause. He, therefore, contends that it is not as if that 30 days period prescribed cannot be extended and unlike other statutes, he claims that the power of the appellate authority to entertain an appeal even if filed beyond the period of 30 days is with reference to the satisfaction of the appellate authority that the appeal deserves to be entertained. He, therefore, contends that the appellate authority having entertained the appeal, issued notices to all the parties, called for the records, having heard the arguments and having received written submissions also on both sides, cannot, therefore, dismiss the appeal on the ground that it is barred by time. He further submits that the writ petitioners were not parties before the Revenue Divisional Officer and as such, only when they came to know of the order, they have applied for certified copy on 12.07.1993 and have preferred the appeal on 16.08.1993 and as such, it cannot be said that there is any such delay as to render the appeal barred by time.

On the second aspect, the learned counsel for the writ petitioners would submit that the concept of physical verification and overlooking the revenue record in the nature of pahani by the Joint Collector is only unjustified. The basic revenue record for verification as to who is in possession of the property on the crucial date has been found unacceptable and as such, ignored by the Joint Collector. It is also submitted that Section 24 of the Act being in the nature of first appeal, the appellate authority is required to consider the material on merits with sufficient details and also deal with the reasons on the basis of the order of the primary authority i.e., the Revenue Divisional Officer, and thereafter has to take a decision. The impugned order being highly cryptic and almost boarding on an unreasonable order, is arbitrary and an order not expected of a first appellate authority, when valuable civil rights are in question.

Sri A.Pulla Reddy, learned counsel appearing for the contesting third respondent, submitted that the Revenue Divisional Officer has correctly considered the grant of ORC to the third respondent, in view of the categorical record of pahani for the year 1973-74, showing the possession of the third respondent as on the crucial date i.e., 01.11.1973. He further submits that in addition to the above, there is other evidence available on record to justify the grant of ORC to the third respondent, as granted by the Revenue Divisional Officer. The learned counsel submits that under Rule 6 of the Rules framed under the Act, the parties could lead such evidence in support of their plea of possession, apart from the revenue record, and the ORC granted to the third respondent is in law fully justified. He has also contended that the writ petitioners who were granted ORC to the extent of Acs.12.25 guntas in the year 1979 for Survey No.643, itself establishes that they are in possession of the only land covered by the said ORC, on the crucial date. The claim of the writ petitioners for grant of ORC for any other land over and above the said Acs.12.25 gunats, according to the learned counsel, is not permissible. The learned counsel also made other submissions on merits that while granting ORC to the third respondent, the writ petitioners were given notice, but they have not filed any objections and accordingly justifies the order of the learned Joint Collector, impugned herein.

I have given due consideration to the submissions made by both the learned counsel and I have examined the orders of the primary authority as well as the appellate authority.

It would be appropriate to extract Section 24 of the Act, before considering the rival contentions.

24. Appeals from orders under Section 10 to prescribed authority:- (1) Any person aggrieved by a decision of the Collector under Section 10 may, within thirty days from the date of decision, or such further time as the prescribed authority may for sufficient cause allow, appeal to the prescribed authority and its decision shall be final. (2) If any question arises whether any building or land fails within the scope of Section 9 the same shall be referred to the prescribed authority whose decision shall be final.

At the outset, it is be noted that the learned counsel for the writ petitioners is right in his submission that the appellate authority could not have rejected the appeal as time barred, having entertained it and having heard it for final disposal on merits. The provisions of Section 24 of the Act are couched in a language different from such appeal provision in other statutes. Even if an appeal is preferred beyond the prescribed period of 30 days, the legislature has left it to the satisfaction of the appellate authority to entertain the appeal, after such further time as the appellate authority deems sufficient. Thus, when the appellate authority has entertained the appeal, issued notices, called for the records, heard both sides and received written submissions on their behalf, could not have dismissed the appeal as time barred, especially as the writ petitioners were not parties to the primary authority’s order and they obtained certified copy of the order and filed the appeal immediately. The delay, even assuming as caused, was not so enormous as to warrant dismissal of the appeal in limini, in the manner in which, the appellate authority has rejected under the impugned order. In all fairness to the learned counsel for the third respondent, he has not seriously supported that part of the order. The said finding under the impugned order, therefore, is clearly unjustified and liable to the reversed.

So far as the other ground is concerned, the finding of the primary authority that the pahani for the year 1973-74 mentions the name of the third respondent as being in possession on 01.11.1973 is categorical. The appellate authority on the contrary reads the same pahani differently, and records that it might have been written by mistake, without ascertaining the location properly. The reasons in support of such conclusion by the appellate authority are not found in the order. Further, in a manner like this, a pahani cannot be rejected, without proper evidence, as it is the primary evidence to prove possession. The very same document is viewed differently by primary authority and appellate authority which is difficult to be sustained, especially in the absence of any other strong circumstance in support of the conclusion of the appellate authority. Further, the order of the appellate authority is very cryptic and does not consider various aspects, which are canvassed and contended by the writ petitioners as well as the third respondent. Since valuable rights of the parties are involved and since the learned Joint Collector exercises jurisdiction in the nature of first appeal in the matter of grant of ORC, it is desirable that the appellate authority should deal with the matter in an independent and more elaborate manner like giving his reasons after considering the material and reasons relied upon by the primary authority and arrive at its own conclusions.

For the reasons stated above, the impugned order cannot be sustained and is accordingly set aside, and appeal No.B3/5605/93 remanded back re- consideration and decision afresh by the second respondent.

The writ petition is accordingly allowed as indicated above. However, no order as to costs.

During the pendency of this writ petition, there was an order, dated 13.03.1996, of status quo with regard to possession, operating. It is desirable that status quo existing during the pendency of the writ petition shall continue till the disposal of the appeal by the second respondent as directed above. Dt.19.11.2008. VGB ____________________ Vilas V.Afzulpurkar, J