High Court · 2025

Petition under Article 226 ol lhe constitution of lndia praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed therewith, the High court may be pleasedtograntappropfiatereliefrnoreinthenatureofWritofMandamusunder irti"t" 226-of the bonstitution of declaring the proceedings D.No.1 304/2016 / r.\to.nolpnyalzol5 dated 20.05.2016 issued by the 1st respondent, in so far as it relates to not treating the deemed suspension period from 24.O1.2005 lo 03-07.2013 as on duty and treating as not on duty is concerned' as arbitrary' ittljat, Jiscriminatory, malafide violating Article 1 4, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of rnoia, ano also declare the action of the 6th respondent in not passing final orders in pursuance of the Report submitted by the 5th respondent by proceedings Rc-No.georrglzote Dated 19.07,2018, as equally arbitrary, illegal "nq unconstitutional violating Article 14, 16 and 21 of the constitution of lndia, and issue consequential directions, directing the respondents to forthwith pay the full salary to the petitioner for the deemed suspension period from 24.01.2005 to 03.07.2013 including increments and all other consequential benefits, forthwith, if necessary directing the 6th respondent to pass final orders to that effect in pursuance of Report submitted by the 5th respondent by proceedings Rc.No.380/T3/2018 Dated 19.07.2018 to the Government lA NO: 2 OF 2019 Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavlt filed in suppo( of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to suspend the operation of the proceedings D.No.13041 201() I No.A6/PR/8/2015 dated 20.05.2016 issued by the 1st respondent, in so far as it relates to not treating the deemed /suspension period from 24.01.2005 to 03.07.2013 as on duty and treating as not on duty is concerned, with a direction to pay the salary and release the increments for the said period, to the petitioner, pending disposal of the writ petition. lA NO: 1 OF 2019 Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to direct the 6th respondent to forlhwith to pass appropriate orders as cer law in pursuance of the Report submitted by Sth respondent by proceedings Rc.No.380fi312018 Dated 19.07.2018, pending disposal of the Writ Petition. Counsel for the Petitioner: SRl. P V KRISHNAIAH Counsel for the Respondents: Government Pleader for Services (Home) wRlT PETITION NO: 5447 Of2019 Between: P. Bichaiah, s/o [Vl. Ramanna (Late) Police Constable, PS Chiragpally, Zaheerabad Crrcle, Sangareddy District H.No.2-74, Khi:napur Village, Kohir Mandal, Sangareddy District ...PETITIONER ANO 1 2 3 4 5 Superintendent of Police, Sangareddy District Sangareddy Superintendent of Police, Medak District, at Sangareddy Superintendent of Police, Rangareddy District, Ranga Reddy Deputy lnspector General of Police, Hyderabad Range, / HFAC Nizamabad Range, Telangana State Director General of Police, State of Telangana, Lakadikal)ul, Police Headquarters, Hyderabad A N )3 6 State of Telangana, represented by its Principal Secretary, Home Department, Sicretariit Buildings,- Hyderabad ...RESPONDENTS Petition under Anicle 226 of the Constitution of lndia praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed therewith, the High Court may be pleased to grant appropriate relief more in the nature of writ of Mandamus under Artict" 2ZO-of the Constitution of declaring the proceedings D.No.1304/2016 / No.A6/PRJ8/2005 dated 2005.2016 issued by the 1st respondent, in so far as it relates to not treating the deemed suspension period from 24.01.2005 to 1O-1o.2O12 as on duty and treating as not on duty is concerned, as arbitrary, ilegal, discriminatory, malafide violating Article 14, 16 and 21 of the constitution of lndia, and also declare the action of the 6th respondent in not passing final orders in pursuance of the Report submitted by the sth respondent by proceedings Rc.No.380ff3/2018 Dated 19.07.2018, as equally arbitrary, illegal and u nconstitutional violating Article 14, 16 and 21 of the constitution of lndia, and issue consequential directions, directing the respondents to forthwith pay the full salary to the petitioner for the deemed suspension period from 24.O1.2OO5 to fii6.ZO12 iniluding increments and all other consequential benefits, forthwith, if necessary directing the 6th respondent to pass final orders to that etfect in pursuance of Report submitted by the STh respondent by proceedings Rc. No.380/T3/2018 Dated 19.O7.2018 to the Government lA NO: 2 OF 2019 Petition under section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High court may be pleased to suspend the operation of the proceedings D.No.13041 2016 I No.A6/PR/8/2015 dated 20.05.2016 issued by the 1st respondent, in so far as it relates to not treating the deemed suspension period from 24.01.2005 lo 10.10.212 as on duty and tr6ating as not on duty is concemed, with a direction to pay the salary and .etease thJ increments for the said period, to the petitioner, pending disposal of the writ petition. lA NO: 1 OF 2019 Petition under section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High court may be pleased to direct the 6th respondent to forthwith to pass appropriate orders as per law in pursuance of the Report submitted by sth respondent by proceedings Rc.No.380 fi312018 Dated 19.07.2018, pending disposal of the Writ Petition. Counsel for the Petitioner: SRl. P V KRISHNAIAH Counsel for the Respondents: Govemment Pleader for Services (Home) The Court made the following: COMMON ORDER 3 wp_5397 & 5447-2019 NBK, J : ii;i .:ttii'.!^ THE HON, BLE SRI JUSTICE N AGESH BH EEMAPAKA WRIT PETITION No.5397 and [email protected] of 2OL9 COMMO N ORDER: Petitioners-M. Dayakar Reddy and P' Buchaiah, while working in Munpally Police Station, have taken Begari Narsimhulu and Jayaram ReddytothePoliceStationon20.06.T99Tontheallegationoftheftof woodenframesofSivaSivanilnternationalschool.Petitionersletoff Jayaram Reddy, however, confined Begari Narsimhulu in the Police Station, beat him wlth rubbers, poured hot water, and tortured him' Unable to bear the torture, Begari Narsirnhulu poured kerosene upon himselfandattemptedsuicidebysettinghimselfablaze'Hewastakento Gandhi Hospital hospital where he succumbed to burns on O7'O7'7997 after giving Dying Declaration to the learned Magistrate' Upon the orders of Addl. DGP, ClD, A'P' Hyderabad, vide Memo dated03.02.lggS,theDeputySuperintendentofPolice,ClD,Nizamabad Zone, took up investigation and filed charge sheet before the Additional Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Sangareddy, which was registered as PRC No.17/2000, and taken cognizance for the offences punishable under sections 342, 347 and 306 IPC and section 3(1xx) of the sc/ST (PoA) Act, 1989. Upon committing the case to the Court of Sessions, the same was made over to the Special Judge for trial of offences under SC/ST (POA) Act' 31989, Medak, Sangareddy, (for short, the trial Court)' The trial Court' after appreciation of evidence of PWs.1 to 23 and documents Exs'Pl to P23 filed on behalf of prosecution, and Ex.D1 on behalf of accused' honvicted the petition ers/accused for the offence punishable ,under \- I I I I I I I I ) I ':.4S- 4 wp_5397 & 5447 _2079 NBt(, i Section 306 tpC by Judgment dated 24.01.2005, while acquittint them of the offences under Sections 342 and 347 lp}and Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST (PoA)Act, 1989. consequent to the judgment of the triar court, dated 24.07.2005, the petitioners were dismissed from service w.e.f. 24.01.2005. The petitioners filed an Appeal, i.e., CriminalAppeal No.72 of 2005 challenging the judgment of the trial court. This court vide Judgment dated 20.03.2012 allowed the Appeal acquitting the petitioners of the offence under Section 306 of lpC. Consequent to the acquittal of the petitioners, the petitioners were reinstated into service by setting aside of dismissar orders, and directing Departmental enquiry on the misconduct that had the effect of imposing penalty of dismissar from service under Andhra pradesh civir services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1991, and directing to deem the period between the date of judgment of trial Court convicting the petitioners and the date of reinstatement consequent to acquittar by the High Court, as deemed suspension. ln the Departmental Enquiry, the Enquiry Officer recorded the statements of prosecution witnesses, and held that the a llegations/cha rge against both the petitioners as ,,Not proved,,. The Department has written to the Government vide retter dated 09.01.2015 seeking instructions in the matter. The Government vide Memo dated 26.08.2015 informed that the Government neither suspended nor reinstated the petitioners and hence the competent authority who issued suspens ion/reinstatement orders have to take a decision on the 5 wp-5397 & 5447_2019 NB( J regularization of deemed suspension of the petitioners under Fundamental Rule 54-B' Thereafter,respondentNo'1-superintendentofpolice'Medak' after going through entire oE records i'e', Preliminary Enquiry report' OE Minutes, Government Memos and other records, and keeping in view the judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court passed Order dated 20'05'2015 holding that the period from 24.01.2005 to 10'10'2012- in respect of petitioner-M.Buchaiah, and the period from 24'OL'2OOS tc 03'07'2013 in respect of petitioner-M.Dayakar Reddy be treated as Not on Duty' The petitioners filed an Appeal before the respondent No'4-Deputy lnspector General. The respondent No'4 disposed of the Appeal by upholding the decision of Superintendent of Police' Medak' Sangareddy' in treating the period from 24'01"2005 to 10'10'201i1 in respect of petitioner-P.Buchaiah, and the period from 24'01'2005 to 03'07'2013 in respect of petitioner-M 'Dayakar Reddy be treated as Not on Duty' Thereafter,petitioner-P.BuchaiahfiledaMercyPetitionbeforethe respondent No.5-Director General of Police, and the respondent No'5' vide Memo dated 18'06'2018 informed the resoondent No'3- Superintendent of Police that the petitioner has exlrausted all the channelsofremediesprovidedinAPcs(CC&A)Rules,lggl,andaccording to Government Memo dated 10.07.2000, there is no provision for mercy petition under the Rules. Thereafter, the respondent No'6 vide Memo dated 17'09'2018 treat the informed that the representation of the petitioners to suspension and out of employment period 35 "6n rJuty" examined and lodged at Government level has been 6 wp-5197 &5447_2079 NBrt, Petitioners challenge the Order dated 20.05.2016 passed by respondent No.1-superintendent of police, Medak, in treating the period from 24.07.2O05 to 10.10.20L2 in respect of petitioner_p.Buchaiah, and the period from 24.0L.2O05 to 03.07.2013 in respect of petitioner_ M.Dayakar Reddy as Not on Duty; and the inaction of respondent No.1_ Government in passing final orders on their representation to treat their suspension periods as .On duty' for all purposes with all consequential benefits.

2. Heard Mr. p.V. Krishnanaiah, learned counsel for the petitioners, and learned Government pleader for Services (Home). perused the record.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioners would essentially contend that the petitioners were earrier convicted for the offence under Section 306 lPC, however, they were ultimately acquitted by this Court in the Criminal Appeal proceedings, and therefore, the petitioners having been acquitted of alr the charges are entitred to reinstatement with a, consequentiar benefits, and therefore denying the benefits by treating the period between dismissal from service and reinstatement as,,Not on Duty',, is illegal and arbitrary.

4. - Learned Government pleader, on the contrary would contend that the criminal proceedings before the Criminal Court, and the Departmental proceedings are two entirery different proceedings with different focus and application of law. Learned Government pleader would contend that the alleged criminal offence under lndian penal Code, and the alleged l I I t 7 wp_5397 & 5/r47_2019 N8K, J misconduct under Departmental Rules cannot be looked at on the same footing. He contends that acquittal in either of the proceedings would not automatically neither impact nor nullify action in the other proceedings. Learned Government Pleader would rely on ther judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Krishnakant Raghunath Bibhavnekar v. State Of Maharashtral and contends that acquittal does not automatically entitle one to get consequential benefits. He would further rely on Reserve Bank of lndia vs Bhopal Singh Panchal2 and contends that the employee does not automatically become entitled to full pay and allowances for suspension period. He would further contend that the Hon' ble Supreme Court in Bhopal Singh Panchal (2 supra) observed that during the suspension period, the employee renders no work, and the reason the Bank has kept the employee away from work was due to the employee's own involvement in the misconduct and therefore the employee is not entitled to backwages/benefits even though he is subsequently reinstated. Learned Government Pleader would further rely on judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ranchhodii Chaturii Thakore v. The Superintendent Engineer, Guiarat Electricity Board, Himmatnagar (Gujarat)3 and contends that it is the conduct of petitioners themselves that has rendered the employer to keep the'n away from duty by dismissing them upon convicting by the trial Court. Learned Government Pleader would therefore contend that there is no illegality in treating the period of out of employment of the 1 1997 (3) SCC 636 , 1994 (1) scc 541 r (1995)r11 sEC 603 8 wp_5397 & 5447 _2079 ?{BK, ,, petitioners as "Not on Duty" and there is no impropriety in the impugned order passed by respondent authorities. 5' lt is not in dispute that the petitioners have confined the deceased- Begari Narasimhulu in the porice station on an ailegation of theft of wooden frames of a schoor, and thereafter the deceased committed suicide by setting himself ablaze. The Department initiated action against the petitioners, and the trial Court convicted them, and this Court acquitted them in the criminar Appeal filed by the petitioners. rn the intervening period of conviction by trial court and acquittal by this court, the respondent-Depa rtment dismissed the petitioners from service, however, upon acquittal by this Court, they were reinstated and the period between dismissal and reinstatement was treated as,,Not on DuV,.

6. ln Raj Narain vs Union Of lndiaa, this Court while referring to the case in Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore (3 supra) held as follows: IThe claim of the petitioner therein was that he was entiUed to full wages on his acquittal by the Criminal Coud This Court rejected the said submission by holding that the question of payment of back wages would arise only in case of termination of service, pursuant to ltndings recorded in a departnental enquiry. ln the event of the dismissal order being set aside by the Cour! the delinquent employee would be entided to claim back wages as he was unlaMully kept away from duty by the employer. This Court was of the opinion that an employee against whom criminal proceedings are initiated would stand on a different footing in \.- 1 2019 (s) SCC 809 9 wp_s397 & 5447_2019 N8(, I cornparison to an employee facing a departnental inquiry' The employee involved in a crime has disabled himself from rendering his services on account of his incarceration in jail. Subsequent acquittal by an Appellate Court would not entide him to claim back wages."

6. The decision of Ranchhodji Chaturii Thakore (supra) was followed by this Couft in Union of lndia and Others v. Jaipal Sinqhs to refuse back wag6 to an employee who was initially convicted for an offence under Section 302 read with Section :14 IPC and later acquitted by the High Court in a criminal appeal. While refusing to grant rcllef to the Petitioner therein, this Court held that subsequent acquittal would not entide an employee to seek back wages. However, this Court was of the opinion that if the pKrsecution is launched at the behost of the department and the employee is acquitted, difrerent considerations may arise. The learned counsel for the Appellant endeavored to distinguish the prosecution launched by the police for involvement of an employee in a criminal case and the criminal proceedings initiated at the behest of the emPloyer. The obsewation made in the judgment in Union of lndia and Otherc v. Jaipal Singh lsupra) has to be understood in a manner in which the department would become liable for back wages in the event of a finding that the initiation of the criminal proceedings was mala fide or with vexatious intent ln all other Gases, we do not see any difference between initiation of the criminal proceedings by the departsnent yis.a-vis a criminal case lodged by the police. For example, if an employee is involved in embezzlement of funds or is found indulging in demand and acceptance of illegal gratification, the employer cannot be mulcted with full back wages on the acquittal of the person by a criminal CouG unless it is found that the prosecution is malicious. ' 2004 (1) SCC 121 d 10 \r/p_5397 & 5i&47_2019 NB(, J

7. lt may be noted that criminal proceedings and disciplinary proceedings are two entirely different proceedings, with different yardstick of proof required to establish the charges, albeit they may have identical basis of charges against a derinquent official. The Hoh, ble Supreme Court in M/s Stanzen Toyotetsu lndia p. Ltd vs. Girish.\i6 while holding that it is we, settred that there is no regar bar to the conduct of the disciplinary proceedings and a criminaltrial simultaneously, observed as follows: , d Tra '1ln a nv. ilt er An hra Pr ohd. You suf Mi l(19971 2 SCc 699J, rhis Court declared that the purpose underlying deparfnental proceedings is distinctly different from the purpose behind prosecution of offenders for commission of offences by them. While criminal prosecution for an offence is launched for violation of a duty that the offender owes to the society, departrnental enquiry is aimed at maintaining discipline and efficiency in service. The difference in the standard of proof and the appricataon of the rures of evidence to one and inappricabirity to the other was arso exprained and highlighted onty to explain that conceptually the two operate in different spheres and are intended to serve distincfly different purposes.,,

8. ln Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore (3 supra), the Hon,ble Supreme Court while deciding the aspect of backwages upon reinstatement consequent to acquittal in criminal proceedings, observed as follows: # *t "The reinstatement of the petitioner into the service has already been ordered by the High Courl The only question is: whether he entitled to back wages? lt was his conduct of involving himself ,is \ 6 AIR 2014 Supreme Court 989 r t' I I i I I I I LL wp_5397 & 5447_2019 NgK, J in the crime that was taken into account for his not being in service of the respondent Consequent upon his acquittal, he is entitled to reinstatement for the reason that his sewice was terminated on the basic ofthe convic{ion by operation of proviso to the statutory rules applicable the situation. The question of back wages would be considered only if the respondents have taken action by way of disciplinary proceeding and the action was found to be unsustainable in law and he was unlawfully prevented from discharging the duties. ln that context his conduct becomes relevant, Each case requircs to be considered in his own backdrops. ln this case, since the petitioner had involved himself in a crime, though he was later acquitted, he had disabled himself from rendering the service on account of conviction and incarceration in jail. Under these circumstances, the petitioner is not entitled to payment of back wages. The learned single iudge and the Division Bench have not committed any error of law warranting interfercnce." ln the instant case, admittedly, there is no finding by the trial Court

9. or this Court that the criminal proceedings were inil.iated against the petitioners with malicious intent though they have notlring to do with the charges at all. Further, the respondent-Department has not dismissed the petitioners until after they were convicted by the trial Court after due trial. Further, in the Criminal Appeal before this Cr:urt, there is no observation by this Court that the Department had resorted to vexatious litigation or malicious prosecution against the petitioners. When the petitioners are acquitted of the charges by a Cor" rt of competent jurisdiction, they may be entitled to reinstatement upon making a representation or at the initiative of the employer, however, the very reinstatement upon acquittal alone would not automatically make the petitioners entitled to backwages/a rrea rs/notiona I increments or 72 wp_5397 & 7_2019 N8(, J attendanVconsequential service benefits, in view of the settled law that disciplinary proceedings and criminal proceedings are two independent proceedings with different focus and object for decision/determination, they stand on a different pedestal.

10. Further, in the light of the law laid down by the Hon, ble Supreme Court in Ranchhodii Chaturji Thakore (3 supra), and in Raj Narain (4 supra) whire referring to Jaipar singh (supra), it was the conduct of the petitioners invorving themserves in the crime that was taken into account for not being in the service of the respondent_Department and the petitioners. As observed by the Hon,ble Supreme Court in Ranchho ji Chaturji Thakore (3 supra), the question of backwages would be considered only if the respondents have taken action by way of disciplinary proceeding and the action was found to be unsustainable in law, whereby they were unlawfully prevented from discharging their duties. Further, there is no finding of vexatious intent or malicious prosecution by the respondent_Department in prosecuting the criminal case against the petitioners, nor there is any order of the Court, while acquitting the petitioners, specifically directing that the petitioners would be entitled to any benefits, monetary or otherwise, for the period they were out of employment on account of dismissal by the respondent_ Department upon being convicted by the trial Court.

11. ln the facts and circumstances of the present case, this Court is of the view that the respondent-Depa rtment cannot be mulcted with payment of backwages or attendant/consequential benefits rncrements or for the period whatsoever, notional 13 wp_5397 & 5447_2019 NBX, J petitioners were out of service, merely for the reason they were reinstated upon acquittal by this Court. ln that view of the matter, this Court does not see any illegality or impropriety in the impugned Order dated 20.05.2016, and subsequent orders passed by the respondent- Department, treating the period from 24.01.2O05 to 10.10.2012 in respect of petitioner-P.Buchaiah, and the period frorn 24.01..2005 to

03.07.2013 in respect of petitioner-M.Dayakar Reddy as "Not on Duty".

12. Accordingly, the writ petitions are dismissed. No costs. Miscellaneous petitions if any, pending, shall stand closed. /,TRUE COPY// NT SD/. T. JAYASREE TANT REGISTRAR \J'u SECTION OFFICER To, 1 2 3 4 q 6 KKS GJP w 11 L.R. Copies. ih"-u;;;'s;;retary, union of lndia, Ministry of Law' Justice and Company Affairs, New Delhi. ih" 5"1i"t".v, Telangana Advocates Association Library' High Court for the State of Telangana at Hyderabad. One CC to SRl. P V KRISHNAIAH Advocate [OPUC] TwoCCstoGovernmentPleaderforServices(Home),HighCourtforthe ii;fir"L"s"na at Hyderabad. IOUTI Two CD coPies i :i i i I I HIGH COURT DATED:1210212025 \ ri i: 5,, ) a o 2 4 ,tuu 26 \ '( t\ t'- \\ r.i { 1) COMMON ORDER WP.No.5397 and 5447 of 2019 DISMISSING THE WRIT PETITION WITHOUT COSTS ,qtQ(* ' Yf- f\.tr'