The High Court · 2025

the Firms and respondent has complete control of the business. Latcr, thc Applicant No.2 camc to know that the responclent had lorged thc signature of the Applicant No.2 and brought into cxistence fwo Amcndmen[ Dceds dated 22.11.2016 reducing the share of the Applicant No.2 from 4Ooh Lo 1% in the Applicant No.1 Firm and also in M/s. Seven Hills Enterprises.

7. It is further submitted that the second and third entities are exclusively owned by the Applicant No.2 and are outside the scope o[ arbitration instituted by the respondent. The Applicant No.2 submits that since 03.O3.2O12 tili date, the respondent has neither disclosed J ravsx, J Arbitrattor Appllcruon o.3O 2024 the quantum of business done by the Applicant No.1 Firm nor has paicl her share ol'profit from the salc of minerals to various cntities by operaling in ther mining leases. Thcrcfore, the respo edent was called upon to render true and proper accounts of the Apltlicant No. 1 F irm from Oll.03.2O 12 onrvards and pay her share of 4O"/o .end that the dispute betu,ee .r-r the parties u'ilh respect to the accctuttts and profits of the Applicant No.I Firm remains unresolved till date.

8. Thc respondent has initiated the arbitration proceedings with respect to M/ s. Seven Hills Enterprises and M/ s. Sicven Hills Sand Factory LLP vidc notice of invocation dated 12.0 1.2023 and has appointed Justice Kongara Vijayalakshmi (Retd) -o arbitrate the disputes and the same \\'.rs acceptcd by the Applican t No.2 vide reply datcd 17 .Ol .2023. Both lhe matters vide ArbitrzLti,rn Case No. 1 of 2023 arnd 2 of 2023 are pcnding. Thcreafter, the Applicants havc invoked arbitration vide notice datcd 17.O5.2O23 rrs <:onlemplated under SecLion 21 o{' the Act for resolving the disput:s arising out of partnership deed datcd 03.03.2012 in relation to th,: Applicant No.1 Firm. It is fulthcr submittcd that thc respondcnl has r-rcither given consent for appoin tmenl of J usticc Kongara Vij ayalakshmi (Retd) to arbitrurte the clisputes arising out of Partnership Deed dated

03.03.2012 nor issued any reply to that extent. Thereafter, Applicants filed Arbitration Application before this Court under Section 1 1(6) of the Act for appointment of Arbitrator. After receiving notice in the said affiIryation, the respondent issued a reply notice dated 4 Arbltr.tior A!Flicetlo! No-30 2024 Ol.\1.2023 giving his consent for appointment of Justice Kongara Vrjayalakshmi (Retd) to arbitrate the disputes arising out of Partnership Deed dated 03.03.2012. It is also submitted that the Applicant No.2 had issued notice of dissolution dated 06. l\.2023 for dissolution of Applicant No. I Firm M/ s. Chennai Best Bluc Metals and lhe Applicant No. I Firm stands dissolved with eiiect lrc., m

06.11.2023. In view of the consensus arrived at bctween the parties, this Court vide its order dated 24.I1.2023 in Arbitration Application No.179 of 2023 appointed Justice Kongara Vijayalakshmi (Retd) as sole Arbitrator to adjudicate the disputes betwecn thc parties. As per thc ordcr of this Court, thc parties appeared belore the Arbitr:rl Tribunal and the Applicants flled Writtcn Statement of reasons for challenge to the Arbitral Tribunal under Section 12 and 13 ot the Act in Arbitration Case No.3 of 2023 along with the other two arbitration proceedings. The respondent has also filed objections in the said applications. Thereafter, vide Procedural Order dated 26.O1.2024, thc Arbitral 'l'ribunal recused itself from all the three arbitrations including Arbitration Case No.3 of 2023. Thereafter, the respondenl filed a petition under Section 9 oi the Act being C.O.P. No.6 of 2024 on the file of the Special Court in thc cadre of District Judge for trial and disposal of Commcrcial Disputes, City Civil Court, Hyderabad. In the said circumstances, the Applicant No.2 has filed the present application seeking lor an appointment of substituted Arbitrator. ) N!S(, J ArbilrrtloD Appli..tiotr No,30 2024

9. On behalf of the respondent, while denying the application averments, counter afidavit has bcen filed.

10. Thereafter, rvhile reitcrating the applicat-ion averments, the Applicant filed rcply aifidavit SUBMISSIONS

11. The learned counsel appearing for thc Applicarrts would submit that Se ction 15 of thc Arbitration and Conciliation Ar;t, 1996 provides for appointment of substitute arbitrator. Hence, this Court has ample power to appoint a substitule arbitrator. In support of this submrssion, reliancc rvas placed in the case of Shailesh Dhairyawan Vs. Mohan Balkrishna Lullat and Ramjee Power Construction Ltd., Vs. Damodar Valley Corporation2.

12. I-carned counsel would further submit that 'Rules of apporntment' contcnrplated under Section I5 include the agreement betrveen the parties and unless the agreemet rt provides for appointment of substitule arbitrator, there is no recluirement of issuing notice of appointmcnl of substitute arritrzrtor as the partnership agreemcnL does noL provide for appointntent of substitute arbitrator. In support of his submissions reliance u:rs placed in the case of S.B.P. and Company Vs. Patel Engineering Limited and 't2tt\ I S,,pr",n" Lolrn L a\r\ hlq . MA\tt'U'R't toh,rr)0c) another3 and Tirath Ram Sumer Kumar Vs. Rakesh Kumar Mishra 6 l{vsr(i J arbrt.atior Appu..tton No.3o 2024 and Othersa.

13. Learned counsel further submits that the Applicant No.2 had representcd the Applicant No.1 in Arbitration Application 179 of 2023 and the respondent has not taken any objection for the samc, therefore is now cstopped from takrng such objection in an Application lor appointment of substitutc arbitrator. Learned counsel furthcr submits that the contention of the 2"d Applicant is estoppcd from representing the Firm in view of the Section 19 of the Partnership Act, 1932 is liable to be rejected as the same is part of Chapter 4 of the Act which deals with rclation rvith third parties and thus is not applicable Lo inter se disputcs between parties in view of Clause 19 of the partnership agreement. Brief factual background & details of events submitted bv respondent counsel:

74. Thc learned Scnior Counsel P.Vikram appearing for the respondcnt would submit that the respondent and Applicant No.2 are husband and wife, having gotten married in 2OO3. Respondent is a mining Engineer by qualification and is engaged in the business of mining/quarrying stone. Together, the parties have set up several entities for running their business. M/s. Chennai Best Blue Metals (Apqlicant No. 1/Firm) is one of the partnership hrms incorporated by \ \ t lZOOe; tO Suprcme Court Cases 293 ' MANU/UP/0 I 9oi2o l 7 7 NVSK, J Arhitrition Appllc.tlor No.3O 2024 the parties, vidc a partnership deed dated 03.03.20 1.1 and the hrm is registered with the Registrar of Firms. The parLic s h:rvc a profit- sharing ratio of 6O:40. The Firm holds four quarry lir;enses issued by the (iovernmen t of Andhra Pradesh for mining of roacl metal and building stones in the ycar 20 12. However, cer[ain marital disputes arosc between the parties, re sulting in the responde n - liling a petition belorc the familv Court seeking a decrec of divorcc, r.,hich is pcnding adj ucl icaLion.

15. It is submitted that on 17.O5.2023 notice ol invocation of arbitlation was issucd by Applicant No.2 under C ause 19 of the partncrship dced for adjudic:rtion o[ allcged disput,- s in re latron to accounts of the firm. Applicant No.2 non inatcd Justice Smt. K.Vijayalakshmi (Retd.,) who is already the sole arbitrator in pendrng arbitration matters for tu,o othcr partnership lirms set up by the parties, as thc sole arbitrator for this clispute as well. On 03.1O.2023 Appliczrnt No.2 filed Arbitration Applir:ation No.179 of 2023 under Section I I of the Arbitration and Concil .rtion Act, 1996 belorc this Court. On 01. 11.2023 respondent rssued a rcply acccpting Justice Sn'rt. K.Vijayalakshmi (Retd.,) as t.ht: sole arbitrator. On 06.11.2023, a notice of dissolution was issued bv Applicant No.2 purporting to dissolve Lhe firm. On 24.11.2023, in vi,:w of consensus arrivcd at bctween the parties regarding the rrppointment of arbitrator, Arbitration Application No.179 of 2023 u'as disposed of. On 06. 12.2023 respondent hacl addressed a re pli' disputing the \./ 8 Arbtk.ttor ApDli.rtion No.30 2024 purported dissolution and on 27 .12.2023 respondent had liled an application under Section 16 of the Act challenging the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.

16. It is further submitLed that the issuance of the notice of invocation on behalf of the firm by Applicant No.2 is devoid of any authority and is in dircct contravention to Clausc g(g) of thc partnership deed and Scction 19(2)(a) of the Indian partnership Act,

1932. Hearing on maintainability of Section 16 application took place on 27.12.2023, O4.OI.2023 and 06.01.2O23 before the Tribunal in Arbitration Case No.3 of 2023. During thc hearing on O4.O1.2023, Applicant No.2 had also filed a mcmo conceding that shc does not have any authority to represent the firm. Thereafter, the Arbitration Case No.3 of 2023 was posed to 27.O7.2024 for a hnal hearing on the maintainability of the Sec[ion 16 Application. On 24.O1.2024 Applicant No.2 [rled a challenge under Sections 12 and 13 of the Act, seeking the Arbitrator's r.r'ithdrau,al from Arbitration Case No.3 of 2023. On 26.O1 .2024 respondent filed rvritten objections. Despite the writtcn objcctions, thc Arbitrator had passed a procedural order dated 26.01.2O24 informing all the parties about thc recusal from Arbitration Case No.3 of 2023. Thereafter, on 29.O1.2024, respondent filed COP. No.6 of 2024 under Section 9 of the Arbitration ar-rd Conciliation Act, 1996 seeking intcrim reliefs regarding the purported dissolution of the applicant No.1 firm, the said petition is currently pending adjudication before the Commercial Court in Hyderabad. I 9 NVSK, J Atl ltratioD ]\pplic.tlou No,3O 2024 Thereafter, ot 13.02.2024, in response to the rcspondent's COP, Applicant No.2 filed the present Arbitration Application without proposing a substitute arbitrator to adjudicat: the disputes mentioned in the notice of invocation date cl 17.O5.2O23. On 07 .O3.2024, respondent issued a notice of invocation of arbitration for adjudication of disputes in relalion to purporte(l dissolution and consequently lor appointmcnt of substitute arbitrator and the respondent nominated Srr Justice Rajasheker Redciy' (Retd.,) as the sole arbitrator. On 26.03.2024, Applicant No.2 issued reply and disagreed u,ith :ippoinlment ol Sri Jus[ice Rajashekcr Reddy (Retd.,)

17. The learned senior counscl would furlher subrnit that the preselrt Arbitration Application is not maintainable li;r the rcason Lhat the jurisdictior of the Court under Section 11(6) of tl'ie ArbitraLion and Conciliation Act, 1996 can only be invoked if lhc rcspondcnt fails to appoint a substitute arbitrator under Section 15 following a specific requcst from the Applicar-rt No.2, urhich did not o<:crrr in thc prescnt casc and that the Applicant No.2 Iacks l-he authoritl to ini(iatc or file procccdings on behalf of Applicant No.1 Firm or to rcl)resent Applicant No. I F irm in any proceedings. The learned se r-rior counsel draws attcntion of this Court to the Section 15 of thc Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, which stipulates that " When: the mandate of an arbitrator tenninates, a substitute orbitrator shall be appointed according to the ntles that utere applicable to the r4rytointment of the arbitrator being replaced" and further submits th:rl on a bare perusal \ l0 ltvsx, J of Section 1 1(5) of the Act, it is evident that in an arbitration with a sole arbitrator, a party desirous of appointing the arbitrator must make a request to the other party to agree for appointment within 30 days from receipt of the request, failing which the appointment shall be made by the Chief Justicc or his designate, upon request of a party and the said rules are also applicable to the appointment of substitute arbitrator rn the present casc as per Section 15(2) of the Act. Learned senior counsel further submits that on a conjoint reading ol Section 11(5) and Section 15(2) of the 1996 Act, the jurisdiction conferred on the High Court to appoint a substitute arbitrator, in the place of thc arbitrator whose mandate stood terminatcd, is only if thc parties fail [o agree on the appointment of a substitute arbitrator within thirq/ days from the date of reccipt of a requcst by one party from the other party to so agree. To buttress his submission" learned senior counsel placed reliance in the case of Yashwith Constructions (P) Ltd. Vs. Simplex Concrete Piles India Ltd.,s and referred to the relevant para No.4 reads as under: "....The withdrarval of an arbitrator from the offlce for any reason is within the pun,ierv of Scction 15(1)(a) of the Act. Obviously, thercfore, Section 15(2) would be attracted and a substitute arbitrator has to be appointed according to the rules that are applicable for the appointment of the arbitrator to bc replaced. Therefore, rvhat Section 15(2) contemplatcs is an appointment of the substituted arbitrator or the replacing of the ' lzooo; o qcc zoa NVSKI J Art itrrtion Applicatio! No.30 2024 arbitrator by another according to the ruler; th:rt were applicable to the appointment of thc original arbitrator who was being replaced. The tenn "rulcs" in Section 15(2) obviously refcrred 1o the provision for appointment contained in the arbitration agreement or any rules of any institution under which the disputes u.ere re brred to arbitration. There was no fa.ilure on the part o[ the party concerned as per the arbittation agreement, to fulhl his obligation in terres of Section 11 ol' the Act so as to attracr tltc jurisdiction of the Chief Justice under Sr:ctior-r 11(6) of the Act for appointing a substitute arbitrator. Obviously, Section I1(6) ol thc Act h:rs application only u-hen a party or thc p:rson - thc conr:crned hzicl failed to act in te]:ms o arbitration agreement. When Section 15(2) says that a substitute arbitrator can be appointcd according to the rules that were applicable fcr thc appointment of the arbitrator originally, ir 1i not confined to an appointment undcr any stat,rtorv rule or rulc framed under the Act or under tlte scbcme. it only means that the appointmcnt of the substitute arbitrator must bc done accordirrg t<; the original agreement or provision applical,,lc to the appointment of the arbitrator at the initial stagc. We are not in a position to agrec with thc contr:rry view taken by some of the High Courts.

18. Thc learncd scnior counsel submits that invoc ation o[ Scction 1 1(6) is based on a default of a party. The que:;tion arising for consideration herre is who had defaulted and on whal basis of clcfaull has the Court cntered jurisdiction under Section I 1(6i. [n this rcgerrd, he placc4 reliance in the case of National Highways Authority of \ \ 12 NVSR. J Adi&atior Applicatior No.30 2024 India and another Vs. Bumihiway DDB Limited (JVf and others6 and refers to paras No.34 and 44 arc cxtracted for rcference. 3'34. In our view, the invocation of Section 1 1(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is squarcly based on a default of a party. Thc ratio laid dorvn tn Datar Suitchgectrs Ltd. v. Tota Finance Ltd. IQ)OO) 8 SCC 15 I I is the corrcct proposition and Punj Lloyds Ltd.v. Petronet MHB Ltd. IQOO6I 2 SCC 6381 followcd Datar Su.titchgears {(2000) 8 SCC 15 1l The question arising for consideration here is who had defaultcd and on what basis of default has the Court entered jurisdiction undcr Section 1l(6). This question thougl.r raiscd by the appellant in the counter-af{idavit before the High Court has not been a-nswered at all. I{cnce, the assumption of jurisdiction ald adjudication by the High Court, in our opinion, is vitiated.

44. As rightly pointed out by the appcllarts, the High Court failed to appreciatc that in accordance wrth Section 15(2) of the Act on thc termination of thc mandatc of t1.e presiding arbitrator, the two nominated arbitrators rvere hrst required to reach a conscnsus and on their failure to arrive at a consensus only was Respondent 2 authorised to makc the appointment. Unless Respondent 2 failcd to excrcise its jurisdiction, the High Court could not assume jurisdiction under Section 1 1(6) of the Act. Respondent I has rvrongly invokcd the jurisdiction of this Court (sic the High Court) without frrst following the procedure agreed to u (2006) 10 Suprcrne Coun Cascs 763 '3 t3 Arbitrrtiou appLicatton No.30 2024 betu,cen the parties. Thus no cause of actio.n had arisen in the facts of the case to scel: the appointment lrom the High Court under St:ction 1 1(6) of the Act arrd thus the said petitior L was premature. The High Court is also not corr,rct irl reh/ing on the contention of Respondent I tltat ir-r casc one o[ the a,rbitrators is a retired Chir:l Justice, the presiding a.rbitrator should be at least a rctired Chicf Justice or a retired Judgc of a High Court with considerable experience- It was subrnitted by learncd Solicitor General appearing for the appellants that the said hnding of the Higl-r Court is sclf contradictory inasmuch as i[ the presi<ling arbitr-ator is a retired Judge of the High Court ar-rd one of the arbitrators is a retired Chief JusLicc of thc High Cor-rrt, the order of hier:rrchy is upsct. Even othenvisc, there does not cxisr an1, such provisior.r in law which requires that if cnc of the arbitrators is a retired Judge the presiding arbitrator also has to be a retired Judge. The par(ics have cntered into a contract after lullv und('rstanding the import of the terms so atlrce(l to frlm rvhich there cannot be any deviation. 'lhc courts haYe hetd that the parties are requir:d to comply with the procedure of appointmerLt as agrccd to and the defaulting party cann.,t bc allou.cd to take advantage of its ovvrr wrong." I 9. Lc:rrned scnior connsel further submits thal in a situaLion where the originirl arbitrator had recused himself, the substitule or ne$' arbitrator is required to be appointed according to the rules lhat \ rere applicable to the appointment of the original arbitrator and applying Lhe rules, it is incumbent on the petitioner l,t give notice and explore theqossibilitl. of naming an arbitrator by mutual conscnt and ../ 14 N,I/SI(, J Arbiuatio! Appltc.tton N6.3O 2024 only on failure thereof, the present application under Section 1 1(6) of the Act could/should have been filed. To buttress his submissions reliance was placed in the case of Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd. Vs. Sterlite Technoligies Ltd.,7 wherein the Hon'blc Supreme Court held at paras 7 and 8 as follows: "7. Clausc 22-3 of the supply contract which deals with the matter mav be extractcd at this stage: "22.3. All disputes, controversics or claims arising out of or in connection with or in relation to this contract of its negotiation, pcrformancc, breach, existcnce or validity, whether contractua-l or tortious, shall be referred to arbitration in accordance with the Indian Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and conducted by a single arbitrator to be appointed by the parties by mutual consent. The cost of arbitration shall bc sharcd by the parties. The placc of the arbitration shali be India and the applicablc las. in relation to the procedure of the arbitration shall be dctermined by refcrence to the law ol the place of the arbitration is to be hcld. The a-rbitratior-r proceedings shall be conducted in English language. The award of the arbitration shall be hnal and binding agarnst the parties l-rereto."

8. Clause 22.3 of the supply contract contemplates appointment of a sole arbitrator by the parties by mutual consent. In a situation where the original arbitrator i.e. Shri Justice S.K. Dubey had recused himself the substitute or new arbitrator is required to be appointed according to '(2016) r scc 72r I5 I{VSK, J Arbi:rtioo Appli..tloo No,30 2024 the rules that were applicable to the appojntment of tl-re origin:rl arbitrator. This is the marrdr:te of Section 15(2) of the Act. It was, thel:fore, incumbent on the petitioner to give notice alrd explore the possibility of narning an arbitratrrr bv mutual consent and only on failure thereol the prcscnt application under Section i1(6) of th,: Act coulcl/should have been frled. The above rccourse is r cquired to be lollowed by virtue of the provisions of Section I5(2) of thc Act and the dccision of this Court in Yashuith Construc tions (P) Ltd. IQOO6) 6 SCC 2O4l Admittedly, the riamc had not been followed. In these circumstance-.., the Court u,itl undcrstand prosent application / arbitration petition to be premature. It is irccordinglv not entcrtained leaving it opcn for the petitioner to act appropriately, if so advisccl, in terms o[ thc prescnt order ald thereafter sct:k its reme dies as provided by law."

20. The learncd scnior counsel has further drarvn rrttetrtion of this Court to the juclgment of this Court in Hemant B. Prasad and another Vs. M/s. Perfect Solutions, rep. by its Prop. Sri Praful S. Shah, Hyderabads, and would submit that sincc, Scction 15(2) requires a substitute arbitrator to be appointed in tLccordance rviLIt the errbitration agrecment, the High Court cannot straightaway appoint a substitute arbitrator even before the applic:ant has sought Lhe consent of the respondent to the appointment o[ the substitutc arbilrator namcd .by them. Relevant paras No.9, 14. 15 and 26 arc relied and are cxtracted for reference. 'izo tsy.r ,lut a:o 16 NVSK. J Arbltration Applic.tion No.3o 2O24 "9. The question which arises for consideration is r,vhat do the words, " ntles that qre applicable to the appointment of the drbitrdtor being replo.ced.", used in Section 15(2) of thc Act, mean? A party, who has entered into ar-r arbitration with another, should not bc permitted to resile therefrom. When the marldatc of the arbitrator stands lerminaled. appoinl ment of an arbitrator should, nccessarily, be made in accordance rvith the arbitration clause of the agreement. (National Highuags Authorit7 of India v. Bumihiutag DDB Ltd. (31 (2006) 10 SCC 763: (2OO7l 2 AW t8.r (DN SC); Yashwithct Constructions (P) Ltd. v. Simplex Concrete Piles India Ltd. rep. bg its Managing Dtrector (4) (2008) 4 ALT 266}. Where thc mandate of the arbitrator stands terminated for any reason, it fails within the purview of Section 15(1)(a) of the Act, and attracts Section 15(2) of the Act. (National Highu,tags Authoity of India (3 supra)).

14. Primacy is given to the procedure agreed upon by the partics, to appoint an arbitrator, failing which alonc does the Act permit judicial interference. The parties are, normally, bound by the arbitration clause, ald are obliged to comply with the proccdure laid down theteir,. (Datar Stuitchgears Ltd.v. Tota Finance Ltd. (6) (2OOO) 6 ALT 26 (SC) = (2000) 8 SCC 151). Since Secrion 15(21 requires a substitute arbitrator to be appointed in accordance with the arbitration agreement, the High Court cannot straightaway appoint a substitute arbitrator even before the applicant has sought the consent of the respondent to the appointment of the substitute arbitrator named by them. On a harmonious t7 A'VSK, J tratio' Appltc.tton No.3O 2024 A construction o[ Sections 1l and 15 (2) it rnust bc held that, on the mandate o[ an arbitrator being terminated and only if the respondenr-, in accordance rvith thc arbitration agreement, f:ils to agree to the appointment of a subsritute arbitrator, can the jurisdiction of the High t)ourt invoked under Section 11 of Act. (Yashutitha Constructiors (P) Ltd. (+ suPr:_)).

15. It is only if, on the terminatior.r o' thc mandatc o[ the ea::lier arbitrator, the resporrdent has either refused, or has failed, to agrce t() the appointment of a substitute arbitrator, within 30 da1's of a spccihc request being made in this regarcl by tl'rc applicant, could the applicant Jtave, thercaIter, invoked the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 11(5) read with Section 15(2) of the 1996 Act se eking appointment ,)f a substitutc arbitrator. As the applicant has lailed to even call upon the respondent to agrec to the appointmcnt oI a substitute arbitrator, Se,:tion 1l(5) is not attracted. On a conjoint readirrg of Section 11(5) and Section 15(2) of the 1996 Act. the jurisdiction conferred on the High Cou:t to appoir.rt a substitute arbitrator, in lhe plact: of the arbltrator rvhose maldate stood terminaterl. is onllr if the partics fail to agree on the appoinrrnent of a substitute arbitrator within thirty days from the date of receipt of a request by one party lrom thc other paJty to so agree. Consequentlr,. the applic:rnt is not entitled to invoke the jurisdir:tion of the High Court seeking appointment ot' an arbitraf,or in the place of the deceased arbitrator, even bcfore requesting the respondent to convey their concurrence to the appointment of the subs, itutc arbir rator proposcd by them. l8 MVSt(, J Ar6ltmtion Appllcation Nd 30 202a

26. As noted hereinabove, the respondent is entitled, in terms of Clause 22 of the agreemcnt read wrth Sections 11(5) and 15 (2) of the 1996 Act, to be consulted by the applicant in the appointment of a substitute arbitrator, even if thcy had failed to agree on the appointment of an -or fail to arbitrator ea-rlier. It is only if they refusc agree to the appointment of the person, suggested by the applicant, as the substitute arbitrator, rvithin thirty days of rcceipt of such a request from the applicant, would the applicant thcn be entitled to invokc thc jurisdiction ot the High Court, under Section 1t(5) read with Section l5(2) of the Act, requesting it to appoint a substitute arbitrator in thc placc o[ the deceased arbitrator. The present application, filed evcn before the appiicalt has rcquested the respondent to agree to the appointment of a substitute arbitrator in the place of the deceased arbitrator, is therefore not maintainable. Necdlcss to statue that this order shall not disable thc applicant from requcsting thc respondent to convey their consent to the appointment o[ a substitute arbitrator, in the place of the deceased arbitrator, ald if thc respondent refuses or fails to convey its consent within thirty days of such a requcst being received, to then invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court seeking appointment of a substitute arbitrator." t9 Arblir.tion Applicatior No.3o 2O24

21. Learned senior counsel further draws the attention of this Court to the judgment rendered by thc High Court of Calculta in the case of Bharat Vanijya Eastern Private Limited Vs. State of West Bengale and rcfcrs to para No.40, rvhich is extracted for refererrce. 4O. As explaincd by the Supreme Court ir r the abovc carsc, 'rules' in Section 15 .{2) mcans 'provisions' or 'produce' for appointment of arbitrator niade by the parties or applicable t: thc dispute. In this case, the sole Arbitrator was appointed with the consent of both the parties. The consent terms do not contain any 'provis,ions' or 'procedure' for appolntment of arbitrator. L- r-rdcr Section I I (5) of the Act, failing an agrec ment. bets,een the parties on a procedure for appoir.rting the arbitrator. in an arbitration with a Sole Arbitrator, a party dcsirous of appointing tl-rc arbitrator must make a rcquest to the other 1tart1, to agree to rin appointmcnt within thirty days fronr receipt o[ the requcst, failing which thc appointment shall bc madc by thc Chicf Justicc or his designate. The petitioner has not made arr1, request to the respondent for appointment of an Arbitrator. 'lhe application by r,r,ay of this Notice ol Motion in the disposcd of Suit in which thc original Arbitrator lvas appointed under cor-isent terms, is clearly misconceived and nol maintainable.

22. Further, the lcarned senior counsel also relied on in the case of Consolidated Construction Company Vs. State 6rf Q1i55ar0 216 refers to para No.1 1, which is extracted for reference. e 2023 SCC Ont,ine Cal648 1979 scc Online ori 5 I 20 ]VVSK, J Arbitr.tlo! Appli..tioq No.30 2024

11. There is no force in this contcntion also. If there is an initial and inherent want ofjurisdiction on the part of the arbitrator to proceed with the matter, that cannot be cured by acquiescence because it is well settled that consent cannot confer jurisdiction. As thc appointment of the arbitrator by the Additional Chief Engincer was nol in accordance with clause (23) of the F-2 agreement, that appointment was illegal and without jurisdiction, ald as there was initial want of jurisdiction for thc arbitrator so appointed to act in the arbitration proceeding, his acts and functions as thc arbitrator were without jurisdiction. Merely because the parties or one of them did not expressly challenge his jurisdictron in the course of the proceeding, such a proceeding would not, in law, be valid and cannot be sustained, because it is well setlled that consent cannot confer jurisdiction and want ofjurisdiction cannot be cured by acquiescence. In paragraph 21 of the decision rcported in WauereLg Jute MiLLs Co. Ltd. v. Ragmon and Co. (lndia) Put. Ltdz . "Now art agreement for arbitration is the very foundation on which the jurisdiction of the arbitrators to act rcsts, and \,r,herc that is not in existence, at the time when they enter on their duties, the proceedings must be helcl to be wholly wlthout jurisdiction. And this defect is not curcd by the appearance of the partics in those proceedings, even if that is without protest, because it is well scttlcd that consent cannot confer juiisdiction." ./ 2t t{vsx, J Arbn ratton Appuc.tion nIo.3O 2024

23. The learned senior counsel would further s ubmit that the aforesaid judgmcnts of the Hon'b1e Supreme Conrt are squarely applicable to thc present case and that the jurisdicti,rn of tl-ris Court under Section 1 1 (6) read with Section 15(2) of the ,\ct can only be invoked, if the respondent fails to appoin[ a subs:itutc arbitrator under Section I5, follorving a specific reque st b1. Applicant No.2 lhrough a written notice and in the present casc rro such written notice rcquesting for appointment of a substitute arbitrator is issued by the Applicant No.2 to the respondent. Thus, there is no failurc/default on the part of the respondent to fulfil his obligation as per Section 11 ol the Act and there is no cause o[ action for il-rstituting the present Arbitration Application.

24. Per contra, learned counsel for petitioner had distinguished the judgmcnt relied by the Iearned counsel for the responrient in the case of Yashwith Constructions (Supra) and submitted that it is a case u,here the agreemcnt provided for appointmcnt of substitute :rrbitrator and thus it was held that the process contcmplatcd undcl Scction l1 necds to be followed. Learned counsel submits that in thc prcsent case, thc partnership agreement does not contain a provision for appointment of substitute arbitrator and thus Lhis jr-rdgrnent is not applicable and tl-re said judgment has been subsequently clarified by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of S.B.P. and Company (supra). For reference learned counscl had drawn the attention of this Court to [he relevant paras No.47 and 48, which reacls as under: 22 tYvsKi J Arbltr.tioE AppUc.tlon No 30.2024

47. Although the languagc of para 4 of the judgment in Simplex Concrete case [(2006) 6 SCC 204] gives an impression that the Court decided the matter by presuming that the agreement between the parties did not contain a provision for appointment of a substitutc arbitrator if the origlnal appoinLment tcrminates or if the original arbitrator wrthdraws from thc arbitration and this omission is supplicd by Section 15(2) of the Act, rf that paragraph is read in conjunction with paras 2 ald 3 it becomes clcar that the arbitration agreement did provide for appointment of another arbitrator in the event originally appointed arbitrator was to resign and there was no plausiblc reason for thc Court to presume that there is art omission in thc agrcement on the issue of appointment of a su bstitute arbitrator. In ar-ry case, the judgment cannot bc read as laying down a proposition of law that in the absence of a specific provision in the arbitration clause, eithcr party to thc agreement can appoint a substitute arbitrator in the event of the originally appointed arbitrator relusing to act.

48. At thc cost of repetition, we consider it necessary to observe that the agreemcnts entered into between the appellant and Respondcnt 1 do not contain a provision for appointment of a substitutc arbitrator ir-r case t]lc arbitrator appointed by either party was to declinc to accept appointment or rcfusc to a-rbitrate in the matter. Therefore, Respondent I cannot draw support from the ratio of the judgment in YashuLith Consttuctions (P) Ltd. v. Simplex Concrete Hles India Ltd.. I|2006) 6 SCC 2041" 23 NVSI{, J ArbitratioE AppU.rtioE No.30 2024

25. The learned counsel for Applicant further leferred to the judgment in the case of National Highways Authority of India (supra) and submitted that it is a case where the agreement stipulated arbitration by 3 arbitrators and that each party strall appoint an arbrtralor and the said two arbitrators shatl appoint a third arbitrator. As the present partnership agreement does not contrlmplate such a procedure, the judgment is not applicable to the facts of the case .

26. Further referred to the case of Huawei Technoligies (supra) and submitted that it is a judgment rendered by a single .judge of the Supreme Court and the judgment rendered by the Sr-rpreme Court in the casc of S.B.P. and Company (supra) is rendererl by a bencl-r of two judges and thus has primacy and is a binding precedenl on this Court. Further, the latter judgment was noL brought to lhc notice of the Hon'ble Supreme Court which decided this case.

27. Learned counsel further referred to the carse of Hemant B. PJasad and another (supra), and submitted that thc judgmer-rt rendercd by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the casc of S.B.p. aod Company (supra) [(2009) 10 Supreme Court Cases 293] was not brought to the notice of the learned Single Judgc ancl thus this judgment is not a binding precedent. 24 Arbltrrti6o Application No.3O 2024

28. In reply to the contentions of the Applicants, the learned senior counsei for the respondents submitted that during the course of hearing the matter on 26.06.2024, the learned counsel for the Applicants had placed reliance on the case of SBP and Company (supra), which allegedly overruled the decision in Yashwith Constructions (supra). In this regard, it is submitted that SBp and Company (Supra) has neither overruled the casc of yashwith Constructions (supra) nor iays down any proposition of law contrary to Yashwith Constructions and has no application to the facts and circumstances of the present case and therefore, the reliance placcd on the judgment by the learncd counsel for Applicants is rvholly misconceived and unsustainable in law or on the facts. Similarly, the reliance placed on the judgment of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Tirath Ram Sumer Kumar (supra), is also not applicablc to the present case.

29. Learned Senior Counsel furthcr submittcd that as pcr Clause 8(g) of the Parnership Deed dated O3.O3.2O12, Applicanr No.2 is not authorised to initiate arbitration or represent the Applicant No. 1 Firm in any proceedings. As such, no claims can bc made by Applicant No.2 on behalf of the Applicant No.1 Firm and that Section 19(2)(a) of the indian partnership Act, 1932, does not grant implied authority to a partner to refer business disputes to arbitration without express consentftom other partners. In support of this aspect, Iearned senior \ 25 IIVSK, J AJbLrr.tioD ApplicntioE No 30 2024 counsel placed reliance in the case of Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Company Limited (MSEDCLI Vs. Godrej and Boyce Manufacturing Company Limitedrl wherein it was lreld that express authority of a partner is mandatory for submitting a dispute relating to the business of firm to arbitration. Further, in thr: case of J.J.L.B. Engineers and Contractors Vs. Manmohan Harijinder and Associates and othersl2 wherein it is held that Section 19(21 of Partnership AcL clearly rules out any implied consent of other partner to refer any dispute relating to the business of the fir.m to arbitration rcspect, unless there is usage or custom to the c()ntrary. In Lhe prcsent case only disputes arising out of inrcrpretation and cn forcement o[ tcrms of the Partnership Deed may I rc referred to an arbitrator by Applicant No.2 in her individual capac.ity as a partner and not on behalf of the Firm.

30. Eventualll', it is submitted that the present Arbitration Applicatior-r is premature in nature and there is no proper cau se of action for invoking the jurisdiction of Lhis Court urrder Section 11 rcacl u.ith 15(2) of the Act. Thus, the present application rs not mair-rtainable in law and sl-rould therefore be dismissecl. 3 t. Heard Lhe learned counsel Sri P.S. Raja:;ckhar for the Applicants and the learned senior counsel Sri P.Vikram for the respondents and perused the material made available on the record ' :0 t9 scc onLine tlon 3920 'r 2000 SCC Onl-ine Ilonr 670 26 t{vsK, J Arbikatiotr Appli..ti6n No.30 2024

32. The following issues would fall for consideration for determination by this Court after hearing the arguments: (i) Whether subsequent to the recusal/ tennination/ tuithdratual of the earlier presiding arbitrator bg order dated 26.01.2O24, the panlles haue to make a request to other party for appointment of a substitute Arbitrator os per the rules contemplated under Section I 1 and the said ntles are also applicable to the appointment of the substitute Arbitrator in terms of the Section 15(2) of the Act in the present case. (ii) Whether the Applicant No.2 has authoritg to inuoke arbitration in terms of Clause 19 of the deed of partnership dated 03.O3.2O12 for inter se disputes u.tith respect to rendeing of true and proper accoltttts of the Firm.

33. The Clause 19 of the Partnership Deed dated 03.03.2012 rcads as under "ln case of ang disputes aising or interpretation or enforcement of term-s oJ the portrrcrship bettueen the parties or their legat representotiues, the same sholl be referred to an arbitrator and tlrc decision of the arbitrator shall be final and binding on the partners. "

34. On a perusal of the records and the list of events submittcd by the learned counsel for the respondents, it appears that a COP No.6 of 2024 was Iiled under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 seeking relief regarding the purport dissolution of the Applicant No.l Firm and the said petition is pending adjudication belore the Corqmercial Court in Hyderabad and the Applicant No.2 has filed the current Arbitration Application for adjudication disputes mentioned in ./ 27 lwsx, J Arbir-rtion AppUc.tion No,3O 2024 the notice dated L7 .O5.2023 . Thereafter, on 07 .O3.2024 the respondents have issued notice for an appointmcr.t o[ substitute Arbitralor and nominated Hon'ble Sri Justice A.l?a.iashekar Reddy (Retired High Court Judge) as sole Arbitrator. On 26.03.2023 Applicant No.2 issued reply disagreeing the appointnrcnt of said sole Arbitrator.

35. Section 1 I of the Arbitration and Concilialion Act, 1996 contemplates thc appointment of Arbitrator. Sectiorr 15 of the Act deals with termination of mandate and substitution ol arbitrator. On a carelul rczrding of the Section 15 of the Act, it is crystal clear thal rr",herc thc rnandate of an Arbitrator terminzltcs, zr substitute Arbitralor shall be appointed according to the rules that were applicable to the appointment of the arbitrator being rcplaced. In Section 15, Provisions of Section 13 and 14 are reI'er rcd to hou,ever, there is ref'erencc of Section 1 1, which deals with tlte appointment Arbitrator in a case where the parties failed to agree rvithin the time prescribed. In the case on hand, process of an rppointment of n rbitrator has already been concluded by order datctl 24.i 1.2023 in Arbitration Application No.179 of 2023. Thereafter, the arbitration proceedings were commenced in Arbitration Case No.3 of 2023 and by procedural ordcr dated 26.O1.2024, sole Arbitrator hi:d rccused lrom the subject arbirration proceedings. The Applicants have nou, hled the presen t Arbitration Application under Section 1 L (6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 read with Secr ion 15(2) of the a'" \/ 28 Arbitr.tioE Appli..tio! o.3O 2024 Act, seeking for an appointment of substitute Arbitrator u,ith respect to the disputes arose between the Applicants and the respondents in terms of the partnership deed dated 03.03.2012. Since the stage of appointment of Arbitrator has already been completed by on order of this Court dated 24.11.2023, now the prescnt application i-e. Arbitration Application No.3O oi 2024 is filed for appointmenI of substitute Aribtrator, which is only a continuation of thc procccdings. As per the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of S.B.P. and Company (supra) wherein it is held that the term 'rules' use d in Section 15(2) is not confined to statutory rules or the rules lramed by thc compctcnt authority in exercise of the porl'er o[ delegated legislation but also includes the terms of agrecmcnt cntered into between the parties. The relevant paras No.31, 32,34,47 arnd 48 are extracted. "31. What is signihcant to be noticcd in thc aJorementioned provisions is that the lcgislaturc has repeatedly laid emphasis on the nccessity of adherence to the terms of agreement bctwcen thc parties in the matter of appointment of arbrtrators and procedure to be followed for such appointment. Even Section 15(2), which regulates appointment of a substitute arbitrator, requires that such an appointment shall be madc according to lhe rules which were applicable to the appointment of al original arbitrator. The term "rdles" used in this sub-section is not confrned to statutory rules or the rules framed by the competent authority in exercise of the power o[ 29 I{VSX, J Arbitratlon Applicatior No.30 2024 delegated legislation but also includes the terrrrs of agreement entered into between the parties. (P)

32. In Yushu-tith Constntctions Ltd. t'. Simplex Concrete Piles India Ltd. 112006) 6 SCC 2041 this Court was called upon to exarnine the scopc of Section 15 of the Act in the backrlrop of thc fact that after resignation of the. arbitr zrtor appointed by the Managing Director oI the respondcnt cornpany, another arbitrator rvas appoirrted by him in accordance with the arbitration agreement. At that stage, the petiti,rner filed an application under Section 11(5) read with Scction 15(2) of the Act and prayed that thc ()hief Juslice of the High Court may appoin t a substitutc arbitrator to resolve the dispr-rtes betrvccn thc partics. The learned Chief Jur;tice dismisscd the application and held that Sct tion 15(2) refers not only to statutory rules framc<l for regulating appointment of arbitrators but :rlso to contractual provisions for such appointment.

34. While approving the decision of the lJigh Colrrt. this Court held : \Simplex cose [(2005) 6 SCC 2041 , SCC pp. 206-07, paras 4-5) " I . ... The term 'rules' in Section f 5(2) obvror-rslv referred to the provision for appointnent conl aincd in t lre arbitration agreement or i my rulcs of any institu.tion under which the disputes were referred to arbitration. There was no fi,rilure on the part of the party concerned as per the arbitlation agreement, to fulfil his obligation in terms of Section 1 I of the Act so as to attract the juriscliction of the Chief Justice under Sc(tion 1 1(6) ot thc Act for appointing a substitute arbitrator. Obviously, Section 1 1(6) of the Acr iras 30 Arhitration Appli..tioo No.3O 2024 application only when a pa_rty or the person concerned had failcd to act in terms of thc arbitration agreemcnt. When Section l5(2) says that a substitute arbitrator carr be appointed according to the rules that were applicable for thc appointment of the arbitrator originally, it is not conhncd to an appointment under any statutory rule or rule framed under the Act or under the scheme. It only means that the appointment of the substitute arbitrator must be done according to the original agreement or provision applicable to the appointment of the arbitrator at the initial stagc. We are not in a position to agree with the contrar5/ view taken by some of the High Courts.

5. Since here, thc power of thc Malaging Director of the respondent is saved by Section 15(2) of lhe Act arld hc has exercised that power on the terms of the arbitration agreement, we see no inhrmity either in the decision of the learned Chief Justice or in that of the Division Bench."

47. Although the language of para 4 of the judgment in Simplex Concrete case [(2006) 6 SCC 204] gives an impression that the Court decided the matter by presuming that the agreemcnt betu,een the parties did not contain a provision for appointment of a substitute arbitrator if the original appointment terminates or if the original arbitrator wrthdraws from the arbitration ald this omission is supplied by Section 15(2) of the Act, if that paragraph is read in conjunction with paras 2 and 3 it becomes clear that the arbitration agreement did provide for appointment of another arbitrator in tl.e event originally appointed arbitrator was to resign and there was no plausible rcason for the Court to presume that JI t{vsx, J Arbirratton Appllc.tion No,30 2024 therc is an omission in the agreement on the issue of zrppointment of a substitute arbitrator. In any casc, Lhc judgment cannot be read as laying clown a ploposition of law that in the absence of a specrhc provision in the arbitration clause, r'ither partl to thc agreement carl appoint a substitute arbitrator in the event of the originally appointed arbit rator refusing to act.

48. At the cost of repetition, we consid:r it ncccssary to obsene that thc agreements entcred into betu,een the appellant ald Respondent I do not contain a provision for appointment cf a substitutc arbitrator in case the arbitr-ator appointed by either party was to decline to a(cep1 appointment or refuse to arbitrate in the mi tter. Thercfore, Respondent I cannot draw su1:,porl from the ratio of the judgment tn Yasl,tuith Consfrzctlons (P) Ltd- v. Simplex Concrete PiLes Indh Ltd. [(2006) 6 SCC 204]"

36. F urthe r, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cirse of Shailesh Dhairyawan (supra) wherein relcrring the case of S.B.P. Company (supra) held at para No.35 as follou,s: "35. Once rve keep in mind the aforc said fur-rdamental aspects of the arbitration, the irresistible conclusion would be that whert:ver parties agrce for mediation, and even nalr].c a specific arbitrator u.ith no specihc provisior for apporntment of another arbitrator on the recu sa1/ withdrawal of the sard arbitrator, the said omission is made up by Section 15(2) of the Act and unless arbitration agreement between the partic's provides a catcgorical prohibitron or )L t{vsK. J A,bitr.tlon Appllcrtion N6.so 2o2rt debarment in rcsolving a question or dispute or diflcrence bctween the parties by a substitutc arbitrator in case of death of the named arbitrator or non-availability of the said arbitrator, courts have the power to appoint substitute arbitrator, which power is given by Section 15(2) of the Act as this provision is to bc givcn liberal interprctation so as to apply to a1l possible circumstances undcr which the mandate of the earlier arbitrator may be terminated."

37. The respondcnts have already issued notice on 07.O3.2O24 for invocation of arbitration for adjudication of the disputes in relation to dissolution of the Firm and for an appointment of substitute Arbitrator and thc respondent has already nominatcd Hon'ble Sri Justice A. Rajashekar Reddy (Retired High Court Judge), as sole Arbitrator and later, the Applicant No.2 by letter dated 26.03.2024 had disagreed u,ith thc said appointment and filed thc present Arbitration Application. ln the case on hand, the partics are bound by the rules of the Agreement dated O3.O3.2012 and the agreement does not contain any Clause/ Provision for appointment of a substitute Arbitrator in case the Arbitrator appointed refused to arbiLrale the matter. As hetd by the Hon'b1e Supreme Court in Shailesh Dhairyawan (supra) such omission is made up by Section 15(2) of the Act and the said clause does not prohibit in resolving disputes by a substitute arbitrator and in the said circumstances this Court has power to appoint substitute arbitrator under Section 15 (2) of the Act. -./ ^r Arbnr.rioo Appli.atior No.sO 2024

38. It is pertinent to note that since the responderrts have already initiated the arbitration proceedings for appointmer'.l of substitute Arbitrator, the submissions of the learned senior r:ounsel for the respondents, at this juncture, arc totally misgr.Lidecl and self contradicting to the ratio laid clou,n by the Hon'ble Suprerne Court in SBP and Company and Shailesh Dhairyawan (srrpra) and are belated, misconccived and unsustainable accordingly, the issue No.1 is answered in favour of the Applicant-

39. On a plzrin reading of clause 19 of par -r-rership dated

03.O3.2O12 for the dispute resolution mechanis:.rr, it can be deciphered that the dispute rcsolulion pertains onll to Lhe inter se disputes betn,ecn the parties and the enforcement oI the terms of the partnership deecl. The Applicant No.2 has invoked rtrbitration with respect to thc unresolved disputcs bctween the Applicant No.2 and the respondent $,ith respect to thc Applicant No.l Irirm business. The disputc raiscd in the arbitration proceedings is orJy to the extent of settlement of accounts bctwecn the Applicant No.2 and the Respondenl with respect to lhe business of applicanL No. 1 hrm. In a partncrship agreemenL, the parLies jointly reprcs;cnt thcmselves as firm for lhe purpose of enlorcement of their rights. It is pertinent to note that any disputes pertaining to the Applicant firm with third parties can only*pe represented by the respondent. IIowever, clause 19 of the partncrship deed covcrs the inter se disputcs between the Applicant No.2, which is the subject matter of the r ispute and the "/ )4 A.titratton Appli.atior No.3O 2024 respondent. As such, the submissions of the learned counsel for the respondent that as per Clause B(g) of the partnership deed dated 03.O3.2O12, thc Applicant No.2 is not authorised to initiate Arbitratron and that only the respondent has authorit5r to refer the disputes with respect to Lhe firm is misconstrued and overlooked the well setrlcd legal posit ion.

40. Accordingly, the issue No.2 is answered against the respondent

41. In view of the preceding judicial analysis and that the respondent has already nominated the substitute Arbilrator, u,hich has been disagreed by the Applicant No.2 and in the said circumstances, this Court is of the considered opinion that under Section 15(2) of the Act has power to appoint substitute Arbitrator. The present Arbitration Application is allowed in terms of the prayer relief sought for.

42. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case and as per aforesaid discussion, Hon'ble Ms. Justice G. Rohini, (Former Chief Justice of Delhi High Court), H.No.3-3-108/ 153 & 172, New Friends Colony Phase-2, Attapur, Hyderguda, Hyderabad-5OO048, Mobile: 8527027 O27 is appointed as the sole Arbitrator to adjudicate the disputes between the parties. r- 35 N1,SI(, J Arhitr rtior Applicatioo l{o.3O-2024

43. Let a copy of this order be furnished to the learned Arbitrator. Parties to appear before the learned Arbitrator as appointed.

44. Accordingly, this Arbitration Application stanc.s disposed of There shall be no order as to costs. As a sequel, miscellaneous applications, pending if any, shall stand closed //TRUE COPY// SD/- K. SAILESHI "IOINT REGISTRAR _-,+-+--) SECTION OFFICER One Fair Copy to the Hon'ble SRI JUSTICE N. SHRAVAN KUMAR (For His Lordship's kind Perusal) To 'I . Ms. Justice G. Rohini, (Former Chief Justice of Delhi High Court), H.No.3-3- 108/1 53 & 172, New Friends Colony Phase-2, Attapur, Hyderguda, Hyderabad-500048, Mobile: 8527027027 (By Speed Post) (Along with a Copy of affidavit and material papers) 2 11LR Copies 3. The Under Secretary, Union of lndia, I\/inistry of Law, Justice and Company Affairs, New Delhi

4. The Secretary, Advocates Association Library, High Court for the State of Telangana, High Court Buildings at Hyderabad. 5. One CC to M/s. P S Rajasekhar, Advocate [OPUC] 6. One CC to lvls. Doddata Achala Siri, Advocate [OPUC] 7. Two CD Copies ADK/gh w HIGH COURT DATED:0910612025 ORDER ARBAPPL.No.30 of 2024 THE S T4 ( (J a * 1B JUll 2025 sPArct't * DISPOSING OF THE ARBAPPL WITHOUT COSTS (e-l o cpP 22 Y^<P'