The High Court · 2025

Petition under section 1.5r cpc praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit fited in suooort_of the petitionliilHi;; bou.rt may be pteabed to stay alr further proceedinos i" o.s.ru" io)""i'zilis'.X'iie fire of the principal Junior Civil Judge, Ranga R"eOOy Oistrict at-r.A.f,r-a!;;. "" "' Counsel for the petitioners: Sri D. Jagan Mohan Reddy Counsel for the Respondents: Sri Koppula Gopal Qivil Rev tsron Petitio n No.429 of 2023 petition under Articre 227 0f the constitution of rndia aggrieved bv the ,ii.i in cMA SR.No 8 of 2oi1 on 'the p;n;i;"i 'Di.i;i of the courr of "i i"rise, L.e.Nasar, Ransa Reddy order dated 10-01'2023 oassed in r.A.No.4 $,:,jli Between: 'l Puppara suchitra, wo. p. Mahesh Kumar, Age: 41 years, occ: House Hord 2. Puppala Manlula, Wo. p. Suresh Kumar, Age: 36 years, Occ: House Hold 3. Puppala Deepika, Wo. p. Naresh Kumar, Age: 31 years, Occ: House Hold 4. Puppala priyanka, Wo. p. Rajesh Kumar, Age: 2l yea$,Occ: House Hold All are R/o. H.No 18_6_996 & 772, Balagunj Laldaruvaza, Hyderabad. AND ...petitioners/Respondents/Defendants ' [i'fi'ft'"1!1i-1"d.*1aor1' .s/o srinivas Reddv, Ase: !l.vears-, occ: Business ",tv'il?rr, sa idabad, Hydurrb, J'"t Maruth inagar' cyhampipet tl6"i c"i"r,

2. Vudumuta Sudhakar- [e!^dy _S/o Tirupathi Reddy, Age: 55 years, Occ: Business R/o H.No 5_3_rod, ai,i rul,.zi. Elrj)i Hayatrni#i n"ngl nuuoy oi.tri"t. namrnagar Vanasthalipuram, ...RespondentsAppellants/petitioners

3. Syed Sami Ahmed. S/o. Syed Ahmed, Age: 7,years, Occ: Business Rl/o. j!,. il S";1,.;3., ii. f; d.,E';;i;;;;i;ilil8iTr."6",,#i?il,1".rf tmrui:trt!;;:Xi%,1: li"i' fiyt".,.Jo;o n"p uv,t.- c irn rj r *i ^ ";,e i,T "i * ... RespondenURespondent l I l lA NO:1 OF 2023 Petition under section r5't cpc praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit fired in support of the petition, in.ifigh court may be preased to stay fyrtl'9r_ploceedings pursuantto the impugnut OiO", dated:10_01_2023 in tA. 3jl No'4 0f 2021 in c.M.A. s R. No. 8 0f 2021 L""ttr" rir. principal bi"tri.ilrog"'"t LB Nagar, Ranga Reddy District. "r Counsel for the petitioners: Sri D. Jagan Mohan Reddy Counsel for the Respondents: Sri Koppula Gopal The Court made the following: COMMON ORDER l i I I I I I I I i I 7 THE HONOURABLE SMT JUSTICE K. SUJAilA COMMON ORDER: Since the parties and /rs involved in both the revision petitions are same, ttrey were heard together and are being disposed of by this common order. t;

2. CRP.No.2527 ot 2022 is filed challenging the order dated 20.o7.2022 passed in IA.No.546 0f 202r in oS.No. 162 of 2079 on the hle of the principal Junior Civil Judge, Ranga Reddy District, at LB.Nagar ; and CRp.No.429 of 2O23 is filed challenging the order dated 1o.or .2022 passed in IA.No.4 of 2O2t in CMA.SR.No.8 of 2O2l on the file of the Principal District Judge, at LB. Nagar, Ranga Reddy District. CRP.No. 2527 0F 2022

3. The brief facts of the case are that the respondents herein filed IA.No.546 of 2O2l in OS.No.l62 of 2O19 under Order I Rule t0 of CpC praying to implead them as plaintiff Nos.2 to 3 in the suit, stating that they purchased the suit schedule property from plaintiff No. t through a registered I 2 SKS,J CRP.Nos.2s27 / 2022 & 42g /2023 sa-le deed dated 09.O9.2O19. However, Defendants I to 4 claimed ownership of the property, alleging that they had purchased it from Ayesha Tabassum, who had acquired it from Syed Sami Ahmed. It was contended that Syed Sami Ahmed was €ul imposter who had created forged documents, including the sa.le deed arrd that defendant Nos.I to 4 were aware of the pending suit and had purchased the property with knowledge of the dispute. On the other hand, the defendant Nos. I to 4 claimed that they were the absolute owners and possessors of the plot, having purchased it from Ayesha Tabassum, and that they had constructed a compound wall and erected a gate on the propert5r, and had obtained an electricity connection as well. 4 After hearing both sides, the trial Court considered the provisions of Order I Rule t 0 of the CpC and the principles laid down in various judgments, such as, Ranesh Hirachand Kundan,mal v. Uunlcipal Corporation of Greater Bombayr, Raj Kumar v. Sardari LaI2, Amit KuEar Shaw v. Faride Khatoon3, Kunna Ramulu v. t (tsgz) z scc sza ' zooa; z scc 60r ' lzoos; rr scc loa /r'i 3 SKS,J CRP.Nos.2527 /2022 &, 429 /2023 Kunna Anaapuroammaa, pannala Renula v. Ikvali (RaJumounif Venkataiahs and held that the respondents herein were necessary parties to the suit and that their impleadment would avoid multiplicity of proceedings and allowed the petition, directing them to pay costs of Rs.2,00O/- to the petitioners herein and to carr5r out amendments and hle a neat copy of the plaint within 14 days. CRP.No.429 OF 2023

5. The brief facts of this case are tl,rat the respondents herein who are third parties to IA.No.2SZ of 2O 19 in OS.No. 162 of 2Ot9 liled IA.No.4 of 2O2t in CMA.SR.No.8 of 2O2l under Section 151 of CpC seeking leave to lile CMA against the order dated 30.01.2020 passed in the said IA., stating that they are the purchasers of the suit schedule property from the Plaintiff, and contended that they are the bona fide purchasers of the suit schedule property and have a strong case. On the other hand, ttre said plea was strongly opposed contending that the respondents herein are third o zooz 121 at ast t zooo 1s1aLo zer 4 SKS,J CRP.Nos.2527 /2022 A 4b /2023 parties to the suit and have no locus standi to hle the appeal, and that they have no cause of action. The trial Court considered the provisions of CpC and the judgments rendered by the Honble Supreme Court in V.II. Krishna Murthy v. Ravikunar6 and RaJ Kumar v. Sardar LaF and held that a stranger can appeal against a decree, only if he is aggrieved person whose rights are alfected, and observed that the respondents herein are lis pendente transferees, having purchased the suit schedule property during the pendency of the suit, and ttrat they are bound by the decree passed in the suit and have the right to challenge it, and accordingly, allowed ttre petition, granting the respondents herein leave to appeal against the impugrred order. Aggrieved thereby, these revision petitions are filed.

6. Heard Sri D.Jagan Mohan Reddy, Iearned counsel for petitioners, and Sri Koppula Gopal, learned counsel for respondents. " zozo s aLo t53 sc '2ml 2 AtD 95 sc r) 5 SKS,J CRP.Nos.2527 /2022 & 42912023 7 . karned counsel for petitioners submitted that the trial Court erred in allowing I.A.No.S46 of 2O2l in O.S.No. 162 of 2Ol9 which was liled by respondents herein who contend that they have purchased the suit schedule property from the plaintiff during the pendency of the suit. He contended that the respondents being purchasers pendente lile cannot be permitted to be brought on record in a suit for injunction and relied on the principle that a purchaser pendente ljte is not entifled to be impteaded in a suit for injunction, as the suit is primarily between the plaintiff and the defendant. He asserted that the trial court failed to appreciate that in a suit for injunction, the plaintiff is required to prove possession over the suit schedule property as on the date of liling the suit, and that subsequent purchasers, such as Respondent Nos. I and 2, would not be in a better position to prove the possession of plaintiffs. He lamented that the plaintiffs possession is a crucial factor in determining the reliefs in a suit for injunction, and that the application to implead respondents was filed only to delay the proceedings in the suit. 6 SKS,J CRP.Nos-2527 I 2022 & 429 / m23

8. Learned counsel for petitioners incessantly contended that respondents purchased the suit schedule property after the order of injunction was vacated, and subsequently flrled C.M.A.SR.No.Oa of 2O2L with a leave to challenge tJle order, and lamented ttrat the same would show the clear attempt to re-agitate the issue that had already been decided by the trial Court. Therefore, while praying this Court to a-llow the revision petitions, setting aside the order dated 2O.O2.2O22 passed in IA.No.546 of 2O2l in OS.No. 162 of 2Ol9 as well as order dated lO.Ol.2O22 passed in IA.No.4 of 2O2l in CMA.SR.No.8 of 2021, in support of the said contentions, he relied on the judgments rendered in the case of S.Kumu.lham Vs. R.Rejendiraa and Anothed, whereunder, it was observed that "A Court of law b not under an obligation to make a lis pend.ens suit, seeking appropriate relief in the manner lotoun to law a nd. in aeord.ane with laut". He a_lso relied on the judgment rendered by the Honble Supreme Court in lrlational Insurance Company Limited Vs. pranay Sethi and Otherse. Furthermore, in the case of llohd. Sharfudai,, Vs. 6 2012 SCC Online Mad 3850 ' zolz t6 scc 6ao 'al 7 SKS,J CRP.Nos.2527 /2022 & 42s /2023 Mohd. Jamal and Otherslo and the relevant paragraph Nos.19 to 2l read as under: "19. A learned Single Judge of Karnataka High Court in Shankaralingappa v. Nanje Gouda, AtR 1981 Karnataka 7g, held that a judgment in a suit for injunction is not a judgment in rem and brnds only the parties to the suit. Broadly, lrivies' are of three kinds uiz., (i) lrivies, in blood; (ii) lrivies, in estate and (iii) privies, in law. The plaintiff is not a !ri!y, in blood and a !.i"y'in law. But, the question is whether he is a lriry'in estate. The leamed Judge observed at paras 25 and 26 as foUows: 'The suit frled by Kalaiah as also the suit frled by the plaintiff are not for declaration of title or their ownerstrip. Both the suits are simple suits for permanent injunctions. A decree permanent injunction does not prohibit defendalt from instituting a suit for declaration of his title ald for recovery of possession from the very decree holder that has obtained a decree for permanent rnjunction On the very first principle stated by Sir William de Greg in 10 2OO3 SCC Online Ap 184 6 SKS,J CRP Nos.2527 / 2c.22 & 429 / ?{i23 Duchess of Kingston s case, as also on the legal principles that distinguish ownership and possession, it is difficult to hold that a trarsferee is a brivy' in estate and the decree made against his transferor operates as res Jtrdicafa against him. A decree for permanent injunction obtained by one person against another person, cannot obviously bind all other persons and ignore the factual changes that take place with regard to possession. If that is not the position, then it ignores all legal and factual changes that take place afld stamps that decree as if it is a covenant running with that land. With all the arxiety of law to safeguard possession, acceptance of such a proposition, would even defeat the very safeguards provided by law and would create innumerable problems in safeguarding possession. In this view also, the Court should be loath to accept the extreme Proposition that the plaintifi, the transferee is a lrivy' in estate and the decree obtained by Kalaiah against lingamtna operates as resi judicota against him. From tl-ris it follows, that the decree in O.S. No. 592 of 1942_1943 (Exhibit D-12, cannot operate as res judicata aBainst the plaintiff. 9 SKS,J CRP .Nos.2527 / 2022 & 429 / 2023 An injunction does not run with the land- An injunction only acts in personam or against a person. Both these principles are firmly established legal principles (vide Somnath Honnappa Bennalkr:; v. Bhimrao Subrao patil, ILR (1974) Kant r506)."

20. In G(l.nesh v. Naraga\ AIR l93l Bom. 4g4, a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court held that "a decree for permanent injunction obtained aBainst a father in Hindu Joint familv can be executed against the son-"

21. The learned Senior Counsel also refers to ttre passage in Text Book by Sir John George Woodrolfe on Law relating to Injunctions in India and extracted para 17.O3 which reads Erus: "INJUNCTION IN RESPECT OF ACTS OF AN INDIVIDUAL:-Insofar as an injunction is in its nature a remedy against an individual, it will be issued only in respect of acts done by him against whom it is sought to be enforced. Thus, an rnlunction cannot be obtained executors on account of acts done by their testator. They may be sued for an injunction in respect of.a wrong done by themselves, but they agarnst 10 SKSJ CRP.Nos 2527 /2022 & 42s / 2023 cannot be so sued in a representative characte.r. And for the same reason, namely, that an injunction is an order dirccted to a person, it does not run with the land. By reason of this same operation in personam the Court may exercise jurisdiction quite independently of the act to be done, provided the defendant be within the reach and amenable to the process of the Court."

9. Per ontra, Ieamed counsel for respondents opposed the submissions made by leamed counsel for petitioners and asserted that there are no illegalities or irregularities in the orders under challenge, as the respondents herein are purchasers of the propert5r from plaintiffs arld if any order is granted against the plaintiffs, the same shall bound on them as well. Therefore, while praying this Court to dismiss the Revision petitions, as the same lacks merits, he relied on the judgments rendered in the case of Amlt Kumar Shas and Another Vs. Farida Khatoon and Anotherrl whereunder, it was observed that " Und_er Order XXII Rule 10, no detailed. inquiry at the stage of granting leaue is contemplated. The court h.as onlg to be prima facie satisfied for exercis " 2oo5 tl scc 4o3 ing its 11 SKS,J CPP.NoS252? /2022 & 429 /2023 discretion in granting leaue for antinuing the suit by or against tlw person on uham the interest hrrs d.euotued. bg assignment or deuolution. The question about tLE existence and ualidity of the assignment or deuolution can be con sidered at tlrc finol learing of the proeedings. The murt h-as onlg to be prima facie satisfied for exercising its discretion in granting leaue for continuing tLe suif . Further, in the case of V.Narayana Reddy Vs. Ani Narayanam and Anotherr2 in paragraph No. 16 it was observed as under: "16. In Kesan Goutham Red.dg v. Velpula John Victor Macaulag,2OOT (S) ALD 656 the question that arose for consideration before this Court was whether a purchaser pendente lite the proceedings can come on record to safeguard his interests in the pending litigation, and whetl.rer it would not be just and proper to dismiss such aI application. This Court followed the judgments of the apex Court in Raj Kumar v- Sardari Lal, (2OO4l 2 SCC 60l arrd Amit Kumar Sha ut v. Farida Khatoon, (AIR 2OOS SC 2209) and held that a person sought to be impleaded is a proper and necessary party to the proceedings because " 2oog a ALo 13 I ) I I 72 SKS,J CRP-N,1.2S27 l2OZ2 e, 42g /2023 his interests are going to be allected it he was not added as partJ. to the proceedings., lO. Having regard to the rival submissions made and on going through the material placed on record, it is noted that admittedly, the respondents are subsequent purchasers of the suit schedule property. The trial Court while considering the judgments passed in the cases of V.IY. Krishna Murthy (supra 6) and Raj Kumar (supra 7) alowed the orders under challenge, specifically obsenring that Ieave to appeal should be granted to the respondents herein, them being the lrs pendent transferees, having been bound by the decree passed and ttrat they have got equaly right to question the validity of the order, and are entitled to seek leave to prefer tlle appeal against the order.

11. In the context of civil proceedings, the issue of impleading a purchaser pend.ente nte often arises, to which the Honble Supreme Court has laid down the principle that under Order XXII Rule 10 of CpC, the C<iurt need only be prima focie satisfied to grant leave for continuing the suit, without conducting a detailed inquiry into the assignment or i I I I 13 CRP.Nos-2527 /2022 & 429 / 2023 SKS,J devolution of interest. The said principle was realfrrmed in the case of Amit Kumar Shaw (supra 11) whereunder, it was held that the validity and existence of such assignment or devolution can be examined at the frnal hearing, and that the said approach ensures that the proceedings are not unduly delayed or complicated by unnecessary inquiries at the interlocutory stage. Furthermore, in the case of V.Ilarayana Reddy (supra 12) the Hontrle Supreme Court relied on the judgment rendered in Kesari Goutham Reddy v. Velpula John Victor Macaulayl3, in Raj Kumar (supra 7) and Amit Kumar Shaw (supra 11) to hold that a purchaser pendente lite can be impleaded as a necessary party to safeguard their interests. In essence, it was rccognizcd that a purchaser pendente life has a legitimate stake in the outcome of the proceedings and should be permitted to participate in the suit to protect their rights and the said approach promotes justice and ensures that all parties with a legitimate interest in the dispute, are heard. I

12. Reverting to the facts of the case on hand, it is rrnperatrve to note that the respondents are subsequent " zooz s eto asa I j 14 SKS,J CRP.Nos.2527l2O22 & 429 / 2023 purchasers of tJre suit schedule property from plaintiffs and having regard to the legal position as discussed above, it is needless to mention tl"at any order passed against the plaintiffs, shall have binding on the respondents herein as well. In other words, it is a matter of their right to seek proper adjudication. Therefore, this Court is of the opinion that there are absolutely no illegalities or irregularities committed by the trial Court in impleading the respondents herein as party to the suit and in granting leave to them to prefer appeal against the injunction order, warralting interference of this Court. There are no merits in these revision petitions and the same are liable to be dismissed.

13. Accordingly, these Civil Revision petitions dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. Miscellaneous applications, if any pending, shall also stand closed. //TRUE COPYII Sd/.V. KAVITHA ASSIST NT REGISTRAR CTION OFFICER To, 'I . The Principal District Judge, L.B.Nagar, Ranga Reddy District 2. One CC to Sri D. Jagan Mohan Reddy, Advocate [OPUC] 3. Qne CC to Sri Kopputa Gopa\, Advocare [Opuc\ A. lrr'roQ$ CoQ\es Karnl o \./ HIGH COURT DATED:2310112025 I I t HE S rAr e 1 k c 2 4 FEB 2025 a * D ES FATC,H 99 .l COMMON ORDER GRP.Nos.2527 ot 2022 & 429 of 2023 THESE CIVIL REYIS'ON PEflT'ONS ARE D'SMTSSED 1 ?d- W