The High Court · 2025

..RespondenUAccused state of relangana, rep. by the Public Prosecutor, High court at Hyderabad for the state of Telangana and the State of Andhra pradesh. ...RespondenURespondent Counsel for the Appellant: Mr. P. Prabhakar Reddy Counsel for the Respondent No.l: None Appeared Counsel for the Respondent No.2: Mr. G. Sundaresan, Assistant Public Prosecutor The Court delivered the following: JUDGMENT ,jn I THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE E.V.VENUGOPAL - JIIDGMENT: This appeal is preferred assailing the judgment dated 28.10.2016 passed in C.C.No.1O96 of 2Ol4 on the file of tl.e learned Special Magistrate, Miryalaguda (for short, "the trial Court")

2. Heard Mr.P.Prabhakar Reddy, learned counsel for the appellant, Mr. G.Sundaresan, learned Assistant Rrblic Frosecutor appearing for respondent No.2 State. For the sake of convenience, the parties hereinafter are referred to as arraYed in C.C.

3. The ca.se of the prosecution is that the accused approached the complainant with a request to give hand loan amount of Rs.1,1O,OOO/- to him. on 10.02.2014, the complainant gave the said amount to the accused and executed a promissory note and the accused assured that he would repay the Same to the complainant within one month. On repeated. requests mad'e by the complainant, on 05.O5.2OI4 the accused issued a cheque. When the complainant presented the said cheque'before the bank on 24.07.2014, the s€une was returned with arn endorsement \ \ I 2 Tunds insufficient'. On 26.07.2OL4, the complainant sent a legal notice to the accused demanding to pay the cheque amount and the accused received t]le said notice on 3O.O7.2tO14 and failed to send any reply to the said legat notice. On 08.09.2OL4, a private complaint was liled by the complainant against the accused for the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act (for short the NI Act). On 18.09 .2OL4 sworn statement of the complainant was recorded

4. After hearing the prosecution and tJ:e defence, charge was framed against accused under Section 138 of the NI Act, read over and exptained to him. Upon examination' accllsed pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.

5. On behalf of the prosecution, PWs.l ald 2 were examined and Exs.Pl to P6 were marked. On behalf of tfue defence, DWs.1 and, 2 were examined and no exhibits were marked. The trial court, on appraisal of entire evidence both oral and documentary, held that the prosecution failed to establish the guilt of respondent No.2/accused for the offences with which he was charged and accordingly, acquitted him'

6. tt is well settled law that in an appeal against acqrrittal, the appellate Court is circumscribed by tJ:e limitation t-hat no 11 J interference has to be made with the order unless the approach made by the trial Court to the consideration of evidence is vitiated by some manifest illegality or the conclusion recorded by it is such; which could not have been possibly arrived at by any Court acting reasonably and judiciously and is therefore, to be characterized as perverse. There is no embargo on the appellate Court reviewing the evidence upon which an order of acquittal is based. Generally, the order of acquittal shall not be interfered with because the presumption of innocence of the accused is further strengthened by acquittal. The golden thread which runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted.

7. ln Mfinal Das Vs. State of Trlpural the Apex Court held as under: "It is clear that in an appeal against acquittal in the absence of perversity in the judgment and order, interference by this Court exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction, is not warranted. However, if the appeal is ' lzor t1 I scc lze 4 -irai heard by an appellate court, being the final court of fact, is fully competent to re-appreciate, reconsider and. review the evidence and take its own decision. In other words, law d.oes not prescribe any limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and the appellate court is free to arrive at its own conclusion keeping in mind that acquittal provides for presumption in favour of the accused. The presumption of innocence is available to the person and in criminal jurisprudence every person is presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by the competent court. If two reasonable views are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb, *" findings of acquittal. There is no limitation on the part of the appellate court to review the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is found and to come to its"own conclusion. The apoellate court can also review the conclusion arrived at by the trial Court with respect to both facts and law. While dealing with the appeal against acquittal preferred by the State, it is the duty of tlle appellate court to marshal the entire evidence on record and only by giving cogent and adequate reasons set aside the judgment of acquittal. An order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when there are "compelling and substantial reasons" for doing so. If the order is "clearly unreasonable", it is a compelling reason for interference. When the trial Court has ignored the evidence or misread the material evidence or has ignored material documents like I I I \ *., 5 declaration/report of banistic experts etc., the appelrate court is competent to reverse the decision of the triar Court depending on the materials placed.,, 8' rn Maloth somaro,lu vs. stcte of And.hra prqd,eshz the Apex court held tl.at there can be no two opinions that merely because the acquittal is found to be wrong and a.other view can be taken, the judgment of acquittar cannot r>e upset. The appellate court has more and serious responsibility while dealing with the judgment of acquittal and unless the acquittal is found to be perverse or not at ail supportable and where the appeflate court comes to the conclusion that conviction is a must, the judgment of acquittal cannot be upset. The appell;ate court has to examine as to whether the triar court, while upsetting the acquittal, has taken such care. ,'

9. In the instant case, pw.r in his cross examination deposed that he is income t",r assessee and for the last four or five years he is filing income tax returns and he did not show the loan arnount of Rs.L,Lo,ooo /- by the complainant in the income tax returns. He also admitted that he stood as a guarantor on behalf of the accused before punjab National Bank. ,rhe accused handed over the brank signed cheque to the complainant. By 2 lzot r1 8 scc 635 f, \ \ ,: i, i t; t, l, l I i I t t t\ \ 6 a taking advantage of availability of blank signed cheque of the accused, the complainant got filed a complaint against the accused. Therefore, a benefit of doubt was given to accused' stating that the prosecution failed to establish his guitt beyond reasonable doubt, for the charge levelled against him and the i trial Court vide impugned judgment, acquitted him.

10. In view of the Judgments referred to above and for the -9 1 aforesaid reasons, I am of the view that there are no merits in the appeal and t}e same is liable to be dismissed. 1 1. AccordinBly, the appeal is dismissed confirming judgment dated 28.10.2016 passed in C.C.No.1O96 of 2014 on the file of I I I I : i As a sequel thereto, Miscetlaneous Petitions, if any, pending ( shall stand closed. _-_ t Ec-- ^ff rJ E _'- L. LAKSHMI BABU DEPUTY REGISTRAR I ,/TRUE COPY'/ SECTION OFFICER To,

1. The Special Magistrate, Miryalaguda. (with 2. Two CCs to the Public Prosecutor, High Court for if any) the State of Telangana at Hyderabad.tOUTl

3. Oie CC to Mr. P. Prabhakar Reddy, Advocate [OPUC] 4. Two CD CoPies Kam/gh HIGH COURT DATED i2210712025 4 JUDGMENT CRLA.No.290 of 2018 $ k+.E 5[0rtM n * I DISMISSING OF THE CRIMINAL APPEAL t ! :, 3 , , t t I I i ;i', + "@ q. 6tr65