The High Court · 2025

THE tION'BLE SRI JUSTICE T. VTNOD KUMAR CIVIL REVTSION PETITTON No. 390 of 2023 ORDER: The present Civil Revision Petition is preferred feeling aggrieved by the order dated 05.01'2022ir-1'A' No' 114 of 2021 in I.A. No. 1862 of 2Ol9 in O.S. No' 853 of 2022 (old O'S' No' 2879 of 2019) passed by the IX Additiona[ Senior Civil Judge' Medchal- Malkaj giri District, at Malkaj giri'

2. The revision petitioner herein filed the subject suit for Permanent Injunction as the plaintiff vide O'S' No' 853 of 2022 under Order VII Rule I r/w Section 26 ol Civil Procedure Code (for short'CPC').

3. The respondents herein are the defendants in the above said Suit.

4. The petitioner herein had tlted an intet'locutory application vile I.A. No. 1862 of 2019 in the subject suit under Order X)O(X Rule I and 2 of CPC for ad-interim injunction restraining the respondents herein or their agents, servants, workers or whosoever they may be claiming through thc respondents from interfering 2 with the lawful possession and enjoyment of the petit oner over the Petition Scheduled property, by causing any attempts of dispossession

5. The trial court vide order dated,04.01.202 l ailo,, ed the above said interlocutory application by granting temporan, injunction in favour of the petitioner herein by restraining the res: rndents from interfering with the lawful possession and enjo 7 nent of the petitioner over the petition Scheduled property

6. The petitioner herein further had filed an interlocutory application vide I.A. No. I 14 of 20Zt in I.A. No. I E ( 2 of 20 19 in the subject suit under Section r5r ofcpC seeking a ci ecrion to rhe Station House Officer, p.S. Ghatkesar to provide pol r e protection, and to initiate appropriate action against the respon lents or any person claiming through them, in the event ol any further interference with the petitioner's lawfut enjoyment an I possession ofthe plaint schedule property.

7. The Trial Court dismissed the undertying nterlocutory Application filed by the petitioner herein seeking poli, e prorecrion by observing that the petitioner lailed to place o I recorcl anl, 3 1 / photographs or documentary evidence to substantiate the alleged disturbances in relation to the suit schedule property; that the petitioner had not specified any particular date on which such interference allegedly occurred after the passing of the injunction order in I.A. No. 1862 of 2019. Moreover, the petitioner did not adduce any evidence to support his contention that the respondents were continuing to interfere with his possession over the suit schedule property.

8.ThetrialCourtfurtherobservedthatincasesofdisobedienceor breach of an order of temporary injunction granted under Order XXXIX rule I and 2 of the CPC, the appropriate remedy lies under Order XXXIX rule 2,{ ol CPC, which empowers the Court to punish such disobedience by directing civil imprisonment or by attachment of the property ol the person tbund guitty of violating the injunction. The trial court lurther observed that the petitioner, having failed to seek relief under the proper provision of law and not having supported his application with any evidence ofbreach, is not entitled to the relielsought. 4

9. Aggrieved by the above said order dated. );.01.2022 the petitioner herein had preferred the present civit Rer i ion petition. l0.Heard leamed counsel for the petitioner and perus :d the record. I l. The petitioner contends that the trial court errec in dismissing the petition filed under Section 151 of CpC seeking l,olice aid; that the impugned Order dated O5.O|.2O2Z passed in L.r. No. I14 of 2021 in I.A. No. 1862 of 2019 is erroneous, conrrry ro [aw, ancl unsustainable on facts and legal principles; thar tr: Trial Court, having already granted temporary injunction in hvour of the petitioner in I.A. No. 1862 of 2019, and having irse I .bserved rhat no appeal was preferred against the said injunction cr ler, dismissed the application for police protection merely on tre ground ol absence of documentary proof.

12. The petitioner contend that the he had tj ed a police complaint/report and also made a specific rele -cnce to the interfeienctj'in ihd fiiSt"iieek'of February 2O2l in p ,rragraph 6 ol the affidavit ftled in support of the underlyinli interlocutory application; that the Trial court failed to consider hese rnarerial 5 \ I facts and dismissed the application without proper.appreiciation of facts and evidence.

13. The petitioner contends that the remedy under Order XXXIX Rule 2A pertains to punishment for breach of injunction, whereas an application under Section 151 CPC seeking police aid is preventive in nature and aims to secure the petitioner's possession in the face of imminent threat; and that the principle for grant of police protection stands on a separate legal footing and has been upheld in various decisions of constitutional courts.

14. The Petitioners also contends that the Trial Court failed to consider the judgments cited by the petitioner in support of the underlying interlocutory application and thus committed a grave error in dismissing the same; that the respondents, being neighbours of the suit schedule property, pose a continuous threat of interference and trespass, and in such circumstances' the only effective remedy to protect the petitioner's possession is through police protection. Therefore, the impugned order passed by the Trial Court deserves to be set aside.

15. I have taken note of the contentions urged. 6

16. At the outset it is beneficial to note that it is not i r dispute that \ an injunction order dated 04.01.2021 passed in I.A. No. 1862 of 2019 is still in force and has not been set aside in aptr:al. The only issue for consideration is 'whether the Trial Court vr .s justified in dismissing the underlying interlocutory application hled seeking police protection on the ground that there was no ;,r tof of actual violation/interference and that the appropriate remr:, iy lies under Order XXXIX Rule 2,4. of CPC'.

17. It is pertinent to note that the petitioner alleges t I Lt despite the injunction granted by the Trial Court in I.A. No. litr 2 of 2019 is subsisting, the respondents continued to interfere witl his peacelul possession of the suit schedule property, thereby neccssitating police protection. However, upon scrutiny of the recrr d, this Court finds that the petitioner failed to produce any cogo ,t or reliable material to substantiate the above claim inasmuch I ; no specific date, incident, photograph, independent witness s,atement, or police cornplaint has been filed to show that there vas actual or imminent interference from the respondent after passing of injunction order dated 04.01.2021. Mere statement it the afftdavit ,1,, 7 I that interference occulred in the "first week of Febnnry 2021" without any corroborative material does not satisry the requirement of prima facie proof of a breach or threat of breach-

18. The Order XXXIX Rule 2,A. of CPC provides an express mechanism to deal with disobedience or breach of injunction orders. It empowers the Court to enforce compliance by way of civil consequences, including attachment of property and detention in civil prison. It is apt to refer to Order XXXIX Rule 2.A. of CPC' which reads as follows: Or e r XXXIX iniunction. Conse o disobedience or breach o (l) In the case of disobedience of any injunction granted or other order made under rule I or rule 2 or breach oJ ony o.f 17s terms on which the injunction wds granted or lhe order macle, tha Court granting the injunction or making the.order, or uny Cottrt to which the suit or proceeding is transferred, may order the property of the person guitty of such disobedience or breach lo he.otl(tched. ond may also order such person to be deloined in the civil prisonfor a term not exceeding three months, unless in thc mcantimc lhe Cotrt'l directs his release. (2) No attachment made under this n e shall renruin in Jbrce .fitr more than one year, at the end of which lime if the disobedience or' breach continues, the property ottached mut- be sold and <tut ol thc proceeds, lhe Court may cward such compensulion as il think: .lit 8 to the injured party and shall pay the balance, if ary,, t i the parry entitled thereto The petitioner, despite alleging that the respondenl violated the injunction, did not choose to file an application ut ler Rule 24, which is the appropriate legal recourse when the resl ondents have breached the injunction order. Instead, he filed an apl) ication under Section t5l CPC, which is not meant to override sp,: ,ific statutory remedies. It is settled legal position that where I party has a specific remedy under the Code, it must be pursuec, and inherent powers cannot be invoked to circumvent or bypass the same.

19. Thus, availing the assistance of the police or. i,eking police protection lor en fbrcement of injunction order withorrr approaching the civil Court granting the injunction order is not pr rvided under the CPC. ln lhct. such shortcut method is not to tr encouraged bypassing the procedure under CpC. Order XXXI)i Rule 2.4 of- CPC deals rvith consequence of disobedience o breach of injunction. How,ever, if the disobedience or breach : rnti,ues, the property attached nray be sold and out of the proccor s, the Court may award such compensation as it thinks fit to the nj ured party and shall pay rhe balance, if any, to the party entitled t, ereto. Thus. 9 I CPC provides for adequate remedy for disobedience ofan order of injunction. (See: Kabbakula Padma vs. Stale of Telangana and orst.)

20. tt is pertinent to note that Section 151 of the CPC preserves the inherent powers of the Court to do complete justice. However, this power is not unfettered. It cannot be exercised in a manner contrary to or inconsistent with the express provisions of the Code. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Manohar Lal Chopro v. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralaf , categorically held that where there is an express provision dealing with a particular situation, inherent powers cannot be invoked. In the present case, since Order xixix nrire )A-ip6iifiiuiri pi.j"idir-triJ nioa" o'i ,i,ai"rtui roi disobedience of injunction, invoking Section l5l CPC to seek potice protection as a first recourse is legally impermissible.

21. In cases where police aid is sought under Section l5l ol CPC, courts require either a recent act o[ interference with possession or a well-substantiated apprehension of breach of the \ MANU/rU25S2l2O2Z ',.rrR rqo: sc 52t 10 injunction order. The relief being preventive in.natrr e, it must be supported by prima facie material establishing, urgency or imminent threat. In the present case, the petition: has neither placed on record any police complaint lodged in r lation to the alleged interference by the respondents nor producec any material indicating an emergent or immediate threat of disJx ssession that would justiS invoking the Court's inherent powers t< direct police protectlon.

22. From a reading ol the provision and the law as r nunciated by the Apex Court, it would be clear that when a rarty alleges disobedience ol an injunction order, the appropriatr and specific remedy lies in initiating proceedings under Rule l-A of Order XXXIX. The said provision empowers the Court r r enforce its injunction order by directing attachment of thr: property or imposing civil irnprisonmenr on the defaulting party A.pplying this settled principle to the present case, it is evident that the petitioner has not invoked the renredy under Order XXXIX t ule 2-A, and has instead sought reliel under Section 151 Cp(: without first exhamting the specific sratutory remedy available to I im. I t i I I l 7t

23. Further a party may seek police protection under Section t5l CPC in aid of an injunction order, provided the applicant satisfies the Court that the threat of disobedience or breach is credible, substantial, and immediate. The standard of proof in such cases lies between the standard of beyond reasonable doubt and a standard of balance on probabilities. In the present case, the petitioner has failed to demonstrate any such threat through substantial or contemporaneous documentary evidence. Moreover, the petitioner has not specified any clear or particular date on which the alleged interf'erence by the respondents is said to have occurred. [n the absence of such material particulars, the plea for police protection cannot be sustained.

24. In the tight of the aforesaid discussion, this Court is of the view that the and trial Court had rightly dismissed the underlying application, inasmuch as the basic ingredients to be met flor granting the police protection are missing in the present case and the impugned order does not merit interference by this Court in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction conferred under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 1-2

25. For the above-mentioned reasons, this Court i: of the view that the order of the trial Court does not suffer from my infirmity or elTor.

26. Accordingly, the Civil Revision perition is de , oid of mi:rit and is dismissed. The order dated O5.OI.2OZZ in I.,ur No. 114 of 2021in I.A. No. 1862 of 2019 in O.S. No.853 of 2C22 (old O.S. No. 2879 of 2019) is sustained. No order as to costs. Consequently, miscellaneous petitions pendinll if any shall stand closed. No order as to costs. sd/- N. SR]HARI DEE UTY REGISTRAR !:-- rS:CTION OFFICER //TRUE COPY// To,

1. The lXAdditionatSenior Civit Judge, at L.B.Nagar, Range Reddy District (with records if any)

2. The Additional Senior Civit Judge, Medchat Malkajgiri 3. One CC to SRl. ERANKT PHANT KUMAR Advocate tOpU: I 4. One CC to SRl. Advocate [OPUC] 5. Two CD Copies ?k JAIPSL HIGH COURT DATED:11 107 12025 ORDER CRP.No.390 of 2023 ,",'- /,.': :-)i|.', 'tt \ '1 ,\r.::- 1,E i [ii :I 2 ..: // '.2/ . : .1:,'S() - --:..=2' - ----. CIVIL RI]VIStON PE'I'I'I'ION IS DISMISSED. (A t\\ \2.-ln,r