High Court · 2012

Judgment

(Per Hon’ble Sri Justice Ghulam Mohammed) All these writ appeals arise out of the impugned orders passed in W.P.Nos.7961 and 7399, dated 20-02-2011, 9709, 9708 and 9707 of 2006, 6503 of 2007, 7320 of 2006, 6768 and 5938 of 2007, 7323 and 7322 of 2006, 6516 of 2007, 9454 and 9710 of 2006, 6513, 6515, 6514 and 5732 of 2007, 478 and 7321 of 2006, 6517 of 2007, dated 16-07-2010, 10429 of 2006, dated 27-07-2010, 7977 and 8461 of 2006, dated 13-08-2010, 13324 of 2006, dated 27-07-2010, 14147 and 9054 of 2006, dated 16-07-2010, 10721 and 10439 of 2006, dated 27-07-2010, 7468 of 2006, dated 13-08-2010, 8492 of 2006, dated 24-12-2010, 9333 of 2006, 13780 of 2007, 19338 of 2006, 7688 of 2006, and 6581 of 2007, dated 08-11-2010, respectively, wherein the learned Single Judge allowed all the writ petitions by setting aside the impugned order dated 28-03-2006.

Brief facts, which are necessary for disposal of these writ appeals, are stated as follows: The writ petitioners, which are the transport companies all over India having branch office in Visakhapatnam, are allotted industrial plots by the appellants for construction of transport offices and godowns. The allotment letter was followed by an agreement of sale between the writ petitioners and APIIC. Twelve years thereafter, APIIC executed sale deeds which were registered by the 2nd appellant. The writ petitioners allege that APIIC did not provide basic infrastructure facilities like roads, water, electricity, and therefore, the plots could not be utilized for the purpose for construction of godown.

However, the APIIC provided road, electricity, water in 2006 only. The writ petitioners then applied seeking permission for construction of godowns to Industrial Area Local Authority (IALA) i.e., Zonal Manager. By letter dated 20.01.2006 the Corporation approved the building permission, in pursuance of

which, the writ petitioners commenced construction. At that stage, the 2nd appellant issued a show cause notice dated 10.08.2005 calling upon the writ petitioners to show cause as to why the allotment of the plots should not be cancelled, the agreement of sale and sale deed be determined, and the writ petitioners should not be evicted from the premises to make the industrial plot available for industrial utilization by the needy entrepreneurs. The writ petitioners submitted their explanations. The 2nd appellant then passed the impugned order dated 28.03.2006 duly determining the agreements of sale and sale deeds executed in favour of the writ petitioners. Various details of all the petitioners are reflected in the following tabular column. Statement showing the particulars of allotment, agreement of sale, sale deed, and date of cancellation (All the petitioners are allottees of plots in Industrial Estate, Pedagantyada) Date of Allotment Date of Agreement Date of Sale Deed Date of Cancellation

11.12.1987 29.12.1997

08.10.1999 08.02.1999

28.3.2006 23.3.2006 Sl. No Writ Petition No. Plot No. Area in Sq. Mts.

1. 2.

3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

2322.58 2136.16 192 173A and B 1858.06 188 991 164B 2013.60 166 2053.16 161 167/B 991.00 179/A/B 1263.48 845.42 187/A 1026.58 180/B Cost Sq.Mt (Rs.) 60/- 132/- 60/- 120/- 120/- 100/- 78/- 120/- 75/-

25.09.1987 31.03.1997 28.08.1997 11.09.1987 05.09.1996 23.03.1987 10.09.1997 11.01.1990 10.05.1989 11.09.1996 22.03.1989

11.12.1987 26.07.1997 22.06.1988 09.01.1998 22.10.1990 18.08.1990 09.05.1997 20.10.1989

11. 172/B

1184.51 60/-

20.11.1987

16.09.1988

1026.58 4830.96 75/- 60/-

16.07.1988 11.09.1987

16.02.1991 10.12.1987 181/B 189 190B 173A and B 180/B 38

12. 13.

15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22.

2136.16 132/-

1026.58 42.60 179 A/B 1263.48 2053.16 2322.58 991.00 842.42 1858.06 161 192 167/B 187/A 188 75/-

78.76 120/- 60/- 100/- 120/- 60/-

31.03.1997 28.08.1997 22.03.1989 27.03.1998 10.05.1989 10.09.1997 25.09.1987 11.01.1990 11.09.1996 11.09.1987

29.12.1997

08.02.1999

23.3.2006

20.10.1989 08.06.1998 18.08.1990 09.01.1998 11.12.1987 22.10.1990 09.05.1997 11.12.1987

30.04.1999 13.10.1998 28.05.2001 22.12.1998 08.10.1999 31.03.1999 01.05.2000 31.03.1999

15.4.2006 15.4.2006 15.4.2006 15.4.2006 28.3.2006 15.4.2006 15.4.2006 23.3.2006

31.03.1999 23.02.1999 08.02.1999 22.12.1998 31.03.1999 28.05.2001 01.05.2000 30.04.1999 No sale 31.03.1999 25.03.1999

23.3.2006 22.3.2006 15.4.2006 15.4.2006 15.4.2006 15.4.2006 15.4.2006 15.4.2006

24.1.2004

23.3.2006 28.3.2006 N.B:- 1. The show cause notice was issued on 10.8.2005. 2. In writ petitions at Sl.Nos.1 to 13 above, order cancelling the allotment is challenged. 3. In writ petitions at Sl.Nos.14 to 22 above, challenge is to the conditional offer for extension of time. The petitioners in the writ petitions at serial Nos.1 to 13 in the tabular column again filed another set of writ petitions as shown in serial Nos.14 to 22 above. The writ petitioner in W.P.No.5938 of 2007 filed W.P.No.7321 of 2006 challenging the cancellation order. The impugned order was suspended. The 2nd appellant issued a letter dated 26.2.2007 informing that a decision is taken to give one more opportunity to the writ petitioner subject to terms and conditions stipulated therein. One such condition was payment of Rs.16,01,120/- towards 50% of the prevailing market value in lump sum for condoning the delay and also subject to withdrawing the writ petition filed by the petitioner earlier. Challenging the said letter, W.P.No.5938 of 2007 is filed. The conditions in the letter dated 26.2.2007 of the 2nd appellant read as under.

1. You should withdraw the suit/writ petition filed by you challenging the cancellation orders.

2. You should give an undertaking, duly signed before the Notary Public in the prescribed proforma enclosed, agreeing to commence the construction of factory building in the above Plot duly obtaining permissions from the competent authorities including the Commissioner, APIIC-IALA before 31.7.2007 and complete construction of factory building and implement your project and commence commercial production before 31.7.2007.

3. You should pay Rs.16,02,120.00 (50% on the present prevailing land cost for the entire extent of the Plot) by way of crossed demand draft drawn in favour of APIIC Ltd., payable at Visakhapatnam towards fee for condonation of delay in lump sum positively by 31.3.2007.

4. After fulfilment of the above two conditions, orders will be issued for keeping the cancellation orders issued already on 23.3.2006 in abeyance and deter the action for eviction duly granting time for commencement of Building, for completion of building and for going into commercial production.

5. Only after complying with the above conditions and after implementation of the project within the stipulated time, the allotment of above Plot shall be restored in your favour duly revoking the cancellation orders. As noticed supra, the writ petitioners mentioned in Sl.Nos.1 to 13 in tabular column were served such letters and all of them filed writ petitions mentioned at Sl.Nos.14 to 22. The cause of action for this category of writ petitions is the letter issued by the 2nd appellant demanding 50% of prevailing market value of the land. Hence, the writ petitions. The learned Single Judge, after considering the entire material available on record, allowed all the writ petitions by setting aside the impugned order, dated 28- 03-2006. Being aggrieved by the same, all these writ appeals are filed. Heard the learned Advocate General appearing on behalf of the appellants, the learned counsel for the respondents and perused the impugned orders. Before the learned Single Judge, APIIC relied on various decisions reported in Radhakrishna Agarwal v State of Bihar , State of Uttar Pradesh v Bridge & [1] Roof Company (India) Ltd., , Indu Kakkar v Haryana State Industrial [2] Development Corporation Ltd., [4] [3] Nigam Limited , Kerala State Electricity Board v Kurien E. Kalathil , and Teri [5] , Infotech Enterprises Ltd. v Bharat Sanchar Oat Estates (P) Ltd., v U.T., Chandigarh [6] . With regard to the maintainability of the writ petitions, APIIC contended that “past threshold contract dispute” arising out of private contract entered into between public authority and a private citizen is not amenable to judicial review. According to them, the allotment letter/ conditions and covenants in the sale agreement between the parties form part of registered sale deed and therefore, dispute in relation to cancellation of allotment for non-compliance with the conditions of allotment is not justiceable before this Court. The APIIC while relying on all those precedents, further contended that in Infotech Enterprises Ltd’s case (supra), a Division Bench of this Court considered the question of maintainability of writ petition when the allotment of industrial plot was cancelled for non-compliance with the conditions of allotment. In that case, in 1996, APIIC allotted the land admeasuring Acs.1.50 cents comprised in Plot Nos.CFC4 and CFC5 at tentative value of Rs.1,923/- per Sq.yard to Department of Telecommunications for construction of a Telephone exchange and ground based tower at Infocity, Madhapur. The payment was made with some delay. Though foundation stone was laid for construction of BSNL Bhavan, work was not taken up. In the mean while, BSNL came into existence as wholly owned by the Government of India company. After issuing notice, APIIC cancelled the allotment, took delivery of possession and re-allotted two plots to Infotech Enterprises. In their challenge, BSNL was successful before the learned Single Judge who held that cancellation of allotment was illegal. Before the Division Bench, the main question was regarding maintainability of writ petition in relation to dispute arising out of a non- statutory contract. While concluding in the affirmative, the Division Bench held as follows. Admittedly, the contract is not a statutory sanction behind the same, and therefore, neither side can take any benefit nor any advantage or any upper-stray in regard to its enforceability. The Industrial Infrastructure Corporation is a body, which has been constituted for the purpose of development of the industries, the business of which includes including the allotment of the plots to the eligible units, both private and public. Therefore, the question now necessarily has to be seen from the angle and a pedestal of a commoner or a citizen as to whether the same approach could have been made for any such attributions as made. Admittedly, there has been no construction and the time lapse far beyond the period and though the notice has been issued and no progress has been shown. … … The complaint admittedly is one against the cancellation of the plot and for the same being allotted to appellant herein. Necessarily, it is only by measure of damages, which the writ petitioner can as well seek to enforce rather than seeking for specific enforcement in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The principles in regard to the enforceability of the contractual obligations under Article 226 of the Constitution no longer res integra. No doubt each case has to be seen from its own facts and circumstances. It is not a case where any such arbitrary action can be attributed or can be made out on the facts and circumstances and even to warrant any extraordinary knock of this Court. (emphasis supplied) On the other hand, the writ petitioners would urge that once the registered sale deeds are executed and the petitioners acquired absolute marketable title to the property, the APIIC, being in the position of vendor, does not have any power under Sections 11, 54 and 55 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (TP Act). They would also urge that APIIC, being public authority, cannot unilaterally take a decision, which would render a valid registered conveyance deed ineffective. Considering the rival contentions advanced by both the counsel, the learned Single Judge held that the allotment was made to petitioners in 1987 followed by an agreement of sale and ten years thereafter a sale deed was also executed by APIIC conveying right, title and interest absolutely to the allottees. When the contract is concluded and regular sale deed is executed between the vendor and vendee in respect of immovable property, it cannot be said that the dispute arises in the realm of a statutory contract or non-statutory contract. The dispute is not with regard to the contract. It is in effect the question of title, which is sought to be nullified by APIIC unilaterally based on conditions of allotment. Hence, the same is not permissible in law. The learned Single Judge further held that APIIC offered industrial plots and the entrepreneurs gave counter offer, which was accepted by the Corporation. At that stage the conditions of offer, counter offer and acceptance found expression in the allotment letter (acceptance of offer subject to conditions) and in the agreement of sale (contract of sale) in terms of Section 54 of TP Act. This ultimately resulted in the conclusion of contract by way of execution of sale deed by vendor in favour of vendee. Once the contract is concluded, the allotment conditions or covenants of agreement of sale ordinarily cannot be enforced having regard to various provisions of TP Act, Indian Contract Act, 1872, the Registration Act, 1908 and Specific Relief Act, 1963, (these constitute Civil Code of India), which govern the transfer of immovable property from one person to another person. The sale agreement does not survive once the contract is concluded on execution of registered sale deed resulting in alienation, conveyance, assignment and transfer of title. Any contrary view would be opposed to the Civil Code of India. The learned Single Judge further held that Chapter II of TP Act contains two parts. Part A deals with transfer of property whether “movable” or “immovable” and part B deals with transfer of “movable” property. As per Section 5 thereof transfer is defined as conveyance of property from one living person to one or more living persons. Section 6 of TP Act declares that property of any kind may be transferred except the one, which is prohibited. Section 6(h) of TP Act inter alia prohibits transfer, which is opposed to the nature interest effected thereby or for an unlawful object or consideration within the meaning of Section 23 of Contract Act. Sections 8, 10 and 11 of TP Act attach sanctity and solemnity to a transfer of immovable property and read as under. Operation of transfer.—Unless a different intention is expressed or necessarily implied, a transfer of property passes forthwith to the transferee all the interest which the transferor is then capable of passing in the property and in the legal incidents thereof. Such incidents include, where the property is land, the easements annexed thereto, the rents and profits thereof accruing after the transfer, and all things attached to the earth; and, where the property is machinery attached to the earth the movable parts thereof; and, where the property is a house, the easements annexed thereto, the rent thereof accruing after the transfer, and the locks, keys, bars, doors, windows and all other things provided for permanent use therewith; and, where the property is a debt or other actionable claim, the securities therefor (except where they are also for other debts or claims not transferred to the transferee), but not arrears of interest accrued before the transfer; and, where the property is money or other property yielding income, the interest or income thereof accruing after the transfer takes effect. Condition restraining alienation.—Where property is transferred subject to a condition or limitation absolutely restraining the transferee or any person claiming under him from parting with or disposing of his interest in the property, the condition or limitation is void except in the case of a lease where the condition is for the benefit of the lessor or those claiming under him: Provided that property may be transferred to or for the benefit of a woman (not being a Hindu, Muhammadan or Buddhist), so that she shall not have power during her marriage to transfer or charge the same for her beneficial interest therein. Restriction repugnant to interest created.—Where, on a transfer of property, an interest therein is created absolutely in favour of any person, but the terms of the transfer direct that such interest shall be applied or enjoyed by him in a particular manner, he shall be entitled to receive and dispose of such interest as if there were no such direction. Where any such direction has been made in respect of one piece of immovable property for the purpose of securing the beneficial enjoyment of another piece of such property, nothing in this section shall be deemed to affect any right which the transferor may have to enforce such direction or any remedy which he may have in respect of a breach thereof. Thus, when transfer is completed (on execution of sale deed in case of immovable property) any restriction contained in the transfer deed disentitling the transferee from operating or disposing of his interest would be void and even when such a restriction is created, transferee can enjoy the property ignoring the same. In view of Section 4 of TP Act, all the provisions relating to contracts shall apply to TP Act and, therefore, any transfer or conveyance incorporating restraint clauses would be void and the purchaser can ignore such clauses. The learned Single Judge further held that in case of contract of sale of immovable property, Section 55 of TP Act dealing with rights and liabilities of buyer and seller governs and when the buyer discharges obligations and the seller passes/conveys the ownership of property the contract is concluded. The liabilities, obligations and rights if any between the buyer and seller after execution of sale deed would be governed by other provisions of the Contract Act and the Specific Relief Act as referred to infra and the seller cannot unilaterally cancel the conveyance or sale. Further the learned Single Judge, relying upon the decisions reported in State of Kerala v Cochin Chemical Refineries Ltd [7] , Badugu Venkata Durga Rao v Surneni Lakshmi , and K.Gopal Reddy v Secretary, M/s.Vijaya Coop. House [8] Buildings Society [9] , held that as the question in these cases is not in relation to the contract but in relation to the authority, power and jurisdiction of APIIC as vendor to cancel the sale, the principle in the decisions relied on by the learned Standing Counsel have no application. Therefore it is held that all those writ petitions are maintainable. With regard to the fact that Clause 7 of the agreement is unenforceable in view of Section 11 of the Transfer of Property Act, the learned Single Judge observed that the Supreme Court considered the issue as under: All that Section 32 of the Transfer of Property Act provides is that "in order that a condition that an interest shall cease to exist may be valid, it is necessary, that the event to which it relates be one which could legally constitute the condition of the creation of an interest." If the condition is invalid it cannot be set up as a condition precedent for crystallization of the interest created. The condition that the industrial until shall be established within a specified period failing which the interest shall cease, is a valid condition. Clause 7 of the Agreement between the parties, is therefore, valid and is binding on the parties thereto.... ....Here the Agreement was entered into between the Corporation and the allottee as a sequel to the request made by the allottee to give him an industrial plot for the purpose of setting up an industry. Corporation reciprocated to the request on being satisfied that the allottee was able to carry out the obligations so as to accomplish the purpose of allotment. The assurance given by of the allottee that he shall start construction of the building for setting up the industry within a period of six months and complete the construction thereof within two years from the date of issue of allotment letter was verified and found acceptable to the Corporation and then only the Corporation has chosen to enter into the agreement with the allottee. It is a matter of confidence which the Corporation acquired in the promise made by the allottee that the latter would perform such obligations. In these cases, however, clause 7 of sale deed cannot be treated as “condition super added”. For the sake of convenience, we may read clause 7 interpreted in Indu Kakkar and clause 7 of sale deed in these cases. the construction Clause 7 of agreement in Indu Kakkar Th a t th e allottee shall start on the said site construction of the building for setting up the aforesaid Industry within a period of 6 months and complete thereof within two years from the date of issue of the allotment letter, the plans of which shall be in accordance with rules made and with directions given from time to time by the Town and Country Planning and Urban Estates Department i n respect and approved by the Director, Town & Country Planning Department or any other office duly authorized by him in this behalf/ Further the allottee the erection and shall complete installation commence production within a period of 3 years from the date of allotment of plot failing which the plot be liable to be resumed by the corporation. of machinery Clause 7 of the sale deed AND WHEREAS THE PARTY OF THE FIRST PART has agreed to sell and the PARTY OF THE SECOND PART has agreed to purchase the said land free from all encumbrances for a total consideration of Rs.1,39,355-00 (Rupees one lakh thirty nine thousand three hundred fifty five only) towards the cost of the Land and development charges having been paid to the PARTY OF THE FIRST PART by the PARTY OF THE SECOND PART, the receipt where of the PARTY OF THE FIRST PART hereby admits and acknowledges the PARTY OF THE FIRST PART doth hereby sell, grant, convey, transfer and assign unto the PARTY OF THE SECOND PART all that piece and parcel in Industrial Estate/Industrial Development Areas/ Autonagars particularly described in the schedule hereunder and for greater clearness delineated in the plan annexed hereto together with all rights, title, easements and all other rights in any wise appertaining thereto to HOLD the said land unto and to the use of the PARTY OF THE SECOND PART absolutely and for ever. The PARTY OF THE SECOND PART shall use the said land for the aforesaid purpose of putting up a factory or factories duly permitted by the competent Authority and for no other purpose. The PARTY OF THE SECOND PART agree that it shall not put any structure or buildings other than a factory building or buildings. land being plots The learned Single Judge further observed that the Standing Counsel for APIIC has relied upon APIIC Allotment Regulations, 1998. The counsel has also placed before this Court the proforma of agreement, which is adopted subsequent to such Regulations. Clause 10 of the Regulations reads as under.

10. AND WHEREAS THE PARTY OF THE SECOND PART having agreed to hold the land allotted to them on the terms and conditions hereinafter mentioned. a) That the party of the second part shall use the shed and land/land for setting up of a factory for manufacture of GENERAL ENGINEERING WORKS. The party of the second part agree that they shall not put up any structure or building other than factory building or buildings without the prior permission in writing of the party of the first part. b) The party of the second part expressly agree and undertake that the said land/shed shall be utilised exclusively for the purpose set forth in the allotment proposal and that no change shall be made without the written sanction of the party of the first part. c) The party of the second part shall implement the project within two years of being put in possession of the said shed/land/plot as detailed at clause 3 above. d) That as and when the said shed/plot/land is no longer required by the party of the second part for the aforesaid purpose, the party of the second part shall forthwith relinquish and restore the land in favour of the party of the first part provided such surrender of the property by the party of the second part is made before cancellation of the allotment by the party of the first part for breach of any of the covenants of this agreement. In the event of surrender refund of the cost of land/shed/plot paid by him shall be made after making deductions as under. i) EMD will be forfeited. ii) Amounts paid towards process fee, penalties and surcharges shall not be refunded. iii) Dues in respect of water charges will be deducted for the actual consumption as against the minimum rate as per the water agreement. iv) In case power supply was obtained by the party of the second part no dues certificate and a certificate of dismantling the service meter issued by the APSEB should be submitted by the party of the second part. v) The party of the second part shall also clear the property taxes to the local bodies and a certificate to this effect should be furnished. No interest will be paid to the party of the second part in this respect. If there are any buildings on the land other than shed/land the party of the first part, may at its option, either refund the cost as assessed by it after the assessed cost is collected from the incoming party or otherwise direct the party of the second part to remove the buildings at their cost within such time as may be allowed by the party of the first part. (e) to (q) are omitted. There is no denial that the agreement entered into by APIIC and the petitioners in these cases, does not contain any clause in the above terms nor clause 7 in the registered sale deed can be construed as “condition super added”. The phrase in clause 7 of the sale deed reading “ ……..shall use the said plots for the aforesaid purpose of putting up factory or factories duly permitted by the competent Authority and for no other purpose” should be construed as “super added clause”. Therefore, the APIIC has no such power or jurisdiction to cancel the allotment, which has effect of nullifying the sale deed. With regard to arbitrariness and waiver, the learned Single Judge observed that in all these cases, after APIIC issued notices in 2006, the writ petitioners obtained building permission from IALA and commenced construction. This allegation is not traversed in the counter affidavits. When the writ petitioners did not commence the civil construction allegedly as stipulated in the allotment letter and sale agreement, nothing prevented APIIC to cancel the allotment. They did not do so. Indeed they executed sale deed in favour of the petitioners. Therefore, they waived the right if any as a contracting party. Further, APIIC acting as statutory IALA accorded permission for construction of the building. Again APIIC waived their right. Therefore the cancellation is arbitrary and cannot stand to Court’s scrutiny. The learned Single Judge further observed that in Teri Oat Estates’s case (supra), Union Territory of Chandigarh allotted lands on leasehold basis, regulated by the Capital of Punjab (Development and Regulation) Act, 1952; Chandigarh Leasehold of Sites and Buildings Rules, 1973 and Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971. Clause 8-A of allotment letter empowered estate officer to cancel allotment if amount is not paid within stipulated period. Teri Oat Estates constructed six storeyed building but could not market built up space for various reasons. They did not pay balance amount. Possession was resumed under Public Premises Act on 21.12.1995. Allottee's appeal was dismissed by Chief Administrator, Chandigarh. This was confirmed by Punjab and Haryana High Court. In appeal, Supreme Court did not consider question whether such a clause is enforceable or such a clause is unconscionable in case of absolute alienation. What Supreme Court considered was the question whether estate officer could invoke the drastic power of resumption and forfeiture while initiating proceedings under Clause 8-A. It was also a question before Supreme Court whether applying doctrine of proportionality, the action of estate officer can be sustained when allottee paid interest for delayed payment. While disposing of allottee's appeal granting time for payment within stipulated time, it was observed as below. We may, however, hasten to add that we do not intend to lay down a law that the statutory right conferring the right of the respondent should never be resorted to. We have merely laid down the principle giving some illustrations where it may not be used. There cannot be any doubt whatsoever that if the intention of the allottee is dishonest or with an ill motive and if the allottee does not make any payment in terms of the allotment or the statute with a dishonest view or any dishonest motive, then Section 8-A can be taken recourse to. (emphasis supplied) It is further observed by the learned Single Judge that in these cases, after the allotment was made, all the petitioners paid entire sale consideration. APIIC entered into agreements and long thereafter executed registered sale deeds. A decade thereafter, when the allottees applied for building permission, as a statutory authority, accorded such sanction. In this background, the question is whether the harsh action of cancelling allotment is proportionate to the situation. The answer should be in the negative. Applying the doctrine of proportionality as was applied in Teri Oat Estates’s case (supra), in these cases, the writ petitioners should be granted some more time for completion of construction especially when they alleged that till 2006, APIIC did not provide any infrastructural facilities. Except denying the allegation in the counter affidavits, APIIC has not placed any material before the Court to disprove the allegation. The learned Single Judge further observed that when the writ petitions were pending, APIIC on their own came forward and sought to compound the contravention (if any) by a novel method. Presumably, under wrong impression that there is a default on the part of the petitioners, APIIC sought to condone the default by demanding 50% of the market value in lump sum towards costs of the plots. Once the sale deed is registered, seller has no such enforceable right to demand more money. There is no such law as of now in Andhra Pradesh, which enables to do so. Unless a law is made conferring such special powers on APIIC any such adventurous attempts by a Government Corporation, cannot be approved by this Court. Therefore, all such orders which are challenged in some of the writ petitions noticed herein above are liable to be set aside, and accordingly, allowed all the writ petitions. The learned Advocate General, appearing for the appellants, contended that there was an agreement deed of conveyance and thus considering the terms of the agreement and conditions therein, the resumption was upheld. He further contended that the allottee has no right since he has violated the allotment. By virtue of the agreement, the authority is at liberty to resume the land which was found fault with by the learned Single Judge. He strongly relies on Indu Kakkar’s case (supra), by quoting para 20 of the said judgment, wherein the Supreme Court held: “Here the Agreement was entered into between the Corporation and the allottee as a sequel to the request made by the allottee to give him an industrial plot for the purpose of setting up an industry. Corporation reciprocated to the request on being satisfied that the allottee was able to carry out the obligations so as to accomplish the purpose of allotment. The assurance given by of the allottee that he shall start construction of the building for setting up the industry within a period of six months and complete the construction thereof within two years from the date of issue of allotment letter was verified and found acceptable to the Corporation and then only the Corporation has chosen to enter into the agreement with the allottee. It is a matter of confidence which the Corporation acquired in the promise made by the allottee that the latter would perform such obligations. If the allottee evacuates from the scene after inducting someone else into the plot without consent of the Corporation it is not legally permissible for the inductee to compel the Corporation to recognize him as the allottee. The learned counsel for the respondents-writ petitioners contended that the APIIC ought not to have cancelled this allotment letter unilaterally and arbitrarily inasmuch as once the sale deed was executed, the rights and interest are transferred under provision of the Transfer of the Property Act and it will govern and operate under Sections 8, 11, 30 and 52 of the TP Act. He further contended that once the sale deed was executed in favour of the writ petitioners, they have acquired absolute marketable title to the property. On considering the rival contentions raised by the learned counsel for both the parties and perusing the impugned orders under appeals, we are of the considered opinion that once the deeds of sale were executed by the vendor in favour of the vendee, by virtue of which, all the rights and interests on the property, are transferred to the vendees, then the vendees have acquired absolute rights to use the property in question. Further, the decision which is strongly relied on by the APIIC in Indu Kakkar’s case (supra) has no application to the facts of the case on hand. Therefore, the learned Single Judge has considered the entire matter in right perspective and the findings arrived at are perfectly justified, and hence, we do not find any legal infirmity or otherwise in the impugned orders passed by the learned Single Judge. In the result, all the writ appeals fail and are accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. _____________________________ JUSTICE GHULAM MOHAMMED ________________________ Dated:01-02-2012 JUSTICE K.S.APPA RAO [1][1] (1977) 3 SCC 457 : AIR 1977 SC 1496 [2][2] (1996) 6 SCC 22 : AIR 1996 SC 3515 [3][3] (1999) 2 SCC 37 : AIR 1999 SC 296 [4][4] 1999 (6) ALT 600 [5][5] (2000) 6 SCC 293 : AIR 2000 SC 2573 [6][6] (2004) 2 SCC 130 [7][8] AIR 1968 SC 1361 [8][9] 2001 (1) ALT 115 = 2001 (1) ALD 86 [9][10] 2004 (2) ALT 538