The High Court · 2025

Counsel for the Petitioners: Sri J. Suresh Babu Counsel for the Respondents: Sri Madishetty Ramu, Standing Counsel for NHAI The Court made the following: ORDER THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE ABHINAND KUMAR SHAVILI AND THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE VAKITI RAMAKRISTINA REDDY CIVIL REVI ,SION PETITION No.341 of20l9 ORDER: (Per llon'ble Sri Justice Vakiti Ramaktishna Redtly) This Civil Revision Petition is preferred by the petitioners aggrieved by the order dated 05.02.2018 (hereinafter referred to as the .,tmpugned Order") passed by the leamed Principal District Judge, Nalgonda, in I.A. No.l146 of 2016 in O.P.S.R. No.3456 of 2016. By the Impugned Order, the Trial Court dismissed the petitioners' application filed under Section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (in short "the Act"), wherein they had sought condoriation ofdelay oftwenty-seven (27) days in filing a petition under Section 34 of the Act, for setting aside the arbitral award passed under the National Highways Act, 1956.

2. This case raises questions conceming the commencement of limitation under Section 34(3) of the Act, the scope of delivery of signed copy ofthe award under Section 31(5) ofthe Act, and the approach to be adopted by Courts while considering applications for condonation of delay in challenging arbitral awards. iI.r,.', I. BRIEF FACTS

3. The t-actual backdrop to the present revision is as follows: i ) AKS.J & I'RKR, J CRP ]41 20 19 (a) The petitioners' agricultural lands were acquired for widening of National Highway No.65 (earlier No.9) at Suryapet' (b) Pursuant thereto, an award dated 03.06'2010 in Case No.C/l l?5l2}Og was passed, awarding compensation which, according to the petitioners, was grossly inadequate. (c) Being dissatisfied, the petitioners sought reference, whereupon the Arbitrator (respondent No.3 ) passed Award No. G2l6452l2Ol0 dated 27.04.2015, marginally enhancing the compensation. (d) The petitioners contend that despite the award having been passed in April 2015, they were never served a signed copy until

04.05.20 r6. (e) On receipt ol the signed copy, rhe petitioners filed O.P.S.R. No.3456 of 2016 under Section 34 of the Acr, on 30.08.2016, accompanied by I.A. No.l146 of 2016 for condonation of 27 days' delay in filing the petition under Section 34 of the Act. (f1 The Trial Court, however, dismissed the condonation application, holding that since rhe award had been dispatched to the petitioners' advocate in May 2015, limitation commenced ftom that dare. On thar basis and by presurnption of ^^_., court concluded rhat the ,,"r;r,_. ../ e petition was hopelessly time_barred. -:"o"-" or servlce, the Trial ) l 4I;S.J & |'RKR. J (:RP 341 2019 (g) Aggrieved by the impugned order passed by the Trial Courr. the petitioners have approached this Court in the present Revision. II. SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES: o) $qbmissions on hehdf of the petitioners:

4. The lollowing arguments have been advanced on behall of the petltloners: i) The petitioners emphasize that limitation under Section 34(3) of the Act is triggered only upon delivery of a signed copy of the Award to the party himsell, as mandated by Section 3l(5) of the Act. Further, service upon counsel docs not satisfy this statutory requirement. ii) The petitioners asseft that they received the signed copy of the Award only on 04.05.2016. Thus, the petition under Section 34 olthe Act was filed within the perrnissible extended or condonable period. iii) The petitioners contend that the delay of 27 days in presenting the petition under Section 34 of the Act, is minimal, which is explained credibty, and that the Trial Court ought to have condoned the delay in the interest ol substantial j ustice. iv) The learned counsel for the petitioners while praying for allowing the Civit Revision Petition placed reliance on the following binding precedents of the Honourable3upreme Court: l AKS,J & I'R]iR. J cRP 31t 2019 a) State of Maharashtra v. ARK Builders Private Limitedl; b) Benarsi Krishna Committee v Ka rrnyogi Shelters Private Limited2. v) [n such circumstances referred to abole, the leamed counsel appearing on behallof the petitioners submitted that there being merit in their Revision, the same may be allowed and the impugned order passed by the Trial Court rnay be set aside, while restoring the O.P.S.R.No.l456l20l6 to the file of Trial Court by condoning the delay in filing the petition under Section 34 of the Act h) Submissions on behalf of the respondents:

5. The following argurnents have been ad'r'anced before us on behalf of respondents No.l and 2: i) -1'he respondents maintain that the arbitral award had been duly dispatched to the petitioners' advocate on record in May 2015, and by presumption of service, limitation commenced on 12.05.2015 itself. ii) The respondents contend that service upon the advocate is sufficient service, as he represents the party in all legal proceedings and therefore, petitioners cannot plead ignorance of the Award until May,

2016. (201t ) I scc 616 (20 t2)9 SCC 496 I _ .:, .11:S,J & I/RKII. J cR? 341 l0l9 iii) Finally, the respondents point out that the petitioners' explanation for delay lacks bonafides and credibility. It is the specific contention ol the respondents that Courls must entbrce limitation provisions strictly in arbitral matters in order to ensure finality and certainty, and no latitude can be granted under Section 3a(3) of the Act, beyond the statutorily permissible period. iv) In such circumstances referred to above,, the leamed counsel appearing for the respondents prayed that there being no merit in the Revision, the same may be dismissed. III. ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION:

6. Having given our anxious consideration to the rival submissions advanced and the material on record, we find that essentially, the following key issues arise fbr consideration (a) Whether limitation under Section 34(3) ol the Act, commences from the date of dispatch to or receipt by the advocate on record or from the date when the party himself receives a signed copy of the award, as contemplated under Section 3 1(5 ) of the Act? (b) Whether the petitioners established sufficient cause for condonation of 27 days' delay in tiling the petition under Section 34 of the Act? I I I AKS,J & YRKR, J I' ' CRP 311 2OI9 IV. STATUTORY SCHEME

7. In order to appreciate the rival contentions, it is appropriate first to extract relevant provisions of the Act: i) Section 2( I )(h) defines a "pafty" to rnean a party to the arbitration agreement, which is extracted hereunder: "'part.t:" means a party to an arbitration agreement.' ii) Section 3l(5) mandates that after an award is made, a signed copy shall be delivered to each party, which is reproduced below: "(5) After the arbitral award is made, a signed copy shall be delivered to each party. " iii) Section 34(3) provides for the period of limitation within which an application to set aside an arbitral award is to be filed. lt reads "(3) An application for setting aside moy not be made after three months have elapsed from the date on which the party making that application had received lhe arbital award or, d a request had been made under section 33, from the date on which that request had been disposed of by the arbitral tribunal: Provi"ded that if the Court is satisfied thot the applicant was prevented by sfficient cause from moking the application within the said period of three months it may entertain the application within afurtherBeriod of thirgt days, but not thereafter. " I 1 AKS,J & TRKR, J cRP 341 2019 V. JUDICIA L PRECEDENTS:

8. Before examining the rival contentions in detail, it would be useful to refer to certain authoritative pronouncements of the Honourable Supreme Court which directly deal with the issue of commencement of limitation under Section 34(3) ol the Act. These precedents lay down the goveming principles and provide clarity on the statutory requirements under Section 3l(5) and 34(3) ofthe Act.

9. The Honourable Supremc Coun in State of Maharashtra and others v. ARI( Builders Private Limitedr, held that the period ol limitation prescribed under Section 3a(3) of the Act would start running only from the date a signed copy is delivered to the party. The relevant observations read as under: " 13. The highlighted portion oJ'the .ludgment extracted above, leaves no room for doubt thut the period of limitation prescribed under section 34(3) of the Act rl)ould start running only J'rom the date a signed copy of the award is delivered to/received by lhe party making the application for setting it aside under section 31(l) oJ'the Act. The legal position on the issue may be stdted thus. lf the lav'prescribes that a copy of the order/award is to be communicated, delivered, dispatched, forwardecl, rendered or sent to the porties concerned in a particulor way antl in case the law also sets a period of limitation for challenging the order/award in question by the aggrieved party, then the period oJ limitation can only commence from the date on which the order/award was received by the party concerned in the manner prescribed by the law. "

10. Similarly, in Benarsi Krishna Committee's case (supra), the Honourable Supreme Court held as undqg; 3 {2011) 4 SCC 616 I 3 AKS,J & YRKR, J cRP 341 2019 -l'rech.),, " 15. Having taken note of the submissions advanced on behnlf of the respective parties and having particular regurd lo the expression "partr-" as deJined in Section 2(h) oJ rhe 1996 Att read with the provisions ofsections 3l(5) and 31(3) o.f the 1996 Aci we are not inclined to interfere with tha decision of lhe Division Bench of the De lhi High Court impugned in the:;e proceedin.qs. The expression "parD," has been amply dealt with in hryineers's t'ose (supra) and also in ARK Builders Ptt. Ltd.'s Teuo case (supra), re/irred to hereinabove. It is one thing.lbr un Advocatc lo Acl and plt'ad on behalf oJ u party in u proceeding and it is another Jbr an Advocate to /lct us the party himself. The expression party", as defined in Section 2(h) of the 1996 Act, clearly indicates u person who is a party to an arbitration agreement. The said definition is not qualified in any way so as to include the agent of the party to such agreement. Any reference, therefore, made in Sectbn 3 I (5) and Section 34(2) of the 1996 Act cun only mean tha pory himself und not his or her agent, or Adtocate empowered to Act on the busis oJ a Vakalalnama. In such cit'cumstdncas, proper compLiunce with Scction 3l(5) would mean delivt:ry oJ u signed copy of the Arbitral Award on the party himself and nol on his Advocate, which gives the purry concerned the right to proceed under Secti<tn 31(3) o/- the oforesuid Act.

16. The vieu, taken in Pushpa Devi Bhagat's case (supra) is in relation lo the uuthority given lo an Advocate lo Act on hehalf of a party to a proceeding in the proceedings itse$ which cunnot stond satisfied u,here a prot,ision such as Section 3l(5) of the 1996 Act is concerned. The said prorision clearlv indicates that a signed copy d the Award has to be delivered to the party. Accordingly, when a copy of the signed Award is not delivercd to tfu party himself it vt)ould not amount to compliance wilh lhe prorision.s ofSettion 31(5) of the Act. The other decision citad by Mr. Ranjit Kunrur in Nilakantha Sidramappa Ningshetti's case (supra) was rentlered under the protisions of the Arbitration Act, 1940, which did not have a provision similur to the provisions ofSection 3l(5) of the 1996 Act. Tlte said decision would, therefore. not be applicdble ru the fActs ofthis case olso.

17. In lhe instanl case, since a signed copy of the Award had not been delivered to the party itself and the parry- obtained the same on l5th Decemher. 2001, and the Petition under Section 34 of the Act v'as Jiled on 3rd February, 2()05, it has to be held that the said petition was filed within the stipulated period qf three months ds contemplated under Section 34(3) o/ the a.fiire.said Act. Consequently, the ohjection taken on behalf oJ the Petitioner herein cannot be sustained and, in our view, wos rightly rejected by the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court. " IKS,J & TRKR, J cRP 34t 20t9

11. In Union of India v. Tecco Trichy Engineers and Contractors,l the Honourable Supreme Court, while specifically holding that delivery of Award under Section 31(5) of the Act is not a mere formality, observed as under: "The dclivery of un arbitral award under suh-Section (5) of Section 3l is not a matter of mere formality. lt is a malter of substance. lt is only after the stage under Section 3lhas passed that the stage of terminalion of arbital proceedings within the meaning of Sec'tion 32 d the Act arises. The delivery of arbitral oward to the party, to be e.ffective, has to be "received" by the party. '[his dclivcrv hrt the arhitral lribunal and receipl hy the party of the award sets in motion several periods oJ limitati<tn such as an application for correclion and interpretulion of an av'ard u'ithin 30 days under Section 3j(l), an appLication .for making an additional avard under Section 33(4) and an applicatbn for setting aside an oward under Section 34(3) and so on. A.; this <lelit'ery of the copl,oJ atard has lhe ffict of conferring certain rights on the purty cs also bringing to an end thc right to exercise those rights on expiry- of the prescrihed period of limitation which would be calculated from that date, the delivery of the copy ofuward by the tribunal and the receipt thereoJ by each pan)* conslitules an importanl stage in lhe arbitral proceedings. "

12. Recently, in Dakshin Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Limited v. Navigant Technologies Private Limited,-' the Honourable Supreme Court followed the earlier judgments in Tecco Trichy's case (supra) and ARK Builders' case (supra) and held that the period of limitation prescribed for filing objections would commence only from the date when the signed copy of the Award is delivered to the party making the application for setting aside the Award. The relevant observations read as under: "The judgment in I-ecco Trichy Engineers (supra) was followed in State of Maharashtra v. Ark Builders,lJ wherein this Court held o t 12005; 4 Supreme Court Cases 239 12021 ; 7 Supreme Court Cases 657 I l0 -1KS,J&I'RKR.J T cRP 341 2019 thot Section 3l(1) obliges the members of the arbitral lribunal to make the att,ard in writing and sign it. The legal requirement under sub-section (5) ofSecrion 3l is rhe delivery of a copy of the award signed by the members ol the urbitral tribunal ,i arbitrator, and not an)' copy of the award. On a hurmonious cotlstt'uclion of Section 3l(5)read $,ith Section 31(3), the ptriod tl limitation prescrihed .for .liling objections would commencc only from the dqte u'hen the signed copy of the award is delivered to the party making the applicationfor setting aside the award. lf the law prescribes that a copl' of the oward is to be communicaled, delivered, despatched, foru'arded, rendered, or sent to the parties concerned in a particular way, and since the luw sets a period of limitation for challenging the au,ard in question by the uggyiered party, then the period of limitation cun only commence./iom the dale on which the award was received by the concerned parn' in the monner prescribed by law. The judgment in T'ecco Trichy has been recenlly followed in Anilkumar Jinabhai Patel v. Pravinchandra Jinabhai Patel. "

13. ln State of West Bengal v. R.K.B.K. Limited6, the Honourable Supreme C'our1 considered as to when the order is effective so as to challenge the same and held that an uncommunicated order cannot be challenged. The relevant observations read as under: .... the words used in Paragraph l0 are "date of the order". ln the scheme ofthe Conttol Order, the order comes into ellect.from the dute ol receipl by rhe agent or lhe dealer. Once thaf becomes the decision, the commencement of limitation of 30 days for the purpose of Paragraph l0 would be the date when the order is effective. The High Court in Rani Soti Kerosene Supply Company and Others (supra) has opined that if the order oJ cuncellation is not served on the afected person and the AIR 20l5 Supreme Court 3.4 t 1 AKS.J & J CRP ]II 20 19 ''RKR, appeal period expires, there is the possibility that the adverse order would become unassailable. The reasoning is totally fallacious. An appeal can only be preferred vhen the order is effective. The ine/fective order, that is to say, uncommunicated order cannot be chullenged. T herefore. the reasoning given by the court in earlier judgment is erroneous and hence, the reliance thereupon by lhe impugned order is faulty. There has to be a purposive construclion of the u,ords "from the date oforder". To place a conslruclion that the date oJ an order would mean passing oJ the order, though not made elfective would leatl to an absurdity. " VI. ANALYSIS: "Issue (a): Whether limitation under Section 34(3) of the Act, commences from the date of dispatch to or receipt by the advocate on record or from the date when the party himself receives a signed copy of the award, as contemplated under Section 3l(5) of the Act?"

14. The principal question that arises for consideration is whether limitation commences from the date of dispatch or receipt of the Award by the advocate on record or from the date when the party himself receives a signed copy of the Award in terms of Section 31(5) of the Act.

15. The statutory mandate under Section 31(5) ofthe Act leaves no room for ambiguity. The provision specificatly requires that a signed copy of the Award shall be delivered "to each party". The language employed by the legislature is deliberate and unequivocal, underscoring that service on I I I I I I2 IKS,J& rRt;R,J V. CRP 311 20 19 counsel or any other agent is not a substitute for service on the palty himselI

16. 'l'he lJonourable Supreme Court, in ARK Builders's case (supra), authoritatively laid down that the period ol limitation prescribed under Section .14(3) u,ould start running only from the date a signed copy of the award is delivered to the pafty making the application, in compliance with Section I l(5) o1'the Act. The Court reasoned that the scheme of the Act contemplates a tbrmal and authenticated communication of the Award to the part), and onll' upon such communication does the period of Iimitation com lncnce

17. 'fhis principle was reiterated in Benarsi Krishna's case (supra), wherein it was emphasized that proper compliance rvith Section 3 I (5) would mean that a signed copy of the award is delivered to the party concemed himseli and mere dispatch or service on his advocate is not sufficient to trigger Iimitation.

18. Earlier, in Tecco Trichy's case (supra), the Honourable Supreme Court had emphasized that limitation under Section 34(3) of the Act beings to run only upon delivery olsigned copy to the party concemed. The Court observed that since the delivery of the arvard is a matter of substance and I] AKS,J & J cRP 34t 2019 '!RKR. not a mere formality, limitation cannot be reckoned from any date anterior to such delivery.

19. More recently, in Dakshin Haryana's case (supra), the Honourable Supreme Couft reaffirmed that the requirement under Section 3l (5) of the Act is mandatory, and limitation under Section 34 (3) of the Act does not commence unless and until a signed copy of the award is served on the pany. The court further clarified.that mere knowledge ol the award or access to an unsigned copy does not suffice for computing lirnitation.

20. Likewise, in Bipromasz Bipron Trading SA v. Bharat Electronics Limited/, it was held that an order or award, takes effect, only upon its communication.to the party in the manner prescribed by law and limitation for challenge must necessarily be reckoned from such communication. 2t Further, in State of West Bengal v. R.K.B.K. Limited,s it was held that an ineffective order, that is to say, an uncommunicated order cannot be challenged.

22. The legislative scheme, reinforced by authoritative precedents, makes it clear that detivery of the award to the party is not a mere procedural fonnality but a substantive requirement. The trial Court's 7 (20r2) 6 scc 384 I ArR 20l5 sc 14t I I

1.1 AKS.J & L'RKR, J cRP 341 2019 presumption that dispatch of award to counsel on record is sufficient, is nothing but ignoring Section 31(5) and the authoritative interpretation in ARK Builders'case (supra) and Benarsi Krishna's case (supra), so also various other similar judgments ol the Hon'ble Supreme Court. These judgments alfirm that linritation cannot run against a party until a signed copy reaches him personally

23. Further, Bipromasz's CASC (supra) and R.K.B.K.Limited's case (supra) highlight a foundational principle of administrative law that an order has no legal efficacy until communicated to the person affected. By analogy. the arbitral au,ard could not bind the petitioners until communicated to them. Mere dispatch to counsel withoirt proof of receipt by the party is legally insufficient

24. In view of the principle laid down in the above said decisions, it is clear that the limitation starts f-rom the date of receipt of award by the party and award copy signed by the arbitral tribunal shall be served on the party himself.

25. This Court would emphasize that the very object ofSection 31(5) of the Act is to ensure fairness, clarity, and certainty. If courts were to treat service on counsel as equivalent to service on the party, it would dilute this safeguard. leaving litigants a9rfre mercy of presumptions and defeating the I5 lKS,J & I'RKR, J (RP -t 1t 20t9 legislative intent. The right to challenge an award is a substantive right; it cannot be cutailed except strictly in accordance with statute.

26. Applying these settled principles to the present case, it is clear that dispatch of the award to the petitioners' counsel in May, 2015 cannot be treated as commencement of limitation. The statutory requirement was satisfied only on 04.05.2016, when a signed copy was delivered to the petitioners' thernselves. Therefore, the trial Court erred in hotding that limitation had commenced in May, 2015 "Issue (b): Whether the petitioners established sufficient cause for condonation of 27 days delay in filing the petition under Section 34 of the Act?"

27. Having determined that limitation under Section 34 (3) ol the Act commenced only upon delivery of a signed copy of the Award to the petitioners on 04.05.20 I 6, the next question is whether the delay of 27 days in filing the application under Section 34 ofthe Act can be condoned.

28. Section 34 (3) of the Act prescribes a period of three months from the date of receipt of the award, with a futther grace period of thirty days if the applicant demonstrates sufficient cause. The provision is couched in It ,IKS,J & J t:RP 341 20t9 ''RJ.R, f.,i strict tenns and sets and absolute out limit of tlree months and thirty days (90 days + 30 days), beyond which delay cannot be condoned.

79. The Honourble Supreme Court in Union of India v. Popular Constructions Companye held that Section 34 (3) of the Act is a self contained code, and that while delay beyond the period of three months is condonable to the next thirty days, no lurther extension is permissible. The Court explained that the legislative intent was to provide frnality to arbitral award, and therefore, only a narrow window ofcondonation is available.

30. This principle was reaffirmed in Simplex Infrastructure Limited v. Union of India/r', wherein the Honourable Supreme Court declined to condone a delay of l3l days beyond the three months and thirty days limit, reiterating that the outer boundary prescribed under Section 34 (3) of the Act is inflexible.

31. At the same time, the discretion to condone delay within the grace period of thirty days has been recognized as one that must be exercised to advance the course of substantial justice where bonafide explanation is offered. As observed in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bherulalr', the ' (2oo t) E scc 470 ro (2019) 2 scc 455 'r (2020) lo scc 654 1'7 AKS.J & I'RKR, J cRP 34t 20 t9 approach of the Courts ought to balance strict adherence to limitation with the need to prevent miscarriage ofjustice in cases ol short, bonafide delays.

32. In Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v KatUr'-. lt was observed by the I Ionourable Supreme Court that "The expression 'sufficient cause' is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner, which sub-serves the ends of justice. A tiberal approach is to be adopteci in condoning short delays."

33. More recently, the Flonourable Supreme Court in Raheem Shah and another v. Govind Singh and others/3, has reiterated the principle laid down in Katijis case (supra), the relevant observations read as under: "1. This Court in lhe case of Colleclor, Land Acquisition, Anantnog & Anr. Vs. Mst. Kdt|i & Ors. reported in (1987) 2 SCC 107 has held as hereunder. The legisluture has conferred the power to condone delay by enActing Section 5 oJ the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order Io enable the courts to do suhstantial 2 justice to parties by disposing of matters on 'merits'. The expression 'sufficient cause' employed by the legislature is adetluately elastic to enable the courls to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice+hat being the life- purpose for the existence of the institution of courts. It is common lcnowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters insliluted in this Courl. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as il is realized that: l. Ordinarily a litigunt &xs not stand lo benefit by lodging an appeal late

2. Refusing kt condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown oul at the very threshold and cause of juslice being defeated. As ogainst this when delay is condoned the highest that con happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the Parties. ''2 (198?) 2 scc r07 I3 2c2l L uela, /sc)572 I l3 ,1K5.] & I/RXR J cRP 31! 20t9

3. " Every day's dela1, must be explained" doe.s not mean that a pedantic approach shoull he made. l[hy not et'ery hour's tlcluy, every second's delay ? The doctrine musl bc opplied in a rational common sense pragmdtic monner.

4. When substanlial jus!ice and lcchnical consideruliow are pitted against each other, caus( of'suhstLtntiul juttice de.serws to be preferred Jbr the other side canru claim lo hote vasted righl in injuslice being done because ofa non-de li beratt Jelu1.

5. There is no p, esumplion that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of malafides. A litigant does nol stand lo benefit by rcsorting n dclay. lnfAct he runs a serious risk.

6. It musl be grasped that.iudiciorl, is respected not on account of its power to legalize inju.stice on technicul growlds but because it is capable oJ' removing injustice and is expected to do stt. Making a justice-oriented opproach from this perspective, Ihere v'as sqffi.cit,nl cause for condoning the delay in the inslitution of the appeul. '

5. The ahove deci.sion expressing the intention ol justice orienled approach percolating down to all the courls was rendered nearly three decades ago but unfortunalely the case on hand demonstrate\ lhe pervading insensitive approach, which apart Jiom continuing the agow oJ'the litigants concerned hrx also unnecessarily bttrdened the judicial hierarchy which afier going through the entire process will have to set lhe clock back at this distant point in lime and prolong their agon)). If only the courl concerned hod been sensitive to the .iustice oriented opproach rather then the iron- cast technical approach, lhe liligalion betu,een the pdrties probably would have come lo an end much carlier after decision on the merils of their rival contention- "

34. This principle squarely supports the petitioners' contention that the 'frial Court oughl to have condoned the marginal delay of twenty-seven (27) days 3 5. Thus, it is settled law that a lrs ' has to be disposed of on merits rather than denying the applicant to contest the case on technical grounds. In the present case, the petitioners filed their petition under Section 34 of the Act on 30.08.2016 i.e., within..tfuee months and twenty seven (27) days t9 (:RP l4 20 t9 from the date ofreceipt ofsigned copy ofthe award. The delay of27 days, thus, falls squarely within the statutory grace period. The explanation advanced by the petitioners that they could not approach the Court earlier as no signed copy had been served until May,2016 is not only credible but also supported by record.

36. In these circumstances, the refusal order of the Trial Court to condone the delay reflects an unduly rigid approach. Once the delay is minimal, properly explained and within the statutory thirty days margin, the courts are enjoined to adopt a j ustice-oriented approach rather than a hyper-technical one. Denial of condonation in such a case would amount to foreclosing judicial review ol the arbitral award on technical grounds, thereby defeating the very object of the statute. More so, in arbitration cases arising out ol land acquisition, where land ownets already suffer compulsory deprivation of properly, technicalities of limitation shold not operate as instruments ol injustice.

37. Accordingly, this Court is satisfied that the petitioners have estabtished "sufficient cause" within the meaning of Section 34 (3) of the Act, lor condonation of27 days delay and the Trial Court erred in rejecting the application. 20 /IiS,.J & YRKR, J ('RP 341 2019 6; VII. FINDTNGS & CONCLUSION:

38. From the foregoing discussion, this Court arrives at the lollowing conclusions: i) On Issue (a): Limitation under Section 34(3) of the Act commences only upon delivery of a signed copy of the award to the party himself, as mandated under Section 3l(5) olthe Act. Service on counsel or dispatch without proof ol such delivery to the party cannot be treated as commencement ol limitation. In the present case, the petitioners received the signed copy of the award only on

04.05.2016 and therefbre, limitation commenced from that date. ii) On Issue (b): The delay of 27 days in filing the application under Section 34 of the Act has been satisfactorily explained by the petitioners. The delay falls within the statutory grace period of thirty (30) days provided under Section 3a(3) of the Act. (lonsistent with the principles laid down in the cases of Katiji's case (supra), Raheen Shah's case (supra) and other binding precedents, the delay being marginal bonafide and credibly explained, ought to have been condoned by the Trial Court. 39 The Trial Court, in dismissing the condonation application, adopted an unduly rigid and hyper-technical approach.-werlooking the settled law 2t ,4KS.J & I:RI:R, J CRP 311 20 19 declared by the Honourable Supreme Court and the larger principle that adjudication on merits is preferable to non-suiting a party on technical grounds. VITI. CONCLUSION:

40. For the reasons aforesaid, this Court is of the considered view that the impugned order of the Trial Court cannot be sustained and accordingly , I liable to be set aside. The Civil Revision Petition deserwes to be aliowed. IX. RESULT & DIRECTIONS:

41. (u) [n the result, the Civil Revision Petition is allowed (b) The Impugned Order dated 05.02.2018 passed by the leamed Principal District Judge, Nalgonda, in I.A. No. I 146 of 201 6 in O.P.S.R. No.3456 of 2016 is hereby set aside. (c) I.A. No. I 146 of 2O16 stands allowed. The delay of 27 days in filing the petition under Section 34 of the Act is condoned. (d) The application made by the petitioners under Section 34 of the Act vde O.P.S.R. No.3456 of 2016 shall be restored to the file of the leamed Principal District Judge, Nalgonda. The Trial Court is directed to dispose of the said O.P. on its own merits and in accordance with law. Given that the matter pertains to 2016, the Trial Court shall endeavor to conclude the I I I I 2) AK:'.J & YRKR, .,: cRP 311 2019 h!., proceedings as expeditiously as possible' preferably within a period of six (6) months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. (e) 'l'here shall be no order as to costs. SD/- A.H.S.GOWRI SHANKAR ASSISTANT REGISTRAR One Fair Copy to the HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE ABHINAND KUMAR SHAVILI (For His Lordship's kind Perusal) //TRUE COPY// SECTION OFFICER One Fair Copy to the HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE VAKITI RAMAKRISHNA REDDY (For His Lordship's kind Perusal) To, 1 2 ,) 4 q 6 7 o The Principal Diskict Judge at Nalgonda. One CC to Sri J. Suresh Babu, Advocate [OPUC] One CC to Sri Madishetty Ramu, Standing Counsel for NHAI [OPUC] 1 1 LR Copies The Under Secretary, Union of lndia Ministry of Law, Justice and Company Affairs. New Delhi The Secretary, Telangana Advocates Association Library, High Court for the State of Telangana, High Court Buildings at Hyderabad. Two CD Copies Kam/PSL HIGH COURT DATED:0611012025 !1. ,? ORDER CRP.No.341 of 2019 I ( a q ,,!firil fiffi I I I ALLOWING THE CIVIL REVISION PETITION o