The High Court · 2025

Judgment

THE HONOURABLE DT. JUSTICE G.RADHA RANI SECOND APPE AL No.4 34 of2004 JUDGMENT: This Second Appeal is filecl bv the appeliant / respondent No.2 / defendant No'2 aggrieved by the judgnrcnt and dccree dated 2g.01.2004 passed in A'S'No'29 of 2003 (A's.No.r4 of r99i on rhe fire of the leamed Senior civil Judge, Asifabad) by the rearned III Aclcrirional District Judge (Fast Track Court), Asifabad in reversing thc .iudgrnenr a.tr decree dated 04.07. 1997 passed in O.S. l4 of 1994 by the leamed Disrrict N.Iunsif. Sirpur.

2. The respondent No. I is the plaintil). .l.he plaintiff filed a suit fbr possession, ejection of tenant .r dc.r'encianr arii tbr- recovery of possession or the prernises bearing No.2-j_22 ( Nerv ) (Old) situated at Sirpur l -j -53 Kaghaznagar rvith arrears of rent of R:;.1,.100/- and future mesne profits @ Rs.500/- per month from the date of f rlinq thc suit

3' The plaintiff submitted rhar rhe praintifs father by name Mandara Rangaiah and the brother or N{andara I.angaiah by name Mandara Narayana obtained a piece of land to an extent of'5g x 5r square feet in Survey Nos.67 and 120 situated at Kaghaznagar in the Sir-pur notitied ar.ea on lease from the management of the M/s.Sirpur paper rvlills, Kaghaznagar in the name ot. 7 l)r.GRR, J sa .lJ.l 200{ Mandala Narayana. The ptaintilT was a barber by caste and his lather and his f'athcr's brother i.i'erc Iivir.rg jointly since childhood and they intended to open a joint hair cutting saloon in the year 1960 on the said picce ol'land and a tcmporary structurc rvas erected. The Municipality, Kaghaznagal' a lso allotted door No.2-3-53 to thc said shop. An electric service meter bcaring No.3 18 u,as also obtained in the nanrc of Mandala Narayana. ln thc ,vear 1976, Mandala Narayana obtained hank loan of Rs. I000i- from the State Bank of'Hyderabad, Sirpur-Kaghaznagar []ranch to develop the shop and the f'ather ot'the plaintitT stood as guarantor. I)ue to their poor financial condition, thel' could not re-pay the loan till 1980 and therefore they gave a poftion o1' the shop measuring I 8 x l6 square l'eet on rent to the delendant on a monthly rent ol Rs.l 00/- in the lnonth of January, l9ll0. The remaining porlion of the shop rvas in possession and enjoyrnent of Mandala Narayana (paternal uncle ol thc plaintit't). As a sub-tenant. the def'endant (deceased) ran Renuka Wine Shop in that rental premises. In the month of October, I990, under a mutual understanding betrveen the t-ather ol' the plaintilf and Mandala Narayana, the' said shop bearing No.2-3-22 was given to the plaintiff, as the plaintilT had no source of tivelihood fhe Managernent of M/s.Sirpur Paper Mills terminated the tenancy of Mandala Narayana and on 01.11.1990, the plaintiff entered into rental agreement with M/s.Sirpur Paper Mills iu rcspect of the said shop on a monthly rent of Rs.l5l-. -l'he lenancv ol' thc plaintifJ u,as continued with M/s.Si4tur [)aper. Mills, 3 Dr.GRR,.I sa {34 2004 Kaghazragar. The defendanr approached the praintifT on 05.[.1990 and requested the ptaintiffto continue the tenancy and agreed to pay monthly rent of Rs'150/- to the praintifr. The ptaintifragreed to the said oral tenancy under the fbllowing conditions: (a) To hand over the shop bearing No.2-3-22 to the praintiff whenever on demand without any prior notice. (b) That the defendant would not make any pakka constructions. (c) That the defendant would pay monthly renr of Rs.r50/- on rhe 5rh day of eveq, tnOnth (d) The tenancy was monthly for a period of rl months commencing from 5,h day of English calendar month. (e) Municipal raxes would be paid by the def,endant. i'l 'iolated The plaintiff further averred that thc dcf'endant rvas sub-tenant of the plaintiff in respect of the disputed shop. In the nronth of october, 1992, the plaintiff came to know that the defendant the conaitions stated above and started construction and made the wine shop into t\e,o poltions without his knowledge and consent. Therefore, the praintifr den.randed vacant possession of the disputed shop from the defendant for running barber shop therein. Since then' the defendant was neither paying the rent nor handing over the vacant possession of the disputed shop to the plaintiff. The defendant with a malafide intention to deprive the praintiff got transf'erred rhe disputed shop in his name in 4 I)r.GRR. sa {-r{_l(10{ the Office of the Municipal Commissioner, Kaghaznagar. Krrowing l.he said fact, the plaintifl' gave application dated 02.0 1.1993 ro the N4unicipal Cornmissioner. Kauhaznagar not to transfer the disputed shop in the narnc ol- defe ndant. Subscquentll'. the plaintilf came to know that the def-endant gave a legal notice dated 09.0i.1993 to Mis.Sirpur Paper Mills requesting to cancel the rental aqreernent of plaintifl. 'fhe plaintiff also came to knorv that thc def'endant also filed a colhrdcd suit O.S.No.6 ol 1993 agair.rsr the N,lunicipal Commissioner, Kaghaznagar in respect of the disputed shop withotrt nraking the plaintiff as a partv to the said suit and obtained ex-partc decree daled

24.06.1993. The defendant made all effbrts to deprive the plaintill tiorn rhe disputed shop. After obtaining colluded decree, the defendant aqain starled making construction, On knowing the said fact, the management ol VI/s.Sirpur Paper Mills gavc a telegraphic message to the det'endant to stop thc construction. The del-endant violated the terms and conditions ol the [enanc\. and stopped pa!'ment of ntonthlv rent from the month of Octoher.. 1991. -l-herefbre. thc plai.rtili'issued a notice dated 27.09.1993 under Section 106 ol' the I'ransf-er ot' Properry Act (fbr short "TP Act"), 1882 terminatirre rhe sub- tenancy of the del-endant with etl'ect fiom the end of November. 199j. The said notice was retumed un-ser'ed, as the det'endant managed fbr its retuln. undcr the said circumstances. the plaintiff was constrained to issue the sell--sarnc notice dated 09. Il.l9()'l under Section 106 of the l'p Act, lgg2 by regisrered I)r.(iRR, J sa {34 2004 posr with acknowledgrnent due as weil as under certificate of posting and arso tllade an afflxture ofthe notice on the door o[the disputed shop. In accordance u'ith the said notice, the sub-tenancy of the derendant was terminated with ef fect fronr the rnidnight of 05.02.1994. Inspite of servicc of norice, the defendant failed to handover vacant possession o[ the disputed shop, but gave a vague reply dated ,.o2.rgg4 0n un-founded grounds. As such, the plaintiff fired the 4' The defbndant filed written statement contending that he w,as rhe owner and occupier of the suit schedule premises bear-ing Municipal Door No.2-j-22 (old No'2-3-53) situated on the R.p. Road at Sirpur-Kaghaznagar. The said pre,rises consisted of two rooms situated side by side covering an area of l7,x I 7', and the det-endant was running a wine shop in thc narne and styre of Renuka Wines in the suit premises. Originally,, one Mandala Rangaiah (plaintiff_s tbther) and Mandala Narayana, who were brothers, were having a temporary structure with damper sheets over the said ptot of 17, x 17'. lt w.as bearing Municipal No'2-3-53 and that they sold the said superst.rcrure standing over the Govemment Land in Survey No.67/2 to the defendant in the year tgg0 and inducted hirn into possession of the same. Subsequentr-v, the def-endant his suit shop and he was continuousry in peacefur possession of it sir.rce 1980 to titl date without any interference of anybody. In the year 1990, during the revision of property tax, the Municipat Authorities entered the suit 'econstructed \ 6 Dr.(lRR.. sa {J{ 2(l0l (disputed) shop in assessnrent books ar-rd other records in the name of def'endant and had given a Municipal Door No.2-3-22. The defendant was paying the property tar regularlr'. 'fhus, it r,'ould show that the defendant \\,as the o\\'ncr and possessor ol'the suit (disputed) shop and the plaintiff had no right or interest and not entitled to lllc' this suit. 'fhe claim of the plaintifl that the def'endant r.r'as his sub-tenant was totallv f'alse and rnisconceived. He denied that there rvas no landlord and tenancv re'lationship between him and the plaintiff with regard to the suit (disputed) shop nol therc was any alleged oral tenancy. The suit iras not rnaintainable in the present lbrm and liable to be dismissed and prayecl to dismiss thc suit u ith e osts

5. Basing on the said pleadings, the trial court liamed the issues as lbllows (i) Whethcr the plaintiflt' \\,as entitled for recovery of possession of plaint schedule propemv. as pravcd lirr') ( ii) To rvhat reliet)

6. Subsequentll after the death of the defendant, his legal represcntatives were brought on lecord as dct-endants 2 to 6. -[he defendants 3 to 6 being lnlnors were rcprcscnted by their mother defendant No.2. No separate or additional rvritten staterncnt was filcd bv defendants 2 to 6

7. The plaintilf exarrined himself as PW. I and got examined his t-ather Mandala Rangaiah as PW.2. the neighboring shop people as PWs.3 and 4 and 7 Dr.ORR, J sa {3{ 2004 t.e Esrare of flcer or M/s.Sirpur paper Mi,s as pw.5 and got marked Exs.A I to A8 I in suppoft ol his contention. The defendant No.2 was examined as DW. l :rnd a,other independent witness as DW.2. Exs.B l to B l0 were marked on behalf of the defendants. .fhe

8. on considering the oral and docurnentary evidence on record, the triar court dis,rissed the suit observing that the lease agreement bet.ween the ptaintiff and M/s'sirpur Paper Mills was only pertaining to the period from 0l.l L1990 lbr a period of r r ,ronths. As such, the lease expired on i0.09. l99 r and the ptaintitr had no locus standi to fire the suit in the year 1994. trial court turther obser'ed that Sirpur notified area was merged with Municiparity, Kaghaznagar with effect from 20.0r.19g9. As such, the rear owner has to f.ile the s,it under Rent control Act and as per the lease agreement between the plaintifrand N4ls'Sirpur Paper Mills rnarked under Ex.A4, the plaintifl.could not sublet the suit premises and as such, he flouted the conditions or rease and a tt'rong doer was not entitled to seek eviction of def'endants. .r.he trial court lurther held that the plaintiff had not impreaded M/s.Sirpur paper Mi,s Limited as a party. As such, the suit suffered from non-joinder ofproper and necessary party and the praintiffhad no right to evict the defendants as on rhe date orthe suit i'e in the year rgg4, as the praintifF was no more the Iease horder of M/s'Sirpur Paper Mills. The trial court further observed that in its opinion, \ 8 Dr.(i RR. . sa {3{ 20{l{ M/s.Sirpur Paper Nlills onl]- can file a Rent Control Case to evict the tenants and as such disnrissed the suit

9. Aggrieved br lhe said disrnissal, the ptaintiff preferred an appeal. 'Ihe appeal was heard by the leanred III Additional District Judge (Fast Track Courl), Asif-abad ancl r idt .iudgment and dccree dated 28.01 .2004 in A.S.No.29 of 2003 reversed thc flndinss ol the trial court and directed the def-endants ro vacate the suit schedule premiscs r,'.ithin two (02) months frorn the date of its judgment and directed the clef-endants to pay Rs.2,400r- towards anears ol rents and that the futurc nrcsne profits rvould be decided after an enquiry to be held on the application lllcd br the plaintifTunder Rule 20 Rule l2 (l)(ba) of CPC and allowed the appeal rvith cosrs

10. Aggrieved bi the said revcrsal judgment passed by the leamed III Additional l)istrict judge ([:asr l-rack Court), Asifabad, the defendant No.2 preferred this Seconcl ,\ppeal I I . This Court aduritted the Second Appeal on the following substantial question of law.: (l) Whether there is anv pelr ersity in the judgment of the First Appellate Courr in decreeing the suit? J 9 Dr.GRR,.l sa {34 2004 ll. tleard Sri V.Ravi Kiran Rao, lcamed counsel for the appellant def'endant No.2 and Sri Laxmi Manohar, leamed counsel for the respondcnt plaintiff li. Leamed counsel for the appellant contended that the husband ol'the appellant (i.e. the deceased defendant No.l) purchased the suit schedule property i.e. plot measuring l8' x 60' along with temporary structure with darnper sheet bearing Municipal Door No.2-3-53 situated at Sirpur- Kaghaznagar, Asifabad District. The husband of the appellant was enjoying the suit schedule propcrty as owner and was running a wine shop in the natne and styte of Renuka Wines. In the year, 1980, during the revision of property tax, the Kaghaznagar Municipal Authorities entered the suit shop in the assessment book and in other records and assigned Municipal No.2-3-22. Further, the husband of the appellant was regularly paying Municipal Taxes pertaining to the suit property as lawful owner and possessor of the property till he died Subsequerrtly, the appellant and the other legal representatives of the deceased succeeded to the properly and they were in peaceful possession and enjoyment of same. '[he lower appellate court without appreciating the documentary evidence filed by the defendants marked under Exs.Bl to B10 reversed the well considered judgment rendered by the trial couft on legal as well as on lactual aspects. The respondent - plaintiff f'ailed to prove the payment of any lease amount by the def-endant in respect of the suit schedule premises as sub-tenant- 10 Dr.GRR, J sa {34 20(l-l The Appellate Court rclr. inq on oral evidence, presumed the existence of sub- lease and status of'thc deceesed delendant as sub-tenant and ordered eviction of the appellant fronr the sLril schedulc property. The judgment and decree passed by the Appellate C'ourt \\ as patently illegal and perverse to the facts and evidence on recold. Even, as per rhe plaintift, the lease obtained by his father and patemal unclc *as terrrinared by M/s.Sirpur paper Mills on 0l.l1.1990. But a rental agreelnerr clated 05.1 i .1990 was executed in favor of the respondent - plaintifT bi' ivl/s.Sirpur paper Mills under Ex.A4. Ex.A4 rvas considered as not a reliable documenr by the trial court, as it ciid not conrain date and seal. Thc Appellate court merely relying upon the oral evidence of PW.5, treated the respondent plaintifl as tenant of the schedule premises, even though, the respo.dert plaintill' violated the tenns and conditions of the agreement of lease. F.r,en though the tenancy was not extended further, the lower appellate couft treated the lespondent as tenant and further treated the deceased defendant No. I as sub-tenant ol the respondent, without appreciating the oral and docurncntary e'idence in a proper perspective. Thejudgment under appeal was contrary to the evidence on record. As such, the sanre was liable to be set aside. He further contcnded that even prior to the institution of the suit by the respondent herein. thc husband of the appellant fited o.S.No.6 of 1993 against Kaghaznagar Municipalitv and obtained decree of pennanent injunction against the Municipatit' in .espect of the suit schedule premises. Exs.B I to 84 ..< 11 Dr.GRR,.I sa 434 2004 tax leceipts would clearly show that the husband of the appellant herein was rhe owner and possessor ol the suit schedule premises. The Appellate coun ignoring the documenrs filed and the evidence let in, passed the judgment under appeal. The Appellate Court faited to obserue that no documentary evidence was produced by the respondent - plaintiff to show the payment of any rent or any amount torvards lease by defendant No. L Merely relying on the oral cvidence, accepted the plea of sub-lease in favor of defendant No. I and ignored the plea ol ownership of the property claimed by deceased defendant Nol and set aside the u'ell considered judgment rendered by the trial court. The Lower Appellate Court failed to appreciate Exs.B8 and 89 receipts showing the payments made by PW.2, the father of the respondent herein towards purchase of the suit schedule premises and though oral evidence was let in, in respect of the said documents, disbelieved the same. The Lower Appellate court had not weighed the evidence on record of the ptaintiff and the defendant on the same scale. He fi.rrther contended that the L,ower Appellate courl erred in not taking into consideration the effect of Ex.B7, the Government order, which would clcarly show that the area of M/s.Sirpur paper Mills inctuding the suit schedule premises was included in the Municipal area of Kaghaznagar Municipality with effect fi'om 20.01.1989 and the provisions of Ap Rent control Act were applicable and the civil court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit for eviction undcr general lavr,. The Appetlate Court ignored the well considered 72 Dr.GRR, J sa {34 200{ principles of lau that even though the parties submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court and to prosecute the case. it was the court which has to take judicial notice rvith regard to jurisdictional aspecr and shall decide the matter whether the ('ourt has jurisdiction or not and relied upon the judgment of the erstwhile High Court of Andhra Pradesh in D.Satyanarayana Rao v. Vasudev Asrani and anotherr on the aspect that an order passed by a Court having no jurisdiction in relation thereto rvould be a nullity and that even a right order passed by a wlong fbrurn would be a non-corum.judis. Such a question of inherent lack ofjurisdiction could be raised at any stage. t{e also relied upon the judgment of the l{igh Courl of Andhra Pradesh in Mrs.Jaya p.Hamrajani v. Mrs.Rose Elvina D'Souzar, u,herein it was held that the Supreme Courl Judgment in Motor General Traders and another v. State of Andhra Pradesh [AIR 1984 SC l2ll striking do,,vn rhe provisions olsection 32(b) of the Rent Control Act is also applicable to all pending suits or appeals. He further contended that the Lower Appeltate couft also failed to observe that Exs.AI5 to A8 I did not contain rhe nunrber olthe suit premises or the extent of the area leased, but had taken the sarne into consideration, even though the evidence of the respondent - plaintifl'would disclose that he obtained lease from M/s.Sirpur Paper Mills initially lor a period of ll months through Ex.A4 1200r (3) ALD 5 t0 'z 1995 (l) .4,LI) 187 -/ 13 Dr.GRR, J sa 434 20O4 and prayed to set aside the judgment of the Lower Appe,ate coun in A.S.No.29 of 2003 and to restore rhe judgmenr of rhe trial courl in o.s.No. l4 of 1994. 14- Leamed counser ror the respondent on the other hand contended that the Lower Appellate coun rightry alrowe, rhe appeal by considering alr the orar and documenrary evidence adduced by borh the parlies answering a, rhe issues with all fairness and justice. The appelrant fired the present Second Appear only to stall the execution proceedings befbre the court berow to deny the Iegitimate fruits of the decree passed by the Low'er Appelrate court in favor of the respondent - praintitr. The Second Appeat was fired without any valid grounds and substantial questions of law invorved only with a f,raudurent, dishonest and malafide intention to cause wrongful loss to the respondent - praintiff and to obtain wrongful gain to themserves. The respondent - praintiff was a helpless poor person. He was a barber by profession and relied upon the judgment of K'P'Janaki Ram v' K.Suguna Bair in support of his contention, wherein it was held that the Ap Buildings (Lease, Renr and Eviction) contror Act, 1960 (for short "the Act")' Section r0(l ) proviso had to be applied only to a case where the relationship of landlord and tenant existed. where the tenant denied title of landlord and relationship of landrord and tenant not established in the case, the Rent control court had no jurisdicrion. l-he landlord had to approach the civir court for eviction and possession of premises under proviso to Section r0(l) of ' 1995 (2) ALI'61 14 D r.(i Rl{, sa {3.1 2001 the Act. He relied upon the .ludgment of the Hon'ble Apex court in Bachhaj Nahar v. Nilima Mandal and anotherr on the aspect that in the absence ot' pleadings and an opportunitv to the first defendant to den-v- the clain.r. the High Court could not havc converled a suit lor title into a suit fbr enlbrcement ol an easementary right. ......... Even if the High Court f-clt that a case lor easernent rvas made out, at t)est libertl'could have been reserved to the plaintifli to tlle a separate suit for easement. But the High court could not. in a second appeal, while rejecting the plea of the plaintifl's that thev owners of the suit "r,ere property, grant the reliel- of injunction in regard to an easementarl' right b1, assuming that they had an easementary right to use the schedule propefty as a passage. He also relied upon the judgment ol the Hon'ble Apex Court in Karunanidhi v. Seetharama Naidu and others'on the aspect that framing ol substantial questions of larv rvas essential tbr dealing with the issue concerned by the High Court. Such question can be formulated at the time of admission or at any time of final hearing by assigning reasons. But without lraming a substantial question on applicability of provisions of an Act, the lligh Court cannot szro motu appl.r' provisions lbr deciding the appeal It rvas also l.reld in the above judgment that though l{igh Court has power to lormulate the substantial question o1'law, but ri,hcn a question was neither raised belbre the trial court. the First Appellate Cour( or cven before the High Court and rvithout a pteading, '(2008) l7 s( (' 491 '(20t7) ,-s sc'(' :183 Dr.GRR,.l sa {34 2004 ISSUC andfindingrecorded,thelJighCourthadnojurisdictiontosuotllotu examine the question in Second Appeal l5.Leamedcounsellortherespondent.plaintilfreliedupontheabove judgmenttocontendthattheappetlant-det.endanthadnotraisedbeforethe courrs below that the civil Court had no jurisdiction to decide the matter and it wastheRentControlCourt,whichrvasonlyhavingjurisdiction.Hefurther relied upon the judgment ol the Hon'ble Apex Court in Suresh Lataruji Ramteke v. Sau.Sumanbai Pandurang Petkar and Others6 on the aspect that theSecondAppealcannotbecolneathirdtrialonfactsor..onemorediceinthe gamble". When a substantial question of law is formulated by the Court then the same must be madc known to parties and thereafter they have to be given an opportunity to advance arguments thereon'

16. On considering the rival contentions, now the point that arises for determinationiswhethertheappellantcanraisetheaspectoflackofjurisdiction of the trial court without there being any pteading in the said regard or any substantialquestionoflawtiamedbythisCourt.Itispertinenttonotethatthe appetlant raised the above ground in his grounds of appea[ raising the same as one of the substantial questions of law arising for consideration as: o 2023 Law Suit (SC) 939 I 16 Dr.GRR. J sa .13{ 200.1 I I(2). Whether the suit is maintainable under law even it' both the parties subjected themselves to the jurisdiction ol- I)istrict Munsil Court. Sirpul even in the light ol E,x.B7 i.e. Govemment Order u,hen area o1' M/s. Sirpur Paper Mills including the suit schedule area included in the Kaghaznagar Municipalitv with e ff'ect from 20.0l.l989 and attracts the provision ol- Rent Control Act by ousting the jurisdiction of Civil Court in cviction matters?

17. In the.ludgmcnt relied bv the learned counsel lbr the respondent Suresh Lataruji Ramteke v. Sau.Sumanbai Pandurang Petkar and Others (cited supra), the Hon'ble Apex Courr while considering w,hether. the High Court could have proceeded to decide the substantial question ol- larv in the absence of'affording adequate opportunity ofhearing to the parties held that "Whcn a sLrbslantial cluestion ol law is lormulatcd b1, the Court, thcn the sarnc must bc made knorvn to the partics and thcrealter thcl'havc to be eiYen an opportunit,v- to advance argumcnts thereon.'' The Hon'ble Apex Court held that

13. Thc jurisprudencc onSection 100. ('PC is ricl.r and varied. Tilnc and again this (lourt in numerous judgments has laid dorvn. distilled and lurther clarificd thc rcquirenrer)ts that must neccssarill bc met in order tbr a Second Appeal as laid doun thcrcin. to br nraintainable. and thereafter be ad.judrcated upon. Considering the lact that numerous cases are filed hcfore this Court rihich hingc on thc application of this provision. r.r,c llnd it ncccssarr to rciteratc thc principlcs. ll. i. 'fhc requircntcnr. ntost lundamcntal under this scction is thc presencc and fianring u1'a -'substautial question ol larv.'. In othcr utrrtls. thc eristencc oi srrch a question is sinc qua non iirr L7 l)r.CRR,.I sa {J{ 2004 cxercise ol this j urisdiction. IPanch ugopal Barua r, Umesh Chandra Goswami and Others l(1997) 4 SCC 7 l3l.

13.2. 'l'he jurisdiction under this scction has been describcd by this Court in Gurdev Kaur v. Kaki [(2007) I SCC 546 - Trvo Judge Bench)l stating that post 197(r amendment- thc scope olSection 100 CPC stands drastically curtailed and narrowcd down to be restrictive in nztture. 'l'he High Cotrrt's jurisdiction of interfering under Section 100 CPC is only in a case where substantial questions of lau' are involved, also clearly formulated/set out in the memorandurn of appcal. It has bcen observ'ed that: "At the time ol admission ol- the second appr:al, it is thc bounden duty and obligation ol the High Court to formulate substantial questions ol lalv and then only the l{igh Coun is permitted to proceed with the case to decide thosc questions ol law. The language used in the amendcd section specifically incorporatcs thc u'ords as "substantial question of [ar.r'' rvhich is indicati"'e of the legislative intcntion. lt must be clearly understood that thc legislative intcntion was very clear that lcgislature ncver lvantcd second appeal to becoure "third trial on facts" or ''onc more dice in the gamble". 'fhe efl'ect ol the amendment mainly, aocording to the amended section, was: (i) The I{igh Court r.r,ould be .justified in admitting the second appcal onll' when a substantial question ol'lavv is involvedl (ii; The substanrial questiorr of law tt-r precisclr state such question; (iii) A duty has been cast on the High Court ttr formulate substantial question ol lara' belore hearing the appeal: (iv) Another part of the section is that the appeal shall be heard only on that question." Gurdev Kaur (supra) was relerred to and relied upon in Randhir Kaur v. Prithvi Pal Singh & Ors. [(2019) l7 SCC 7l (DB)l

13.3. [nSantosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari [(2001) 3 SCC 179 Three Judge Benchl a Bc'nch of three Judges. held 18 l)r.(lRR, sa {J-l 200{ as under in legartl to whal constitutes a substantial question ol lau : a) Not prcviousl), settled by law of land or a binding preceder,t b) Nlatcrial bearinu on thc decision olcasc; and (c)Nerr point raised for the first time bcfore the High Coun is not J qucstion involvcd in the case unless it goes to thc root ol' thc nratter lherelbre. it will depcnd on lacts ofcach casc. Such prirrciples stand fbllowed in Government of Kerala r'. Joscph [1023 S(]t'Online SC 961 (DB)l and Chandrabhan v. Saras*'ati [2022 SCC Online SC] 1273 (DB)1. l3 4 Non-lbrmulation of substantial question(s) of law renclcrs oroccedinrs "patcntlf illegal". This Court's decision: in I merkhan ,r'. Bimillabi [20i I 9 SCC 684 (DB)] and Shiv Cotcx v.'I'irgun Auto Plast Private Ltd. & Ors. [20] I 9 S('C' 67lt (Ilts)indicatc this position.

15. In Kichha Sugar Co. Ltd. v. Roofrite (P) Limited []009 16 SCC 280 Thrce Judge Benchl. it was observed: '';1. Our attention is drawn by the leamed counsel Ibr thc respondents to the provisions ofSection t00(5)of the Civil Procedure Code uhcrc thc respondent to a sccond appeal is permiftcd "to argue that the case does not iurrrlve such question" i.e. the questions lirr-nrLrlalcd earlier. No cloubt. but thcn the ordcr on the sccond appcal should indicate, howsoevcr bric111. u'h;-' the questions formulated at the carliel stagc had, at the stage of final hearing, bccr lbund to be no questions o1'law." 16, Substantial questions should ordinaril,"-. not be liarned at :r lttcr stilge. If- donc so, thcn parties must bc give n an opponunilr to mect them.-[his Court in U.R. Virupakshappa v. Sarvamangala 12009 (2) SCC 1771, held: "i-; lt. lurthernrore, should not ordinaril) franie a srrbstantial question ol law at a subsequent stagc without assigning any reason there lor and rvithout gii,ing a reasonablc opportunity of hearins to the respondents. [Sec Nune Prasad r'. \unc Ramakrishna [(2008) 8 SCC 25tl: (2008) l0 Scale 523]: Panchugopal Barua v. Umesh C'hrrndra (iossami [(1997) 4 SC'C Tljj (SC(' parirs 8 antl 9). anti Kshitish Chandra Purkait 1,9 Dr.GRR. J sa 434 200.{ v. Santosh Kumar Purkait J(1997) -i SCC 1j8l (SCC paras l0 and t 2)1.

16. The High Court, in this case , however. lormulated a substantial question of lan u.hile dictating the judgment in open court. f]cfore such a substantial question of' lau. could be formulated, the parties should have becn put ro notice. They should have becn given an opportunity to meet the same. Atthough thc Court has the requisite jurisdiction to fbmrulatc a substantial question of law at a subscquent stage which was not formulated at thc time ot' admission of the second appeal but the requirements laid down in the proviso appcnded to Section 100 of the Code of Civil procedure were required to be met.'.

18. 'l'hus, the Hon'ble Apex court held that though the High court has rcquisite jurisdiction to formulate a substantial question of law at a subsequent stage, which was not formulated at the time of admission of the Second Appeal, the partie; should be put to notice and that they must be given an opportunity to rneet the same' The lack ofjurisdiction was also raised by thc trial court in its .iLrdgment and the same was also addressed by the Lower Appeuate court. The appellant has also raised it as one of the grounds in the grounds of appeal .equiring the court to formulate the same as one of the substantial questions oF law. This Court had not framed the said question whire admitting the appeal. However, both the parties addressed their argumenrs on rhe said aspect and placed reliance upon various judgments on this aspect. It u,as a well settred principle of law that the plea of lack of jurisdiction can be enteftained at any stage [Most. Rev. P.M.A. Metroporitan and others v. Moran I\4ar Dr.(iRR..l sa .lJ{ 200.1 Marthoma and another - l1)95 Supplelnentar\, (4) scc 2g6]. rvherein it *as 20 held that an order or decree passed wirhout jurisdiction is nonest in lau,.

19. 'the Hon'ble,\pex court in Shri Saurav Jain & another r,. M/s. A.B.P.Design and another IL.L 202r sc 3541 in civir Appear No.4448 of 202 I also hcld thar an order or decree passed without jurisdiction is noncst in law and that the plea of a bar or lack of jurisdiction can be entertained at any stage. 'l'he lack o1-.iurisdiction of the Court is a pure question of law, which can be examincd at an' stage of the case and it cannot be rvaived si'rply because the def'endant had ^ot i-aised the plea at the initial stage in his pleadi.gs.

20. As rightl,r corrtcnded br, the leamed counsel for the appeilant, e'erl if both the parries aereecl ro submit thenrselves to the jurisdiction of the court b," consent. a dutr iic-s ,po. the c'ourt to take notice on the.lurisdictionar aspcct. The High clourt or- Andhra pradesh in D.Satvanarayana Rao v. vasude' Asrani and another (cited supra), wherein also in a similar matter, where the petitioner filed a ci'il suit fbr recovery of possessior and mesne profits instead of filing betbre the AI'] tluildings llease, rent and eviction) contror .Act, i960 and the sanle was decrced in thvor of the petitioner and in the execution petition filed, the lack of'jLrrisdictionar aspect was raised by the judgment debtor and the Executing court concLrrred r'ith the contention of the judgr,ent debtor by, relying upo, the jud-umenr ol- the llon'ble Apex court in Motor General 2l Dr.GRR. J sa {3{ 2004 Traders and another v. State of Andhra Pradesh [AIR 1984 SC l2l], concumed with it, observing that:

8. In the instant case, admittcdly. the suit uas tilcd bctbre the Courl, which did not have any .iurisdiction. An ordcr passed by a Court having no jurisdiction in relation thcreto would be a nullity. In Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan [AlR 1954 SC 3401, the Apex Court at paragraph 6 of the judgment held; "6. ........,., It is a fundamental principle that a decree passed by a Court without jurisdiction is a nullity, and that its invalidity could be set up whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon even at the stage of execution and even in collateral proceedings. A defect ofjurisdiction, whether it is pecuniary or territorial, or whether it is in respect of the subject-matter of the action, strikes at the verv authority of the Court to pass any decree. and such a defect cannot be cured even by consent of Parties..."

9. Yet again, the Apex Court in Pandurang v. State of Maharashtra [AIR 1987 SC 535], hetd that even a right order passed by a wrong forum would l:e a non-coramiudls. Such a question of inherent lack of jurisdiction can be raised even in collatcral proceedings.

21. As seen from the record, the defendant got marked G-O.Ms.No. l8 issued by the Housing Municipal Administration and Urban Development Department dated 09.01.1989 notifring inclusion of Sirpur notified area into the limits of Kaghaznagar Municipality with effect from 20.01.1989. The objections taken by M/s. Sirpur Paper Mills was rejected and a final notification was issued and the same was published in the extraordinary issue of Andhra Pradesh Cazette dated 20.01.1989. As the Telangana Buitdings (least, rent and eviction) Control Act, 1960 is applicable to all the Municipal Corporations and Municipalities in 22 Dr.GRR, J sa 4J.l 200{ the State of Telangana and the Kaghaznagar Municipal area limits was notified with effect frorn 20.01.1989. the above Act is applicable for evicting the tenants.

22. The definition of landlord under Section 2(vi) of Ap Buildings (Lease. Rent & Eviction) ('ontrol Act. 1960 defines landlord as follows: "Landkrrd nteans rhc ouner ol'a building and includes a person who is rcccivinq ol is entitled to receive the rent of a building w'hethcr orr his ou n account or on behalf of another person or on bchall rrl'hintscll-and others or as an aBent, trustee, executor. administrator. reccircr or guardian or who would so receive the rent or he entitlt-d to rcceive the renl; if the building were lct a tenant. '['hc explanation untler this dcfinition also includes: .A tenant who sub-lers a buildinq shall be deemed to be a landlord within the mcaninu olthis \ct in relation to the sub-tenant.,, Thus, the dellnition o{'the landlord includes a tenant, who sub-rets a building within the rneaning ol'rhe Act. 23- The pecunian jurisdiction of the Rent controller is limited to Rs.3,500/- per month in the areas co'ercd b1, the Municipal Corporations in the State and Rs.2,000/- per month in othcr areas. As the disputed premises is situated within the limits ol Kaghaznaear N,lunicipality and within the pecuniary .jLrrisdiction of the Rent controller. it ivas the Rent Controller who had jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate the pctition filed b1 the plaintifffor eviction ofthe defendant. 24- Learncd counser fi;r the respondent contended that when the tenant denied the title of' the Iandlorci. it was the Civil Court, which had the n4. .,..., 23 Dr.GRR, J sa 434 200,f jurisdiction, but not the Rent Control Court and relied upon the judgment olthe elstwhile High Court of Andhra Pradesh in K.P.Janaki Ram v. K.Suguna Bai (cited supra), wherein the leamed Singte Judge basing upon the facts of the case observed that when the petitioner was denying tenancy and title of landlord to demised premises by virtue of an agreement of sale tn his father's favor executed in 1956 and landlord not able to establish payment of rent at any time by tenant since 1956, even if the petitioner is assumed to be tenant, it was a case of bonafide denial of title of landlord. The Rent Control Court has no j urisdiction. The landlord has to approach the Civil Court for eviction and possession of premises under proviso to Section 10( 1 ) of the Rent Control Act.

25. As such, it is considered ht to extract Section 10(1) of the Rent Control Act along with its proviso. It reads as follows: I (). Eviction of tenants: ( l) A tenant shall not be evicted whether in exeoution of a dccree or otherwise except in accordance with the provisions of this section or sections l2 and 13. Provided that where the tenant denies the title ofthe landlord or claims right of permanent tenancy, the Controller shall dccide whether the denial or claim is bona fide and if he records a finding to that effect, the landlord shall be entitled to sue for eviction of the tenant in a Civil Court and the Court may pass a decree for eviction on any ofthe grounds mentioned in the said sections. notwithstanding that the Court hnds that such denial docs not involve forfeiture of the lease or that the claim is unlounded. /- 24 Dr.GRR, J sa 434 2004

26. Thus, as per rhe proviso ro section l0( r ) of the Rent Control Act. when the tenant was derrying the title of the landlord, the case was initially to be flled before the Rent control courl arrd in the written statement if the tenant was denying the title ol-the landlord, it was the Controller, who should decide whether the said claim was bonaflde or not and after recording a finding to that effect, has to direct the parries ro approach the Civit Court if required.

27. Thus, there must be prinu .facie adjudication with regard to the title of the landlord in terrns of proviso to Section l0( l) of the Rent control Act fbr maintaining a suit belore the civil court fbr eviction. Thus, when the state Rent Control Act provides lbr specific provisions relating to adjudication of disputes between a landlord and a tenant, the civil court has no jurisdiction to entertain and try such suits.

28. But, however, in Rcnt Control proceedings, the title of the property cannot be decided. In the w'ritren sratemL'nt filed by the defendant, he did not accept the title of the piaintifT to the suit schedule property and contended that he purchased the suit schedule propefiv iiom the predecessors of the plaintiff i.e. his father and his paternal uncle. r'he question of title cannot be gone into by the Rent controller and have to ref-er the parties to the civil Court to decide the same. The controller could only, give a finding whether the denial of title is bonafide or not. In the presenr casL,. as rh- itle of the plaintiff is denied by the _/ 25 Dr.ORR..l sa .lJ{ 200{ del'endant. it q,as the Civil Court, which was having the ultirnate jurisdiction to decide the said aspect and whether the ptaintiff is entitled for recovery of possesslon or not.

29. Considering that the original suit was pertaining to the year 1994 and though it was proper for the plaintitT to approach the Rent Controller. considering the dei'cnce takcn by the defendant, wherein he denied the title of the plaintifland as the suit has to be ultimately decided by the Civil Court and as the trial court, as uell as the Lower Appellate Court had decided all the aspects. it is considered not fit to relegate the plaintiff to file a case befbre the Rent Controller atier such a long period of 30 years and which was ultimately to be decided by the Civil Court. This Court considers it as an unnecessary tcchnicality to insist the plaintitito approach the Rent Controller. Substantial Question of law: Whether there is any perversity in the judgment of the First Appellate Court in decreeing the suit?

30. On a perusal of the judgment ol the l.ower Appellate Couft, the Lower Appellate Court considered the pleadings and evidence on record and observed that there was no categorical denial by the defendant in his written statement that the land was taken on lease from NVs. Sirpur Paper Mills Limited by the plaintifls tather and his paternal uncle and that he only stated that he had no knowledge ofthe said fact, but the copy ofthe legal notice issued by defendant No.l to the General Manager ol M/s. Sirpur Paper Mills Limited dated I 26 -&;,. Dr.GRR. sa 4J,l 200{

09.03.1993 marked under Er.z\7 $'ould sho\&' the adrnission of the def'endant of the ownership of NzL's. Sirpur Papcr Mills Limited

31. On considerins the contcnts ol' Ex.A7. the Lower Appellate Court observed that det-endant No. I requested the Company to cancel the rental agreement executed in t'avor ol the plaintilf and requested to execute an agreement in his favor in respect of the said land. The Lower Appellate Couft also observed that the defendant admittcd that thc schedule prernises was given to hirn by the plaintifls l'ather and his patemal urrcle. but denied the natule of transaction as lease and conterrded tlrat it wns a sale, but failed to fi le the registered i un-registered sale dced, through which he purchased the same. It was also rightly observed that the olal evidence of DWs.l and 2 could not be looked into. as accordirrg to t]rcrn. the transaction was covered under an un- registered sale deed and since the docurnent was not produced befbre the Court, held that the defendants tailed 1<.l prove that the father of the plaintiff and his paternal uncle sold thc said pl'opert\ to ,le f'endant No.l. Ihe lower appellate couft also observed that the rclceipts rnarked under Exs.B8 and 89 were not confronted to PW.2, the f'ather ol the plaintitf. The lower appellate court also observed that there \vas l1o ci:oss-examination of PW.2 and his evidence remained un-controvefted. The l-ow,er Appellate Court also observed that the Ilstate Officer of M/s. Sirpur l)aper Mills was exalnined as PW.4 and he stated about the lease deed execute<l b;. M/s. Sirpur paper Mi[s in favor. of the Dr.GRR, J sa ,134 2004 plaintifls father and his patemal uncle Narayana initially and subsequently to the plaintiff in the year 1990 under rental agreement marked under Ex.A4 with the Company and that he identit'ied the signatures on Ex.A4 and that there was no cross-examination of PW.5. As such, the rental agreement marked under Ex.A4, remained un-challenged. The Lower Appellate Court also considered the documents marked under Exs.A8 and ,{9, the certified copy of the ptaint in o.S.No.6 of 1993 and certified copy of the decree in the suit filed by defendant No. I against the Municipality, Kaghaznagar and observed that the decree was not binding on the plaintiff, since he was nor a party to the suit and that the said I decree would not confer any title in favor of defendant No. I . I 32. Thus, considering the oral and documentary evidence adduced by the I plaintiff and defendant on record, the Lower Appellate court rightly came to the conclusion that the plaintiff was tenant of the schedule premises and as a I tenant he sub-let the premises to delendant No.l and defendant No.l violated the terms of the sub-lease and rhat the plaintiff validly terminated the renancy by issuing a notice under Secrion 106 ofthe Transfer ofproperfy Act, lgg2, and is entitled for recovery of possession of the prernises. This court does not find any perversity in the judgment of the Lower Appellate Court in drawing the inferences basing upon the evidence let in and coming to the said conclusions. 2?, Dr.GRR, sa 414 200,1

33. In the result, the Second A1-.pea.l is dismissed confiming the judgrnent and decree dated 28.01.2004 passed in A.S.No.29 of 2001 (A.S.No. l4 of 1997 on the file of the lcarned Senior Civil Judge, Asiflabad) by the learned III Additional District Judge (Fast Track Court), Asifabad. No order as to costs. As a sequel, nriscellaneous applications pending in this appeal, if any shall stand closed //TRUE COPY// Sd/- M. MANJULA EGISTRAR DEPU JSE ION OFFICER To, 1 The lllAdditional District Judge (Fast Track Court)' Adilabad (with records' if any) 1 i

2. The Senior Civil Judge, Asifabad' 3. The District Munsrf, SirPur 4. One CC to Sri V Ravi Kiran Rao, Advocate [OPUCI 5. One CC to Sri K Lakshmi Manohar, Advocate [OPUC] 6. Two CD CoPies Vtughu \lt, 'F HIGH COURT DATED:1010112025 oe 1HE S 4 (' 'J CJ 'J + 21rEB 2m /l-l-.^...- -.: JUDGMENT + DECREE ( 2 DRAFTS ) SA.No.434 ot 2004 DISMISSING THE APPEAL 3tItb( IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA AT HYDERABAD FRIDAY, THE TENTH DAY OF JANUARY TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE PRESENT THE HONOURABLE DR. JUSTICE G.RADHA RANI SECOND APPEAL NO: 434 OF 2004 Between: Smt. G. Aruna, Wo. Late Balraj Goud, Aged 46 yrs, Occ. House wife, R/o Kagaznagar, Adilabad Dist ...Appellant / Respondent No 2 / Defendant No 2 ANO

1. Mandal Srinivas, S/o. Mandal Rangaiah, Aged 32 yrs, Oc,c. Barber, R/o. Sirpur Kagaznagar, Adilabad Dist ...Respondent / Appellant / Plaintiff

2. Mummari G. Renuka 3. G. Sarika 4 G. Sai 5. G. Vamshi (Res.2 to 5 are not necessary parties) ...Respondents / Respondents in Appeal 29/03 Appeal under Section '100 of CPC against the Judgment and Decree dated 28-01-2004 made in A.S.No 29 of 2003 (A.S.No.14 of '1997 on the file of the Senior Civil Judge, Asifabad) on the file of the Court of the lll Additional District Judge (Fast Track Court), Adilabad, preferred against the Judgment and Decree passed in O.S.No.14 of 1994 dated 04-07-'1997 on the file of the Court of the District Munsif, Sirpur. ORDER: This appeal coming on for hearing and upon perusing the grounds of appeal, the Judgment and Decree of the Lower Court and the material papers in the case and upon hearing the arguments of Sri V Ravi Kiran Rao, Advocate for the Appellant and of Sri K Lakshmi Manohar, Advocate for the Respondent No. '1 . This Court doth Order and decree as follows:- '1. That the Second Appeal be and hereby is dismissed confirming the Judgment and Decree dated 28-01-2004 passed in A.S.No.29 of 2OO3 (A.S.No..l4 of 1997 on the file of the Senior Civil Judge, Asifabad) by the lll Additional District Judge (Fast Track Court) Asifabad; and 2. That there shall be no order as to costs in this appeal; //TRUE COPY// Sd/- M, MANJULA EGISTRAR DEPU x U SECTION OFFICER The lll Additional District Judge (Fast Track Court), Aditabad The Senior Civil Judge, Asifabad The District Munsif, Sirpur Two CD Copies To, 1 2 J 4 +1, HIGH COURT DATED:10 10112025 DECREE SA.No.434 ot 2004 DISMISSING THE APPEAL bt lrla<