Perugu Dhurgabavani v. 1. The State of Telangana

Petition under section 151 cPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to vacate the interim order passed on w.P.No 2076/2025 on dated:27.01.2o2s in lhe interest of justice. lA NO: 7 OF 2025 Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to allow the present Petition by considering, applying, and extending the order dated 12.08.2025 passed in SLP (C) No. 4342 of 2025, which arose from the common order dated 28.11 .2024 passed in a batch of nine Writ Appeals (Nos. 1 1 93, 1228, 1257, 1260, 1265, 1266, 1267, 1268, and 1277 of 2024), and by directing the Respondents to forthwith hand over the custody of my adopted baby girl, perugu 7 Bhavya Sree, to me, considering the paramount welfare of n y toddler and in the interest of justice' Counsel for the Petitioner: SRI C.RAKEE SRIDHARAN Counsel for the Respondents 1 to 3: GP FOR WOMEN DEV t CHILD WELFARE Counsel for the Respondent No.4: GP FOR HOME Counsel for the Respondent No.7: Ms.KAVITHA YADAV, S: FOR CENTRAL GOVT Counsel for the Respondents Nos.s & 6: - - - The Court made the following: ORDER , IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA AT HYDERABAD THE HONOURABLE SMT JUSTICE T.MADHAVI DEVI WRIT PETI TION NO. 2076 0F 2025 DATED2L[2.2o.2s Between: Perugu Dhurgabavani And The State Of Telangana, Represented by its Principal Secretary, Department of Women and Child Welfare, Secretariat, Hyderabad and Six Others. .... Petitioner ... Respondents ORDER: In this writ petition, the petitioner is seeking a writ of mandamus to set aside the order datcd 09. I 2 2024 and publication dated 10.12.2 O24 by respondent No.2 as illegal, arbitrary and to declare that it was passed without considering the representations of the pctitioner dated 3I.O5'2024'

07.06.2024, 11.12.2024 and 07.O1.2O25 and to pass such other order or orders in the interest ofjustice.

2. Brief facts leading to the filing of the present wrtt petition are that the petitioner claims to be the adopted mother 2 of the child Perugu Barya Shree. She claims that sf e along with her husband, adopted a child through adoption deed dated

28.06.2022 from the respondents No.5 and 6, '.,ho are thc biological parcnts of the child. It is stated that rhough the petitioner and her husband were married for seve r z I _vears, they drd not havc any children and through a nurse, they came to know that there is a child for adoption and that th: respondents No.S and 6 have four girl children and thereforc he qrr, child was oflered for adoption and therefore, the petit r ner and her husband paid Rs. I ,50,0OO/ - to them arid have tiL .cn the child in adoption and have been taking care of the baby r versince and they have named the child as Perugu Bavya Shree. It is submitted that while the child was growing under he protected environment, the petitioner received a call from t [- : respondcnt No.4 on 28.05.'2024 instructing her and husbani to bring the chitd to the police station and as soon as thei reached the police station, the child was snatched away from .l e ir Lrands on 29 .O5.2O24 u,ithout due process of law and .l r: child ri,as handed over to the custody of the respondent No..i and the child w'as distressed and fainted in the station. it is s,l lted that the petitioner thercafter filed a writ petition i.e., W I . No.l2 1 l 0g ot 2024 before this Court and the same was alloq,er tv a common 3 order dated 23.09.2024 in W.P.Nos.22O2O of 2024 and batch, directing the respondents to handover the children to the adopted parents and also granted liberty to the petitioners therein to adopt the prescribed procedure for continuing the custody of the children with them, if they so desire by having validly executed adoption deeds or by following any other legal procedure which would allow them to retain their custody forever as observed by the Division Bench of Bombay High Court in its judgment dated 22.07 .2024.

3. It is stated that aggrieved by the order of the single judge, the respondent No.2 hled a Writ Appeal No. 1228 of 2024 against the order in W.P.No.21lO8 of 2024, d,aLed 23.09.2024 and the same was disposed of on 28.1 7.2024 in W.A.No_ 1265 of 2024 and batch by observing that the Court was not inclined to disturb the custody of the children on accounI of non_ compliance of Sections 36, 3Z and 38 of 2015 Act and observed that the Committee shall pass an order in terms of Section 37 of the 2015 Act within a period of two weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of the order passed by the Court and since some of the adoptive parents had hled an applications seeking adoption of the children, the competent authority was directed to decide the applications seeking adoption within a period of / 4 four weeks from the date of receipt of copy of ordcl' cassed and further obserwed that the custody of the childr t n shall be subject to outcome of the said directions.

4. It rs stated that without considering the petitioner's application for adoption, which was pendin: u'jl'h the authorities, the respondent No.2 passed the im;rr Lgned order dated 09.12.2021 and the publication dated 10.12.2 )24 holding that all the ch rldrcn mentioned therein are 'lc(l: lly free for adoption'. It is statecl lhat the name of the child [', rugu Ba\-a Shree is also mt:ntioned in the said list and that t I : said name was given to th( child by the petitioner and her h : ;band when she was six days old. It is submitted that during I re pendency of the writ pctjtion, the petitioner's husband ir:1,. died. It is stated that the respondent No.2 had partly comp' ed with the order of the Writ Appcal and rest of the order was lot complied with i.e., with rcgard to the legal adoption of thi child by the petitioner. It is stated that the petitioner's app i:ation dated

31.O5.2O24 and 07.06.2024 ]nave not been conside 'ed nor were they disposcd ol by the respondents and theref<.r:, there is a willful disobedir:nce of the orders of this Court b.'virtue o[ Lhe order dated 09.12.2024 and publication dated 70.I !.2024. r 5

5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the child was six days old when she was taken in adoption from the natural mother of the child and that the petitioner and her husband also reduced the adoption into writing in their own understanding and have been taking care of the child eversince. It is stated that since the child wouid not come within the definition of 'abandoned child' or 'child in need of care and protection' under Sections 2(1) and 2(lal of Juvenile Justice Act, the respondents did not have aly jurisdiction to take au'ay the child from their custody and give the custody of the child to the respondent No.3.

6. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that the Social Investigation Report of the social worker in respect of the petitioner also demonstrates that the child was being taken care of by the petitioner and her husband and she suffered no negligence or abuse in the hands of the adoptive parents and they also suggested handing over the child to the adoptive parents. Therefore, according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the respondents have acted in haste in taking the child from the petitioner's custody and in handing over the child to the custody of the respondent No.3. She further submitted that the petitioner has also registered for adoption under the 6 respondent No.7 but the same was rejected on th( lrollnd that the petitioner has not submitted all the relevant dcc -rmernts and the petitioncr has made a subsequent applicat ic n again on O1.O4.2O25 b1' uploading all the relevant docum,r rrs, but the home study report which was supposed to be uplc aded by the respondent ageltcy has not been uploaded and ,l erefore, the pctitioner's application has not been considr: ed by the respondent No.7. It is statcd that the respondent No.7 is now considering thr: application ot the petitioner as :r lresh application and not as an application which has l sen directed to be considered by thc Hon'bie Division Bench r f this Court and therefore, their action is illegal and a: ltrary. She submitted that there is an emotional bond )et\t'een the pctitioncr and thc child Perugu Bavya Shree and tterelbre, her application for adoption should be considered on.. with regard to the said chilcl and not for any other child. It is :;t rted that the respondents are stating that the peLitioner will hc,re to wait in queue and she may be given any other child bur rot the child who has been brought up by the petitioner. Learnr I counsel for the petitioner further submitted that the responc ( nts have not followed the procedure laid dou.n while taking t re child into thcir custody such as counseling the parents or the children / / /' 7 and have behaved very rudely while taking the child away from the adoptive parents.

7. [carned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance upon the decision of the Honble Supreme Court in SLP (C) No.4342 of 2025, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has considered the claim of the adoptive parents in similar circumstances and submitted the writ petition number of the petitioner was also mentioned therein and the Hontrle Supreme Court has considered the 'General Principles in Section 3 of the Juvenile Justice Act to direct the respondent authorities to handover the custody of the children to the respective adoptive parents. She submitted that as a safeguard and in the best interest of the children, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has directed the Member Secretary of the State kgal Services Authority or Member Secretary of the District Legal Services Committee, within whose jurisdiction the 'adoptive parents' reside to seek reports on the welfare and progress of the child from the respective 'adoptive parents'on a quarterly basis. She further submitted that in many cases of adoption through CARA, many of the children have not been able to adapt to the adopted atmosphere and have been returned to the child care institutions and she has filed a newspaper report with regard to .-- l!i:-,:.- / a the same. She therefore, submitted that tbe custorl ' of the child be given to tlte petitioner herein in accordatr:e u,ith the directions of tht: Hon'ble Apex Court in the above cz se. 8, Learned Government Pleader ltr Women Development and Child Welfare, on the other hanc, reJied upon the directions of the Division Bench in the Writ \ppeal order and also thr: order of the Child Welfare Cort nittee dated

09.12.2024, r,r,hcrein it was observed that after dr r enquiry and based on the investigation report submitted bv 1re Medipally Police Station, the children were declared as 'J : 1all1. free for adoption' under Section 37(h) of the .Juvenile ,.t _rstice Act of 20 15. She submitted that though the petitioner ras rnade an application to CARA i.e., the respondent No.7 for rdoption, she did not fulfill the conditions i.e., did not upload r Ll tht: relevant documents and therefore, the application has t een rejected. Further, she has drawn the attention ol this CoLrr . to para-6 of the writ affidavit filed in W.P.No.21lO8 of 2O2,r wherein the petitioner's husband himself had admitted t., have paid Rs.1,5O,0OO/ to the alleged biological parents oI the baby for the baby ernd that the adoption deed dated 1rr 0g.2022 was enclosed u,ith girl child's birth report and m€rt(.r tiqr report of the biological mothe r. It is stated that Section 61 r t the Juvenile / 9 JusLice Act prohibits any payment to be received for consideration for adoption. She referred to Sections 16 and 17 of Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, to submit that only registered adoption deeds are to be presumed to be correct and since no such document is registered in this case, the adoption cannot be considered as legal. She also placed reliance upon the Social Investigation Report placed at Page Nos.l89 to 199 to submit that the petitioner and her deceased husband were working as coolies and therefore, they were not financially stable to look after the baby child. She also placed reliance upon the report of the Police dated 07. 12.2024, wherein it is stated that the biological parents of the baby child could not be traced out and therefore, she submitted that the contentions of the petitioner that the child was adopted from the biological parents cannot be accepted. She submitted that since the petitioner herein has admitted to having made the payment, the adoption cannot be considered to be legal. She also referred to Sections 8O and 81 of the Juvenile Justice Act which prescribes the punitive measure for adoption without following prescribed procedures and also the punishment prescribed for sale and procurement of children for any purpose. She therefore prayed for dismissal of the writ petition. ,/ 10

9. In reply, the learned counsel for ti e pctitioner submitted that the petitioner has not received a r / reply from the CARA authorities till the datc o[ hling of thr writ petition with regard to her application for adoption an I the second application to CARA is also l-rled along with al the relevant documents but it's only at the instructions of tl), respondent authorities that the house study report has not lrr en uploaded by the agency anri therefore, her application for Ldoption has not been considered. She prayed that thc custodr. :;'the child be given to the adoptive parents / pe titioners herein.

10. Thc learned standing counsel lor tir respondcnt No.7 referred tr> Section 10 of the Adoption Regul, tion of 2022 for adoption procedure for resident Indians an(l :,r bmitted that except by folktu.ing the said proccdure, thc lt lal adoption cannot be made. She referred to Schedule Vl tht, .eof which is the online registration form and .list of d(xll nenls to be uploaded for in-country adoptions and submrt ed that the petitioner has not submitted the relevant cr:uments for adoption. She further submitted that CARI, follows the regulations scrupulously and the applications for he adoptions will be considered in seriatim and therefore, thc retitioner will have to wait in the queue. Y l1

11. Having regard to the rival contentions and the material on record, this Court hnds that the writ petition herein has already referred to by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in SLP (C).No.6322 of 2025 in the case of Dasari Anil Kumar and Another Vs. The Child Vlelfare Project Director and Others, and by invoking the provisions of Article 142 of tl:re Constitution of tndia and the Hon'ble Supreme Court has directed the respondents authorities to hand over the custody of the children to the respective adoptive parents. Following the same, the another writ petitioner in W.P.No. 139 of 2025 in the case of Gudla Jayachandra Reddy and Another, also, the Hon''ble Supreme Court has directed to hand over the custody of the child to the respective adoptive parents. Since this writ petition was also part of the batch and in the very same batch, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has passed the order of handing over the custody of the child to the resPective adoptive parents, this writ petition is also allowed with similar directions. For the purpose of ready reference the relevant paragraph of the Hon'ble Supreme Court is reproduced hereunder: "3. The oppellants a-ssailed the ualiditg of the action of tLrc police authoities in taking otDaA the anstodg of the minor children from them as theg claim to be the "ad"optiue parents' on the prembe thdt it is tuithout authoritg of lanu. The details of the cases as nanated bg the Diuision Bench of the High Court in Wit Appeol _ *-J t2 Nos.1265 of 2O24, 1277 of 2024, 1267 of 2O2a. 266 of 2024 are sdracted as under: "ln W.A. No.1265 of 2024, it is the cas? of the respon<7ents No.l and 2 thot theA are the 't loptiue porents; of one minor girl chiLd, namelg D. Maanu I a, Lulto is aged about three Aears. It is their o(t: ? that responrTents No . 1 and 2 u-tere tnfonned th t u -r1h a common friend that a nine dags old baby girl is e ctilabLe for adoplion. The a.foresaid respondents I erefore odopted the child on 30.03.2024, in accordance t itlt the prouisiorLs of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintentu ce Act, 1956 (hereinafier refened to as, "the 1956 / ct"). In W.A.No.1277 of 2024, the respondent No.l clui ts that she has adopted a tu.to days old babg girl, nrt teLy K. Unla Maheshtuari, from her biological patt 1ts on 15.11.2021, as theA Luere not in a position to ltitt, upthe child. In W.A.No.1267 of 2024, the respondents \ r. 1 and 2 assert Lheg learnt through o common fien,) that a ttuentg days old babg girl, namely S.Rishika, is 1,r t up Jor odoption. Therefore, the said respondents ad< J ted the soid child on 26.01.2024 from her biological pt.t znts. la W.A.No.1266 of 2024, the respondents No.l and 2 claim to be adoptiue parents of a minor child, nameltl f Sresta. It is their case that tley adopted the aforesaid r n dags old babu qirl on 22.O1.2O24 from the biologlcaL p t ents."

4. In fact, there uere petitioners, utlrc Lre soid to be "adoptiue parents" in nine Wit Petitions fu fore. the leorned Single Judge of the High Court, u.tho : )ught a declaration that action of the Commissioner : ' Police, Rachakonda and Station House Officer, Medpc t q Police Station in forcibly and illegally taking the cusk.r t1 of the minor children from tLrc appelLants and hanc;i 11 them ouer to the Child Welfure Project Director and i; eqroted Child Protection Seruices, Sbhuuihar, Hyderaba. I on the basis of the First Infonnation Report No.579 )f 2024 dated 22.O5.2O24 uas illegal, arbitrary and u rttttiue of Articles 14 ond 2O of the Constihttion of India.

5. The learned single Judge bg hi: common order doted 23.09.2024 passed in W.P.Nc .22020, 19623, 21 108, 21980, 21981, 17040.22026.25 129 and Y 7 13 23727 of 2O24 alloued_ tlrc Wit petitions and held that the proui.sions of the Juuenite Justice (Care and protection of Children) Act, 2O15 (for breuity, 'the Act"), did not applg to the fact situation of the cases and further the action of the police outllorities in taking the artodg of the children in question from the appetlants lerein uho claim to be adoptiue parents of the children in question tuas illegal and u.tithout authoitg of laut. The leamed. single Judge of the High Court granted libertg to the appeLlants herein to adopt the procedure prescibed for continuation of the custody of the children u;ith them bg ualidty executing adoption deeds or bg following anA other procedure u.thich toould allou them to retain the custodA of the children foreuer.

6. Being aggieued bg tlrc said common order dated 23.09.2024 pa-ssed by the leorned single Judge, the Child Welfare Project Director, Women, Child-ren, DisobLed. And Senior Citi.zen and Welfare DeparTment, Medchal, Malkajgiri District and Directorate of Women Deuelopment and Child Welfore Department, represented by its Director, YusuJguda Main Road, Madhuranaga4 Yusufguda,.Hyderabad, had preferred the appeals. There uere also interuening application in the Writ Appeals. By the impugned judgment, the Diuision Bench of the High Court for the Stote of Telangana dbposed of the appeals bg setting aside the order of the leamed single Judge and obserued in paragraphs 25 and 26 as under: "25. The children in Elestion are in the custodA uith the Committee since 22.05.2024. Therefore, presentlg in the obtaining factual matrk of the case, ue are not inclined to disturb the a$todA of the children on occount of non- compliance of Sections 36, 37 and 38 of 2015 Act. It is stated before us thot sociol inuestigation has been completed.

26. Houeuer, it is necessary to issue the following directions: (1) The Commtttee shall pass an order in term-s of Section 37 of the 2015 Act u.tithin a peiod of ttuo weeks from the date of receipt of copg of the order possed. tod.ay. (2) Some of the adoptiue parents haue ftled an seeking adoption of the children. The competent authoitg .J L4 is directed to decide the apptication seeking (.( option within a pe.riod of four uLeelts from the date of r<t eipl of copy of order passed todag. (3) Needtess to state that tlae cx.LstodA )f tlle children shatl be subiect to outcome of the al resa.id directions."

7. Hence, these oPPeals

8. We haue heard Leamed senior axLt sel .for the appetLants and learned counsel for the resy ndents and learned ASG at Length- We haue perused the t nterial on reatrd.

9. The details of the "Adoptiue parents" ' nd the chitdrcn ore prouided by learned senior coutrst'l lbr the appeLlants in a tabular form, wlticlt k repntr.t.t cecl as urtder: NAME Of TEE BAAY DAT9 ADOP 'ION OT DATE OF colrFlsc,{ TION D. Maanuika ?,0 ( I 4)24

22.O5.2024 DISTRTCT & STATE OF RESIDENc.E Of PAR?IES Dbtnct, AndhrQ Pradesh State sr. ,lvo stP o. st.P (c) 6322 of 2A) I{AME OCCWATION PARTII.S AND OF P|- Da:;ari Arril kumo. lota,Lpalion AssL\ta t E,Lgineer' .kientr/ic Assrstaal, Bhabha Atomrc Resetrch t"enlrel P BezaLl,oda Sathqa (Ocd)patlon Cusl\ner Assoclale, Stat.! Bank of lndia) 2 st-P lc) 2025 .Soie Pdltio,rcr Kaidala Padma (Occleatti\ Vlllage Nalgondo District, Telangana S-fate K. Umo I I )021 )2 05.:to21 Ilusbetld Lote Kandala Venkat Reddq (Pussed auog on os.o5 2O23, afier PI ShulLa Matesh loctut)atot Senior Cruphrc DesigtLea Medchal- Matkajsin Dislnct, s. Rr.shilra :)t i t )02.1 2 ).05.2021 J s LP (q 126 of 7 15 Tekingana State Ilgderobad, Telangana Stale 202s SLP(C) No.660 soI 2025 BRK Neus) P2- *utla Stuthi (O.t .patton Phaflnacist ir Apollo B Sanlosh Pl (Ocalpation .Asslslant I+oJ".l Manager, CMMCO Limited) P2- Dasan Jagadees@ari Deui (Ocaqation- QualitA Deslgner - I, Electronb Arts Cames India hrt. Ltd.) B.Sresta 22 0 t 2024 22 05 2024

10. Hauing heard learned senior counsel for the appellants and leamed counsel for the respondents, u.te find that ends of justice Luould be serued in the tnstant case bg directing return of the aboue-mentioned children to the "adoptiue parents"- We also saA so bg inuoking our powers under Arlicle 142 of the Constitution in the pealiar facts of the cose.

11. ?hrs is in the interest of the chtldren ou.ting to tle bonding betueen the "adoptiue porents" ond the respectiue children. Thi,s is bg follouing the pinciple of the best interest of the child; principle of familA responsibilitA; pinciple of safetg, positiue measures, pinciple of Institutionalization as a measure of last resort,. principle of repatiation and restoration, uhich are also enunciated a,s generaL pinciples in Section 3 of the Juuenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015.

12. For ease of reference, the oforesaid pinciples are ertracted as under: "3. General principles to be folloued in administration of Act.- The Central Gouemment, the State Gouernments, the Board, the Committee, or other agencies, as the cose mag be, uhile impLementtng the proui.sions of thi-s Act shall be guided bg the follouing fundomentol principles, namely : ) 16 (iu) Principle of best interest: All de :isions regarding the child shall be based on the J -imary consideration that theg are in the best interest <tJ tl z child ancl to help the child to deuelop full potential. (u) I'>rinciple of familg responsibilitg: Thez 1 rimary responsibility of core, nurture ond protection oJ tl ? child shall be- lhat of the biologicaL famitg or adopttue ) foster parents, as the cose maA be- (u) Principle of safetg: All mea.sures shall ,; taken to c-nsure that the child b safe ond is not subjecte L to onA harm, abuse or maltreatment uthile in contad ) ith the care and protection sgstem, and thereafier. (uii) Positiue measures: All resources ar( to be ntobilised including those of familg and comntt r itg, .for promoting the well-being, facititating deuelopn enl of identity ttnd prouiding an inclusiue anrl t tablng enuirortment, to reduce uulnerabilities of chtldren ,nd the need for tnteruention under this Act- (;or) Pinciple of institutionalisation o.s a met lrrst resorT. A child shaLl be placed in institutionol a step of krct resort afier making a reasonable intl (xiiil Principle of repatiation and restorat iu child irt the ytuentle justice sgstem shall haue th: be re united uith his familg at the earliest a t restorcd to the some socio-economic ond q turt that he uas in, before coming under. the puruie ,,t Acl, unless such restoration and repatiation is rr best interest. " sura of )are as iry. : Euery right to Itobe slatus of t his t in his

13. ln the cirdtmstances, u)e drt ct the respondertt authorities to handouer the custctat of lhe children to the respectiue "adoptiue parents" on r. befc;re 11.08.202 5 by O5:OO PM.

14. Houteuer, as a safeguard and in he best interesl (t' the children, ue direct that the V[ember Secretary of the State Legal Seruices Autttoitg a t l/ or the Mernber Secretary of the Distict Legal )erui<:es Committet:, tuithin uhose jurisdiction the ,, ulooliue t7 parents't reside to seek reports on the LoeVare and progress of the child from the respectiue "adoptiue parents" on a qtarterly ba'sis starting from Nouember, 2O25 onwards. The Member Secretary of the State Legal Seruices Authoity and/ or the Member Secretary of the District Legal Seruices Committee uill also be at liberty to depute a Child Welfare Expert to inspect tle home uthere the chtld and the "adoptiue parents" reside. Thls b to ensure the uelfare and progress of the children u-tho houe been returned to the "adoptiue porents".

15. We again clarifg that tue Ltaue passed the aforesaid order in the best interest of the children concented in the in-stant case o-s theg haue been uith their adoptiue parents for a feu.t montl.Ls upto three gears in these cases-

16. A copy of the said report maA also be submitted to the jurisdictional Child Welfare Committee.

17. It is needless to obserue that the a.foresaid order hos been passed not onlA in the best interest of the children concented, but c.bo bg inuoking Article 142 of the Constitution of India so os to do complete justice in the matter.

18. If ris also needless to obserue that this order would not come in the uag of ang other proceeding that hns been initiated bg the respondent(s)-authorities."

12. The Hon'ble Supreme Court relied upon Article 142 o[ the Constitution of India to do complete justice to the case. Article 142 of the Constitution of India reads as under : "142. Enforcement of decrees ond orders of Supreme Court and orders as to discouery, etc.- (1 ) The Supreme Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction maA po'ss such decree or make such order as is necessary for dotng complete justice in anA cause or matter pending before it, and ang decree so possed or J 18 order so made sho'll be enforceable througltc tt the tenitonl of India in such manner as may be prescr )ed bA or und<:r artg latu made bg Parliament and, until 1t tuision in that behnf is so made, in such manner 7s tlLe President may by order3 prescibe- (2) Sub ject to the prouisions of anA lanL ,t ade tn this be half bg Parliomen| the Supreme Court :;t ctll, os respecls tLrc tuhole of the teritory of India, hanx ;.ll arLd euery pouter to make ong order for tlrc pu;1 ose of seatring tlle attendance of ang person, the d;.s<c rcry or production of ong doanments, or the inuesttgc lion or pun[shmerLt of ang contempt of itself. "

13. Considering that the power of the [{or ble Supreme Court under Article 142 is exclusive and extraordir ary, whether an ordcr p:rssod under Article 742 can be cotr;idered as a precedent for srmilar cases, particularly when the -{onble Apex Court has observed that this order would not comt in the way of any other procc.cdings that has been initiated by tI e respondent authorities, the question that would arise for con:;j leration. The Hon'ble Suprerne Court in the case of Suprenr ) Court Bar Association Vs. Union of ladia and Another, re I )rted in 1998 (4) SCC 409, has observed thus: "The plenary pouers of this court under Ar icle 142 of the Constitution are inherent in the courl tnd are complementary to those pouers uhich are sp cif.catly confened on the court bg uaious stafutes thouc,l are not limited by those statutes. These pouers al o exist independent of the statutes uith a uiew to do omplete justice between the parties. These powers ors ) erisls independent of the stotutes uith a uieut to do omplete l9 justice betueen the parties. TLLese pouers are of uery uide amplitude and are in the nature of supplementary pou-)ers- This pouer, ensls as a separate and independent basis of jurisdiction, apart from the statutes. It stonds upon the foundation, and the basis for its exercise mag be put on a different and perhaps euen uider footing, to preuent inlustice in the process of litigation and to do complete justice betu.teen the parties. This plenary jurisdiction is, tLuts, the residual source of potuer uhich this Court mag dra ut upon as necess(try tuleneuer it rb lst and equitable to do so and in partianlar to en-sure the obseruance of the due process of la u-t, to d.o complete justice betuteen the parttes. This plenary juisdiction is, thus, the residual source of poraer tuhich this court maA dra u.t upon as necessary tuheneuer it is just and equitable to do so and in particular to ensure the obseruance of the due process of lau, to do complete justice betueen the porties, uhile administeing justice according to lou-t- There b no doubt thot tt is an indispensable adjunct to oll other potuers and is free from the restraint of jurisdiction and operates as a ualuable u)eapon in the hands of the court to preuent "clogging or obstntction of tlLe stream of justice". It, houteuer, needs to be remembered that the pouers confened on the court by Article 142 being curatiue in nature cannot be construed as pou)ers uhich authorise the court to ignore the substantiue ights of a litigant u.thile dealing uith a cause pending before it- thi"s pouter cannot be used to "supplant" substantiue lata applicable to the case or cause under consid-eration of the court. Article 142, euen uith the u-tidth of its amplitude, cannot be used to build a neu edifice uhere none existed earlier, by ignoring express statutory prouisions dealtng uith a subject and therebg to achieue something indirectlg which connot be achieued directlg.' "No enactment made bg Central or State Legislature can limit or restict the pouer of this Court under Article 142 of the constitution, th.e court must take into consideration th.e stotutory prouisions reqtktting the ) 20 r1 matter in dispute. Whtt tuould be the need of "ct nplete I.rstice" in a cause or motter would depend upon t 1 t facts ancl circumstances of each case and ruhile exercisi g that pouter the courl uould take into consideration tlre t cpress prouisiorts of a substontiue statute. Once this ()t rt has taken seisin of a case, couse or matter, it hos p( 'uer to pass arLA order or issue direction as mog be nece; iaru ro d.o contplete justice in the matter. Thts has bt:n the consislenf uieut of this Court as u.tould appeor li tm the decisions oJ this court tn State of U.P. Vs. Poost' 9" Anr' (1976 (3)SCR lOO5; Ganga Bi.shan & Ors. 7s. Jcti \arain (1986 (1)SCC 75; Naunit R. Kamani & Ors. Vs Jt'i Naruin (1t)88 (4) SCC 387); B.N. Nagarajan & Ors. v'' : tate of Mgsor<' & Ors. (1986 f3i SCR 682): Special Rekr : rce No' 1 of 1964, (supra), ond Harbans Singh us. Stat' of t) P' ( -rr.s.

14. This Court hnds that the Hon'ble Srr )reme Court initialty in rhe case of Dasari Anil Kumar (cite'c supra), has invoked Article i42 of the Constitution of India a I I later in the case of Gudla Jayaehandra Reddy and Another I s. The Child Welfare Project Director and Others, in Sl,P (Ct No. 57581 of 2025 has followed the above decision and I tssed orders invoking Article 142 of the Constitution of India lherefore, by implrcation, the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Co'-: t in the case of Dasari Anil Kumar (cited suprol, is applicabk .o the similar r:ases of balch only.

15. Therefore, this Court, following the j : lgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, directs the respondenl authorities to release the infants in these cases also to the conr: rned adoptive 1 ZL parcnts hcrein within a period of one (l) week from the date of receipt of a copy of this order subject to the same conditions as imposed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. However, except for these cases which were considered and disposed as a batch of cases by the Single Judge as well as the Division Bench of this Court and the Hon'ble Supreme Court in its decision has also referred to the batch of these writ petitions and has directed the release of children in the respective appeals, these decisions shall not be considered as precedents for any other case.

16. With these directions, the writ petition is allowed There shall be no order as to costs.

17. Miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in this writ petition, shall stand closed. t //TRUE COPY// AS OMINA MEHAR T REGIS ION OFFICER To, 'l . The Principal Secretary, Department of Women and Child Welfare Secretariat, Hyderabad.

2. The Chairperson, Child Welfare Committee, Alwal Medchal Malkajgiri District Telangana State - 500010.

3. The Director, Directorate of Women Development and Child Welfare Department, Yosufguda Main Road Madhura Nagar Yosufguda Hyderabad - 500045 \

4. The Station House Officer, Medipally Police Station, Medipally, M.M Dist - 501301 .

5. Central Adoption Resource Agency, Ramakrishna Puram, New Delhi PIN - 1 '10054

6. One CC to SRI C. RAKEE SRIDHARAN, Advocate [OPUC] 7. One CC to SRI KAVITHA YADAV, SC FOR CENTRAL GOW [OPUC] 8. Two CCs to GP FOR WOMEN DEV & CHILD WELFARE , High Court for the State of Telangana at Hyderabad . [OUTJ

9. Two CCs to GP FOR HOME, High Court for the State of Telangana at Hyderabad . [OUT]

10.Two CD Copies HIGH COURT C(: TODAY DATED:2311212025 1;; it-,{;, ( L -f, till ') 24 \i( *\:.{).ts._:i:._. -,o :.:4, ORDER WP.No.2076 of 2025 ALLOWING THE WRIT PETITION WITHOUT COSTS