Ie High Court · 2025

Counsel for the Appellant: Sri A.Ramakrishna Reddy Amicus Curiae for the Appellant : Sri. S. Madhu Sudhan Reddy, Advocate Counsel for the Respondents:-'- The Gourt made the following: JUDGMENT THE HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR JUKANTI JUDGMENT: Aggrieved by order, dated 12.03.2012, tn W.C.No.10 of 2OLl passed by the Comrnissioner for Workmen's Compensation and Deputy Commissioner of Labour at Nizamabad, the present Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is filed by Insurance Company (appellant)

2. On L4.O2.2O25, there \ryas no reprcscnration on bchalf of appellant. On 05.03.2025, none erppcared for the appellant, matter \[ras posted under thc caption "for dismissal". Inspite of being posted under the caption "for dismissal", there is no representation on bchalf of appeliant on 27.O3.2O25, O2.O4.2O25 ancl 02.O5.2025.

3. This Court on 27.06.2025 passed thc follor,ving order: "lnspite of matter being postcd uncler the n() caption "for dismissal", there is representation on behalf of appellant. CMA is of the year 2014 and WC is of the year 2O11. This Court is not inclined to dismiss the matter f<rr non-prosecution. This Court deems it appropriate to appoint Mr. S. Madhu Sudhan Recldy \ ;\ .lAK..l ('.L|.tl.No l6J )(tl1 2 (Phone.No.9949l32l82l (a young budding lawyer) as amicus curiae on behalf of appellant to assist the Court and make submissions. Registry is directed to furnish a copy of entire set of documents to Mr. S. Madhu Sudhzrn Reddy (Phone. No .9949 L32L821."

4. Today, when the matter was called, Mr. A. Rama Krishna Redd-v, learned counsel, informed this Court that appellant-Neu, India Asstrancc Company Limited has informed about ttre CMA to him and requested him to appcar in thc rnatter and make submissions.

5. Mr. S. Madhu Sudhan Reddy, $oung budding lawyer) was appointed as amicus, is present.

5. This Courrt rcquestcd Mr. A. Rama Krishna Reddv', learned ooLrnscl for appcllant to rnake his submissions first and thcn Nlr'. S. Madhu Sudhan Reddy, leamed amicus shall present his submissions. 7 . Mr. A. Rama Krishna Reddy, learned counsel appearing on behalf of appellant, submitted that there is no ernployc:r-cmplol'ee relationship between ttre deceased and oppositc part-1'' No.I -clwner of the vehicle (Kashi .tAK..t (.M.A.No.l6t 2011 3 Kishore Kumar). It is further submitted that death of the deceased is not covered. under the insurance policy. It is also submitted that the Commissioner erred in law in concluding that the deceased, after finishing the work, 'rvhile going to his house, met with an accident and that the theory of notional extension is applicable in the present case. That the applicants did not submit any documents with regard to employment nor the wages. It is pointed out that the individual died due to injuries sustained when his two wheeler got punctured and hit a stone far away from r,r,orkplace while going home. t]. l,earned amtcus submitted that the theory of notional r-'xtension cannot be extended in the present case, as the accidcnt occurred f'ar away from work place, tvkrile the dcceascd was going to his residence. It is further submitted that thc accident did not occur in the employer's premises and the appellant-lnsurance cornpany is not liable to pay the compensation. It is also submitted that insurance policy does not cover the deceased. It is lastly pointed out JAK. J (:.t'l.A.No.l61 _2011 4 that there was no employer-employee relationship between the deceased and opposite party No.1 (owner).

9. There is no representation on behalf of respondents.

10. Heard learned counscl(s) and perused the record.

11. On 19.05.2011at 8:00 a.m., the deceased attended agricultural work in the land of opposite part5, No.l. After work, while returning homc, he met with an accident at Malthumeda Sivar. Thc tyre of the motor cycle got punctured, he cr-luld not c:ontrol the said motor cycle, dashed a big stor-rc. suffered grievous injuries. He was shifted to Government t [ospital, Yellareddy, from there to Gandhi Hospital, Secunderabad. On 06.O6.2O11, he died while undergoing trcatmcnt

12. Crime No.35 of 20 I 1 under Section 304-A of IPC was registered in Nagir-cclcll'pr:t policc station. Deceased was a driver of tract<.rr bcaring No.AP-20-U-4386. The said tractor was registered in the namc of opposite party No.1. Copy of the driving licensc of the cleccased was marked. Tractor was insured rvith opltositc party No.2 uide policy .tAK..t C.M.A.No.l61 20lt 5 No.61060531 10010000694 vatid from 06.0L.20LL to

05.0L.2O12. At the time of accident, insurance policy was in operation

13. RWt (opposite party No.l) in his evidence deposed that deceased was working as a driver on his tractor and on the date of accident, deceased was working with opposite party No.l. Though insurance company denied the employment of deceased, the commissioner considering the evidence of RWI and pleadings in the written statement <lf RWl, held that deceased was an employce u'irh opposite party No.1. Ex.Al2 is salary certificate reflecting that the d.eceased was being paid an amount of Rs.7,OOO l- per month. Relying on the judgment of Hon'ble Apex court in the case of scurcshtra sclt Manufacturing compang a. Bo;i valu RaJa and othersl, the Commissioner extended the benefit of notional extension in thc facts and circumstances of the Case.

14. Attention 9f this Court is invited to the Hon'|le Apex Court's judgment in the case of Regional Director, ^E.S.L ' lq:g SCC Onlirre SC li I \ ,IAK,.I (.lel.,1.No.l6J 2011 6 Corporation and Another a. Francis De Costa and Anotherz. The Commissioner has not taken note of this Judgment of the Honble Apex Court (consisting of 3 judges). The Apex Court dealt with Section 2(81 of Employment lnsurance Corporation Act on ttre aspect of employment injuries. Judgment rendered in Saurashtra's co.ste (1 supra) is of the samc strength.

15. Learned counsel invited the attention of this Court to paragraph No.18 of the Hon'ble Apex Court's Sudgment in Frrr;ncis De Costcr's ccse (2 supra) and contended that as the deceased died far a\vav from his work place, the principle laid down in the judgmcnt <>[ Fro,ncis De Costc's ccse (2 supra) is applicable to thc prcsent case and the appellant/insurancc companr is not liable to pay the compensation to the applicants

16. Both the judgments (Sarrrtzshtra's case (1 supra) and Francis De Costa's cqse (2 supra)) are of similar strength, but on different facts and on different. Acts. In the case of Frq.ncis De Costa's cq.se (2 supra), the deceased, a '1leo616scc I ,f 7 \ JAK, J C.M.A.No.l64. .2014 workmen, suffered a cardiac failure, in such fact situation, Section 2{Bl of Bmployment State trnsurance Act was considered. The Hon'ble Apex Court, while dealing with definition of employment injury, considered phrase "arising out of employment" and. went on to hold that the legislature gave a restrictive meaning to "employment injury". The Honbte Apex Court held that injury must be to such an extent that as can be attributed to an accident or an occupational disease arising out of emplo5fment. Apex Court hetd that, "Out of', in the said context, must mean caused during the course of employment. In tlre context of Section 2(Bl, the ',r'ords "out of indicate that the injury must be caused bl, an accident which had:its origin in the employment. A mere roaci accident, while an employee is on his wa_v to his placc of employment, cannot be said to have its origin in thc course of his employment. Relying on this judgment, learned counsel contended that in the present casc, the employee left his work place and as per the judgment in Francis De Costc's case' (2 supra), appellant is not liable to pay the compensation. 8 JAK, J (:.M.A.No.l6J 20lt 6

17. In Francis fu Costa's (Supra), the employee met with an accident when he was on his way to the place of employment, at a distance of 1 km, from the place of work. The Apex Court held as follows Therefore, the employee, in order to "5. succeed in this case, will have to prove that the: injury he had suffered arose out of and was in the: course of his employment. Both the conditions will have to be fulfrlled before hc could claim an1' benefit under the Act. It does not appcar that thc: injury suffered by the employee in the instant case arose in any way out of his emplo,rrment. The: injury was sustained rvhile thc cmplovce was ort his way to the factory rvhcre he 'uvas cmployed. The accident took place one kilornetre aw'ay frorrt the place of employment. Unless it can bc saicl that his emplo5rment begzrn as soon as hc set oul- for the factory from his home, it cannot be sarcl that the injury was caused by an accident- his employment". A roacl "arising out of accident may happen anywhere at ernv time. But such accident cannot be said to havc arisen out of emplo5rment, unless it can bc shown that the employee was doing something incidental to hir; emplo5rment. 6. In our judgment, by usiug thc rvords "arising out of ... his employment", the legislatttrc gavc ;l restrictive meaning to "emplo-l'mcnt in.iurl'". '[h<: injury must be of such an cst(-'rrt its cil"n bt-' attributed to an accidcnt or alll occulxrLional disease arising out of his cmplo-\irncnt. "Out of'. in this context, must meal) cetusecl b-rz employment. Of course, thc phrasc "out clf' ha:; an exclusive meaning also. [f a man is describcrl to be out of his employment, it means hc i:; without a job. The other meaning of the phrasr: "out of" is "influenced, inspired, or caused by: ottt of pity; out of respect for him" (Wcbster':s Comprehensive Dictionary lntcri-Iational Edition - 1984). In the contcxt of Section 2(8), the words "out of' indicate that the injury musl had its origin in be caused by an accident the emplo5rment. A merc roacl'accident, whilc atr "vhich ; if) 9 ,IAK.,I ('.n4.A.No.l6J 2Ol1 employee is on his way to his place of cannot be said to have its origin in- "mptoyment hiJemployment in the factory. The phrase "out of the employment" was construed in the case of South Maiflana Railways Pty. Ltd. v. James [67 CLR 4961 where construing the phrase "out of the employment", Sta-rk€, J., held "the words but of require that the injury had its origin in the employment". 7. Unless an employee can cstablish that the injury was caused or hacl its origin in thg empl,oyment, he cannot succeed in a claim based on Section 2(8) of the Act- The words "accident "' arising out of ... his employment" indicate that any a-cident which occurred while going to the- place of employment or for the purpose of employment, cannot be said to have arisen out of his- employment. There is no causal connection between the accident and the employment. 8. The other words of limitation in sub-section (8) of Section 2 are "in the course of his employment". 'lhe dictionary meaning of "in the of' is "during (in the course of time, as "orr.". time goes by), while doing" (The Concise Oxford Dictionary, New Sevcnth tidition). 'lhe dictionary meaning indicatcs that thc accidcnt must take place within or during the pcricld of employment' if tfre employce's work-sttift bcgins at 4.30 P'ffi', any accident before that time will not be "in the of his emplol'mcnt". 'l'hc journey to the "ort". factory may havc bcctr utlclcrt:rken for working at the factory at 4.30 p.m. Rr-rt. this journey was- certainly not in the coLlrsc of employment' If 'employment' beings from the moment the .mploye. sets out from his house for the factory, theh 6ven if the employce stumbles and falls down at the cloorstcp of his house, the accident will have to be trcated as to have taken place in the course of his employment- This interpretation leads to absurdity and has to be avoided'' (Emphasis supplicd)

18. The Hon'ble APex Court in (1 supra), while dcaling 'uvith ttre principle of theory of Sg;urq,shtra's ca.se notional extension o[ limit' hcld ars follows: 10 ,IAK.,! (:.M.A.No. 161 2()11 f' "7. As a rule, the employment of a workman does not commence until he has reached the place of employment and does not continue when he has left the place of employment, the journey to and from the place of employment being excluded. It is nou, well- settled, however, that this is subject to thc theory of notional extension of the employer's premises so as to include an area which thc workman passes and repasses in going to an,C in leaving the actual place of work. There may be some reasonable extension in both time and place and a workman may be regarded as in the course of his employment even though he had not reached or had left his employer's premises. The facts and circumstances of each case will have to be examined very carefully ire order to deterrnine whether the accident arose out of and in the course of the employmcnt ol ,a workman, keeping in vier,v at all times this theory of notional extension." "8. A workman is not in the coursc of tris employment from the moment he lcaves l-ris home and is on his way to his u.ork. [.[:: certainly is in the course of his employment if he reaches the place of work or a point or arr area which comes within the theory of notior-ral extension, outside of which the emplo-yer is not liable to pay compensation for any accident happening to him. In the present casc, cven if it be assumed that the theory of notional extension extends upto point D, the theor,, cannot be extended beyond it. 'lhc momcnt :l workman left point B in a boat or lcft point i\ but had not yet reached point B, he could not be said to be in the course of his emplo-yment and any accident happening to him on thc journey between these two points could not lt<: said to have arisen out of and in the coursc of ,lAK..t (:.M.A.No.161 2014 t1 his employment. Both the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation and the High Court were in error in supposing that the deceased workmen in this case were still in the course of their employment when they were crossing the creek between points A and U. Thc accident which took place when thc b<lat was almost at point A resulting in thc dcath of so many workmen was unfortunate, but for that accident the appellant cannot be made liable."

19. Applying the principle laid out by the Apex Court in both the judgments to the present facts of the case, it can be inferred that accident which occurred when the deceased reached Malthunreda Sivar while going home after his work cannot be said to be during the course of employment. The deceased r,r'as neithcr driving the vehicle i.e., tractor nor was carrying on any agricultural work with the tractor. If the deceased rv\/as driving the tractor on instructions of the employer and had the accident occured, the accident can be said to have occurred in the course of employment. Then ttrc insurance comp€rny can be made liable to pay thc compctrsation. Th:,. deceased herein Was travelling on his motor cycle after completing his work and the accid.ent occurrcd at a far of place. It is not known whether the deceased l\ras travelling straight .t.1K.l ( ,'1/,l.rV, l6t 2(,1I t2 from the work place to residence. In the facts and circumstances of the case, this court is not inclined to opine with the order of the commissioner and the lnsurance company succeeds in the appeal. Each case has to be dealt with on the basis of its facts.

20. This court queried learned standing counscl for appellant-lnsurance company, as to whether the amount of compensation awarded has been deposited, if deposited, whether it is still lying in tl:e account of the commissioner. on instructions, it is stated that the compensa.tion amount of Rs.6,55,7gBl- deposited was witl-rdrau,n bt. re spondents / applicants.

21. Learned standing counsel further srrLrmittcd that under the provisions of Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, the Insurance company is entitled to recover the amount from the owner of the vehicle as per the principle of pay and recover. It is further submitted that ir is settled principle that in such cases, the Insurance compar-rf is permitted to pay and recover the compenszrtion amount from the ovvncr of the vehicle. The Insurancc compan,r is /l .IAK, J ('.M.A.No.l64 2011 l3 at liberty to proceed in accordance with law. Needless to state that the Insur€rnce Company sha[[ not initiate any steps to recover the compensation amount from the respondents/ applicants

22. For the reasons aforesaid, the Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is allowed. No order as to costs. Miscellaneous applications pending, if any, shall stand closed. //TRUE COPYII SD'. K. SHYLESHI JOINT REGISTRAR 6 SECTION OFFICER t \ To,

1. The Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation and Deputy Commissioner of Labour at Nizamabad.(with records, if any)

2. One CC to SRI A.RAMAKRISHNA REDDY Advocate TOPUCI 3. One CC to SRI S.MADHUSUDHAN REDDY, Advocate amicus IOPUCI 4. Two CD Copies G NVB/sa Jt I HIGH COURT DATED il110712025 JUDGMENT CMA.No.164 of 2014 (,1 i'. i a' : -r ;; .: ... :j ri i[l 3 [rC ifrfr ", ,i .-) I i-t * ALLOWING THE CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS APPEAL