The High Court · 2025

Judgment

2. a 4 Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of lndia praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed therewith, the High Court may be pleased to pass an Order, Direction or Writ and more particularly one in nature of Writ of Certiorari calling for the records relating to the order daled 22-09-2023 passed in l.A.No.1412021 in M.P.No.6l2O19 on the file of the Additional lndustrial Tribunal - cum - Additional Labour Court, Hyderabad, the respondent No-2 herein, directing the petitioner herein to deposit a sum of Rs.49'00'000/- to the credit of the said case within four months from the date of order, to quash and set aside the same as illegal, arbitrary, high handed, against the provisions of law and procedure, without following due procodure and against principles of natural justice, in the interest of justice 7 IA NO: 1 0F 2024 Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition, the High Court may be pleased to pass an order suspending the order dated 22-09-2023 passed in l.A.No.14l2O21 in M.P.No.6/2019 on the file of the Additional lndustrial Tribunal - cum- Additional Labour Court, Hyderabad, the respondent No.2, pending disposal of writ petition, in the rnterest of justice lA NO: 2 OF 2024 Between: D.B.R. Mills, Karmika Sangh, Redg No Secretary Y. Krishna , S/o. Narsimha, Colony Kavadiguda. Hyderabad 5000020. B M-1123, Represented by its H.No.'1-3-176/4/1b, Padmashali AND .....PETITIONEFURESPONDENT No.3 M/s. Kshitij lnfraventures Private Limited, represented by its Managing director Sri Girish Mallpani S/o. Sri Rajkumar Malpani, aged about 48 years Occ. business, office at Plot No.136, IVILA Colony Road No.12, Banjara Hills, Hyderabad. ...WRIT PETITIONERYRESPONDENT department, Secretariat, Hyderabad.

2. The State of Telangana, represented by Principal Secretary Labour 3. Additional lndustrial Tribunal cum - Additional Labour Court, represented by 4. M/s. D.B.R. IMills, represented by its Chairman and tVanaging Director 1-2- its Registrar Chandravihar, Hyderabad. 630, Elchiguda, Lower Tank Bund, Hyderabad.. ....RESPONDENTS Petition under Section 1 51 CPC praying that'in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to

vacate the interim order granted on 29-02-2024 in W.P.No.195812024 by dismisslng the writ petition, in the interest of justice Counsel for the Petitioner: SRl. SHYAM S AGRAWAL Counsel for the Respondent Nos. 1: GP FOR LABOUR Counsel for the Respondent No.3: SRI CH. OMERNATHAN Counsel for the Respondent No'4: SRI A.K.JAYA PRAKASH RAO The Court made the following: ORDER J ) HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE NAGESH BHEEMAPAKA WRIT PETITION No. 1 958 0F 2024 o RDER: Heard Sri Shyam S Agrarval' learned coLlnsel for petitioner, Iearned Government Pleadcr for ['abor.:r'on behalf o1' the 1't respondent, Sri A'K' Jayaprakash Rao' lt:arned counsel on behalf of the 4th respondcnt and Sri Ch' flmcrnathan' learnecl counsel for the 3'd respondent' This Writ Petition challenges the v'-i'lidiI and 2. propriety of the order d,aLed, 22-09-2O23 in i A N"o' 14 of 2O2 1 in M.P.No. 6 of 2019 on the frle of the Additional lndustrial HyC,erabzrd (2"'i Tribunal-cumAdditional Labour Courl' responclent). By the said order, petitioner deposit Rs.49,Oo,OoO/- to the credir of M P No 5 ol 2019 ri''ithin a period of four months from the d;rte of the saicl ortier' r,rras ciirected to M.P.No.6 of 2019 q'as filei-i b]' thc ll"L rcspotldcnt' 3. M/s DBR Mills Karniika Sangh, in F-ornr K 3 under Section 33C(5) of the Industrial DisPutes AcL, 1947 (for short ' 'ihc Act')' with a praye r LC compute t hc amount a tlcgecll,v clue to the u,orkers and direct petitioner to pay the saule to thc 3'd respondent rvith accrued interest Peti'rioner cotrtcnds thar an 2 agrecment r,lated O7 O3-2O17 was entered into under Section l2(3) of ihc Act before the Conciliation Officer/Joint Comrnissioner of Labour, Hyderabad, wherein they agreed to pa!' a toral Lrrnoult of Rs.7,00,0O0/ in two instalments as full and llnal seitlcmenr of all arrears, back wages, compensation, and other cjttes. Subsequently, the 3'd respondent filed I.A.No.14 of 2O2 L under Scction 11 of the Act seeking a direction tcr pctitioner [o deposit a sum of Rs.49,O0,00O/- in compliancc v.'ith thc Memorandum of SettlemenL dated O7-O3 2017. Pi:tilioncr filed a counter to the said Application, rlisputing i,hc c'lairn made by the 3'd respondent. Peti[i,rner statcs that agreement dated 07 -O3-2O17 u'as follou'cci bi a memorandum of compromise and a compior.nise decrt'c in O.S.No.69 of 2003 (earlier O.S.No.1201 of i995) on t"hc llLt: ol the XII Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Corrrt, H}r6lspairercl. Undcr the compromise, the 4tl' respondent rvas Lo obtzrin tit Ie over Acs.16.O0 of land, which was to be dcvelopcd b-). pctiticner as per a development agreement. Petitioncr contcn,is thzrt it had the right to settie the workers' cliiirrs on behiut of thc 4rh respondent pursuant to the cornprornise. Llo.,r'cvcr, the 4th respondent,. who was a tenant in -' j ) DBR Mills property, opposed the compromisc and initiartecl litigation by filing C.C.C.A.No.329 of 2OO3 before the High Court and later before the Hon'ble Supremc Court' This led to two rounds of litigation and eventual dismissal of SLP'No 5 163 51b':+ of 2022 uid.e ord'et dated B O4-2O22' resulting in the compromise decree being set aside and the 4'i' responclel'it being treated as a tenant at sufferance. It is the case of petitioner that ali parlics, inciucling workmen, were iully aware at the time ol cnlerirlg into the agreement dated 07-O3-2017 that petitioner $as nor r' lpiovcr of the said workmen and that the provisions ol the Acl arc not applicable to them. The said settlement itsell trarrilteci the nature of relationship, specifically referetrcing thc di:velopment agreement clated 15-03- 1999, based otr u'hich de'r'clo1:rnent rights were granted by the 4tl' respondcnt to p'til'ioner' Subsequently. thc 4rh respondent repudiated Ihi ( utnI)lolrlisc' It is also stated, the 3'd respondent llled () S No-2911 of 2016 against petitioner for cancellation cl regislered documents executed by the original owners of Lhe propcrtf in favour of petitioner. Despite attempts by pctirioncr t'-i givc eft'cct to the compromise decree, ir-rcluding legal cballenges, Appcal 4 $'as drsmissed ;alrd the subsequent Special Leave Petition aiso met rvit.h disn'iissal, thereby frustrating thc compromise. It is the contention of petitioner thaL the 2nd responderrt Tribnnal was fully aware of the developments, including frustrat ion of the compromise duc to the conduct of thc 4Lh responrlent and the pendency of litigation by the u'orkers ol the ,4fi r6:sponrjent regarcling wages which had originated in 20 13 arLd c:ontinued cven after the agreement dated C7-O3-2O17 . Tht: said M.P.No. 1 of 20 13 was errentually dismisscd b,v t he Trtbunal by order dated l3-O7 -2021 . Pctiticner asserts that development agreement between petitioncr and thc 4th rcspondent stood nullihed due to the irustration o[ Lhe compromise decree, which formed foundation of 12[3) agrecnrent dated O7 03 2017. Consequcntly, petitioner hzr s become a third party with no employer-employee rciationship ancl rvi tl-r no legal authority or authorisation from the 4ti' respon(lcnt t-o settle any claims on its behalf. Therefore, imposing a le.qal iiabiiitl'on pctitioncr is impermissible under la rr, . i'ctiii, ,ncr further contended that upon being approachcd by rvorkmen of the 4th respondent for 7', .) ) implementation of the agreement, the Assistant Commissl()11( r of Labour III, Hyderabad, was instructed to file zr crimin:ri compiaint, and accordingly, they filed Crl'M P No 1 722 ol 2O23 before the XII Additional Metropolitan Magistr:rle' I ll cler:rbnd' the present pit'cecclinqs' seeking relief similar to It is admitted that there is no employer-empio--vce rt:lariotrsirip betu,eenpetitioneranclworkmenofthe4&responclctlt'henr:c, petitioner states that the order impugnecl is u'itl-tout jltrisciir:rion ancl thcrelore, is liab1e to be set aside' It is stated, the Joint Commissirlnet ni L;rbottt ' Hyderabad addressed letter clated 25-07-20 13 to thtr Government Pleader seeking clarification u'ith rospect tc) agreement dated O7-O3-2017 ' Tine said letter narratcs thc entire factual chronology and concludes that thcre rvcrc sc\1('l-ii1 objections raised by M/s DBR Mills Limiteci' u'()rktnel) '-1rl'l petitioner. It was observed therein that since pctitioncr is:r lhird party, the terms and conditions of the agreement 'rilntlot enforced. Desplte no opinion being reccivecl lronl I'lre Government Pleader, the Joint Commissioner itlslructecl thc Assistant Commissloner to lrle a criminal compIa,Lt-rt, r'r,l-il r.I'i remains pending. Furthermore, the 4tr' respondcrtt adclressed 6 letlcr datccl 01+-12-2017 to the Joint Commissioner of Labour, I ll.derabacl clc:'rr-ly stating thaL petitioner had no right to negotiatc or ser:tlc the dues on behalf of the 4th respondcnt. It rs also submitted by petitioner that as per Section 12 cf the Act, r';hen an industrial dispute exists, lhe Conciliation Oliicer is to conduct proceedings and submit a report within 14 clays and a settlement, if any is to be lorwarded to the appropriate (ior.ernment. Only upon satisfaction can the (iovernmerrt refer the matter to a Tribunal. [n the instant case, there is r-io record of compliance with [hese procedural requirements- It is also contended thal there is also reference to an order of slertus quo dated 16-06-2008 in W.A.M.P.No.814 of 2008 in Writ Appeal No. 391 ol 2008, whcrc the Union of Employecs r,,,as lrrraved as lhe 7rt, respondent. It is lurther argued that a crin'rinal complaint u,as filed by the Assistant Labour Comrnrssioner on the same set of facls as [he present drspute anci para liel prosecution in two Courts on th e same mal[er is not legall.v'-permissible. Petitioner reiterates thal it is not the managcment of DBR Mills, hence had no legal status or focus to enter inlo any 12(3) agreement rvith the workmen. It is emphasizecl that petitioner does not fall u.ithin the definition of 7 'employer' or 'management' under the Act and therefore cannot be subjected to its provisions. The definition ol 'scttlemcnt' under Section 2(p) ol the Act necessarily requires a vaiid employer-workman relationship, which is absent ir-i Lhe present CASC Petitioner further states thal r'r'as ti.it. responsibitity of the Conciliation Officer to provide pr-opcr- lcgai guidance to workmen regarding the parties to zln-r' such seLtlement. Despite these legal shortcomings, the Tribuntr) passed the impugned order directing petitioner t, tl''p""it Rs.49,O0,OOO/ in M.P.No.6 of 2019, which is iilegal anci contrary to law. It is finally stated that merely bec3ri'ser petitioner had agreed to pay the amount which u'as clue bt lhc 4th respondent to the employees in view of their ent.rirl* in't' l development agreement in respect of the land coverecl b]'' ttle r+rlr responclent, they could not be directed to pay the amount The Joint Commissioner of Labour liletl c-ounlcr

4. stating that the present dispute pertains to pctitlollcr zrllcl Respondents 3 and 4 and that subject matter lie s exclusivcl.r. between these parties. It was emphasized that the rcle of thc Labour Dcpartment is purely formal in nature, therefore, no -J-rhi.(.. -. 8 reiief carl bc sor-iqht against the Labour Department in this context.

5. In th. colrnter fi1ed on behalf of the 4th respondent ir is siatcd thai in N'I.P. No. 6 of 2019, pelitioner being a signatory, had aclmitted the Settlement under Scction l2(3) of the Act, hcncc, they are liable to pay the agreed amount. [t was lLrthcr asserted that the said Settlement is binding upon petitioner and the 3'd respondcnt, but nol upon ttre 4th rcspondent:, rvho uras not a party or signatory to Settlcmenl. It is argued thaL coiltentions raised by petitioner extend beyond the scope of tlre order passed by the Tribunal.

6. The 3'd respondent - Union liled a counter stating th:rl peti[ioner, ir its counter to the original pctition, aclmitted Lhe Sotticnrr:nt under Section 12(3) and expressed in,illingness to deposit thc ;rgreed amount until disposal of the main rniscellar.iei-trs petition. However, they raised objections, such as non disclosule of number of workers by the Labour Department and claimed thaL it was rvilling to deposit and pay the agreed arnounL ol lts. 49,0O,00O/- if such informaLion rverc provided. It r.r,a s iurther stat(:cl that petitioner had earlier settled claims of some u,orkers through the Memorandum of Settlement dated i. 7' .j 9 07-O3 2Ol7. This indicates that petitioner, after convincing workers oI a comprehensive ltnancial resolution, dcla--ved execution u,ithout reason and later, attempted to escape [he liabitities voluntarily undertaken in the settlement rvhcn t[r.- mat[er rvas takcn bclore the Tribunal. The Tribunal rightly held that petitioner's objections and apprehensions lacked merit and that the amount should be deposited in court. It is the further case of the 3'd respondent thai petitioncr's claim that Memorandum of Settlement d;ttcd 07 03 201,7 became unenforceable ciue to dismissal of SLP Nos. 5163-5164 of 2022 on 18-04-2022 is false. Petitione:- intentionally suppressed details of prior proccedings belbre the trial Courl and the High Court before movrng the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The SLPs. were dismissed at the thrcshold solely on the ground of limitation, due to a dclay of 159 1 clavs. ancl not on merils. Pelitioner was accused oI misreprcsentatitrn. abuse of process, and misleading the Court. Hence, they are not entitled to any relief. It was also submitted that parties and tl'rird partics to O.S. No. 69 o[ 2OO3 had filed C.C.C.A. Nos. 350, 74, 329 of 2OO3 zrncl C.C.C.A. No. i31 of 2OO4 challenging thc comprornise l0 decrr.'c dated 03-04-2003. All the appeals were dismissed by a comrnon -jr-rdgment dated l2-O4 2OO4 confirming the comprornise ciecrce. The matter was remandcd to the trial court .soleh' lor veril;irg the suit schedule property's market vahre anci r:ourt lee- SLP Nos. 13630 of 2OO5 and 13633 of 2005 were lrlccl bciore thc Supreme Court, which were dismissed on 21-08-2005. Review petitions against the dismissal w'ere also dismisscd on .14-08-2005. Post-remand, after multiple rrcljourn nrents, st-rit was dismissed on 28-04 20 1 5 by the XIII Adcil. Chicf .iuclge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, as plaintilfs ft,rile d fee. Pet,.ririier larer lilcd c.c.c.A. No. 66 of 2o2o aggrievcd by the dismissal iuclginc-rt dated 28-04-2015, along with I.A. No. 1 of 2O'lrll unclr:r Sc'.rl-:ri)n 5 of the Limitation Act to condone the clelay r-.i[ i69 1 cie11,5. 'lhis petition was dismissed on 07 -O1'2022. I'etitioncr filed SLP Nos. 5163 5164 of 2O22, rnhich u,ere clisinisseri b-v tl-rc Supreme Court on la-O4-2O22. Hencc, 1rt:tiiirrncr's cliriu that settlement dated O7-03 2017 became ,.1i.t.'r-ihi,.:c;-,ble is ferlse. The petitioner was fully awarc of the pcnclirio, litigatiors related to DBR Mills, including those iii:;nrissr:cl mi.rr:h beibre the date of settlement. The compromise 7 !: decree in the Appeat by DBR Mills managemellt was dismissed in 2OO4 ie. 13 years before the settlement. The refore, petitioner cannot now cite this litigation to avoid the settlcmcl'rt. Thel' voluntarily agreed [o pay Rs. 7,OO,OOOl- in nro instal]ments- Rs. 2,OO,OOO I - on 3l 03 2017 and Rs. 5,00,000//- on l4-OB '2017, but defaulted in making the paymcnt despite voluntarily settling worker claims under Section 12(3) of the Act and Rule 60 of the Telangana State Industrial Disputes Rulcs,

1958. Peti[ioncr informed the Commissioner of Labour and enfered into the Memorandum of Settlemen t on 07 -O3-2'Ol7 , executed bcfore the conciliation officer and ttre Joint Commissioner of Labour, Hyderabad (Twin Cities), after the suit in O.S. No.69 of 2O03 (Old O.S. No. 1201 of 1995) r'r,as dismissed on 28 04 20 15. Hence, it is argued th:rt pctirrone r is precluded from pleading that settlement became unenlorceablc due to culmination of the saicl suit proceeclings. It is alleged that the petitioner is abusing legal process aud harassing the respondents by delaying legirimate claims. It is contended that once the Metnorandunt of Settlement dated 07 03 2017 was executed under Section 12(3), creating a pre existing admitted liability,. petit-ioner is barrcd ) r-\ fronr ilucstioning the proceedings initiated under Section 33(C)(2) ol tlre lndustrial Disputes Act. These proceedings were initiultc(l afrcr obtaining a rccovery certificate under Section 33(Cl)(l) It. is submittcd that workers were subjcctcd to harassmcnL and mental turmoil due to false promises of financiai relicf and employment and that workers werc forced to appro:rch thc 'l'r-ibunal to enforce petitioner's admitted liability. Thc proceedings before the Tribunal are legal and valid. The prescnL Writ Pclition is only a continuation of delay tactics by thc pciitionr:r. According to this respondent, petitioner did not inforrn ihe Trrburral about dismissai of SLPs. by the I-Ion'ble Supremc Clourt on 18 O4-2O22 until O5-O9-2O23. The orders wcrc sut.rrrrttcrl only during the hearing of an interim Appiir::rl iori. Pciirioner l-rad already admitted in its counter affidavit beforc thc Tribunal its obligation to pay and cited vague reasons lirr nol'payment. It did not make any effort to obtain u,oLkr:r clerails frorn the Labour Department, reveaiing its lack of intcntion to conrply. Furthermore, petitioner concealed filing of this Writ [)r: tilron and the order of stay obtained therein, The5, drd not cvcn illr a memo to inform the Tribunal and falsely alleged tirat lribunal u,as proceeding despite the stay. The trial 7 had already commenced and cross-examination was completed by petitioner. To delay procecdings and ar''oid the ouLcome' petilioner approached this Court after four years Pclitior-rer' having voluntarill' subjectcd itself to the prorrisions of the Act' cannot nou'claim that the Act is not applicablc to it' 7 . The Tribunal in the ordcr impugned recorded rhat petitioner from the very inception honestly has becn saying thaL they are rcady to pay the amount to the t'orkei:s who rvr:re working as on lhe datc of closure of DBR Mills in199 i Though there is confusion with rcgard to number of rl'orkers to lr''hom the payment is supposed to be made, al one stage, ltre numbi:r of workers as per the assessment made by lhc District Coilector is 349, subsequently, the number is risen to 484- Petitioner also agreed to clear the payments [o 349 workers basccl on the letter addressecl by the District Collector dated 27'C5 201o which gcsture was taken into consideraiion by thc 'l'ribunal The Tribunal further obscrved that lt'hen such u'as the case, thc present Petition filed by a lerv employees seeking rlcposir o;i the amount as a measure to secure the amount cannot be denied by petitioner. As is evident from the material and lrom the order impugned, the Union dicl not want to tt'ithdrarv thc amounl', l4 their endearour is only to see to it that amount assured as per tl-re mcmorandurrr of settlcment should be secr-rrcd. The amount r,vhich u.e,-s ergrc:t:cl upon could not bc disbursed yet. For the litigaticin belu,cr:rr petitioner ancl respondents, workers should not br: r-i-ra ric ro su[I'er.

8. H:ri,ing considered the material on record and on perusal of the crcier of the Tribunal, it is clear that petitioner's primurn' otrjr:r;Lilrn is thc enforceability of settlement agreement citing liustratron of the compromise decree in O.S. No.69 of 2OO3 (earlicr ().S. No. I2O I of 1995) and the related litigation. LIowevcr, this urrgument overlooks the fact that petitioner volunlilriiv cntered into the Memorandum of Settlement under Sectiorr 12(3} oi rhe Industrial Disputes Act, 7947 before the ConcrliaLion Oiiiccr and Lhe Joint Commissioner of Labour, I{1'dera baci. Pt:lilioner, having voluntarily agreed to pay the u,orkcrs t.ir{r sr.rm of Rs. 7,00,00O/ as part of the settlement, can not nor.v scek to escape its obligations merely due to the r:onrplt'xrLir:s ;rrsing from other litigation. Furthcrmore, petitioner rn:Ltlc a<lmissions in its pleadings regarding the rvo-rk-ers' claims ;. r'ici its involvement in the settlement process. 'fher:cii',r'c, ck spitr: the tcchnical arguments raised by the f, t5 petitioner regarding the lack of an emplorl.er employee relationship, it is evident that they assumeci resporrsibility ior the workers' claims and cannot now distancc itsell from the settlemcnt.

9. Petitioner raises the issue ol frustration of compromise decree, resulting from the disnri_qs:rl ot' Si,p Nos. 5163-5164 of 2022 by the Hon'ble Suprcme Courr. Hou,ever, this argument does not invalidate the scttlemcnt unclcr Sec[ion 12(3) for it was made in compliance with Lhi: pror,isions of the Act and petitioner cannot now claim that it is uncnforccable due to the outcome of the compromise decree in unreiatcd litigation. It is general principle of law of contract that rryhen a parr-y agrecs to the terms of settlement and signs the agrecnrent voluntariiv, the said party is bound by the terms of seftlernent. It is not the case of petitioner that they were forced, coercecl, threaieneci or misrepresented to enler into the mcmorandum o[ scttierlcr-tt. They have voluntarily undertaken thc oblig:ition Lo set tlc Lhe workers' claims, hence, the Tribunal is rveil \\,ithil) its jurisdiction to direct them to futfil this obligation_ l(r t.. i 0. Pei,itioner chalienges the jurisdiction of the Tribunal arguing tha t it is a third party and has no authority to be directcd [o de posit the amount. However, the Tribunal's order is ba-scil on the leqal obligations arising from the settlement. The 'lribunai, harrirrg considered the claims of the workers and petir,loner's roic in thc se[tlement, rightly exercised its jurisr.liction in clirecting the latter to deposit Rs. 49,0O,OOO/ . Petitioner',s objcciions regarding the Tribunal's jurisdiction are unsubstanlialr:r'i anci fail io establish any valid grounds for intcri-cring with ihc Tnbunal's order. Despite acknowledging its liabiirtr, nnd agreeing t() palr the surn in insLalhnents, petitioner larlecl ro rnai<e tlrr: pa):ments in a timely manner. This delay has canscri ttr:cir-t,: lr;;r'<'lshiu to r,,'orkcrs, rvho bave been waiting for fuanci;rl r e iiei ior se vcral years. The Tribunal, in its order, rigirth' tin pir l:;i;:,.:d pcriticner's [aiiure to fulfill its obligations ancl ci;r.--i:tcri i.irPosit of the amount to ensure that workers' clarrns ari: ;r clri rr'::sed- i l. i,: ilr: light of the foregoing discussion, it is clear tl:ar 1-;r.;;,:,lir! i-:s. :.)i-ijun-!ents do not merit inierference with the orrler oi rl;c 'ir-ibunal. The Tribunai's direction to cleposit 7 l7 Rs. 49,OO,OO0/- is within its jurisdiction and is consistent with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 ' T}:e petitioner's attempts to avoid its obligations based on technical and procedural arguments are without merit and are rejected' Therefore, Writ Petition is liable to be dismissed-

12. costs.

13. The Writ Petition is accordingly, dismissed' No Consequently, the interim order dated 29 02 '2024 shall stand automatically dissolved //TRUE COPY// SD A t- A SI SRINIVASA REDDY TANT REGISTRAR SECTION OFFICER I "'1ff :BBJi"'EiP5[fl ,'dr"ffTJf i1'J?i:"fr J3'"u'""1''"''nsanaat - Hvderabad [OUTI :1. Ohe CC to SRI CI-t' OMERNATHA'N'. f!1oc^ate 4. one cc to SRl. n r'Yivi'ijiilrnsr-r nno' Advocate toPUCl 5. Two CD CoPies ICPUCI BM GJP $ HIGH COURT DATED:2910412025 ORDER WP.No.1958 of 2024 1 H e s 14 ( J q 23JUt'l P5 ($ Ct t f)c. n4.TCrl( s DISMISSING THE WRIT PETITION WITHOUT COSTS @)'P8 b" 6Yr