1. Pyarya Andulu, Wo. Sailu v. '1. P.Shankaraiah

Judgment

7 t THE HON'BLE JUSTICE MOUSHUMI BHATTACHARYA AND THE HON'BLE JUSTICE GADI PRAVEEN KUMAR C.M.A. No.44 of 2025 .IUDGMENT: Qnr Hon'hlc Justice Gudi Praveen Kumur) l. The present Appeal is filed by the appellants being aggrieved by the order passed by the leamed III Additional District Judge, Ranga Reddy District at L.B. Nagar in LA.No.423 of 2024 in O.S.No. 170 of 2024 dated

18.12.2024 dismissing the Interlocutory Application filed by the appellants under Order 39 Rute I and 2 r/w Section l5l C.P.C., lor granting ad interim injunction restraining the respondcnts/de t-endants from alienating, transferring or otherwise creating any charge in lavour of third parties over the petition schedule property, pending disposal of the suit.

2. The appellants herein are the plaintilfi in the main suit filed for partition and separate possession and lor declaration ol documents i.e. (i) registered sale deed dated 14.08.1985 bearing Doc.No.576511985 (ii) registered agreement of sale-cum -(leneral Power of Attorney dated

19.10.2004 bearing Doc.No.824712004 and (iii) registered sale deed dated

27.03.2006 bearing Doc.No.4480/2006 as null, void and not binding on

appellants/plaintiffs. 2

3. Pending consideration of the suit, the appellants fi!c I I'A'No''l2l of 2024 contending that the appellant No.l is one of the sr trers in the suit schedule property admeasuring Ac.2.00 guntas in Sy.Nt 108 situated at Kokapet village, Gandipet Mandat (earlier Rajendranagal Vandal), Ranga Reddy District. It is contended that appellant No.2 ha; entered into an Agreement with the appellant No. l.

4. It is lurther contended by the appellant No.l tll t originally her lather i.e. late Kistaiah, out of his hard eamed money ar d bv cultivating the lands on lease iiom different land owners, had purcl :sed the sub.iect land admeasuring Ac.2.00 gts in Sy.No. 108 from Caddz ['axmaiah under regisrered sale deed dated 1,l.02.1981 vide Doc.No.S59rl)8 I in the name of his wile Smt.Pastham Durgamma. After the death ol- I .istaiah, his w'ile Durgamma along with their chitdren viz.,. appellant I o' I . respondent Nos. I and 2, Arjun and Pochamma were jointly cultivr'1 ng the schedule land with peaceful possession and enjoyment.

5. It is further contended that after the death t I late Kistaiah, Durgarnma along rvith her three sons viz., respondent 'los. I ancl 2 and Arjun jointly alienated the suit schedule property t() hird parties i.e. 't ,/ J respondent No.3 under registered sale deed bearing Doc.No.5765/1985 dated 14.08.1985 behind the backs ofappellant No. I herein and her sister Pochamma by suppressing the fact that appellant No. I herein and her sister Pochamma are also legitimate shareholders, being legal heirs of late Kistaiah, and that the respondent No.3 without knowing all these facts, purchased the schedule property. Subsequently, sister and brother of appeltant No.I viz., Pochamma and Arjun died issueless. Mother of appellant No.1 Pastham Durgammma also died on I0. I 1.2019.

6. It is contended by appellant No.l that subsequent to purchase of schedule propefty by respondent No.3 along with his family members i.e. respondent No.4 to 7, had alienated the land admeasuring Ac. 1.35 gts in Sy.No.108/A in favour of respondent No.S vide AGPA bearing Doc.No.8247l2004 dated 19.10.2004. l'hereafter, respondent No.3 to 7 represented by their GPA Holder i.e. respondent No.8 executed a sale deed vide Doc.No.448012006 dated 27.03.2006 in favour of respondent No.9 in respect of land admeasuring Ac.1.35 gts in Sy.No. 108/4 out of the suit schedule property. 4

7. It is further contended that the sons of late Gaddr Laxmaiah, in collusion with Pastham Durgamma executed a Rectificat on Deed vide Doc.No. 1973/2006 dt.13.02.2006 in favour of Pasthen Durgamma confirming the validity and execution of sale deed dated 11.02.1981 vide Doc.No.559/1981 and the same was executed behind the be:k of appellant No.1. Subsequently, some third parties, who are in no way :oncerned with the suit schedule property, also issued a Rectificatio r Deed dated

22.04.2006 vide Doc.No.6l54l2006 in favour of Pastha n Durgamma' mother of appellant No.1 confirming the validity and e;t :cution of sale deed dated 11.02. t981 bearing Doc.No.559/1981, nd the said Rectification Deed is only to the extent of non-claiming any title or right in the suit schedule property.

8. It is further contended that in the month of Ma'ch, 2023, the appellant No. I receired summons in O.S.No.l68 of 2023 rending on the fite of learned Principal lll Additional District Judge, Ranga Reddy District at L.B. Nagar, which was instituted by one Kum.Kr vitha, daughter of respondent No.2 herein without having any right, title ( r concem over the suit schedule property. In fact, the respondent No.2 father of "l:rein, t 5 said Kavitha had sold the property by virtue of registered Sale Deed bparing Doc.No.576511985 dated 14.08.1985 and as such,, said Kavitha has no right, title or concem to file O.S.No.168 of 2023.

9. It is further contended that after receiving the summons in O.S.No.168 of 2023 only, the appellant No.l came to know about the fiaudulent transactions that had taken place between thc respondents behind her back, since she is already in possession of the suit schedule property to the extent of her share. In the month of October, 2023, she approached respondent No.l and 2 for partition, but they denied for partition of the suit schedule propefty. Hence, as appellant No. I is tegally entitled for a share in the suit schedule property, she filed the suit as respondent No.l and 2 have fraudulently alienated the suit schedule property in favour of respondent Nos.3 to 9 behind the back of appellant No. l.

10. Thus, appellant No.l in LA.No.423 of 2024 contends that she has made out a prima facie case and balance of convenience for granting of ad interim injunction restraining the respondents/defendant from 6 alienating, transferring or otherwise creating any charge i r favour of third parties over the petition schedule property'

11. On behalf of respondent No.9, One Kasireddy Bha ;ker Reddy hled counter-affidavit to I.A.No.423 of 2024 stating that he s the authorized signatory of respondent No.9 Firm, which was origina [y a partnership firm vide Registration No.3 134 of 2007 and subsequentl reconstituted as Limited Liability Partnership vide LLP Registration Nc' \40-6232 dated

25.03.2019.

12. It is contended in the counter-affidavit that s rit filed by the appellants/plaintiffs tbr partition and to declare the sale leeds as null and void is neither maintainable under law nor on facts. Il. Ls contended that P.Durgamma w/o.Kistaiah, mother of appellant No'1 b 'ing pattedar and possessor of the suit schedule land in Sy.No'108 total adr gts of Kokapet village by virtue of Doc.No.559/1981 Lated 11'02'198 l' lawfully sotd the entire extent of land for value to respc -rdent No.3 under 'easuring Ac'2'00 registered sale deed bearing Doc.No.5765/1985 ,l rted 14.08.1985' Thereafter, respor1dent No.3 executed a registererl AGPA bearing Doc.No.8247l2004 dated 19.10.2004 in favour of resrl rndent No'S duly ) 1 authorizing him to alienate the suit schedule property, who in tum . executed a registered sale deed bearing Doc.No.4480/2006 dated

27.03.2006 in favour of respondent No.9 in respect of Ac.1.35 gts out of Ac.2.00 gts in Sy.No.l08/A as the remaining extent of Ac'0'05 gts thereof was already sold to Smt.L.Jaya Bharathi through a registered sale deed bearing Doc.No.724912004 dated' 03.09'2004. Subsequently' said L'Jaya Bharathi sold the said extent of Ac.0.05 gts to respondent No'9 under registered sale deed bearing Doc.No.3 l9l2018 dated 16.,l2.2018. thus, respondent No.9 became the absolute owner and possessor of entire suit schedule property. Mutation was also effected in the Revenue Records and pattedar passbook and title deed vide Katha No'573 were also issued in favour of respondent No.9' The suit schedule property was also convefted inro Non-Agricultural Land vide proceedings No.cl/3736/20 l6 dated

22.04.2017.

13. It is lurther contended in the counter that the appellant No'l herein fraudulently filed the subject suit knowing fully well that registered sale deed datcd 14.08.1985 has been lawfully executed by her mother and brothers in favour of respondent No.2 in respect of the subject propefty, / ,: .: .-\:a 8 and that appellant No.l and respondent No'I herein, thoul h minors at the time of execution of sale deed dated t4.08:1985, they never chose to challenge the sale made thereunder even after attaining rr ajority, thereby the right of appellant No.l and respondent No'2 to disp"r e the sale deed stood extinguished bv efflux of time.

14. It is fuither contended that the appellants herein har', filed the suit as well as the present petition in collusion with respond: rt Nos' 1 and 2 knowing fully well that their famity parted with possessicr of the schedule properry in the year 1985 itsetl and it is ex facie evident 1l at the appellants have fited the present petition with the sole objective trl illegally extract money from respondent No.9 by creating vexatious liti6;r tion, amounting to abuse of process of law.

15. Basing on the above pleadings, the leamed ll ial Court, after marking Exs.P-l to P-5 during hearing, had lramed the iollowing points for determination ol the underlying Interlocutory Applicat on : " L Whether the plaintffi are having prima facie cas t tnd balance of convenience in their -favour?

2. Wether the plainliflls suffbr irreparablc loss or initr 'f if the relieJ i,s not granted? " - \ 9

16. Sri Muhammad Vequar Hussain, learned counsel for the appellants vehemently contended that on I 1 .02. 198 I , the father of appellant No. I has purchased the subject propefty in the name of mother of appellant No. I by name Pastham Durgamma by virtue of a registered sale deed, and thereafter in the year 1985, the mother of appellant No.l along with brothers of appellant No. l, without the knowledge of appellant No. 1, executed a fraudulent sale deed in favour of third party i.e. respondent No.3 behind the back of appellant No.1, and in the year in 2004, another alienation deed was executed by respondent Nos.3 to 7 in favour of respondent No.8

17. Learned counsel for appellants further contended that in the year 2023, the daughter of respondent No.2 instituted a suit O.S.No. 168 of 2023 for partition, and it is only after receiving summons in the said suit, the appellant No. I herein came to know about the fraudulent transactions took place behind her back and as such, the appellants herein filed the present suit O.S.No. I 70 of 2024 for partition and other reliefs.

18. Learned counsel for appellant No.1 contended that the leamed Trial Court, without appreciating the various contentions urged, erroneously l0 dismissed the lnterrlocutory Application filed seekin 1 for grant of ad interim injunction holding that the claim of appella rts is barred by limitation.

19. Leamed counsel for the appellants contended that the observations of the learned Trial Court held that when appellant No.l recame major in 1990, it has to be assumed that she got knowledge of t te same, but the leamed Trial Coun. without any legal backing cannot ust assume that appellant No.l got knowledge of the transactions when she came major and that the learned Trial Court cannot say the samc on the basis of assumptions. Howcver, the appellant No.l got knowledr: of the previous transactions after receiving summons in O.S.No.168 of 2t) 13.

20. Learned counsel for the appellants relying on t te provisions of Section 17 of the l,imitation Act, placed reliance on th: judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Daliben Valjibhai antl olht s Vs. Praiapati Kodarbhai Kachrubhai and anotherl. With respect t r fraud nullifies everything, leamed counsel for the appellants placecl reliance on the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Commissioner of Customs Vs. I 2024 0 Suprerne (SC) 133+ - ZO24 O INSC I0,t9 u candid EnterpnbeJ. Regarding limitation in case of partition, right to sue, leamed counsel for the appellant placed reliance on the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Krishna pillai Rajasekharan Nair (died) by LRs Vs. Padmanabha Piltai3 and, Vidya Devi alias Vidya Vafi (Dead) by LRs Vs. Prem Prakash and othersa. 2l . Learned counsel for the appellants further contended that the provisions of Section 52 of the Transfer of property Act, does attract to the present case, but the relief under Order 39 Rule I and 2 CpC for restraining the respondents not to alienate or encumber the subject property is generally a routine kind of relief and is a preventive order which would protect the interests of the parties from unnecessary litigations. If the respondents alienate the property in favour of the third parties, it would just create multiplicity of litigations causing an irreparable loss and injury to the plaintiffs. In this regard, he placed on the decision in Ramakunt Amhalal Choksi Vs. Harish Ambalal Choksi and otherss. ' lzoo t; s scc loz ' Ordcr dated I 5. I 2-2003 in C.A.No_0 I i I il-0 I :t I ii/1996 ' ltees; + scc a96 ' zozs iz; ,+r-o lscy zr I 'i i 12

22. It is further contended that the mother of the ap rellant No.l has alienated the property along with the brothers of appellar No'1, when the appellant No.1 and her brothers were tninors, in grave vic lation of Section 8(1) of The Hindu Minority and Guardianship At:r 1956 without permission of the Court.

23. Learned counsel for the appellants further placec reliance on the judgments in O.G.Sunkar Vs. S.Veera Sameera Kumar ,l ev6 and Saurabh Gupta Vs. Smt. Archanu Gupla and othersT with respet - to applicability of Section 8 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act and Section I l4 of The Indian Evidence Act equivalent to Section I 9 of Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023.

24. Leamed counsel for the appellants contended that re suit instituted is well within the period of limitation i.e. from the date , f knowledge of the fraudulent alienations by the respondents and basing : r the above facts and legal position, prima facie case and balance of r: ,nvenience is in favour ofthe appellants for grant of ad interim injunction. 1996 Lawsuir (Ap) 542 6 ' zoz+121 eol z+t l3

25. Thus, leamed counsel for the appellants contended that the order passed by the learned Trial Court is erroneous and liable to be set aside and the appellants are entitled for grant of ad interim injunction.

26. On the other hand, Sri P.Venkat Reddy, leamed counsel appearing for respondent No.9 submits that the suit filed by the appellants/plaintiffs itself is not maintainable, which is filed after 39 years of sale of suit land, without challenging any of the registered sale deeds thereon, and on the said ground, the suit is liable to be disrnissed in limini. 27- Learned counsel appearing for respondent No.9 further contended that as per the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court, in the instant case, there is a constructive notice from the date of registration and the presumption under Section 3 of The Transfer for Property Act comes into operation. In this regard, he placed relianee on the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Uma Devi and olhers Vs. Anand Kumar and otherss .

28. Leamed counsel appearing lor respondent No.9 further contended that the appellants termed the 39 years old sale deed as 'fraudulent' in the ' lzozsy s scc ros 14 \ plaint, however, the appellants neither challenged th': said registered document nor pleaded any material particulars of the lleged fraud as required under Order VI Rute 4 CPC. To this effect, he p aced reliance on the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Bishnudeo Nat n and another Vs. Seogeni Rai and anothere and Electricsl Caslings r-imiled Vs. UV Assets Reconstruction Company Limited and olhersl0.

29. We have given our earnest consideration to the cont :ntions raised by the counsel on record and thoroughly perused the record

10. The learned Trial Court relying upon the various i spects including legal provisions as well as law laid down by the Hon'b'l : Apex Court in respect of cardinal principle enshrined in Section 17 of tl : Limitation Act with respect to fraud nullifies everything, held tht t the appellant No. I /plaintiff No.1 cannot say that she got knowledge o[ fiaud only when she received summons in the former suit. lt is a f'act that the subject property was transferred to third party way back in the year 1985 itself. Therefore, appellant No.1/plaintiff No.1 cannot claim that the suit schedule property is still in their joint possession, even after its tran f'er '1ro: t.y scc a+z "' 1zozz1z scc 5'l3 15

31. The leamed Trial Court further held that even assuming that appellant No. I got knowledge of alleged fraud, immediately after she attained majority, that may be in the year 1990, she would have filed the suit, but she still allowed 34 years to pass through without any claim or challenge, where the limitation prescribed was only for 12 years, and thereby the appellant No. I cannot get any benefit out of the various legal positions placed betbre the Court.

32. The leamed Trial Court upon considering the various contentions raised before it including the judgment relied upon by appellants in Krishna Pillai Rajasekharan Nair (supra), wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the limitation for the suit would be govemed by Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1908, and that for a suit for partition, the starting point of limitation is when the right to sue accrues, that is when the plaintitf has notice of his entitlement to partition being denied, and if the plaintiff was a minor, it commences after attaining majority. It has further held that when the property has been parted with by family of appellant No.1 way back in the year 1985 itseli cause of action does not flow to file the suit. t6 \

33.ThelearnedT'rialCourtrightlycametoconclusic'rthatinjunction not to alienate is generally a routine kind of relief' the Ccr rts tend to grant in the light of Sectron -52 doctrine of lis pendens under the Transler ol Property Act, whereas in the present case, a reading of the plaint itself appears to be not sustainable and it is glaringly barred I I limitation' and thereby agreed the contentions advanced by respor lent No'9 that appellants/ptaintil fs are trying to create a vexatious ltigation thereby committing an act of abuse of process of law' there t y dismisscd the lnterlocutory Application filed by the appellants'

34. The appeltants have relied upon the decisior of the Llon'ble Supreme Court in Daliben Valiibhai (supra), wherein th: Court considered a case involving a suit for cancellation of a registerer sale deed dated O4.I2.2OO4.ln that case, the plaintiffs came to know o the execution of the impugned sale deed only when they received notic': from the revenue authorities in 2017. and upon obtaining a certified cop'1 ' they discovered that their signatures had been forged' The Supreme Co Lrt held that since the plaintills filed the suit immediately after discover ng the fraud' the action was within lhe prescribed period of limitation' t7 However, the facts of the present case are clearly distinguishable. Here, the suit is filed for partition and declaration of certain sale deeds as null and void, though the property in question was alienated way back in

1985. The appellants, having remained silent for nearly four decades, cannot now claim ignorance of such transactions. Hence, the ruling in Daliben Valjibhai (supra) has no application to the facts and circumstances ofthe present case

35. Per contra, the respondent No.9 has relied upon the recent judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Umu Devi (supra), where it was held that when sale deeds executed in 1978 were registered and the plaintiffs or their predecessors had notice of such transactions, failure to challenge them for decades rendered the subsequent suit barred by limitation. '[he Court observed that parties cannot revive stale claims or reignite rights after long inaction. It was further held that suits filed after decades, without a valid explanation for delay, amount to meaningless litigation. Therefore, the ratio of Uma Devi squarely applies to the present case, where the appellants have approached the Court after about forty years of the original alienation. t8 \ \

36. It is a well-settled principle of law that allegations of fraud, undue influence, or coercion must be pleaded with full and spt;ific particulars- Mere general or vague allegations are insr.rfficient to estah ish fraud before a Court of law. In the present case, though the appellr tts have alleged fraudulent conduct by their family members, no conc 'ete material or specific pafticulars have been fumished to substantiate s,r :h allegations. [t appears that the plea of fraud has been taken as an after1h tught, merely to overcome thc bar of limitation and to give a semblance o1' :ause of action. 31 . A perusal of the documents filed by the appellants s lows that except for the sale deed dated 11.02.1981, no document ,videncing their ownership, possession, or recognition in the revenue r:cords has been produced. Further, no specific date or material has been s rown to indicate when the alleged fraud came to their knowledge.

38. The law extends equitable relief only to those rv ro approach the Court with bona fide and legitimate claims. Resorting to I tigation through clever drafting and belated allegations of fraud, without ,: edible evidence, constitutes an abuse of process and clogs the judicial syste n with tiivolous cases, thereby hindering the dispensation ofjustice. W l9

39. The learned Trial Court, upon a thorough consideration of the material on record, rightly held that the appellants have failed to establish a prima facie case or to show that the balance of convenience lies in their favour. The Trial Court correctly concluded that the present suit and interlocutory application were filed with an oblique motive, amounting to \ vexatious litigation.

40. The finding of the Trial Court that any transfer made during the pendency of the suit would be subject to the outcome of the main proceedings sufficiently safeguards the interests of the appellants. The parties remain at liberty to establish their respective claims and defences during the course of trial. 4J . Therefore, this Court finds no itlegality or infirmity in the order passed by the leamed trial Court in I.A.No.423 of 2024 in O.S.No.170 of 2024 dated 18.12.2024, rejecting the appellants' application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 15 I CPC for grant of ad interim injunction. This Court is of the considered view that the impugned order warrants no interference.

42.. Accordingly, C.M.A.No.44 of 2023 is dismissed. I i, 20

43. Interim orders granted, if any shall stand vacate(. Miscellaneous petitions pending ifany shall also stand closed. There sha I be no order as to costs. //TRUE COPYII .,.' d .SRIHARI GISTRAR OFFICER -/( To\ 1. The lll Additional Distrigt_Jujlger Ranga Reddy Distiic I at L.B.Nagar 2. One CC to SRI. MUHAMMAD VEQUAR HUSSAIN, AcI, ocate ToPUc] €. One CC L P;-\rEffi(AtREDDY, Advocate [OpU(: Two CD Copies Kul./PSL rh\ ,, ,,4:i c/i t GF .\$s tl-, \ 'erit + ,ti .+'/.; r '>. t; ':, HIGH COURT DATED:1411'l12025 JUDGMENT CMA.No.44 oI 2025 DISMISSING THE CMI\ WITHOUT COSTS t \.'6