The High Court · 2025

Counsel for the Appellant: SRI VIVEK JAIN Counsel for the Respondent No.1: SRI D.ANIKETH REDDY Counsel for the Respondent No.2: SRI GADI PRAVEEN KUMAR, DEPUTY SOLICITOR GENERIAL OF INDIA Counsel for the Respondent No.3 to 6: SRI THOOM SRINIVAS The Court delivered the following: JUDGMENT THE HON,BLE TIIE ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE SUJOY PAUL AND THE IION'BLE SMT. JUSTICE RENUKA YARA WRIT No.1O3 of2025 JUDGMENT (Per Hon'bte Smt- Justice Renuka Yara) Heard Sri Vivek Jain' learned counsel for the Sri D.Aniketh Reddy, learned counsel for respondent appellant; No.1; and SriThoomsrinivas,IearnedcorrnselforrespondentNos.3to6

2. This is art Intra-Court appeal arising from the order passed by the learned Single Judge in W'P'No'33756 of 2024' dated 27.12.2024 whereby, the writ petition was allowed setting aside the impugned letter dated \O'IO'2O24 directing the HPCL to process the application of writ petitioner/respondent No' 1 and to make provisional allotment of Retail Outlet Dealership to him'

3. The background facts of the case are that resPondent No. 1 / writ petitioner applied for allotment of Retail Outlet Dealership in Group - 1, where the applicants have suitable piece of f.rra I way of ownership/long term lease for a period of minimum 19 years 11 months' The said application was rejected ttY dated lO.LO.2024, respondent Nos'3 to 6 herein vide letter \\/.A.\lo.l 0i of 2025 t' 2 Ref.No.SRO/'ISR/RET. Aggrieved by the sarno, respondent No. 1 frled writ petition vide W.P.No.33756 of 2024 to set aside the letter dated 1O. lO-'.2O24, rvhereby, his application for allotmernt of Retail Outlet Dealership has been rejected

4. The learned Single Judge upon examining the case of respondent Itlo.1/writ petitioner and writ appeilant//respondent No.6 in rvrit petition, allowed the writ petition on the ground that there was fzLvourable interpretation of the brochure classifying Group - 1 rn favour of similarly situated applicants but the same bene{it was not extended to respondent No. 1 }rerein. 'lhe learned Single Judge found violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India in interpretation of Group - 1 classifrcation to the <letriment of respondent Nlo.1 herein. Consequently, the learned Single Judge I allowed the '/rit Petition setting aside the rejection letter dated lO.lO.2O24 v,.ith a direction to respondent Nos.3 to 6 to make provisional allotment of Retail Outlet Dealership to respondent No.l. The said order of the learned Single Judge has given rise to the present appeal '.-' llfi{...ilfw:'2V W.A.No,l03 of 2025

5. The writ appellant challenged the order of the learned Single Judge on two grounds i.e' 1) Erroneous interpretation of the classifrcation of Group - 1 ald 2) Application of equality on the basis of negative ParitY'

6. l,earned counsel for the appellant would submit that the crux of the matter is dependent upon interpretation of Group - 1 and Group - 2 as dehned under Clause 4 (vi) of Brochure for Selection of Dealers for Regular & Rural Retail Outlets' The said definitions are extracted and Produced below: 'Group - 1 : Applicants having suitable piece of lald in the advertisedlocation/areaeitherbywayofownerstrip/longterm lease for a period of minimum 19 years 11 rnonths or as advertised bY the OMC' Group - 2: Applicants having Firm Offer for suitable piece of d fo. pr."h"se or long-term lease for a period of minimum 19 years I 1 months or as advertised by the OMC'"

7. In addition to the above, Clause 10 of the Lease Deed dated Oa.Og .2023 submitted by the respondent No' t has to be read in consonance to determine whether respondent No' 1 would fall under the category of Group - 1 or Group - 2' The said clause 1O of the LeaseDeeddatedo8'0g.2o23isextractedandproducedbelow: "The l,essor shall put the lessee in actual possession of schedule property immediately after the l'essee is issued wrth I-etter of Indent by the concerned Oil companies and since then' \ l I 4 W.A No. 103 of 2025 :11 the kss;ee would be entitled to hold the leased premises together with all ways, passages, lights, drains, sewers water courses, easements ald appurtenances whatsoever."

8. According to the writ appellant, Group - 1 covers the applicants who are in possession of the land in the advertised location/arerl either by way of ownership/long term lease. Emphasis is made on the words "Applicants having suil.able piece of land", wherein, the word 'having' is read with the meaning 'possession'. Coming to the Group - 2, such applicants are those who have a firm offer for suitable piece of land for purchase or long- term lease fbr a minimum period of 19 years 1l rnonths. The applicants falling under Group - 2 are those who are having a firm offer to purcJ-rase suitable piece of land or likely to ent,:r long-term lease for the required period.

9. In the above context, learned counsel for the appellant argues that as per Clause l0 of the Lease Deed dated 0g.09.2O23, possession woulcl be delivered to respondent No.1 only upon issuance of Letter of Intent (LOI) by the concerned Oil Company. Since the Oil Company has not issued LOI and since respondent No.l is not in physical possession of the land, he does not fall under Group 1 ald therefore the order passed by the learned Single Judge .s erroneous \- ) I '' 5 W.A.No. 103 of 2025

10. With regard to the power of judicial review by a Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India' learned counsel for the appellant relied upon a judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Michitgan Rubber (Indial Limited a' State o'f Ko;rflorto,ka and otherst wherein it is held that, ".-.a court betore interfering in tender or contractual matters' in exercise of power ofjudicial review, should pose to itself the following questions: (i) Whether the process adopted or decision made by the authority is mala fie or intended to favour someone; or whether the process adopted or dccision made is so arbitrary and irrational that the court can say: 'the decision is such that no responsjble authority acting reasonably and in accordance with relevant law could have reached"? (ii) Whether the public interest is affected?

11. To determine the merits of appellant,s case, there is a need to exarnine the definitions of Group - 1 and Group - 2 applicants' It is seen that applicants "having suitable piece of land" fa1l under the category of Group - 1' Only when the word 'having' is given the interpretation of "possession' as contended by the learned counsel for the writ appellant, a case can be made out in favour of writ appellant. However, the defrnition of Group - 1 cannot be read in ' (zotz) s scc zto \ I I 6 W.A.No.103 of 2025 isolation but- has to be read along with definitjon of tlre applicants under Group - 2 which covers those who have a firm offer for suitable pier:e of land for purchase or long-term lease. When the definition of applicants under Group - 2 is examined closely, it is seen that szrid people have a firm offer either to purchase or to lease. The term "offer" means that said applicarts are either holders of Agreement of Sale or holders of Agreement for Lease. Said Agreements of Sale or l,ease might have reached rhe stage of execution of contract or not. To the contrary, the applicants under Group - 1zre those individuals who had an offer, said offer is accepted and enforceable contract has been executecl subject to issuance of Letter of Intent by the Oil Company. Thererfore, it may be convenielttly concluded that since respondent l,lo.1 had a concluded cc'ntract duly signed, his status is different from those applicants under Group - 2 whose ciffer man, or may not have concluded rvith execution of contract. This inteqtretation of Group _ 1 is further r,:inforced by the example wherein another applicant by name Sri P. Gangawar who also had a lease subject to issuance of Letter of Intent dated 15.02.2024 by HpCL was classified under Group - 1. The learned Single Judge rightly invoked the power of . \.. . . Ju$rcral revrerrr as per Michigan Rubber,s case failing which the 7 W.A.No. 103 of 2025 decisions made by HPCL would have been arbitrary, favouring some one to the exclusion of respondent No. 1.

12. Next coming to the aspect of negative parity, learned counsel for the appellant relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in R. Muthukumar and others tts' Cha;inna;n and Mdnaging Director, TANGEDCO and. others2, wherein it is held as follows: "A principle, axiomaLic in this country's constitutional lore is that there is no negative equality. In other words, if there has been a beneltt or advantage conferred on one or a set of people, without legal basis or justification, that beneht cannot multiply, or be relied upon as a principle of parity or equality-"

13. In view of the aforesaid interpretation of categorization of applicants under Group - 1 and 2, we are of the considered opinion that there was no negative relief given and that respondent No' 1 is not reaping benefrts of the negative order in previously given instances. Therefore, we do not find any reason to interfere with the order passed by the learned Single Judge'

14. Accordingly, this Writ Appeal is dismissed' No costs' '7 2022 SCC OnLine SC l5l i 8 W.A.No. 103 of 2025 A.s a sequel, Miscellaneous petitiorrs, pending if any, stand disposed of To, //TRUE COPY// SD/.I. NAGA LAKSHMI PUTY REGIS R SECTION OFFICER

1. One CC to SRI VIVEK JAIN, Advocate [OPUC] 2. One CC to SRI D.ANIKETH REDDY, Advocate [OPUC] 3. One CC to SRI THOOTM SRINIVAS, Advocate IOPUC] 4. One CC to SRI GADI PRAVEEN KUMAR, DEPUTY SOLICITOR GENERIAL OF lNDIA, High Court for the State of Telangana at Hyderabad [OPUC]

5. Two CD Copies BSR bs YY I \ -BFi''l* HIGH COURT DATED: 0610312025 JUDGMENT WA.No.103 ot 2025 1 riE S 14 () 10 l'tAlr 2025 ( 2( * i'-.in'rrr t+:6 r-;.-:-. DISMISSING THE WRIT APPEAL, WTHOUT COSTS o"fld st, l