In Basawaraj and another v. Special Land Acquisition Ollicerr, the Hon,ble Supreme Court held as under

SRI VEDULA CHITRALEKHA MD MURTUZA ALt FAROOQI The Court made the fotlowing: COMMON ORDER HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE LAXMI NARAYANA ALISHETTY I.A.No,3 of202 Io And c.M ,A.No.1 4A6 OF 4 M.A. COMMON ORDER: This I'A No'3 of 2024is filed to condone the delay of '1048 days in ancl clecree dated29J'720\9 filing the Appeal challenging the iudgment in f"I.v.o.P.N o.524 0f 2013 passed by the Chairman-M'A'C'l'-cum-l Aclditional District Judge, Mahabubnagar Hearcl Smt' Vedula Chitralekha' learned counsel for petitioner 2 ancl Sri Murtuza Ali Farooqt' learned counsel for resPondents' 3' Learned counsel for the petifioner contended that respondent 0f 2013 0n the file of the Chairman- Nos l to 5 filccl M'VoP'No524 M.A.C.'f -curn-I Additional District Judge' Mahabubnagar' against the I...titioner herei. claimrng a sum of Rs 4'00'000/- towards compensatiou on account of accident that took place on 18'09'2013' In the said acciclent, responrlent No 1' who is mothcr of respondent No 2 and 3 and sotr of respondent No 4 and 5' diect on the spot The Tribunal vide order datecl 29.11.2019 disposeul of the M'V O'P No 524 2013 granting cotrrpctrsa tion of. Rs 10,'19'200/-' l-earned counsel for thc petitioner coutcnded that the Crimc 4 ve'lricre ,,vas purchasccl by one sri Mcl Asif' on 15'03 2013 in a public I t .l \ \ 1.4.No.3 o!.1021 tnAt),t y A t: Lt A No.t186 auction conducted by the petitioner-Bank and the vehicle was delivered 2 to him on 19.03.2013 after executing undertaking anc also indemnity bond in favour of the petitio.er. Therefore, petitioner is not the owner of the vehicle a t the time of accident and is not liable to pay the compensation. 1'his aspect was not properly appreciated by ttre Tribunal and erroneousry fastened the riability on the petitioner. 5. In the a pplica rion filed for condonation of the delay, it is mentioned that the counser for thc petitioner filecl copy appricatio. on '13.02.2020 and the same was received by the petitioner-bar.rk orr

20.02.2020. The said matter was handled by state lega Coordinaror of tl.re appellant-Bank and the said coordinator abruptly left the services of the bank due to which he did rrot handover thc file to the counsel for filing of the appeal, therefore, appeal could not be fir,:d. It is further contended that in the month of May of 2022, appellant-Bank observed that no appeal was filed challenging the order datecr 29.71,.2079 and, immediately, the matter w.as entrusted to one of the Authorized officers of the Bank and therefore, delay of 104g days, occasio^ed in filing the appeal.

6. Learned counsel for the petitioner further c,rntended that petitioner-Bank is not liable to pay compensation ar; held by the Tribunal, since the vehicle was auctioned and one Sri Mohd.Asi| LIiA.J, IA No3 of2024 In/And M t C trI A No. ta86 of )021 purchased the vehicle and however, he was not made a party to the -) - M.V.O.P. and that the peLitioner has very good case on merits, and the petitioner is likely to succeed in the appeal, therefore, prayed to allow the application.

7. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents contended that the Respondent Nos.1 to 5 filed E.P.No.106 of 2020 before the concerned court and the petitioner has also appeared in the court in the said case on 06.09.2020, and further, Petitioner-Bank is actively pursuing the said E.P. filed by the respondent Nos. 1 to 5. Therefore, contention o[ the petitioner that it was not aware of the award passed by the Tribunal is incorrect. Even otherwise, as per their own admission, the petitioner came to know about non-filing of the appeal in the month of May,2022, however, appeal was filed on 13.09.2024, along with an application for condona tion of huge delay of 1048 days. Hence, the application is devoid of merits and the same is liable to be'dismissed as the approach of the appellant is very causal in nature and has failed to explain the inorclinate clelay in filing the appeal

8. It is apt to examine the principles and parameters to be considered for condonation of delay.'fhe Hon'ble Apex Court it Union of India nnd anothu tt. lalmngir Byramji leejeebhoy (D) through his LR (SLP (Ciuil) No.21096 of 2019 dnted 03.04.202a), by referring the judgment of I t \ l4 to -l oI202t tn...1)t(t M t C.M A Not186 I the same Court in Esla Blnttacha rJee o. L4artagtng Comnittee of Raghunathpur Nnlar Academy & Others [(2013) 12 S(C 619], held that "deray shourd nctt be excuse. as o ttnfter of generosity. Rettdering suhstantiar justice is not to cntrse prejutlice to tlrc opposite party,,. {

9. In Basawaraj and another v. Special Land Acquisition Ollicerr, the Hon,ble Supreme Court held as under: cause'shourd be givert a iiberar ,j.,.;HH::":,.:":i'"'' 1at substantral justice is donr , bp1 enly so long as negliqence, inactiotl or lack of bona ftdes cannot be rmputed lo the partu concerned, rvhether or not sUfficr,lnt cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts o[ a ])articular, case and no slraitjack(.t forrnula is possiblc. (Vide Modanlal v. Shgamlat [(2002) I SCC s: saov.Gobardha,s",u2o:;r:'J"':rt;t^:-':::r:\i';:r::'^

12. It is a settled legal proposition that larv of limitat ion may harshly affec t a particular part], but it has to be appiiert with all its rigour when the statutc so prescrrbes. Thc court has Iro powel to extend thc period of Iirnitation on equitable grounds. ..A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve. what it considers a distress resulting from its operation.,,The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconver to a particular party l)ut the court has no choice 0,,, ,o rforce it giving full effect to tlrt same. "r"tt"" The legal maxim dura lex sed lex rvhich means "the law rs hard but it is the larv", stands attracted in such a situation. lt has consistently been held that. ,, a d':cisive factor to be considered -a,," ;.;;.J"-'"";,r,""tt

15. The law on the issue ca where a case has o*, o*."1,"1i :Tl:J.:;j::;::::,, that ion. 'zot3 1r,F 81 tA No t o.202t t,L/,tnd M A c.M.A N" tts6 "lNA!; 5 ttre applicant has to explain the court as to what was the "sufficicnt cause" which means an adequate and enough reason lvhich prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances o[ the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remainecl inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided onty within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation ot delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach thc court on time condoning the delay without any Justification, putting an). conditron whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showlng utter djsregard to the legislature."

10. From a reading of the aforesaid observations, it is clear that the Hon'ble Apex Court at paras- 1 I and 12 of the judgment interpreted the expression "sufl-rcient cause" and at para-15 summarized the law with regard to the issue of limitation. 1 1. In Postmaster General and others vs. Living Media India Limited and another:, Hon,ble Apex Court having considered catena of decisions, including pundlik Jalam patil (deadf by LRs. Vs. Executive Engineer, Jalgaon Medium project and another3, held as hereunder: "17....... The evidence on record suggests neglect of its own right for long time in preferring appeals. ,l.he court cannot enquire into belated and stale clarms on the ground of equity. Delay defeats equity. The court helps thosc u,ho are vigilant and "do not slumber over their rights". ' (zorz(: scc se: ' lzooslLz sc aaa \

1.1 .\'oIof]a:It 'tttd"'.1C\1.1 \o/J86 oi''\ 6 and observed that taking very lenicnt view in condorLing the delay' particularly, on the pa'rt of the Government an(l Government Undertaking, would not Lre proper and obse n'cd as und'lr:- '29. It needs no restatement at our hands that the obje( t lor fixing tlme-limitforlitigationiSbasedol-tpubticpolicvfixingalifespanfor legal remedl- for the purpose oI gcncral s'elfare. Thc] ar I meant to sec that thc partics do not resort to dilator) tac[ics bul avail their legal remedies promptly. Salmond in his Jurisprudence states that the laws comc to the assistancc of the vigilant and not of lhe slccpy 30. Public interest undoubtcdly is a paramount consi'leralion in exercising the coLlrts' discretron wherever con[erred upon it by the relevant statutes. Pursuing stalc claims and rnr'rltiplicity of procee<lings in no manner subserves public intercst' I'rompt and timety payment oI compensation to the landlosers facililating their rehabilitation/ resettlement is cquallv aE integral par - of pub\ic policy. Public interest demands that the State or the l)( neficiarv of acquisition, as tlle case may bc, should not be allowed 1') indulge in any act to unsettle the scttlcd legal rights accrued in law by resorting to avoidable litigatior-r unless the claimants i're guilty of deriving bencflt to which the'r arc otherwise not entil lcd' in anY fraudulent manncr' One should rlot forget the basic fact that what is acquired is not the land but the lrvetihood oI the landlosers Thcse public interest parameters ought to be kept in mind b" the courts whileexercisingthediscretiondealingwiththeapplicatlonfiled underSection5oftheLirr!itationACt,Draggingthelrrlldlosersto courts of lart years after the termination of legal proceedings rvould not serve ar]y public interest Settled rights cannot be lightly interfered rvith by condoning inordinate delay wittroLtt there being any proper explanation of such dela-y on the ground o[ involvement of public revenLle. It serves no pttblic interest "

12. In Government of Maharashtra (W:rter Resources Department) reP.by Executive Engineer vs. Borse Brothers n D\'A ,J. h.noJo/2021 lnlAndMACMA No.la86 of )D,t Engineers and Contractors Private Limiteda, Honlcle Supreme 7 Court held as under: "63. ...... In a fit case in which a party has otherwise acLed bona jde and not in a negligent manner, a short delay beyond such period can, in the drscretion of the court, be condoned, always bearing in mind that the other side of the picture is that the opposite party may have acquired both in equity and justice, what may now be iost by the hrst party's inaction, negligence or laches.'

13. From the aforesaid judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court, it is well settled that condonation of detay is not a matter of right and unless sufficient and plausible reasons are shown, the delay cannot be condoned. While condoning the delay, the Courts should aiso see the substantial rights accrued to the opposite party and also the passage of considerable time.

14. Condonation of dclay is not a matter of routine, more so when there is huge inordinate delay and, therefore, the petitioner ought to have offered detailed, cogent reasons, plausible explanation for such inordinate delay. The reasons stated in the affidavit are vague, , I unsatisfactory and does not inspire the confidence of this Court. Therefore, it is not a fit case to condone the inordinate delav of 1048 days in hling the M.A.C.M.A. \ t

15. A perusal of the record would disclose that award was passed on 29.11.2019 and whereas, appeal was filed on ),3.O9.2O24 with inordinate delay of 1048 days and the delay has not been properly ' 1zoz11 o scc +oo

1.t \,.. ,t :t..,r 1,1 l/" r/ l'',t/ I \o /./8^ 1 8 expiained by the Petitioner-Bank. The reasons assigned by thc petitioner-Bank for condonation of delay does trot inspire the confidence of this court and more so, when the P<:titioner-Bank is aware of filing E.P., and petitioner was also represenled by counsel in the said E.P. and as such, the petitioner cannot sa)' t ltat they came to know about non filing of the appcal only in the monlh ol May,2022. Therefore, therc are clear laches and default on the part of tl-re Petitioner-Bank in filing the appeal.

16. In view of the foregoing reasons and legal position and as no plausible and convincing reasons are shown lor condonation of inordinate delay ol 1048 days in hling Second Appr:al, I.A.No.3 o[ 2024 is liable to be dismisscd and is accordirrglv dismissed. Consequently, the M.A.C.M.A. also stands dismisscrl There shall be no order as to costs. Pending miscellaneous applications if an1, shall :;tand c:loscd. //TRUE COPY// SD/- A.SREENIVASA REDDY A trsrANr.TEgrSIR4R I]ECTION OFFICER To,

1. The Motor Vehrcles Claims Tribunal-cum-l Addl. District .ludge, Mahaboobnagar(With records, if any)

2. One CC to SRI VEDULA CHITRALEKHA, Advocate [OPUC] 3. One CC to SRI MD MURTUZA ALI FAROOQI, Advocate I,f,PUC] 4. Two CD Copies AI)K/gh HIGH COURT DATED:27103t2025 J COMMON ORDER l.A.No.3 ot 2024 IN/AND MACMA.No.1486 of 2024 1 ..--. HiI S 14 6 ) J 2 O ;ul 2p5 ) o^. x -\ i./ .:/ DISMISSING THE MACMA AND l.A.No.3 of 2024 WITHOUT COSTS 6 6W L?(