The High Court · 2025

Petition under Section 482 of Cr. p.C praying that in the circumstances stated in the Memorandum of Grounds of criminal petition, the High court may be pleased to quash the proceedings in C. C. No. 236 ot 2011 on the file of Judicial First Class Magistrate at Miryalguda, Nalgonda District ...RESPONDENT F Petition under Section 482 of Cr.P.C praying that in the circumstances stated in the Memorandum of Grounds of criminal petition, the High court may be pleased to stay of all further proceedings iircluding the appeirance of the petitioner in c. c. No. 236 of 2011 on the file of Judicial First class Magistrate at Miryalguda, Nalgonda District, pending quash petition This Petition coming on for hearing, upon perusing the Memorandum of Grounds of Criminal Petition and upon hearing the arguments of Sri p PRABHAKAR REDDY, Advocate for the Petitioner and SRl. JITHENDER RAO VEERAMALLA, Additional Public Prosecutor on behalf of the Respondent No.1 & 2 The Court made the following: ORDER 1 ORDER THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE N.TUKARAMJI CRIMINAL PETITION No.639 OF 2024 This Criminal Petition has been filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short 'Cr.P C.') seeking quashment of proceedings against the petitioner in C.C.No. 236 of 2011 on the file of the learned Judicial First Class ltlagistrate, Miryalaguda, Nalgonda District.

2. The petitioner is sole accused in the above Calendar Case facing accusations for the offence punishable under Section 340 of the A.P. Municipalities Act, 1965, for the violation of plan approved by the Municipality under Sections 217(1), (2) and (3) of the A.P. Municipalities Act, '1965 (for short, 'the Act, 1965') 3 I have heard Mr.P.Prabhakar Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Jithender Rao Veeramalla, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, representing respondent No.2-State

4. The prosecution's case, in brief, is that while the petitioner was constructing a residential apartment, the construction was carried out in deviation from the approved plan. Consequently, the complainant, who was serving as the Town Planning Supervisor of Miryalaguda Municipality, issued a provisional notice dated 17.08.2010 under the 2 \"rR./ _\ Lrl.P.i\0. 6)9 of 2024 provisions of the Municipalities Act, directing the petitioner to dismanle the deviated portion. This was foilowed by a confirmataon order dated 24.08.2010. Further, the High court of Andhra pradesh, in w.p. Nos. 27826 ano 29264 of 2010, by order dated 20.12.2010, directed the petitioner/accused not to proceed with further construction, and further restrained the occupation or use of the building until rectification of the deviations was made within six months. Despite this, the petitioner/accused neither rectified the deviations nor complied with the court's order. on the contrary, on 09.0 1.2011, the petitioner laid another slab' prompting the Municipality to issue further notices dated 05.01 .2011 and 10.01.2011 ln response, the petitioner/accused submitted tetters acknowledging their inability to remove the deviated portion and instead requested that the deviations be regura rize.d upon payment of penarty. This conduct demonstrated non-compriance not onry with the notices issued by the Municiparity but arso with the binding directions of the High court' Accordingly, the complainant rodged a report areging an offence under section 340 of the Andhra pradesh Municiparities Act, 1965. 5' Learned counser for the petitioner contends that for initiating prosecution under the Municipalities Act, the compraint must be fired either by the commissioner of the Municiparity or by a person specifica,y \ \ 3 .\./ R./ (.n.1'.\tt. 6 )9 o1 !021 authorized by the Council. ln the present case, the complaint was filed by the Town Planning Supervisor, purportedly under an authorization given by the Commissioner of tvliryalaguda Municipality. lt is submitted that the statute does not empower the commissioner to delegate or authorize any person to lodge a complaint on his behalf. Thus, the very foundation of the prosecution is unsustainable in law. It is further argued that cognizance of the offence under Section 340 of the Act, 1965, is barred by limitation' Hence, continuance of the proceedings would amount to an abuse of the process of the Court ln support of this contention, reliance is placed on the decision of this Court in Crl.P. No. 11908 of 2022, where, in a similar factual situation' the proceedings were quashed on the ground that the statutory preconditions for initiating prosecution were not fulfilled Accordingly' the petitioner prays for quashing of the present proceedings'

6. On the other hand' the learned Additional Public Prosecutor submits that the complaint was validly filed by the Town Planning Supervisor, who had been duly authorized by the Commissioner under Section 56(3) of the Act' 1965' to prosecute the petitioner/accused' However, the learned Prosecutor fairly concedes that in Crl P No 11908 of 2022,this Court quashed criminal proceedings on identical grounds ln *ght of the same, the prosecutor prays that appropriate orders be passed in the Present case' 4 NlR./ Lr/.P.No. 6)9 of 2021

7. I have perused the materials on record

8. The plain reading of the complaint shows that it was filed by the Town Planning Supervisor of tvliryalaguda t\Iunicipality, purportedly authorized by the commissioner under section 56(3) of the Act. 9 Section 56(3) of the Act provides: "subject to any directions given, or restricfions imposed by the Government or the councir, the commissioner may, by order in writing, deregate any of his powers or functions to any officer or other emproyee of the councir or to any employee of the Government. The exercise of such delegated power or function shart be subject to conditions as specified by the commissioner and shart remain under his control and revision.', 10 ln contrast, section 366 of the Act specifies who may initiate prosecution "subject to section 36s, no offence under this Act or retated rules or bye-taws shart be tried unless a compraint is fibd by the commr'ssioner or by a person expressry authorised by the councir within three months of the offence provided that failures regarding licences, permissions or registrations constitute continuing offences, attowing compriint within twelve months from com mencement.,, 11' A concerted reading estabrishes that, Section 56(3) dears with administrative delegation of duties by the commissioner and Section 366 is unambiguous in restricting prosecutoriar authority to either the commissioner or a person expliciil y authorized by the council. \ \ i ( t 5 .\ I t{./ (.ri.l'.,\+ 6)9 of)021

12. The Court holds that Section 366's stipulation cannot be subsumed under Section 56. lf general delegation allowed prosecution to be initiated by any subordinate, it would undermine the legislative purpose of carefully circumscribing prosecutorial authority, a safeguard against arbitrary criminalization of citizens.

13. Judicial precedents of this Court underscore such slatutory construction. ln Managipet y. Stale of Telangana (2018), the investigation initiated by a subordinate lacking proper statutory authority has been invalidated, noting that such defects go to the root of jurisdiction, thereby mandating corrective action via fresh proceedings Furthermore, this High Court has repeatedly emphasized strict adherence to statutory authority. ln R. Pushpavathi v. Specla/ Deputy Collector, LA, GHMC Hyderabad, the court invalidated acquisition notifications issued by a local authority not lawfully empowered under the statute, affirming that powers can only be exercised as expressly delegated in law'

14. Thus, in the instant case, the Town Planning Supervisor's attempt to initiate prosecution, being authorized solely by the Commissioner and not by the Council falls outside the statutory framework established in Section 366 and is therefore, regafly impermissibre. This defect is not I I j 6 N111'l 5*. (.rYll).No' 6)9 ol?024 merely technical but foundational' striking at the very iurisdiction of the prosecution l5.Fortheaforestatedreasons,thecharge-sheetisunsustainableas it suffers from an incurable defect in initiating authority' The prosecution must therefore be quashed for lack of lawful competence' l6.Accordingly'theCrimina|Petitionisallowed.Consequently'allthe proceedings in c.c.No. 236 of zo11on the f*e of the rearned Judiciar First Class Magistrate' Miryalaguda' Nalgonda District' are hereby quashed against the petitioner/accused Pending miscellaneous applications , if anY, shall stand closed' SD'- T //TRUE COPY/ N OFFICER \ To, l.TheJudicialFirstClasslt/lagistrateatMiryalguda,NalgondaDistrict 2. One CC to SRI P PRABHAKAR REDDY Advocate [OPUC] 3. Two CCs to Public Prosecutor, High Court for the State of Telangana at 'riYOeraoad [OUT]

4. Two CD CoPies VM/GR g HIGH COURT DATED: 2ZtOtt2O2S ORDER CRLP.No.639 of 2024 { i{5 :: i.q r".- ) I i 1 EEC P5 * *- THE CRIMINAL PETITION ALLOWING