The High Court · 2025

Order

This civil Revision Petition is f,rled by the petitioner-defendant No.l aggrieved by the- order dated 03.01'2025 passed in I'A' No'185 of 2024 in o.S. No.142 of 2024 by the Senior civil Judge cum Assistant Sessions Judge, Kodad

2. The facts of the case in brief are that the respondent Nos'l and 2 - plaintiffs filed o.S. No.142 of 2024 seeking the relief of directing the defendants to vacate the plaint schedule building and to deliver vacant possession of the same to them, to cancel the lease deed dated 05.09.2020 bearing document No.9528 of 2019 on the file of Sub-Registrar, Kodad, in favour of the defendants as the same was obtained by deceiving the plaintiffs and directing the defendants to pay damages @ Rs'5,00'000/- per month for use and occupation of the plaint schedule building from

01.05.2024 along with costs of the suit'

3. As per the averments of the plaint, the plaintiffs were the absolute owners of the plaint schedule building consisting of G+3 floors situated in Kodad Town and Municipality in an extent of 907.5 2 D..GRR.l CRP No.79 of2025 Sq. yds. They rvere represented by their Power of Attomey holder, who was none other than their father. The defendant was a Trust, running Educational Instrtutions and approached the plaintiffs for taking the plaint schedule building on lease for running educational institution and the plaintiffs also agreed to give the plaint building on lease to the defendants and through their G.P.A. holder entered into an agreement dated

20.09.2018. Later the defendants requested the ptaintiffs to execute a nominal registered lease deed for the pulpose of obtaining permissions from the Govenrment for running school. As per the request ol the defendants, the plaintiffs executed a registered lease cleed nominally in favour of the defendants through their authorized representative Danda Venkateswarlu. Ihe defendants got prepared the lease deed and without informing the contents ol the lease deed, asked the plaintiffs to sign the same. Having reposed confidence in the defendants, the plaintiffs signed the alleged lease deed which was nominal for the purpose of obtaining permission from the Government for running school. As per the terms of agreement of lease, the monthly rent for the schedule building is Rs.1,81,828/-, but the defendants to evade stamp duty and registration fee to the Govemment and to cheat the Government and the plaintiff wrongly mentioned the rent in the lease deed as Rs. 10,000/- per month. The

defendants did not disclose the same at the time of obtaining signature. of J Dr-GRR, J CRP No-79 of2025 the plaintiff on the lease deed and cheated the plaintiff and the Govemment and evaded the actual stamp duty and registration fee to be paid on the actual rent of the schedule building taken on lease. As such, the plaintiffs contended that the alleged lease deed was non-est in the eye of law on the principle of non-est lactum and that the same was not legally valid and was liable to be cancelled.

3.i. They further submitted that the defendants took possession of the plaint schedule building on 19-.09.2019 and agreed to pay rent as per the area available for occupation. The lessee agreed to pay 10% enhancement of rent for every 2 years. At the time of agreement, the rent was mentioned as Rs. 1,75,5671-, but it was specifically mentioned in the agreement that the plinth area shalt be determined after completion of construction of the building and the rent was payable for the actual plinth area available for occupation. As such, as the plinth area increased alter construction of the building, the rent was fixed at Rs.1,81,828/- as per the actual area of occupancy i.e.28,664 Sq.ft. As per clause 3 of the agreement of lease, the lease period is for 10 years and the lessors and lessee had the option of terminating the lease by serving a notice of six months in advance from either side. The plaintiffs and the defendants agreed for other terms and conditions mentioned in the lease agreement and the defendants occupied the plaint schedule building and running a school in the plaint 4 D..GR& J CRP No.79 of 2025 schedule building. As per the said clause, if the lease deed was to be registered, the plaintiff will have to bear the expenses for registration and for obtaining permission from Govemment if the lease deed was registered, the defendants had to bear the expenses for registration. The lease was not registered by the plaintiffs but the defendants obtained a nominal registered lease deed for obtaining permission from Government. The defendants kept the plaintifli in dark without disclosing the contents of the lease deed and obtained the lease deed by wrongly mentioning the lease amount therein to avoid stamp duty and registration fee to Govetnment and cheated the plaintiffs and the Govemment. The defendants paid rent for some time as agreed at the rate of Rs.1,81,828/-, but later committed default in payment of rent and committed breach of contract. The defendants failed to pay the rents 1br two months completely i.e. for the months of April and May, 2020 and paid only half of monthiy rent for 16 rnonths from June, 2020 to September, 2021

3.2. The defendants sent a letter requesting the plaintiffs to defer payment of rent for the months of March 2020 to June 2020 due to Covid pandemic prevaiLing at that time. The plaintiffs got issued a reply notice dated 20.04.2020 to the defendants stating that they bok loan I}om the Bank for construction of the schedule building and as per the moratorium granted by the Bank to the plaintiffs, they would extend the same time to 5 D|-GR&.1 CRP No.79 of2025 the defendants in payment ofrent and agreed to defer the paynent ofrent for the months of April and May 2020. As per the terms and conditions of the lease agreement there was a clause for enhancement of l0%o increase of rent for every two years and the defendants were liable to pay enhanced rent after two years. But, the defendants paid 5"/o enhanced rent only instead of L\Y, for the period fiom luly 2022 to October 2022. Since November, the defendants are not paying the rents regularly with 10% enhanced rent and committed default. As per the account statement hled by the defendants itself, there was an outstanding due of rent of Rs.18,29,2491- to be paid to the plaintiffs as on October 2022. Af\er that regular monthly rent with 107o enhancement was due from November 2022 onwards. The plaintiffs orally demanded the defendants and when they committed breach of terms of agreement of lease, got issued a legal notice to the defendants on 17.01.2023 demanding to pay the arrears of rent. After the legal notice was issued, the defendants paid some amounts towards alrears, but still the defendants were due an amount of Rs.i8,75,756l- as on September 2023. The defendants were not regular in payment of rents and were committing default- As such, the plaintiffs asked the defendants to vacate the schedule premises and issued a legal notice on 06.10.2023 to the defendants terminating the lease by giving 6 months prior notice as per the terms of the agreement of lease and 6 D..GRR, J CRP No.79 of2025 demanded the defendants to pay the arrears of rent and to vacate the schedule building by 30.04.2024. The plaintiffs keeping in view the welfare and future of the children and not to disturb their academic year, did not demand the defendants to vacate the paint schedule building in the middle of the academic year though the defendants committed default in pa,.rnent of rents. The defendants were trespassers after 30.04.2024 asthe lease was terminated. The defendants received the notice and did not pay the arrears nor gave any reply.

3.3. As lhe defendants were trying to remain in possession of the schedule building u,ithout vacating, the plaintiffs filed a suit for recovery of arrears ofrent and for injunction on the file of the Junior Civil Judge Court, Kodad, vide O.S. No.24l of 2023 to restrain the delendants from admitting students and running the school in the schedule buitding from 01.05.2024 onwards and the same was pending. The court granted interim injunction but the same was suspended by the Senior Civil Judge, Kodad vide C.M.A.No.7 of 2024. As the defendants did not vacate the plaint schedule building and not paying anears of rent, the plaintiffs got issued a legal notice dated 02.05.2024 to the defendants demanding them to vacate the schedule building, claiming damages at the rate of Rs.5,00,000/- per month. But, the defendants failed to respond to the said notice, as such filed the present suit seeking the above reliefs. 7 D..GRR,I CRP No.79 of 202s

3.4. It was also mentioned in the plaint that there was an Arbitration clause in both the umegistered and registered lease deeds, but as the matter involved in the suit was not against the terms and conditions of the lease agreement, as such, the suit proceedings before civil court were maintainable under law. The plaintifls claimed that the suit was within limitation as per Articie 113 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and had shown the cause of action as it arose on 19.09.2019 when the defendants occupied the schedule building arld on20.09.2018 when the plaintiffs and the defendants entered into the agreement of lease and on 11.04.2020 when the defendants requested to defer payment of rent for the months of April and May 2020 till the sitnation was normalized and on 20.04.2020 when the plaintiffs got issued a reply notice to the defendants and on various other dates like

17.01.2023 when the plaintiff got issued notice to the defendants demanding them to pay the arrears of rent and on 17.12'2022 and on

06.10.2023 terminating the lease and demanding them to pay the arrears of rent and or 02.05 .2024 further demanding to pay damages of Rs'5,00,000/- per month for the use and occupation of the schedule building after termination of lease and on subsequent days when the defendants failed to vacate the schedule building and failed to pay the damages as demanded by them. 8 D..GRR, J CRP No.79 of202s

4. The defendants subsequently filed a petition under Order VII Rule I 1 (a) and (d) of CPC for rejection of the plaint on the ground that it was not disclosing the cause of action and as being barred by law of limitation. The Executive Trustee and Authorized signatory of the defendant No.1 filed an affidavit in support of the petition submitting that the plaintiffs admitted in the plaint that the lease agreement dated

20.09.2018 was not a registered one and also asserted tha[ they had executed a registered lease deed and the plaint did not disclose that the plaintiffs-respondents had issued any notice under the registered lease deed. The registered lease deed was subsisting and rerrains uninfringed Section 50 of the Registration Act, 1908, would declare that a lease deed if duly registered, would take precedence as regards the property comprised therein against every unregistered document relating to the same property. Thus, the rights of the petitioner-Defendant No.1 under the registered lease deed would have supremacy over the unregistered lease agreement. Under the registered lease deed, defendant No.1 was entitled to continue in the suit schedule property until 31.07.2029, as such the plaint was liable to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11(a) of the CpC for not disclosing cause of action.

4.1. It was further submitted that the plaint was not clear as to whether the plaintiffs were seeking cancellation of the lease document 9 D..GRR, J CRP No.79 of 2025 No.9528/2019 or altematively to declare the same as null and void. Article 58 of the Limitation Act provided for a three-year limitation when the right to sue first accrued to obtain a declaration with respect to any documents as null and void. Similarly, Article 59 provided for the limitation of three years to have the instrument canceled after it hrst became known to the plaintiffs. Thus, if the relief was for the cancellation of the document, the respondents -plaintiffs were required to invoke the limitation of Article 59 byassertingthedateofknowledgeforentitlementtosue.Ifthe respondents-plaintiffs were seeking a declaration of the document as null and void, they were required under Article 58 by asserting when the right to sue first accrued. The plaint would not disclose any pieading showing the event of commencement of limitation for the said relief. The plaintiffs proclaimed that the suit was within limitation as per Article 113 of the Indian Limitation Act. Article 1 13 of the Limitation Act was residuary and could be invoked only if no other Article applies. The plaintiffs could not circumvent Articles 58 and 59 of the Limitation Act by employing clever drafting by avoiding mentioning those circumstances by which the suit was barred by the law of limitation. In the present case, residuary Article I 13 could not be invoked because of the availability of specific Articles 5 8 and

59. Thus, the plaint would not disclose that it was hled within the limitation period.orderVIIRuIell(d)CPCmakesitclearthatiftheplaintdidnot l0 Dz,GRR,l CW No.79 of 2025 disclose the necessary averments relating to limitation, the same was liable to be rejected as such, the plaint relief (b) was barred by limitation.

4.2. The defendant fufther contended that the plaintiffs could not claim the benefit of mistake or fraud conceming the contents of document No.9528/2019 as the said document was a registered document and the plaintiffs could have discovered it with reasonable diligence. The said registered lease deed was signed on 5.9.2019. Therefore, the time limit would start on 05.09.2019 and end on04.09.2022 under z\rticles 5g and 59. Therefore, the suit was barred by limitation and was liable to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11(d) of CpC. The Court could not take into cognizance the assertions in the plaint which were contrary to statutory law and judicial dicta for deciding the case in rejecting the plaint. The word 'shall' in order vll Rule 11 implied that it would obligate the courr to reject the plaint i I it fell under any of the conditions specified in the four clauses of Rule 11 of cPC even without the defendants involvement and prayed to reject the plaint under Order VII Rule 1l of CpC.

5. The respondents-plaintiffs filed their counter contending that the petitioner-defendant No.1 had not disputed about the agreement of lease entered between them on 20.09.2018. As per the agreement of lease and also the disputed registered lease deed dated 05.09.2019 under clause-3, 11 DLGRR, t CRP No,79 of2025 thelessorandlesseehadtheoptionofterminatingtheleaseafterservinga six months notice in advance on either side which was a condition agreed by the parties and was binding on both the parties' As such' the respondents-plaintiffs had got every legal right to tetminate the lease by issuing legal notice. Under Clause 14 of the agreement of lease dated 20.0g.2018,'the registration charge for getting lease deed registered for all purposes should be bome by the lessor' The lessor on the request of the lessee agreed to register a separate lease deed to get permission to run the educational institution on the expenses to be borne by the lessee As such the disputed registered lease was executed keeping the plaintiffs in dark about its contents' There was no consensus ad-idem between the parties for the terms of the disputed registered lease deed' The respondents-plaintiffs cametoknowaboutthefraudplayedbythepetitioner-defendantNo.lonly when the plaintiffs filed the suit against the defendants vide O'S' No'241 of 2023whereinthedefendantsfiledtheircountercontendingthattheyhad not defaulted on rent pa,'rnents as per the registered lease deed dated 05.09.2019. The said registered lease deed was obtained by playing fraud upon them as well as on the government with wrong recitals in the documents to evade stamp duty and registration charges' Though the respondents-plaintiffs were parties to the registered lease deed' having cometoknowaboutthefraudplayedbythepetitioner-defendantNo.lafter t2 D..GRR, J CRP No.79 oI2025 filing the counter in I.A No.603 of 2023 in o.S. No.24 r of 2023, rrred the present suit for eviction and for cancelation of registered lease deed dated

05.09.2019 and to declare the same as nur and void. It was clearly stated in the plaint averments under which circumstances the said document was brought into existence. Till date, the petitioner-defendant No. r was making palment of rents as per the lease agreement dated 20.09.201g as such, the said unregistereci agreement of lease was binding on the petitioner and it was acted upon. The cause of action was categorically pleaded in the plaint. The cancelration of lease deed dated 05.09.2019 was sought by the plaintiffs within the limitation from the date of knowledge of the contents of the document and prayed to dismiss the petition.

6. The trial court i.e. the leamed Senior Civil Judge cum Assistant Sessions Judge, Kodad, on hearing both the corrnsel representing the parties, dismissed the petition, observing that whether which lease deed would prevail, registered or unregistered could be decided by the court during the course cf trial. The fact of fraud must be proved before the court through oral or documentary evidence and couid not be presumed from the pleadings itself. As the suit was filed seeking the relief of eviction of the defendants from the suit schedure property and there was no provision of limitation for eviction, the respondents-praintiffs had rightry invoked Articie 1 13 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and further opined that the issue of l3 DIGRR,I CRP No.79 of202s limitation was a mixed question of fact and law' which requires evidence and the same could not be decided at the threshold'

7. Aggrieved by the said order passed by the learned Senior Civil Judge cum Assistant Sessions Judge' Kodad, the defendant No'1 prefer:red this revision S. Heard Sri P. Balaji Verma, learned counsel for the petitioner- defendant No.1 and Sri Shaik Madar, learned counsel for the respondents- plaintiffs. g. Learned counsel for the revision petitioner contended that the plaintiffs' suit for eviction, cancellation of lease deed and damages was fundamentally fraud as it lacks valid cause of action' Section 50 of the Registration Act, 1908 unequivocally established the supremacy of registered document over unregistered document pertaining to the same property. The piaintiffs acknowledged that the eviction notice referred to in the plaint relates only to the unregistered lease deed and that no notice of eviction was issued conceming the registered lease deed' No lease existed under the unregistered lease deed' The unregistered iease deed would disclose that the lease would commence on 01'06'2019' while the subsequent registered lease deed dated 05'09'2019 would indicate that the lease would begin on 01.08'2019 and lease payments were made only after t4 D..GRR, I CRP No.79 of2025

01.08.2019. Thus, only the registered lease deed was acted upon. He contended that when there was no lease under the unregistered lease, eviction could n't be pursued basing on the unregistered lease deed. He further contended that the plaintiff incorrectly invoked Article I l3 of the Limitation .A'ct, r residuary Article. Article 59 prescribes a three year limitation period for cancelration of a document running from the date when the facts e,titling the plaintiff to seek cancellation became known. The ptaintiffi being a signatory to the registered lease deed could not clai*r ignorance ol its contents or ailege delayed discovery of the document contents. The plaintiff could not rely on the doctrine of the non-est factum as it would apply only to those who were incapacitated from understanding the contents of the document without the assistance of others, which was not the present case. Section 17 of the Limitation Act wourd stipulate that the lirnitation peri,rd would begin when the fraud was discovered or could have been discovered with reasonabre diligence. The plaintiffs failure to exercise due diligence at the time of executing the registered rease deed could not extend the limitation period. Since there was no cause of action for eviction based on either the registered lease or unregistered rease and the eviction relief sought in the present suit was a consequentiar remedy linked to the cancellation of the lease deed, therefore, the limitation applicable to the canceilation of the documents only applies to the case. 15 Dn.GRR,I CRP No-79 of2025 The suit was barred by limitation as per Article 59 of the Limitation Act,

1963. lt was three years limitation period specified under Article 59 of the Limitation Act, which would begin from the date of execution of the lease deed. The attempt at creative drafting was an effort to circumvent the specific provisions of the Limitation Act by improperly invoking a residuary articie. The plaintiffs' allegations offraud, deception or cheating were vague and unsubstantiated. The difference in rents specified in the registered lease compared to the unregistered lease deed would not indicate fraud, particularly since the defendant had consistently paid Rs.1,81,828/- per month with enhancement as outlined in the unregistered lease deed. Furthermore, it was not the case that the petitioner-defendant No. I had gained any undue advantage or benefit as a result of the alleged fraud. Therefore, the unsubstantiated lraud allegations would not provide a valid basis lor the suit. The trial court incorrectly stated that the precedence between the registered and unregistered lease deeds would be determined after reviewing evidence. Section 50 of the Registration Act was a clear provision that could be applied at the stage of Order VII Rule 1 1 . The court could not consider assertions in the complaint that would contradict statutory law. The trial court failed to recogtize that eviction relief was based on notices sent from unregistered lease deed which was legally untenable. The observation of the trial court that limitation was a mixed I6 D.-GRR,I CRP No.79 of 2025 question of fact and law was also contrary to the established legal principles and relied upon the judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Sri Mukund Bhavan Trust v. Shrimant Chhatrapati Udayan Raje Pratapsinh Maharaj Bhonsle and anotherr and Ramathal and others v. K. Rajamani (Dead) through LRs. and another2.

10. Leamed counsel for the respondents-plaintiffs, on the other hand, contended that the petitioner was a corporate body running several schools in various places and have a separate legal department. The respondent Nos.l and 2 were represented by their GPA holder and father Ganta Satyanarayana. They had entered into an unregistered lease deed with the petitioner on 20.09.2018 which was a comprehensive one. As per clause No. 14 of the said lease deed, the land ladies airreed to execute a nominal registered lease deed in favour of the petitioner herein, since it was required to get permission to run the school. Accordingly, the petitioner herein obtained a nominal registered lease deed on 05 09.2019 from the respondents - plaintiffs for the purpose of getting permissions to run the school. The stamp paper was purchased by the petitioner and it was drafted by their legal department. The land ladies were under the impression that the registered lease deed would not be used against them. At that time, '202t SCC Online SC 384,, '2023 SCC Ool-ine SC 1022

1.7 Dr.GRR,I CRP No.79 of2025 they could not understand the nefarious and clandestine design of the petitioner. In the registered lease deed, the lease amount was shown as Rs. 10,000i- per month only instead of Rs.1,80,000/- and odd per month as stipulated in the originai unregistered lease deed. The building was constructed by obtaining a bank loan by the land ladies. As per the requirement of the petitioner herein to run the school, its possession was handed over to the petitioner as stipulated in the registered lease deed. The land ladies would not have executed the registered lease deed, if it was not required for obtaining permissions to run the school by the petitioner. It was fraud played by a Corporate body. Since the petitioner committed default in paying the lease amount regularly, the respondents got issued legal notices dated I 7.0 1.2023, 06.10.2023 and 02.05.2024 demanding the petitioner for paS.T nent of arrears of lease amount and also to vacate the premises if they failed to pay the lease amount regularly, under the lease agreement. The petitioner received the same, but did not give any reply and intentionally kept quiet. As such, the respondent Nos'1 and 2lied a suit vide O.S. No.241 of 2023 and filed I.A. No.603 of 2023 seeking temporary injunction. The same was allowed on merits, but challenging the same, the petitioner preferred a CMA and the same was pending' The respondent Nos.l and 2 for the first time came to know about the fraud played by the petitioner on 23.12.2023 when the defendant filed their 18 Dz.GRR,I CRP No.79 oI2025 counter in I.A. No.603 of 2023, wherein they stated that the rent was Rs.10,000/- per month only. As such, after issuing the third legal notice, the land ladies had filed the present suit O.S.No.l42 of'2024 for eviction, for cancellation of the registered lease deed on the ground of fraud and also claiming damages @ Rs.5,00,000/- per month for the unauthorized use and occupation of the premises of the plaintiffs.

10.1. The learned counsel for the respondents fur1her contended that the suit was filed for eviction, which was the main reliel and since there was no specific provision in the Limitation Act lor eviction, the respondents-plaintiffs pleaded that the suir was filed within the timitation under Article 1 13 of the Limitation Act, 1963 . Even if it was presumed for the sake of argument that Article 59 of the Limitation Ac1 was applicable to the facts of the case, the suit was filed rvithin the limitation period of three years, when the plaintiffs hrst came to know about the fraud played by the petitioner on23.12.2023 when a counrer was frled in I.A. No.603 of 2023 in O.S. No.241 of 2023. It was well established that limitation was a mixed question of fact and law and it had to be decided only a11er completion of trial. The plaint could not be rejected on the said ground. The order passed by the trial couft was in accordance with the well established principles of law. As per Clause 3 of the unregistered lease deed as well as the registered lease deed, there was no need to plead about violation of any 19 D..GRR,I CRP No.79 of2025 rightsorinfringementforfilingasuitforeviction.Eitheroftheparties could terminate the lease by issuing a six months notice in advance. The petitioner was paying rents as per the unregistered lease deed only' The petitioner did not deny the claim of the respondent Nos. I and 2 in the three legalnotices.Assuch,therewasavalidcauseofactionforthemto|rlethe presentsuit.Thepleaofnon-estfactumwasatriableissueanditcouldnot be decided in a petition filed for rejection of the plaint. Theijudgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Ramathal and others v' K' Rajamani (Dead) throughLRs.andanother(2supra)reiiedbythelearnedcounselforthe petitioner was suppofiing the case of the respondent Nos l and 2 herein' The piaint could not be rejected on the ground of inconsistent pleadings or that one of the relief was barred by taw, because it was well established that theplaintwouldnotberejectedinpart.SincetherespondentNos.land2 had also prayed for the relief of eviction and for damages' apart from the relief of cancellation of registered lease deed and relied upon the judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court in G' Nagaraj and others v' B'P' Mruthunjayanna and others3, on the principles to be followed while dealing with the application under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC; and in Sejal Glass Ltd. v. Navilan Merchants Pvt. Ltd.a and central Bank of India 'Ml,Nu sc/oszSlu ozl o zorz (o) ar,o rlz (sc) 20 D..GRR, J CRP No,79 of 2025 and another v. Prabha Jain & otherss, on the aspect that the plaint cannot be rejected in part and Gujarat Composite Limited v. A rnfrastructure Limited & others6 on the aspect whether the parties were required to be referred to arbitration when there is a clause of arbitration mentioned in the agreement. 1 1. Nou, the point for consideration in this revision petition is: Whether the order passed by the courl below is within its jurisdiction and mandate under Order VII Rule 11 of CpC or whether the same is liable to be set aside?

12. The Hon'ble Apex Courl in Dahiben v. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali (Gajra) 7 outlined the principles for deciding an application under Order VII Rule 11 of CpC as follows: "The remedy under Order VII Rule 11 is an independent and special remedy, wherein the Court is empowered to strmmarily dismiss a suit at the threshold, without proceeding lo record evidence. and conducting a trial, on the basis of the evidence adduced, if it is satisfied that the action should be terminated on any of tho grounds contained in this provision. The underlyrng object of Order VII Rule l l (a) is that if in a suit, no cause of action is disclosed, or the suit is barred by limitation under Rule I I (d), the Court would not permit the plaintiff to unnecessarily protract the proceedings in the suit. ln such a case, it would be necessary to put an end to the sham litigation, so that firtherjudicial time is not wasted. s 5 2025 Lawsuir (SC) 102 2023 Live[,aw (SC) 3E4 ':ozo (z) scc tor Di-GR& J CRP No.79 of2025 In Azhar Hussain v. Rajiv Gandhi [1986 Supp SCC 366], this .Court held that the whole purpose of conferment of powers under this provision is to ensure that a litigation which is meaningless, and bound to prove abortive, should not be permitted to continue to waste judicial time of the court, in the following words: "12. ...The whole purpose of conferment of such power is to ensure that a litigation which is meaningless, and bound to prove abortive should not be permitted to occupy the time of the Court. The sword of Damocles need not be kept hanging over his head unnecessarily without any point or purpose. Even in an ordinary civil litigation, the Court should readily exercise the power to reject a plaint, if it does not disclose any cause of action." The power conferred on the coun to terminate a civil action is, however, a drastic one, and the conditions enumcrated in Order VII Rule 1 1 are required to be strictly adhered to. Under Order VII Rule 1 l, a duty is cast on the Court to determine whether the plaint discloses a cause of action by scrutinizing the averments in the plaint read in conjunction with the documents relied upon, or whether the suit is barred by any law. Order VII Rule l4(l) provides for production of documents, on which the plaintiffplaces reliance in his suit. Having regard to Order VII Rule 14 CPC, the documents filed along with the plaint, are required to be taken into consideration for deciding the application under Order VII Rule 1 1 (a). When a document referred to in the plaint, forms the basis of the plaint, it shouid be treated as part of the plaint. In exercise of power under this provision, the Court would determine if the assertions made in the plaint are conhary to stahrtory law, or judicial dicta, for deciding whether a case for rejecting the plaint at the threshold is made out. At this stage, the pleas taken by the defendant in the written statement and application for rejection of the plaint on merits, 22 D..GRR,I CRP No.79 of2025 would be irrelevant, and camot be adverted to, or taken into consideration. The test for exercising the power under Order VII Rule 11 is that if the averments made in the plaint are taken in entirety, in conjunction with the documents relied upon, would the same result in a decree being passed. This test was laid down in Liverpool & London S.P. & I Assn. Ltd. v. M.V.Sea Success which reads as: "139. \\4rether a plaint discloses a cause of action or not is essentially a question of fact. But whether it does or does not must be found out from reading the plaint itself. For the said purpose. the averments made in the plaint in therr cntirety must be held to be correct. The test is as to whether if the averments made in the plaint are taken to be correct in their entiroty, a decree would be passed." In Hardesh Ores (P.) Ltd. v. Hede & Co.[(2007) 5 SCC 614] the Court further held that it is not permissible to oull out a sentence or a passage, and to read it in isolation. It is the substance, and not merely the form, which has to be looked into. The plaint has to be construed as it stands, without addition or subtraction of words. If the allegations in the plaint prima facic show a cause of action, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry whether the allegations ate true in fact. D.Ramachandran v. R.V.Janakiraman [(1999) 3 SCC 267]. If on a meaningful reading of the plaint, it is found thet thc suit is manif-estly vexatious and without any merit, and does not disclose a right to sue, the court would be justihed in exercising the powor under Order VII Rule I I CPC. The power under Order VII Rule I I CPC may be exercised by the Coufi at any stage of the suit, either before registering the plaint. or after issuing sutrllnons to the defendant, or before conclusion of the trial, as held by this Courl in the judgment ofSaleern Bhai v. State of Maharashkal4. The plea that once issues are framed, the matter must necessarily go to trial was repelled by this Court in Azhar Hussain (supra). The provision of Order VII Rule I I is mandatory in nature. It states that the plaint "shall" be rejected if any of the grounds specified in clause (a) to (e) are made out. If the Court finds that 23 D..GRR,,l CRP No,79 of2025 the plaint does not disclose a cause of action, or that the suit is barred by any law, the Court has no option, but to reject the plaint. "Cause of action" means every fact which would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to judgrnent. It consists of a bundle of material facts, which are necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to entitle him to the reliefs claimed in the suit. In Swamy Atmanand v. Sri Ramakrishna Tapovanarn, this Court held : "24. A cause of action, thus, means every fact, which if traversed, it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to support his right to a judgnent of the court. In other words, it is a bundle of facts, which taken with the law applicable to them gives the plaintiff a right to relief against the defendant. It must include some act done by the defendant since in the absence of such an act, no cause of action can possibly accrue. It is not limited to the achral infringement of the right sued on but includes all the material facts on which it is founded" (emphasis supplied) In T. Arivanandam v. T.V. Satyapal l(1997) 4 SCC 4671 this Court held that while considering an application under Order VII Rute I 1 CPC what is required to be decided is whether the plaint discloses a real cause of action, or something purely illusory, in the following words: "5. ...The leamed Munsif must remember that if on a meaningful not formal reading of the plaint it is manifestly vexatious, and meritless, in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, he should exercise his power under Order VII, Rule 1 1 C.P.C. taking care to see that the ground mentioned therein is fulfilled. And, if clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action, nip it in the bud at the first hearing ..." (emphasis supplied) Subsequently, in I.T.C. Ltd. v. Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal l(1998) 2 SCC 701 this Court held that law cannot 24 DT.GRR,J CRP No.79 of202s permit clever drafting which creates illusions of a cause of action. What is required is that a clear right must be made out in the plaint. If, however, by clever drafting of the plaint, it has created the illusion of a cause of action, this Court in Madanuri Sri Ramaohandra Murthy v. Syed Jalal l(2O11 13 SCC 1741 held that it should be nipped in the bud, so that bogus litigation rvill end at the earliest stage. The Court must be vigilant against any camouflage or suppression, and determine whether the litigation is utterly vexatious, and an abuse of the process of the court. The Limitation Act, 1963 prescribes a time-limit for the institution of all suits, appeals, and applications, Section 2O defines the expression "period of limitation" to mean the period of limitation prescribed in the Schedule ior suits, appeals or applications. Section 3 lays down that every suit instituted after the prescribed period, shall be dismissed even though limitation may not have been set up as a defence. If a suit is not covercd by any specific article, then it would fall .,vithin the residuary article. Articles 58 and 59 ofthe Schedule to the 1963 Act, prescribe the poriod rrf limitation for filing a suit where a declaration is sought, or cancellation of an instrument, or rescission of a contract which reads as under : Period of Limitation Tbree vears Three years Description of

58. To obtain declaration 59. To cancel or set aside an instrument or decree or for the rescission of a contract Time from which limitation begins to When the risht to sue first accrues When the lircts entitling the plaintiff instrument or decree cancelled or set aside the contract rescinded become known to him. 25 DTGRR, I CRP No.79 of2025 The period of limitation proscribsd under Artiolos 58 and 59 of the 1963 Act is tfuee years, which cornmencos from the date when the right to sue first accrues. In Khatri Hotels Prt. Ltd. v. Union of India [(2011) I SCC 126] this Court held that the use of the word 'first' between the words 'sue' and 'accrued', would mean that if a suit is based on multipte causes of action, the period of limitation will begin to run from the date when the right to sue first accrues That is, if there are successive violations of the right, it would not give rise to a fresh cause of action, and the suit will be liable to be dismissed, if it is beyond the period of limitation counted from the date when the right to sue first accrued. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in State of Punjab v Gurdev Singh [(1991) 4 SCC 1] held that the Court must examine the plaint and determine when the right to sue first accrued to the plaintiff, and whether on the assumed facts, the plaint is within time. The words "right to sue" means the right to seek relief by means of legal proccedings. The right to sue accrues only when the cause of action arises' The suit must be instituted when the right asserted in the suit is infringed, or when there is a clear and unequivocal theat to infrinle such right by the defendant against whom the suit is instituted. Ordei vtl Rule I 1(d) provides that where a suit appears from the averments in the plaint to be barred by any law, the plaint shall be rejected."

13. The Hon'ble Apex Courl in Sri Mukund Bhavan Trust v' ShrimantChhatrapatiUdayanRajePratapsinhMaharajBhonsleand anotherE held that: "12. As settled in law, when an application to reject the plaint is filed, the averments in the plaint and the documents annexed therewith alone are germane. The averments in the application can be taken into account only to consider whether the case falls within any of the sub-rules of Order VII Rule 11 by considering * 2024 SCC Online sc 3844 Dr.GRR, J CRP No.79 of202s the averments in the plaint. The Court cannot look into the written statement or the documents filed by the defendants. The Civil C ourts including this Court cannot go into the rival contentions at that stage." In para-14. it was also held that: . "14....There is also a presumption in law that a rcgistcred document is validiy executed and is valid until it is deciarecl as illegal."

13.1. Section 3 of the Transfer of property Act, 1gg2 was also extracted in para No. l5 of the said judgment to consider when a person is said to have notice of a fact. "15. At this juncture, it would be relevant to refer to relevant portion ofsection 3 of the Transfer of property Act, lgg2, which reads as under: "3. Interpretation clause.....- ...... .,a person is said to have notice of a fact when he actuaiy knows that fact. or when. but for willful abstcntion from an enquiry or search which he ought to have rnade. or gross negligence, he would have krown it. Fxplanation l.-Where any transaction relating to immoveable property is required by law to be anJhas been. eflected by a regis(ered instrument. anv person acquiring such property or any part of, or share or interest in, such property shall be deemed to have notice of such instrument as from the date of registration or, where the property is not all situated in one sub-district, or where the registered instrument has been registered under sub-seciion (2) ofsection 30 of the Indian Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), from the earliest date on which -y .".o.uodrr* oi such registered instrument has been filed by any Sub_ Registrar within whose sub-district u.,y purt tf tn" property which is being acquired, or of the property wherein a share or interest is Ueirg acquirea, is situated: 27 DIGRR, J CEP No-79 of2025 Provided that{ 1) the instrument has been registered and its registration completed in the manner prescribed by the Indian Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), and the rules made thereunder, (2) the instrument or memorandum has been duly entered or fi1ed, as the case may be, in books kept under section 51 of that Act, and(3)the particulars regarding the transaction to which the instrument relates have been correctly entered in the indexes kept under section 55 of that Act. Explanation II.-Any person acqulnng any immovable property or any share or interest in any such property shall be deemed to have notice of the title, if any, of any person who is for the time being in actual possession thereof. Explanation III.-A person shall be deemed to have had notice of any fact if his agent acquires noticc thereof whilst acting on his behalf in the course of business to which that fact is material: Provided that, if the agent fiaudulently conceals thc fact, the principal shall not be charged with notice thereof as against any person who was a party to or otherwise cogrizant ofthe fraud."

13.2, Thus, it was held that there was a constructive notice from the date of registration and the presumption under Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act comes into operation from the said date

13.3. Even with regard to the plea of limitation, it was held by the Hon'ble Apex Court therein that "18. Continuing further with the plea of limitation, the Courts below have held that the question of the suit being barred by limitation can bb decided at the time of trial as the question of limitation is a mixed question of law and facts. Though the question of limitation generally is a mixed question of law and fact, when upon meaningful reading of the plaint, the coud can come to a conclusion that under the given circumstances, after ,a Dt.GRR, J CRP No.79 oJ2025 dissecting the vices of clever drafting creating an illusion of cause ol action, the suit is hopelessly barred and the plaint can be rejected under Order VII Rule 1 1."

13.4. While also considering the aspect whether Article 59 or Article I l3 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act was applicable, while refening to the case of Mohd. Noorul Hoda v. Bibi Raifunnisa [(1996) 7 SCC 767J, rvhich was extracted as follows: *2t. .

6. The question, therefore, is as to whether Article 59 or Article 113 of the Schedule to the Act is applicable to the fircts in this case. Article 59 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1908 had provided inter alia for suits to set aside decree obtained by fiaud. There was no specific article to set aside a decree on any other ground. In such a case. the residuary Article 120 in Schedute III was attraced. Thc present Article 59 of the Schedule to the Act will govem any suit to set aside a decree either on fraud or any other ground. Theretbre, Article 59 would be applicable to any suit to set asidc a decree either on fiaud or any other ground. It is true that Article 59 would be applicable if a person affected is a party lo a decree or an instrument or a contract. There is no disput,: that Article 59 would apply to set aside the instrument, decree or contract between the inter se parties. The question is whether in case of person claiming titie through the pafiy to the decree or instrument or having knowledge of the instrument or decree or contract and seeking to avoid the decree by a specific declaration, whethcr Article 59 gets attracted? As stated earlier, Article 59 is a general provision. In a suit to set aside or cancel an instrunrent, a contract or a decree on the ground of fiaud, .A.dicle 59 is attracted. The starting point of limitation is the date of knowledge of the alleged fraud. When the plaintiff seeks to establish his title to the property which cannot be established without avoiding the decree or an instmment that stands as an insurmountable obstacle in his way which otherwise binds him, though not a party, the plaintiff necessarily has to seek a declaration and-have that decree, instrument or contract cancelled or set aside or rescinded. Section 31of the Specific Relief Act. 1963 regulates suits for cancellation of an instrument whrch lays 29 DLGRR' T CRP No.79 of2025 down that ahy person against whom a written instrument is void or voidable and who has a reasonable apprehension that such instrument, if left outstanding, may cause him serious injury, can sue to have it adjudged void or voidable and the court may in its discretion so adjudge it and order it to be delivered or cancelled. It would thus be clear that the word 'person' in Section 3l of the Specific Relief Act is wide enough to eocompass a person seeking derivative title from his setler. It would, therefore, be clear that if he seeks avoidance of the instrument, decree or contract and seeks a declaration to have the decrees set aside or cancelled he is necessarily bound to lay the suit within three years from the date when the facts entitling the plaintiff to have the decree set aside, first became known to him." 1 3.5 While considering the scope of Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the Flon'ble Apex Court also extracted its earlier judgment in Prem Singh v. Birbale and held that "22. lt wlll also be useful to refer to the judgrnent of this Cou( in Prem Singh v. Birbal, where the scope of the Limitation Act, 1963 and Article 59 was discussed and held as under: "11. Limitation is a statute of repose. It ordinarily bars a remedy, but, does not extinguish a right. The only exception to the said rule is to be found in Section 27 of the Limitation Act, 1963 which provides that at the determination of the period prescribed thereby, limited to any person for instituting a suit for possession of any property, his right to such property shall be extinguished.

12. An extinction ofright, as contemplated by the provisions of the Limitation Act, prima facie would be attracted in all types of suits. The Schedule appended to the Limitation Act, as prescribed by the articles, provides that upon lapse of the prescribed period, the instihrtion of a suit will be barred. Section 3 of the Limitation Act provides that irrespective of the fact as to whether any defence is set out or is raised by the defendant or not, in the event a suit is found to be barred by limitation, every suit instituted, appeal ' lzooo; s scc lsl 30 Dt GRR, J CRP No.79 of2025 prefcrred and every application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed.

13. Article 59 of the Limitation Act applies specially when a relief is claimed on the ground of fiaud or mistake. It only encornpasses within its fold fraudulent transactions which are voidable transactions.

14. r\ suit for cancellation of instrument is based on thc provisions ofSection 3l of the Specifrc Relief Act. which reads as under: "3 I . When cancellation may be ordered.-(l ) Any person against whom a written instrument is void or voidable, and who has reasonable apprehension that such instrument, if left outstanding may cause him serious injury, may sue to have it adjudged void or voidable; and the court may, in its discretion, so adjudge it and order it to be delivered up and cancelled. (2) If the instrument has been registered under the Indian Rcgistration Act, i908 (16 of 1908), the court shall.also send a copy of its decree to the officer in whose office the instrument has been so registered; and such officer shall note on the copy of the instrument contained in his books the fact of its cancellation.,,

15. Scction 3l of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 thus, refers to both void and voidabte documents. It provides for a discretionary relief. I 6- When a document is valid, no question arises of its cancellation. When a document is void ab initio, a decree for setting aside the same would not be necessary as the same is non est in the eye of the law, as it would be a nullity.

17. Once, however, a suit is filed by a plaintiff for cancellation of a transaction, it would be govemed b1,fu1lsls 59. Even if Article 59 is not attracted, the residuary article would be. 31 Dz.CRR, J CRP No.79 of2025

18. Article 59 would bo attracted when coorcion, undue influence, misappropriation or fraud which the plaintiff asserts is required to be proved. Article 59 would apply to the case of such instruments. It would, therefore, apply where a document is prima facie valid. It would not apply only to instruments which are presumptively invalid'

22. In Ningawwa v. Byrappa (1968) 2 SCR 797 : AIR 1968 SC 9561 this Court held that the fraudulent misrepresentation ^ ,"guid. character of a document is void but fraudulent misrelresentation as regards contents of a document is voidable stating: "The legal position will be different if there is a fraudulent misrepresentation not merely as to the contents of the document but as to its character' The authorities make a clear distinction between fraudulent misrepresentation as to the character of the document and fraudulent misrepresentation as to the contents thereof. With reference to the former, it has been held that the transaction is void, while in the case of the latter, it is merely voidable."

13.6.TheHon'bleApexCourtwhileconsideringwhetherlimitation was a mixed question of fact and law and could be decided only after weighing the evidence on record, held that: *26. At this juncture, we wish to observe that we are not unmindful of the position of law that limitation is a mixed question of fact and law and the question of rejecting the plaint on that score has to be decided after weighing the evidence on record. However, in cases like this, where it is glaring from the plaint averments that the suit is hopelessly barred by limitation' ihe Courts should not be hesitant in granting the relief and drive the parties back to the trial Court. We again place it on record that this is not a case where any forgery or fabrication is committed which had recently come to the knowledge of the plaintiff. Rather, the plaintiff and his predecessors did no-t take any steps to assert their title and rights in time The- alleged cause oi'action is also found to be creation of fiction' However' the trial Court erroneously dismissed the application filed by the appellants under Order VII Rule 11(d) ofCPC' The High Court in affirming the same, keeping the question of ui* "."a 32 D\GRR, J CRP No.79 of2025 limitation open to be considered by the trial Court after considering the evidence along with other issues, without deciding the core issue on the basis of the averments made bv the Respondent No.l in the plaint as mandated by Order VIi Rule I I (d) of CPC. The spirit and intention of Orjer VII Rule 1(d) of CPC is only for the Courts to nip at its bud when any litigation ex facie appears to be a clear ibuse of process. The Courts by being reluctant only cause more harm to the defendants by forcing them to undergo the ordeal of leading evidence. Therefore, we hold that the plaint is liable to be rejected at the threshold.', _1 t4. ln the light of the observations of the Hon,ble Apex Court in the above case, whether the trial court has decided the petition by considering all these principles or not, need to be looked into.

15. Admittedly, there were two lease deeds executed between the parties; one registered iease deed dated 05.09.2019 vide document No.952g of 2019 arrd the other unregistered lease deed dated 20.09.20rg. Under Section 17(1Xd) ,f the Registration Act, l90g and Secrion 107 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, registration of a lease deed for a term exceeding 1r months is mandatory. An unregistered lease deed cannot be used to prove the .erms of lease or cannot be the basis to file an eviction suit unless it falrs under the proviso to section 49 of the Registration Act, 1908 i.e. for collaterar purpose to prove possession. Section 50 of the Registration Act, 1908 gives priority to registered documents over oral or un-registered docurnents. It emphasizes that registered documents take precedence over un-registered documents relating to the same property, if 13 D|.GRR,I CRP No.79 of202s executed in good faith and without notice of the earlier claims- Thus, whenever there was conflict between the registered document and an unregistered document, (which was required to be registered), the registered document prevails. Thus, the registered lease deed would prevail over an unregistered lease deed under Section 50 of the Registration Act, 1908, even if it does not reflect the true tems' The object of enacting Section 50 is to discourage secret or fraudulent deals hidden through unregistered agreements. As both the registered and unregistered lease deeds exists for the same propefiy, as per Section 50 of the Registration Act, 1908, the registered document prevails over unregistered one in conflicting claims as per the rule of priority prescribed under it and the trial court cannot ignore the statutory law while deciding a petition under Order VII Rule 1l of CPC and cannot say that it could be decided by the Court after considering the evidence adduced by the parties in the course of trial. The evidence adduced by the parties would be having no bearing on this principle.

16. The contention of learned counsel for the respondents- plaintiffs that the respondents had executed the registered lease deed without understanding its legal complications and that it was a nominal deed executed only for the purpose obtaining permission from the D|.GRR, J CRP No.79 of 2025 authorities and the same was not legally valid and bincling upon them on the principle of non-est factum, cannot be accepted, as the respondents- plaintiffs are well educated persons and can read the contents of the documents and can understand its meaning and had executed the document with full knowiectge, they cannot take the plea of fraud.

17. The Hon'bie Apex Court in Ramathal and others v. K. Rajamani (Dead) through LRs. and anotherr0 held that: "19. The ingredients of the plea ofnon est factum as laid down not only in the case of Smt. Bismillah v. Janesh,,vrrr prasad [(l 990) l SCC 2071 are existing in the present case, but also the three parameters as can be deduced from Saunders .v. Anglia Building Society [(1970) 3 ALL ER 961] were in exisrence in the present case as well. The aforementioned test for a success{irl plea ofnon est factum requires that: A. The person pleading non est factum must belong to ,,class of persons, who through no fault of their own, are unable to have any understanding of the purpose ofthe particular document because of blindness, illiteracy or some other disability". The disability must be one requinng the reliance on others for advice as to what they are signing. As Lord Pearson had aptly put: "In my opinion, the plea of non est factum ought to be available in a proper case for the relief of a person who for permanent or temporary reasons (not limited to blindness or illiteracy) is not capable of both reading and suffrciently understanding the deed or other document to be signed. By ..sulficiently understanding" I mean understanding at least to the point of detecting a fundamental diflerence between the actual document and the document as the signer had believed it to be." B. "Tire "signatory must have made a fundamental mistake as to the nature of the contents of the document being to 2023 scc onliue sc 1022 35 D|.GRR, J CRP No.79 of2025 signed", including its practical effects. Lord Wilberfore has succinctly put this aspect: "In my opinion, a document should be held to be void (as opposed to voidable) only when the element of consent to it is totally lacking, that is, more concretely, when the transaction which the document purports to effect is essentially different in substance or in kind from the transaction intended" C. The document must have been radically different fiom one intended to be signed. As Lord Reid rernarked in the judgnent: "There must, I think, be a radical difference between what he signed and what he thought he was signing - or one could use the words "fundamental" or "serious" or 'tery substantial." But what amounts to a radical difference will depend on all the circumstances."

18. Thus, to prove the plea of non-est tactum, the plaintiffs must be persons who were unable to understand the contents or nature of the document due to some disability like blindness, illiteracy or unable to detect the fundamental difference between the actual factual document and document they believed it to be. These aspects are absent in the present case. The respondents-plaintiffs are party to the said document and party to the fraud played by the petitioner-defendant No.1 in cheating the government authorities and executed it with full knowledge. only when the said document was used against them, the respondents-plaintiffs are raising the plea of fraud. They are also ready to conceal the rent payable under the said document with an intention to deceive the authorities JO Dt GRR, J CRP No.79 of 2025 knowing fully-well that it was a fraudulent document. As such, the plea of fraud is also appticable to them and no evidence was required to be proved such fraud as the facts averred in the plaint itself would make it clear. The starting point of limitation is the date of the knowledge of the alleged fraud and as they were parties to the said fraudurent document, they were aware of the fraud conrmitted by the petitioner-defendant since the date of its execution. As such, it was Article 59 of the Limitation Act rvhich was applicable to the f-acts of the case and the suit has to be filed within three years from the date of execution of the registered lease deed to seek for its cancellation. As it was not the case of the respondents-plaintiffs that they came to know about the existence of the registered lease deed with terms mentioned in it with regard to rent only recently about the said fact, limitation cannot be considered as a mixed question of f-act and law and that it could be decided only after evidence was adduced. As the courts could not help the persons who were also parties to the fraud, abusing the process of law for their own monetary benefit and the spirit and intention of order vll Rule 11 (d) of cpc is to nip at bud any vexatious litigation which ex facie appears to be against raw, the defendant need not be forced to undergo the ordeal of trial and wait till the evidence is completed. 37 D..GRR,t CRP No.79 of2025 lg.Admittedly,thelegalnoticeswhichwereannexedtothelistof documents to the plaint are issued with reference to the unregistered lease deed but not with reference to the registered lease deed. As such, the suit for eviction is also not maintainable basing upon the notices issued on an invalid and legally inadmissibie document. The relief claimed by the respondents-plaintiffs for eviction of the defendants cannot be granted as there was no cause of action to file the suit for the respondents-plaintiffs without issuing notice in reference to the registered lease deed. The relief claimedunderclause(b)tocanceltheregisteredleasedeeddocumentis barred by limitation under Article 59 of the Limitation Act. The relief claimed under clause (c) for damages @ Rs'5,00,000i- per month is consequential to the reliefs claimed under clauses (a) and (b)' When the reliefs under clauses (a) and (b) cannot be granted, the relief under clause (c) also cannot be granted.

20.Assuch,astheplaintdoesnotdiscloseanycauseofactionto file the suit for eviction or cancellation of the registered lease deed and as the reliefs claimed by the respondents-plaintiffs are baned by the law of limitation, the plaint can be rejected. As the trial court passed the order in ignorance of the statutory provision under Section 50 of the Registration Act, 1908 and failed to consider that the eviction notices were issued 38 DI.GRR, J cRP No.79 oI202S basing upon the unregistered lease deed and passed order contrary to the established legal principles as reiterated by the Hon'blc Apex court in the above cases ancl on incorrect assessrnent of limitation, it is considered fit to set aside the impugned order.

21. In the result, the I.A. No.lg5 of 2024 is altowed and the plaint in O.S. No.142 of 2024 stands rejected. No order as to costs. Miscellaneous Applications pending, if any, shafl stand closed. SD/. MOHD.ISMATL DEPUTY REGISTRAR I NOTE: This order is amended as per the Court order dated 25-06-2025 passed in l.A.No.2 of 2O2S by incorporating the sentence in the operative portion as "ln the result, the LA.No.185 of 2024 is allowed and the plaint in O.S.No.142 ot 2024 stands rejected. ln place of "ln the result, the CRP is allowed setting aside the order in l.A.No.'I85 of 2024 in O.S.No.142 of 2024 passed by the Senior Civil Judge cum Assistant Sessions Judge, Kodad, dated 03-01-2025". This amended order substitutes the earlier order, which was despatched on 23-06-2025 becomes infructuous To, //TRUE COPY// SD/. MOHD.ISMAIL DEPUry REGISTRAR Rat- SECTION OFFICER 1 . The S^enior Civil J_udge-Cum- Assistant Sessions Judge, at Kodad 2. One CC to SRl. P. BALAJT VARMA, Advocate topu6l 3. One CC to SRl. SHATK MADAR, Advocate tOpUCl 4. Two CD Copies *{ r \ ! ., ;.1

7.,- ).' 2 2 sEP 2025 i'tl .:"/ ..\ ,,a icHeg '.'i. HIGH COURT DATED:09/06/2025 25t06t2025 AMENDED ORDER CIVIL REVISION PETTTION No.79 of 2025 ALLOWING THE CI\'IL REVISION PETITION