GPA Smr v. Nirupama Reddy wo rate or .rigin

Judgment

r) HON'BLE JUSTICE MOUSHUMI BHATTACHARYA AND HON'BLE JTISTICE M.G. PRTYADARSINI A.S.No.19 of 2024

Mr. P.Venugopal, learncrl Senior Counsel representing Mr. Nizampur Chandra Sekhar, le:rrrrcd cour1sel [or the appellant. M M r r D.Prarkarsh llcridy, lcarned Senior Counsel representing K K.Mahcn(lr. Red<lv, k:arned counsel for the respondent Nos.l to 5. {UDC!4EN t I I P e r J u s t i ce Mous humi Bhatt ac hnry a) The Alrpeal .rrises out of an order dated 30.IO.2O23 passed by the IX Additional District Judge, Ranga Reddy District, at t..B Nagar in 1.A.No.162 of 2024 in 0.S.No.414 of 20'23

2. Bl thc rmpugned order, the Trial Court allowed the interlocutorv application tiled by the respondent Nos.1- 5/dcfencl:urr Nos.2 6 (1.A.No.162 of 2024) for rejection of plaint in the Sr.rit liled bv the appellant/ plaintiff (O.S.No.414 of 2023).

3. Thc 'l'rial Court rvas of the view that the plaint was liable to be rejr:ctcci on thc grouncl that the plaint lacked pleadings as to the maintainability of the relief for directing the defendant Nos.2 6 (thc rcspondent Nos.l-5 in the first Appeal't to execute a rcgistered Salc D<:cd in favour of the plaintiff. The Trial Courl .) MB,J & MGP,J A.s.No.19 J 2024 was also of the view that there was no pleading tbr justig,ing specific performance of Agreement of Sale. 4 The relevant facts pleaded by the parties and the views of the Trial Court will be discussed in the later part of this judgment.

5. The appeliant liied the Suit against the respondents/defendants for a direction on the defendant Nos. 1_ 7 to execute and register a sale deed in favour of tlre appellant/plaintiff or his nominees in respect of the Schedule A, and 'B' properties and in the alternative, for the Court to execute the sale deed in favour of the ptaintiff.

6. Learned Senior Counsel appcaring for appellant/ plaintiff submits that the defendant No. 1 entered into an Agreement of SaIe with rhe appellant/ plaintiff on 23.Og.2O 18 for alienating the suit schedule properties on the premise that the properties were acquired by the defendant No. l,s parents through registered SaIe Deeds and the defendant No. I was the absolute owner of the said properties. Counsel submits that since the Agreement of Sale dated 23.O8.2O1g did not stipulate a date for performance of the contract, the appellant issued a legal notice on 18.05.2023 to show that the appellant was ready 1, 3 MB,J AL MGP,J A.S.No.79 I 2024 and witling to pr:rform the contract Counsel submits that the appellant also called upon the defendant No l on O5'06'2023 to executearegistcredSaledeed,whereupontheappellantwas informed of tu'o Sutts, namely, O'S'Nos'42 and 43 of 2Ol4 ' in which the defcnclant Nrl l and the other defendants are parties' The appcllant was informed that the said Suits were hled seeking lbr p<:rmanent injunction and the defendant No 1 compromised u'ith the o[her defendants in the said Suits' 7 . Coltnsel submil s that the appellant vvas therefore constrained to lile the present Suit for specihc performance of the Agreement ol Sate dated 23'OB'2018 and for cancellation of the compromisc decrccs passed in O S'Nos 42 and 43 of 2014' Learne<l Sct-rior Counsel appearing for the respondent 8. Nos. 1-5/ defer-rdernt Nos.2-6 in the Suit (O S'No'414 of 2023]l submits that thc Suit filed by the appellant is bereft of a cause ofactionanc]isalsobarredbylawsinceaSuitforspecific performance is llot mzrintainable against third parties who are not parties to the Agreement of Sale which forms the subject matterofthesuit.Counselsubmitsthatthesethirdpartiesare not clarmtng an-v Property from the defendant No l in the Agreeme nt ol Sale. C)ortnsel relies on Order XXIII Rttle 3 A of the 4 MB,J & MGP,J A.S.No.79 f 2024 C.P.C. and on Section t9 of The Specihc Relief Acr, 1963, which bars setting aside of a compromise decree by way of a Suit.

9. Counsel submits that the present Appeal seeking rnlunction restraining alienation cannot be entertained in view of the fact of the appellant/plaintiff having failed ro make out a pima facie case with regard to the other defendants having derived title to the property from the defendant No.l.

10. I have heard learned Senior Counsel appearing for. the appellant/plaintiff and the respondent Nos. 1 to S/defendant Nos.2 to 6.

11. It is relevant to clarify that the respondent Nos. I to 5 are the defendant Nos.2 to 6 and respondent No.6 is the defendant No. 1 in O.S.No.414 of 2023 respectively. The application for rejection of the plaint (I.A.No.162 of 20231, which was allowed by the impugned order, was filed by the defendant Nos.2 to 6 (respondent Nos. I to 5 in the present Appeal). t2 The events which are relevant for the present Appeal are as follows:

13. The father of the defendant No.1 purchased Ac. 15.03 guntas of land in Survey No.49 situated at Ilaikunta Maktha, l, 5 MB,J & MGP,J A.S.No.79 I 2024 Golkond:r Kalan Viltage, Shamshabad Mandal, Ranga Reddy District, under a registered Sale Deed No.552/ 1969 (Schedule 'A' property) dated O1.08.1969. On the same date i.e., on 01.08.196:9, the mother of the defendant No.1 purchased Ac.7l.O7 guntas o[ Ianri in Survey Nos.43, 44, 45,33, 35 and 36 situated at Raikunra Maktha, Golkonda Kalan Viilage, Shamshabad Mandal, Ranga Reddy District, under a registered Sale Deed No.550/ 1969 (Schedule .8, propergr). An Agreement of Sale was executed on 23.08.2018 between the defendant No.1 and the plaintiff in rcspect of Schedule A,and ts,properties for a total consideration of Rs.4.OO Crores, Rs.12,00,000/- of which was paid ers advance consideration.

14. The plaintilf issued a Legal Notice to the defendant No.l on 18.O5.2O23 calling upon the defendant No.1 to receive the balance sale considcration and execute a registered Sale Deed. The plaintiff thereafter again called upon the defendant No.l on

05.06.2023 to exccute a registered Sale Deed when the plaintiff was informed by thc d<:fendant No. 1 that the defendant No. 1 had entered in[o an unclcrstanding with the defendant Nos.2_6 herein. O.S.No.42 ot 2Ol4 filed by the defendarrt Nos.2_6 against the defendant No.1 lor declaration and injunction was decreed in terms of a compromise dated O2.O1.2O23 by the I l i I I I I I I 6 MB,J & MGP,J A.S.No.19 I 2024 learned X Additional District and Sessions Judge, Ranga Reddy District at L.B. Nagar. The appellant/plaintiff obtained copies of the Suits and the compromise decrees passed therein in June 2023 and filed the present Suit (O.S.No.474 of 20231 on t4.06.2023.

15. In the present Suit, the appellant/ plaintiff prayed for a direction on the defendant Nos.l-7 to execute a registered Sale Deed in the plaintiff's favour in respect of the Schedule A' and 'B'properties and for the Court to execute tJle same in favour of the plaintiff or his nominees and for delivery of possession in the alternative. The plaintiff also prayed for cancellation of the compromise decrees in O.S.Nos.42 ard 43 of 2074.

16. The ptaintiff hled I.A.No. l24 of 2023 on 14.06.2023 seeking injunction against the defendant Nos.2-6 from alienating the suit schedule properties. The defendant Nos.2-6 filed I.A.No. 162 of 2023 on 01.08.2023 for rejection of the plaint filed in O.S.No.414 of 2023 under Order VII Rule 11 (d) of The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (C.P.C). The Trial Court passed the impugned order on 3O.1O.2O23 allowing I.A.No' 162 of 2023 for rejecting the plaint in the Suit (O.S.No.414 of 20231' I 7 MB,J & MGP,J A.S.No.79 f 2O24

17. The adjudication in the instant Appeal centres on q'hether the compromise decrees in O.S.Nos.42 and 43 of 2074 i.e'' between the respondent Nos. 1-5 (plaintiffs in the two Suits) and the respondent No.6 (defendant No 1 in the said two Suits), should be set asicle.

18. To simplify the facts, O.S.No.42 of 2074 was filed by the predecessors oi the respondent Nos. 1-5 for restraining the respondcnI No.6 frorn interfering with their possession and enjoyment of the properties. O.S.No.43 of 2074 was hled by.the respondr:nt No.7/defendant No.7 seeking perpetual injunction' Respondent No.7 / defendar-rt No.7 is not material to the present Appeal zrs the said defendant did not [-rle any application for rejection of the plaint.

19. As statcd befort:, the respondent Nos. 1-5 in the present Appeal are the clefe ndant Nos.2-6 in O.S.No.4l4 of 2023 filed by the apperllant/ plaintifl'. The respondent No.6 is the defendant No.1 in the said Suit. Thc compromise decrees dated O2.O1.2O23 rccord thc respondent No 6 (defendant No.l in O.S.No.4 14 of 20231 conhrming the pre-existing title of the respondent Nos. I-5. In essence, the respondent No.6 (defendant No.1 in O-S.No.414 of 2023]l settled the dispute with the 8 fuIB,J & MGP,J A-S.No.19 J 2O24 respondent Nos. 1-S and the Suits were decreed in terms of the compromlse

20. It is clear from the aforesaid that the respondent Nos. l-5 .did not acquire any title under the said compromise decrees since the said respondents sued the respondent No.6 on a pre- existing and independcnt title. It is also clear that the title of the respondent Nos.2-6 existed from a date prior to the Agreement of Sale executcd between the plaintiff/appellant in the present Appeal and the defendant No. l/respondent No.6on 23.08.2018. This finding would be evident from the fact that the respondent Nos.1-5 and 7 filed the Suits in 2Ot4 not for title to the properties in question but for restraining the respondent No.6 from interfering with the suit schedule properfy and for perpetual injunction, respectively.

27. The second logical finding from the above facts is that even if the compromise decrees are set aside, the appellant/plaintiff would not derive any right to the properties which was the subject matter of the 2Ol4 Suits and least of all, title to the said propert ies.

22. The legal premise of the Court,s decision is based on the following considerations. I MB,J & MGP,J A.s.No.t9 f 2024 Is the appellan t's praver for cancellation of the Com promlse Decrees hit by Order XXIII Rule 34, of The Code of Civil Procedure 1908 ?

23. Order XXIII of the C.p.C provides for ,,Withdrawal Adjustment o/ Sulrs,'. Rule 34 of Order XXIII of the C.p.C. sets down the following: and. "Ba.r to Suit No suit shall lic to set aside a dec.ree on thc grollnd that the compromise on which the cle cree is based u.as not lawful,,.

24. The bar to a Suit for setting aside a compromise decree, as stipulated under Order XXIII Rule 3.A of the C.p.C, is self_ explanatory. It is clear that the provision prohibits filing of a separate Suit lor sctting aside a compromise or consent decree. The bar is peremptory and draws in a third party to the compromise decree . Therefore, the bar to hling of a seconcl Suit would necessarily cover a stranger to lhe earlier compromise decree who assails the same either on the ground of failure of consideration, ur-rlawful consideration or fraud: .liloki Singh u. Anintdh Singht The Supreme Court in that decision considered the scheme o[ Orde r XXIII Rule 3,A of rhe C.p.C and relied on puslrya Deui Bhagat (Dead) Through l.R Sad.hna Nath ' I(zozo)o scc ozgl t0 MB,J & MGP,J A.S.No.79 t 2024 Rai(Smt) Vs. Rajinder Singh2 to hold that no independent suit can be filed for setting aside a compromise decree on the ground that the compromise was not iawful Thc Supreme Court proceeded to hold that the only remcdy available to a party to a consentdecreeforavoidingthedecreeistoapproachtheCourt which recorded the compromise- The party must establish that there was indeed no comPromise'

25. Amro Deui Vs- Julft Ram3, relied on by the appellant' laid emphasis on Order XXIII Rule 3 of the C'P C rcquiring a lawful agreement/ compromise in r'r'riting, signed by the parties' The Supreme Court in that case came Lo a specihc finding that the relevantorderwasnotanorderolcompromiscofsuitunder Order XXIII Rule 3 of the C P C In the facts of the present case' there is no dispute that O'S Nos '42 arrd 43 of 2014 were decreedonConsentofthepartiestheretoi.e.,betweenthe respondent Nos. 1-5 and the respondent No'6 The terms of the MemorandumofUnderstandingbetweenthepartiescontained in the affrdavit hted by the ptaintiffs clearly record the terms to theeffectofthedefendantConfirmingthetitleinrespectofthe suit property in favour of the plaintitfs The Terms further record that the defendant (the respondent No 6 in lhe present ' zoos(s) scc soo 3 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1715 11 MB,J &' MGP,J A.S.No.79 J 2024 Appeal) confers title in lavour of the plaintiff and covenants that the defendant cloes not have any right' title or interest in the said ProPertY ' .the

26. The deft:ndant is the respondent No 6/defendant No 1 in the Suit (O S No 414 ol 2023\ which forms the subject matter of the present Appeal The existence of a compromise decree would also bc evident from prayer (e) of the plaint where the plainLiff/ appcllant has sought for cancellation thereof' 27 . The appellant/ plaintiff' who seeks setting zrside of compromise decrees passed in the Suits of 2Ol4 ' is admittedly a stranger to the said Suits The case of the appellant is that the compromise decrees ought to be set aside on tht: ground that there $'as no lau'ful consideration for the said compromise A challenge to a compr()mise decree on the ground that there was no lawful consideration for the compromise was considered by the Supremc Court in Sree Surya Deuelopers & Promoters Vs' N' Sailesh Prasod'a The Supreme Court categorically held that there cannot be any challenge to a consent decrec as stipulated under Ordcr XXIII Rule 3 A of the C P C The Supreme Court acoordingly held that the Trial Court was absolurely justificd in rejecting the plaint on the ground that the Suit $'as hled ' (zozz) s scc z lo l2 MB,J & MGP,J A,S.No.19 f 2024 challenging the compromise decree and that clever drafting would not permit the plaintiff to maintain the Suit when it was otherwise barred by law.

28. Rule 3 A was added in Order XXIII of the C.p.C w.e.f. 01.02.1977 for a bar to Suits for setting aside a decree on the ground that the compromise on which the decree was passed was not lawful. The purpose of the amendment reinforces the finality of decisions as the salutary principle of certaint5r of litigation. The certainty would also call for an end of litigafion. The object is to prevent multiplicity of litigation and disallow parties to file a new Suit to unsettle a purely voluntary act of giving consent to end litigation: Tiloki Nath Singh (supra).

29. A compromise decree or compromise of a Suit is provided under Order XXIII RuIe 3 of the C.p.C where the Court is empowered to order the compromise arrived at between the parties in relation to the whole or part of the subject matter of the Suit and pass a decree recording the same. The only window available to a party to the compromise to deny the adjustment or satisfaction is under the proviso to Order XXIII Rule 3 of the C.P.C., in which case rhe Court shall decide the question without delay or granting of adjournment. 13 MB,J & MGP,J A.S.No.19 f 2024 Does Section 19 of The Specific Relief Act. 1963, come in the wa of the relicf of specific performance against the answerlng respondents? 30 The relev;rnt part of Section 19 of The Specific Reliet Act, 1963 is set out below "19. Relief against parties and persons claiming undcr tllem b], su l)se(luent title.- Except as othcnvise provided by this Chapter, specific performancc o[ a contract may be enforced against- (a) either pirrt\ thereto, (b) an\ olher person claiming under him by a title arisiog s,rl,scquenrll to the contract, except ,i transferec for value u,ho has paid his money in goorl faith and without notice of the original contract; (c) any person claiming under a title which, thougtr prior to ttrc contract and known to the plaintiff, mighl have been <lisplaced by the defendant; 3 1 . Scction 1 9, its extracted above, makes it clear that the relief claimed in :t suit for specific performance can, in the usual course, be ntadc against parties who claim title to the subject property subseqLrent to filir-rg of the Suit. Specific performance of the contract n'ray be enforced in such cases against either of the parties to thc contract. The relief for specihc perlormance can also be enforcecl against a person who is not a party to the contract but u.ho claims title through a person who is a party to 9 l4 MB,J &, MGP,J A.S.No.19 f 2024 the contract. The claim must however be made subsequent to the contract against which the relief is sought by the plaintiff under Section 19 of the 1963 Act. The only exception lor enforcing a contract for specific performance in such cases would apply where a transferee claims title to the property, of which specific performance is sought, and has paid money for the property in good faith and without knowlcdge of the original contract (Section 19(a) and (b)) of the 1963 Act.

32. Sub-section (c) of Section 19 covers cases where title is claimed by a person prior to the contract and who is known to the plaintiff but who has been dispossessed by the defendant in the Suit hled by the plaintiff for specihc performance. Section 19 and sub-section (b) thereunder uses three pronouns which adds a measure of ambiguity. The ambiguity can however be clarihed with an analogr of concentric circles of contractual relationships. The contract involving title to the property forms the core. Either of the contracting parties can enforce specihc performance of the contract against each otJ"er. ii. The next circle consists of a party who is not one of the contracting parties but who clarms title subsequent to the contract and through one of t5 MB,J & MGP,J A.s.No.19 f 2024 the pzrrties to the contract. Specific performance can be enforced agarnst such non-party; exoept where the non party is a tralsferee for value and who lras paid money for the transfer of the property in good faith and without notice of the original contract. (Section 19(b)). iii. Thc outer-circle involves a person who clarms title belbre the contract was entered into in respcct of the property and whose identity is kno$.n to the plaintiff but who was subsequently dispossessed b1. the defendant in the suit for spccr lic performance.

33. The othcr sub-sections of section 19 are not relevant to the present ad3uclication

34. In the context of paragraph 29 of this judgment, the three pronouns uscrl in Section 19 and sub-section (b) thereunder may thus bc clanfied in the follorving manner: " them' in Section 19 rcfers to the pa,rties to a contract involving the property, the title whereof forms thc subject matter of a subsequent suit for spccifir: performance relating to the szune propcrty '' him" rt Section 19(b) refers to one of the contritcting parties under section 19. i 16 MB,J &, MGP,J A.S.No.19 J 2A24 "his" in Section 19(b) refers to a trarrsferee for value who has parted witl money for purchase of the property in good faith and without notice.

35. A breakdown of the intent and purposes of Section i9 would show that Section l9 is not relevant to the present facts.

36. Although section 19 contemplates enforcing specific perfornance of a contract against non-parties or persons claiming under a title, both prior and subsequent to the contract, the circles of enforcement close against third parties who cannot be brought within the ambit of section 19. A Court cannot grant specific performarce against a person by compelling him/her to enter into an agreement with a third party and seek specific relief against the third parry: Ramc,n (dead) Vs. R. Natarajans. Section 19 of The S pecr fic Relief Act. 1963 does not aDDlv to the present case

37. In the present case, the respondents Nos.1-5 are neither purchasers of the property from the respondent No.6 nor do they claim title through the respondent No.6. Therefore, the respondent Nos.1-5 cannot be compelled to execute a sale deed s (20221 lO Supreme Court Cases 143 l l7 MB,J & IWGP,J A.s.No.79 f 2024 in favour of the appellant/ plaintiff or join the respondent No'6 in executing a sale deed in favour of the appellant/ plaintiff'

38. The facruzrl narration given in the preceding section of this judgmenl makes it clear that the respondent Nos' 1- S/defenclant Nos.2-6 did not claim title to the suit schedule properties through the respondent No.6/defendanl. No' 1 in the 2014 Surts. The plaint hled in O.S.No.414 of 2023 does not contain any statement that the respondent Nos. 1-5 acquired the suit schedulc properties through the respondent No 6 or the respondent Nos. 1-5 are subsequent purchasers of the suit schedule propt-'rties through the respondent No'6 Therefore, there is adn'rittedly no privity of contract between the respondent Nos. 1 5 and the respondent No.6 which is essential to Sectiorr 19 of thc Act.

39. The appcllant/ plaintilf could only have relied on Section i9 of the Act il the respondent Nos.l-5 had made a. claim to the suit schcdul<: properties through the respondent No'6' The above analysis r-rl'section 19 makes it evident that the claim of title to propertv of which specific performance is sought must be a continuing claim and one that runs through the concentric circles of relrrtionships. In other words, specific performance can be enfort-ccl b1' a party against a party to the contract and 18 MB,J & MGP,J A.S.No.19 J 2O24 !a., thereafter against a non-party who claims title to the property through one of the parties to the contract. The chain of claim to the property in question must hence remain unbroken so as to bind subsequent title-holders to the property save and except bona ftde transferees for value and without notice.

40. In the present case, there is no underlying contract between the respondent Nos.2-5 and the respondent No.6. Therefore, there is also no case of any party staking a claim to the property under any other party which would entitb the plaintiff/appellant to enforce specific performance of the Agreement of Sale dated 23.08.2O18 (between the plaintiff and the respondent No.6/defendant No. 1) against the answering respondent Nos. 1-5. There is in fact no chain of claim to title subsequent to the Agreement of Sale dated 23.08.2018 betwcen the plaintilf and the respondent No.6/defendant No. I sincc the respondent Nos. 1-5 claimed to be the owners of the properties in question prior to 2O I 4.

41. The facts and the law read together lead to the inescapable conclusion that Section 19 of The Specific Relicf Act, 1963 has no application to the present Appeal and the appellant/ plaintiff cannot rely on the same. 19 MB,J & MGP,J A.S.No.19 f 2O24 Is Order VII Rule I I of The Code of Civil Procedure complete bar to mentless Suits? 1908 a

42. The relevant part of Order VII Rule I i of the CPC is set out belorv "ll. Rejcction ot plaint.- The ptaint shalt be rejected in the follos,ing cases: (a) where it does not disclose a cause of action; (d) rvhere the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to lrc barred br anv law:

43. The languagc of Order VII Rule 1 1 of the C.P.C is peremptory. The plaint without a cause of action or contrary to law' " shal| be rejectcd. The larv is that the plaint is the only document for deciding whether the plaint should cross the threshold of the six conditions contemplated in Order VII Rule I I of the C.P.C unsr:athed. Or simply put, whether the plaint should bc rejected on zrny one of the conditions uncler Order VII Rule 1 1. The adjuclication would involve a meaningful reading of the plaint including whether the cause of action pleaded supports the relief pravcd [or: Dahiben Vs. Aruindbhai Kolyanji Bhanusali (Gajra)6 6 QbAfsl Supreme Court Cirses 366 II 20 MB,J & MGP,J A.S.No.79 f 2024

44. A Division Bench of this High Court and a Single Bench of the Allahabad High Court in S.P.R. Publications Put. Ltd. Vs. Ganpati IndustiesT and Rajeeu Gupta Vs. Swotantrata Sangram Senani Ashit Sangathan8 reiLerated the position in law that the Court should read a plaint in its totality for considering an application for rejection of plaint a,nd that the power can be exercised at any sterge of the Suit. These decisions do not assist the case of the appellant.

45. The discussion in the forgoing paragraphs would show that the appellant/ plaintiff seeks to prop its case up on the unstable frame of section 19 of The Specific Relief Act, 1963 and Order XXIII Rule 3-A of the CPC and also the fact that the respondent No.6/defendant No. 1 did not file any application for rejection of the plaint. The appellant relies on the law under section 19 and Order XXIII Rule 3 A is misplaced. This has already been discussed above and is not being repeated.

46. On the factual score, nothing turns on the respondent No.6/defendant No.1 not filing an application for rejecting the plaint in O.S.No.414 of 2023 since the respondent 7 2024 6 ALD 2a8 6 E1RONLINE 2024 ALI, 657 -!, rl 2l MB,J & MGP,J A.S.No.19 f 2024 No.6/ dcfendant No. I did not contend that it had transferred any title to the respondent Nos. 1-5/defendant Nos'2-6'

47. The plaintiff has failed to establish a cause of action u,hich would bind the answering respondents to the relief of specihc performance insofar as the answering respondents deriving title to Lhc property from the respondent No'6' The plaint rnust naturzrlly fail on the appellant's failure to plead a cause of action against the respondent Nos' 1-5/defendant Nos.2-6. TI-re relief claimed in the Suit is hit by Order VII Rule 11(a) o1' the CPC. The fact that the Suit is barred by law would be clear from Section 19 of The Specific Relief Act, 1963 and Order XXIII Rule 3 A of the CPC. Therefore, the plaint is also hit by order VII Rule 1 1(d) of the CPC.

48. This Cour t is hence o[ [he view that the first to hfth responclcnts have made out a good case for rejecting the appellant's plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC The said respondents' case is supporled by the taw and the attending facts. 49 . Thc clecisions cited on behalf of the appellant do not take the appellant's casc lbrward 22 MB,J & MGP,J A.S.No.19 f 2024

50. Vijag A. Mittal Vs. Kulwant Rai (dead) through Legal Representatiuese , P.V. Guru Rai Reddy, Rep' by GPA Laxmi Naragana Reddg u. P. Neeradha Reddg 1o ar.d Ahmed Nouab Attrldin u. Hgderabad Industies Limited, Hgderabadt t deal with the general proposition of Order VII Rule 11 of the C'P'C' and on the specihc hnding arrived at by the Courts as to the plaint disclosing a cause of action in the particular facts and circumstances of each case. The proposition that rejection of plaint is a rarity and the Courts would generally prefer to adjudicate the Suit on merits than to discard it at the threshold cannot be applied omnibus to each and every fact situation and certainly not in contradiction to the express language of Order VII Rule 1l of the C.P.C, which uses the words " "'shall be rejected. . .

51. Khalil Hoji Bholumiga Salar u' Parueenl2 and Vipin Kumar Manaktala u. Vinod Kumart3 have been cited for the proposition that fraudulently obtained compromise decrees can be set aside' This proposition is not applicabte to the present case since there is no evidence of fraud in the compromise decree nor has the appellant given any particulars of fraud which would warrant ' (zorg) : scc szo 'o zots 1a1alo 6s 1sc1 1' 2015 (3)ALD 584 1') 2013 (3) Mhu 1.82 ag2.15cc onLine Del 3876 23 MB,J & LTGP,J A.S.No.79 f 2024 setting aside of the compromise decree. The appellant has failed to clear the benchmark of the compromise decree being vitiated by fraucl

52.. Uruashiben u. Krishnakant Manuprasad Triuedil a has been relied on for the issue of limitation being a mixed questior-r of fact and larv. We do not find this decision to be useful since we have given other reasons for sustaining the impugned order. The Impu ned Order

53. The subject matter of the present Appeal is the impugned order dated 30. 10.2023 allowing the application hled by the respondent Nos.1-5 (the defendant Nos.2-6) in a Suit fi1ed by the appellant (plaintiff) for rejection of plainl.

54. The Trial Court discussed the mandate of Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC - Rejection of Plaint - and came to the conciusion that the plaint does not contain any pleading as to how the petitioners (the respondent Nos. I -5) acquired interest rn the suit schedule property or in rvhat manner the relief claimed by the plaintiff/appellant for a direction on the defendants for executing a registered sale deed is maintainable. 'o 12ots1 t: scc :zz 1 I Itil 24 MB,J & MGP,J A.s.No.19 f 2024

55. The Trial Court found that there are no documents to prove that the respondent No.6/defendant No'I is the owner and possessor of the suit schedule property or that he is the only owner of the suit schedule property or is in possession thereof. The Trial Court also held that the plaintiff could not establish that the Suit was filed within limitation' The Trial Court also found that the ptaint did not contain any pleading with regard to supporting the relief of specific performance of the Agreement of Sale between the plaintiff and the defendants' The Trial Court accordingly allowed the application filed b! the respondent Nos. 1-5 for rejection of plaint'

56. We must confess that the reasons given by the Trial Court in the impugned order are insufficient for the purpose of adjudication under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC' Rejection of a plaint entails drastic consequences since a plaintiff is non- suited at the very threshold. Rejection of a plaint also amounts to a decree under Section 2 (21 of the CPC which means that a defendant who successfully applies under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC would obtain a decree in his/her favour'

57. Order VII Rule 11 of the C.P.C has tight contours srnce a plaint can only be rejected on any one of the six grounds * oontemplated therein. The Court must hence be circumspect 25 MB,J & MGP,J A.S.No.19 f 2O24 before rejecting a plaint and must thoroughly enquire into the facts and the law in this regard. Although the Trial Court gave certain findings u,ith regard to the plaint not disclosing essential pleadings, the reasons fall short of the exactirrg standards which are to be expected o[ a Court while rcjecting a plaint. We have indicated our reasons for the view that the respondent Nos. 1-5 correctly applied under Order VII Rule 1 1 since the plaint lacked a cause of action and was barred by law. Our reasons deal r,",ith both aspects in detail.

58. Therefore, even though we cannot fully cndorse the reasons given by the Trial Court in allowing the application hled by the ansu.ering respondents for rejection of the plaint, we are of the view that the impugned order should be sustained on the grounds urged by the answering respondents and accepted by us. As a matter of general principle a party in an appeal who has lhe order in his/her favour, is entitled to show that the order can still be sustained by reversing the material finding on some other ground: Jamshed Hormusji Wadia Vs. Board of Ttlrstees, Port of Mumbaits.

59. Although an argument has been made on behalf of the appellant that the Suit was filed within the period of limitation " (zooa) : scc zrq 26 MB,J & MGP,J A.S.No.19 f 2O24 as provided under the Schedule to The Limitation Act, 1963, we are of the view that the plaint should be rejected for absence of a cause of action, and being barred by law under Order VII Rule 11 (d) of the C.P.C. on the o[her legal premise as discussed above. Conclusion:

60. We do not find any scope for interference with the impugned order dated 30.1O.2023 allowing the application filed by the respondent Nos. 1-5/ defendant Nos.2-6 for rejection of the plaint. We have already opined that the reasons given by the Trial Court in allowing the application under Order VII Rule 11 (d) of the C.P.C ought to have been better articulated. A judgment can be upheld albeit for differcnt or supplemental reasons: M.T. Khan Vs. Gouemment of Andhro Pradeshl6. This however would not operate as a basis to set aside the impugned order since we have given our independent reasons as to why the appellant's plaint should any,way have been rejected on failing to disclose a cause of action against the respondents and being barred by law. The defence taken by the appellant under section 31 ofThe Specific Relief Act, 1963, authorising a person to sue for cancellation of a written instrument as void or '" 1zooa12 scc 2a-t 27 MB,J & MGP,J A.S.No.19 J 2O24 voidable, loses relevance in the face of the bar under section 19 of the very same Act. Thus, we find no merit in the Appeal.

61. A.S. No. 19 of 2024 is accordingly dismissed. lnterim orders, if any, shall stand dismissed. All connected applications are disposcd of. There shall be no order as to costs. //TRUE COPY// Sd/. K. SAILESHI REGISTRAR D \SECTION OFFICER One Fair Copy to the Hon'ble Justice Moushum (For His LordshiP s kind Perusal) iBhattacharya One Fair Copy to the Hon'ble Smt Justice M'G'Priyadarsini '(For His LordshiP's kind Perusal) To, 1 The X Additional Distrrct Judge, Ranga Reddy District at L B Nagar (with records. if anY) 2 11 LR CoPies 5 fn" U n-OJt Secretary, Union of lndia, Ministry of Law' Justice and Company Affairs. New Delhi in. sL"r"trry Telangana Hrgh Court^AdYolale's Association Library' High C;u,t for tf," Strt" of ielangaria, High Court Buildings at Hy9erabad. O"" CC to Sri Nizampur Chandra Sekhar, Advocate lglucl On" CC to Sri K K. IViahender Reddy, Advocate [OPUC] Two CD CoPies 4 5 6 7. VH/gh li'1, L _r: Hr HIGH COURT DATED: 1010112025 JUDGMENT AS.No.19 of 2024 t{E SIA /(: q J o o O7 l'lAB '/r' * .Jt 2s6 z -{- DISMISSING THE APPEAL WITHOUT COSTS u W IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA AT HYDERABAD FRIDAY, THE TENTH DAY OF JANUARY TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE PRESENT THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE MOUSHUMI BHATTACHARYA AND THE HONOURABLE SMT JUSTICE M.G.PRIYADARSINI APPEAL SUIT NO: 19 OF 2024 Between: Sri Boyenepally Srijayavardhan, S/o. Sri Boyenepally Sampath Kumar aged about 33 years, Occ. business Rlo. 1-10-1451A, Street No.8 Ashoknagar, Hyderabad - 500020 ...APPELLANT/RESPONDENT No. 1 /PLAINTIFF AND

1. Smt. V. Nirupama Reddy, Wo. late Dr. Jagan Mohan Reddy, aged about 60 years Occ. business, R/o. B-2-686/G-1/K-5, Kimtee Colony Road No.12, Banlara Hills, Hyderabad - 500034.

2. Ms. V. Anusha Reddy, D/o. late Dr. Jagan Mohan Reddy, aged about 37 years Occ. business, R/o.8-2-686/G-1/K-5, Kimtee Colony Road No- 12, Banjara Hills, Hyderabad - 500034.

3. Ms. V. Pratyusha Reddy, D/o. late Dr. Jagan Mohan Reddy, aged about 33 years Occ. business, R/o.8-2-686/G-'1/K-5, Kimtee Colony Road No.12, Banjara Hills, Hyderabad - 500034

4. Smt. Veeranki Megana Reddy, Wo. Sri Veeranki Vineel and D/o. late Sri Viddam Madan Mohan Reddy, aged about 31 years, Occ. Business, R/o. Columbia, U.S.A. represented by her GPA Smt. V. Nirupama Reddy Wio. late Dr. Jagan Mohan Reddy, aged about 60 years Occ. business, R/o.B-2-686/G. 1/K-5, Kimtee Colony Road No.12, Banjara Hills, Hyderabad - 500034

5. Ms. Viddam Aniana Reddy, D/o. late Sri Viddam Madan Mohan Reddy, aged about 28 years, Occ. Business, R/o. Columbia, U.S.A., represented by her GPA Smt. V. Nirupama Reddy Wo. late Dr. Jagan Mohan Reddy, aged about 60 years Occ. business, R/o.8-2-686/G-1/K-5, Kimtee Colony Road No.12, Banjara Hills, Hyderabad - 500034

6. Smt. Maddi Prashanthi, Wo. Sri Venkata Rajendra Tej, D/o. late Sri L.V. Subba Reddy, aged about 49 years Occ. business, Rio 3-152, Kandukru Road Centre, Singarayakonda village, Prakasam district - 52310'1, A.P.

7. Sri l. Ram Reddy, S/o. Sn Ganga Reddy, aged about 82 years Occ, business. Rl o. 2-2-647 17 7 16121 I 1, B agh Amberpet, Hyderabad.

8. The District corrector, Ranga Reddy district Kongara Karaan,Ranga Reddy district.

9. The Tahsildar-cum-Joint sub-Registrar, shamshabad mandar, Ranga Reddy district. ...RESPONDENTS/RESpONDENTS No. 2 to S/DEFENDANTS No. 1, 7 to 9 (The respondents No 6 to g are not necessary parties to this appeal) .Appeal filed under Section g6 read with order XLI Rule-r of cpc, Rure 170 of the Telangana civil Rules of practice and circular orders, 190g against the order and decree dated 30-10 2023 made in r.A.No.'162 of 2023 in o s.No.414 of 2023 on the file of the X Additionat Distrrct Judge, Ranga Reddy District at L.B. Nagar. This appeal comrng on for hearing and upon perusing the grounds of appeal, the Judgment and Decree of the court below and the material papers in the case and upon hearing the arguments of sri p. venuGopal, senior counser rqpresenting Sri Nizampur chandra Sekhar. Advocate for the appellant and sri D. prakash Reddy, Senior counser representing Sri K.K. Mahender Reddy, Advocate for the Respondent Nos. 1 to 5. This Court doth Order and Decree as follows:

1. That the Appeal be and hereby is dismissed; and 2. That there shall be no order as to costs in this appeal //TRUE COPY// Sd/- K. SAILESHI DEPUTY REGISTRAR $'l ECTION OFFICER 1 2 The X Additionat District Judge, Ranga Reddy District at L B. Nagar Two CD Copies To, VH HIGH COURT DATED: 10t0112025 DECREE AS.No.19 of 2024 DISMISSING THE APPEAL WITHOUT COSTS 7 ) t)n