STATE OF GUJARAT v. M/S SOUTH SORN CORPO.(INDIA)

CORAM : MR.JUSTICE M.S.PARIKH Date of decision: 18/03/98 ORAL JUDGEMENT

1.(cid:9)The two respondents (accused nos. 1 and 4 before the learned Special Judge) faced Summary Case No. E.S.T.P. 41 of 1995 before the learned Special Judge, Vadodara in respect of production 'Falcin 500' with a printed price exceeding the maximum price fixed by the Central Government under the Drugs (Price Control) Order, 1987 (for short 'the Order'). The price that was printed was Rs.20/- instead of Rs.15.30 paise and thus the price which was printed was excess price by Rs.4.70 paise. Hence, the process which the accused persons received was for violation of para. 2(r), para. 8(1), para. 8 and para. 9 of the Order read with sections 3, 7 and 12AA of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (for short 'the Act'). Out of the 4 accused, accused nos. 1 and 4 (respondents herein) pleaded guilty to the charge as accused no. 4 was managing the affairs of accused no.1. Consequently the learned Special Judge by his impugned judgment and order dated 9/7/1997 acquitted the accused nos. 2 and 3 and convicted the accused nos. 1 and 4 upon their plea of guilt and sentenced them to pay fine of Rs.7,000/- each. The fine has been paid up by the said accused persons. However, the State of Gujarat feeling aggrieved with and dissatisfied by the said judgment and order has filed this appeal for enhancement of sentence on the ground that the aforesaid accused persons were liable for minimum sentence as provided u/S. 7 (1) (a) (ii) and that the case cannot be said to have been covered u/S. 7(1) (a) (i) of the Act.

2.(cid:9)I have gone through the relevant provisions of the aforesaid Order as well as section 3 read with section 7 of the Act. I have also gone through the provisions of section 12AA (1) (f). The aforesaid clause (f) provides for conviction in a summary trial by a Special Judge and it has been lawful for the special Court to pass sentence of imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years. It might be noted that upon examination of the relevant clauses of the Order the case appears to be not falling within para. 2 (r), para. 8(1), para. 8 and para. 9. Of-course, there has been debate about para. 10 that might be applied as also the provision regarding exemption to a small scale industries likely to come into play. Bearing in mind all these special facts and circumstances of the present case, I find that this is not a fit case for going into the merits of the proposition regarding whether the respondents are liable for minimum sentence or not.