MINOR KAILASH MANGILAL v. RAFIQUEBHAI MANSURI & 1
Case at a glance
Outcome
Partly allowed
the appeal is partly allowed and the impugned order
Provisions considered
- Constitution of India
- Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 ss. 140, 141, 166, 173
Key paragraphs
- Para 44. In the above facts and circumstances, since the impugned order appears to be based on prima facie reading of the material placed before the learned Tribunal and since substantive right of the applicant to claim compensation under section 140 of the MV Act has…
Judgment
1 to 5 NO ============================================================== MINOR KAILASH MANGILAL - Appellant(s) Versus RAFIQUEBHAI MANSURI & 1 - Defendant(s) ============================================================== Appearance : MR CH VORA for Appellant(s) : 1, RULE SERVED BY DS for Defendant(s) : 1, MR DAKSHESH MEHTA for Defendant(s) : 2, ===================================================================== CORAM : HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE D.H.WAGHELA Date : 12/01/2006 ORAL JUDGMENT
This appeal under section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (“the MV Act” for short) is preferred from the order dated 24.12.2004 of the FA/1978/2005 JUDGMENT learned City Civil Judge, Ahmedabad, below the application at Ex.30 in Motor Accident Claim Petition No.640 of 1998. Admittedly, the application at Exh.30 was filed by the appellant under section 140 of the MV Act with a prayer to award Rs.25,000/- by way of compensation on the basis of permanent disability to the extent of 20% of the whole body caused to the ward in whose name the application is filed. That application in the pending petition under section 166 of the MV Act was rejected by the impugned order mainly on the ground that, “....prima facie, there was no permanent disability....”, and that conclusion was reached on the basis that the applicant had not produced certified copies of relevant documents like medical certificate, disability certificate etc. Moreover, copies of the documents produced by the applicant were not legible.
It was submitted that, if the applicant had the opportunity, he could have produced necessary documentary evidence and proved his case for compensation under section 140 of the MV Act. Instead of granting such opportunity, the Court had apparently disposed the application with an order to raise the issues in the main petition on the same day and to keep the matter for recording of evidence of the applicant on 5.1.2005. Thus, the Tribunal took care to have the main petition claiming compensation on the basis of fault of the respondents expedited FA/1978/2005 JUDGMENT but, in the process, disposed the application under section 140 of the MV Act on the basis of prima facie conclusions reached without recording of evidence and without the applicant getting sufficient opportunity to establish his case.
It is clear from bare reading of the provisions of section 141 of the MV Act that the application under section 140 has to be disposed of as expeditiously as possible and such claim has to be disposed of in the first place. It, however, does not mean that adjudication of the claim under section 140 of the MV Act has to be truncated and the claim can be disposed summarily without deciding the issues arising in the matter. The right of compensation under section 140 of the MV Act is an independent right and, in cases, it may be more important and a better source for compensation.
Operative part
In the above facts and circumstances, since the impugned order appears to be based on prima facie reading of the material placed before the learned Tribunal and since substantive right of the applicant to claim compensation under section 140 of the MV Act has come to be defeated without proper adjudication, the appeal is partly allowed and the impugned order dated 24.12.2004 is set aside with a direction to adjudicate the application at Ex.30 in MACP No.640 of 1998 afresh after giving to the parties sufficient FA/1978/2005 JUDGMENT opportunity of being heard and leading evidence in accordance with law. It is needless to clarify that the Court may adopt the summary procedure prescribed by Rule 231 of the Gujarat Motor Vehicles Rules,
1989. (KMG Thilake) Sd/-
( D.H.WAGHELA, J.)
Questions this judgment answers
What did the Court decide in this case?
The Court recorded the following disposition: the appeal is partly allowed and the impugned order
Which statutory provisions did this judgment involve?
Constitution of India; Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — ss. 140, 141, 166, 173.
Precedent status how later indexed judgments have treated this case
No known negative treatment found in the Courts & Cases corpus.
This is a result about the indexed corpus, not a finding that the judgment remains good law. Coverage may be incomplete.