Als o heard Mr. D. Baruah v. Nos. 1

Mr. Mahanta, learned counsel for the petitioner, submits that ev 6. en in a case of temporary appointment the principles of natural justice cannot b e altogether abandoned. The petitioner was in continuous employment for almost 8 (eight) years and, therefore, he was entitled to a fair procedure. He submits th at considering the circumstances in which the termination order was passed, it s hould be construed to be stigmatic in nature and, therefore, the petitioner shou ld have been given a reasonable opportunity to make his submission. He further s ubmits that in any case a single line order of termination is not something whic h can be appreciated. In support of his submission, learned counsel has placed r eliance on a decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of V.P. Ahuja Vrs . State of Punjab and Others; reported in (2000) 3 SCC 239.

7. On the other hand, Mr. Baruah, learned counsel for the responden t Nos. 1 and 2 submits that the Institute is at a very nascent stage and does no t have any rules relating to matters of discipline of its staff. He further subm its that there are very few staff in the Institute and those are being brought f rom the Assam Legislative Assembly. He contends that as the petitioner was in te mporary service, the moment it was found that his service was no longer required , the respondents released him from his service and nothing more should be read into it. Lastly, he submits that the delay in the disposal of the appeal was bec ause of a change in the presidentship of the Institute. He therefore submits tha t if some time is given, the appeal itself can be disposed of by the authority b y giving due opportunity to the petitioner.

8. idered. The submissions made by the learned counsels have been duly cons

9. The constitution of the Institute has already been noticed in th e earlier part of this judgment. In the opinion of this Court, the Institute wou ld come within the meaning of (cid:28)State (cid:29) under Article 12 of the Constitution of In dia. As a matter of fact, the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 have not taken the stand t hat it is not a (cid:28)State (cid:29) within the meaning of Article 12.

10. Coming to the merit of the challenge, the order impugned may now be noticed, which reads as under: (cid:28)ÓFFICE OF THE NORTH EAST REGIONAL INSTITUTE OF PARLIAMENTARY STUDIES TRAINING A ND RESEARCH (NERIPSTR) JAWAHAR NAGAR, KHANAPARA, GUWAHATI-22 No. NERIPSTR 06/04/22 Dated Guwahati the, 7th May, 2011 ORDER Shri Mrigen Kalita, Steno-cum-Computer Operator is hereby terminated from the se rvices with effect from 7th May, 2011. Sd/- (G.P. DAS) DIRECTOR Memo No. NERIPSR 06/04/22(A) Dated Guwahati the 7th May, 2011 Copy forwarded to: 1) The Hon’ble President NERIPSTR 2) Shri Mrigen Kalita, Steno-cum-Computer Operator 3) Order file DIRECTOR NERIPSTR (cid:29) Though the order appears to be an innocuous one, the circumstanc 11. es in which the said order was passed cannot, however, be overlooked. The petiti oner was arrested in connection with a criminal case wherein the main allegation appears to be against the respondent No. 3. The Director of the Institute had l odged a first information before the Basistha police station on 02-05-2011 alleg ing that an amount of Rs. 11,60,000/- was fraudulently withdrawn from the accoun t of the Institute by submitting three cheques of the State Bank of India, Dispu r Branch belonging to the Institute, further stating that the respondent No. 3 was the custodian of the cheque book. It was further alleged that an amount of R s. 5,00,000/- was deposited and credited in the account of the respondent No. 3. On the basis of such information, Basistha P.S Case No. 282 of 2011 under Secti on 406/407/468/420 IPC has been registered. On the other hand, the respondent No . 3 lodged a complaint against the petitioner, which on being forwarded to the B asistha police station, was registered as Basistha P.S Case No. 294 of 2011. In his complaint, the respondent No. 3 has alleged that a sum of Rs. 5,00,000/- cam e to be deposited in his account through an official cheque of the Institute for which he suspected the involvement of the petitioner. From the above, the follo wing facts emerge. Respondent No. 3 was the custodian of the cheque book out of which three cheques were removed and used to withdraw money from the account of the Institute and a part of the said money amounting to Rs. 5,00,000/- was there after found credited in the account of the respondent No. 3. For this the respon dent No. 3 has sought to put the blame on the petitioner! Prima facie, the alleg ation made against the petitioner, appears to be quite absurd.

12. Though the impugned order is couched in innocuous terms and is a lso sought to be justified in such terms, the circumstances in which the said or der was passed leaves no room for doubt that it is clearly relatable to the arre st of the petitioner in the criminal case and is not a termination simplicitor. The explanation given by the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 that because of financial c onstraints, the service of the petitioner is no longer required does not appeal to the Court as the Institute has retained the services of the other staff and o nly recently the fixed pay of the petitioner was enhanced. In such circumstances, this Court is of the view that the petiti 13. oner should have been provided with at least a show-cause notice. Failure to do so has vitiated the order of termination. Here it may be mentioned that on a que ry by the Court, the learned counsel for the respondents submitted that in so fa r the respondent No. 3 is concerned, he has been placed under suspension by the Institute and a departmental proceeding has been drawn up against him.

14. The law is well settled that even in a case where the employment is of a temporary nature or a person is on probation, the principle of natural justice cannot altogether be given a gobye. More so, in a case like the present one where the circumstances which accompanied the termination order carries with it a stigma. It may also be pointed out here that the petitioner was in continu ous service since the year 2004 for about 8(eight) years.

15. In the case of V.P. Ahuja(Supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that a probationer, like a temporary servant, is also entitled to certain prote ction and his service cannot be terminated arbitrarily.

16. In the considered opinion of this Court, the petitioner was enti tled to a notice and hearing prior to his termination. The absence of the same h as rendered the termination arbitrary. Accordingly, the impugned order of termin ation dated 07-05-2011 is hereby set aside. Since the termination order has bee n set aside, the petitioner shall be re-instated in his temporary service, subje ct to such orders as may be passed by the respondents in accordance with law.

18. Writ petition stands allowed to the extent indicated above. No cost.