Judgment · High Court · 2012

#8. Petitioner submitted his written statement in defence denying the charge s levelled against him. An inquiry was conducted and on conclusion of the same, the Inquiry Officer submitted his report holding that the first two charges were proved.

#9. Petitioner submitted detailed representation against the inquiry report. The disciplinary authority i.e. appellant no.3 by order dated 24-11-1997 held t hat the departmental case against the petitioner was established in so far char ge nos. 1 & 2 were concerned and, therefore, imposed the major penalty of dismis sal from service.

#10. Petitioner preferred statutory appeal before the appellate autho rity against the award of penalty imposed on him. However, the appellate authori ty vide order dated 22-01-1998 upheld the penalty imposed by the disciplinary au thority and rejected the appeal of the petitioner. Initially, the petitioner had moved the Madras High Court challe 11. nging his dismissal from service. His writ petition was dismissed by a Single Be nch of the said High Court where after he filed writ appeal. A Division Bench of Madras High Court set aside the order of the learned Single Judge and gave op portunity to the petitioner to approach the appropriate High Court. Thereafter, WP(C) No.1445/2009 was filed by the petitioner before this Court challenging t he order of dismissal as well as the order of the appellate authority.

#12. The respondents (appellants herein) resisted the writ petition b y filing counter affidavit. It was submitted that possession of unaccounted mone y was strongly suggestive of corruption. The charges framed against the petition er were established and after following the due procedure, penalty of dismissal from service was imposed on the petitioner. It was further stated that as the c ase had become time barred for trial under the Army Act, 1950, the authority th erefore decided to initiate proceedings under 1965 Rules, which are applicable to the members of GREF. There was no irregularity or illegality in switching over from the Army Act to the 1965 Rules.

#13. Learned Single Judge by the impugned judgment and order interfered wit h the penalty imposed on the petitioner on two grounds. Firstly, it was held tha t switching over from the Army Act to the 1965 Rules was not justified. Secondly , learned Single Judge also held that the charges against the petitioner were no t independently proved in the disciplinary proceeding and that the charges coul d not be said to have been proved on the basis of materials collected in the court of inquiry held under the Army Act and in the preliminary inquiry conduct ed prior to the issuance of the charge-sheet. Learned Single Judge also held th at the appellate order did not reflect due application of mind by the appellate authority. The order of the disciplinary authority as well as of the appellate authority were accordingly set aside. Consequently, petitioner was directed to be reinstated in service and the money seized from the petitioner was directed to be returned back to him with interest @ 6% per annum. However, as indicated e arlier, payment of back-wages was left to the discretion of the authority.

#14. Aggrieved, the respondents in the writ petition are in appeal questionin g the correctness of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. This Court by ord er dated 22-07-2011 passed in MC 2074/2011 had stayed the judgment of the learne d Single Judge.

#15. We have heard Mr. N. Barah, learned CGC appearing for the appellants as well as Mr. P.K. Deka, learned counsel appearing for the respondent/writ petiti oner.

#16. Learned CGC submits that learned Single Judge was not justified in i nterfering with the penalty imposed on the petitioner by the disciplinary author ity as the same was imposed following the due procedure. It is contended that t he view taken by the learned Single Judge that the disciplinary proceeding stood vitiated because of switching over from the Army Act to the 1965 Rules does no t reflect the correct legal position and requires interference by the appellat e court. It is submitted that the proceeding under the Army Act had to be abando ned as the same had become barred and, therefore, the departmental proceeding wa s initiated under 1965 Rules. He also submits that there were enough materials b efore the inquiry officer to hold that the charges against the petitioner were p roved as the standard of proof in a departmental proceeding is not to be equated with that of a criminal trial. He, therefore, prays for setting aside of the ju dgment of the learned Single Judge. Learned counsel for the respondent/writ petitioner, on the other hand, s 17. upporting the judgment of the learned Single Judge on both the counts, submits t hat the appellants had initiated proceeding under Army Act but finding the proc eeding time barred, they shifted over and took recourse to proceeding under the 1965 Rules, which was not permissible. In support of his aforesaid submission, learned counsel has placed reliance on a Division Bench judgment of the Delhi Hi gh Court dated 31-01-2008 passed in WP(C) no.743/1983 (Pratap Singh- vs- Directo r General, Border Roads Organization), which was also considered by the learned Single Judge. He also supports the view taken by the learned Single Judge that the charges against the petitioner could not be said to have been proved in the departmental proceeding. He, therefore, prays for dismissal of the appeal.

#18. The submissions made have been considered.

#19. As has been noticed above, one of the grounds of interference by the lea rned Single Judge in the order of dismissal is that the appellants had switched over from proceeding under the Army Act to proceeding under the 1965 Rules, whic h vitiated the penalty imposed. While reaching the above conclusion, learned Sin gle Judge recorded the sequence of events as under:- (cid:28) 17. In order to answer the first question raised by the petitioner regarding s witched over of the proceeding from Army Act to CCS(CCA) Rules, it may be noted that admittedly the vigilance team had seized a sum of Rs.1,09,344/- on 12.06.92 from the petitioner after conducting the court of inquiry under the Army Act an d the Rules and accordingly put him under suspension with effect from 27.07.92 b y the order of DGBR on the basis of court of inquiry and the disciplinary action under the Army Act was directed to be issued but subsequently the trial under t he Army Act 1950 was ruled out being time barred and the disciplinary proceeding was thereafter initiated under CCS(CCA) Rules. Now the question that requires f or consideration as to whether the initiation of disciplinary action under the A rmy Act can be switched over under the CCS (CCA) Rules when the disciplinary act ion under the Army Act was ruled out because of time barred. _ _ _ _ . (cid:29)

#20. After referring to the above and the judgment of the Delhi Hig h Court in the case of Pratap Singh (Supra), learned Single Judge held as under :- (cid:28) 19. In the instant case admittedly the court of inquiry was he ld under the Army Act and the petitioner was alleged to have been confessed to t he Investigating Officer in presence of an independent witness on 18.06.92 that he accumulated the money by selling government stores to civilians and the said confessional statement was used as a part of disciplinary proceedings initiated under CCS (CCA) Rules, though the independent witness Lt. Col RK Guha in whose p resence the confessional statement alleged to have been made was not a witness b efore the inquiry officer and therefore it can be safely held that the entire di sciplinary proceeding is vitiated since the matter was switched over from the pu rview of Army Act to CCS (CCA) Rules and accordingly answered in positive and ag ainst the respondents. (cid:29) 21 We are unable to accept the above view of the learned Single Judge as th e Army Act and the 1965 Rules operate in different fields and do not overlap. This position has been made clear by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Un ion of India and others Vs. Sunil Kr. Sarkar, reported in (2001) 3 SCC 414. Para -11 of the said judgment may be gainfully quoted:- (cid:28)11. Before concluding we must point out that during the course of arguments, a doubt was raised as to the maintainability of the concurrent proceedings init iated against the respondent by the authorities. The respondent in this case has been punished for the same misconduct both under the Army Act as also under the Central Rules. Hence, a question arises whether this would tantamount to (cid:28)doubl e jeopardy (cid:29) and is in violation of Article 20 of the Constitution of India. Havi ng considered the arguments addressed in this behalf, we are of the opinion that so far as the concurrent proceedings initiated by the Organisation against the respondent both under the Army Act and the Central Rules are concerned, they are unexceptionable. These two proceedings operate in two different fields though t he crime or the misconduct might arise out of the same act. The court-martial pr oceedings deal with the penal aspect of the misconduct while the proceedings und er the Central Rules deal with the disciplinary aspect of the misconduct. The tw o proceedings do not overlap. As a matter of fact, Notification No. SRO-329 date d 23-9-1960 issued under the Central Rules and under sub-sections (1) and (4) of Section 4 of the Army Act makes this position clear. By this notification, the punishments that could be meted out under the Central Rules have been taken out of the purview of the court-martial proceedings under the Army Act. We further f ind support for this view of ours in the judgment of this Court in R. Viswan v. Union of India. (cid:29)

#22. In the case of Pratap Singh (Supra) a court of inquiry was held and a c ommon inquiry was conducted against the petitioner, Shri Pratap Singh and anothe r person. In the inquiry, charges were held proved against the said petitioner following which, he was dismissed from service. The Delhi High Court noted that the other person Shri Ganga Ram Sharma against whom charges were similar and co mmon inquiry was held, was also dismissed from service along with the petitioner . He had filed a writ petition before the Delhi High Court, which was allowed b y a Single Bench of that Court. The punishment was set aside on the ground tha t after taking recourse to proceeding under the Army Act and the Rules, he could not have been charged under the 1965 Rules.

#23. The appeal filed against the said judgment was dismissed for default. Since no steps were taken for restoration of the appeal, the judgement in the c ase of Shri Ganga Ram Sharma became final. Since it was a common inquiry level ling the same charges against Shri Pratap Singh as well as Shri Ganga Ram Sharma and the punishment imposed on Shri Ganga Ram Sharma having been quashed, the D elhi High Court did not deem it fit and proper to take a different view in th e matter. Accordingly, the writ petition of Shri Pratap Singh was allowed and h is dismissal order was set aside.

#24. Admittedly, the facts in the present case as adverted to above are cle arly distinguishable from the facts in the case of Shri Pratap Singh, which was decided by Delhi High Court. Moreover, in view of the clear enunciation of law by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, we are unable to accept the view of the learned S ingle Judge that switching over from the Army Act to the 1965 Rules vitiated th e departmental proceeding. To that extent, the decision of the learned Single Ju dge stands interfered with.

#25. Coming now to the other aspect, namely, that there were no materials before the inquiry officer to hold that charges against the petitioner stood pro ved, let us first notice the charges framed against the petitioner, which are a s under:- (cid:28) Article-I That the said Shri S. Rengarajan, Supdt B/R Gde II, GS-1 66217Y, while functioning as Supvr Incharge in various Detts and also worked in office of the erstwhile 73 RCC from Jun 90 to May 92, found in illegal possess ion of Rs.1,09,344/-( Rupees one lac nine thousand three hundred fortyfour only) on 10 Jun 92 which is disproportionate to his known source of income. Thus, he failed to maintain absolute integrity and violated Rule 3(1)(i) of CCS (Conduct ) Rules, 1964. Article-II That during the period from Aug 91 to May 92, while functioning as Supervisor Incharge for execution of permanent works between Km 28 to Km 60 on T henzawl-Bunghmun Road, the said Shri S. Rengarajan Supdt B/R Gde II misappropria ted the Government stores by faulty construction/fictitious booking i.e. cons truction of lesser dimension than those shown in the work diaries. Thus, he did not maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty and violated Rule 3(1)(i) a nd (ii) of CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964. That during the aforesaid period while functioning as Supdt B/R Gde II in various Detts, the said Shri S Rengarajan Supdt B/R Gde II amassed money by gamb ling. Thus, he committed an act unbecoming of a Government servant and violated Rule 3 (1)(iii) of CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964. (cid:29) Article-III

#26. The Inquiry Officer in his inquiry report dated 04-10-1997 after ana lysing and assessing the evidence, held that charges 1 & 2 against the petitione r stood proved whereas charge no.3 was not proved. Since the disciplinary autho rity did not question the finding of the Inquiry Officer on charge no.3, we, the refore limit our consideration to charge nos. 1 & 2 only. The analysis and ass essment of evidence in respect of the two charges by the Inquiry Officer is as u nder:- (cid:28) (a) Charge No.I There is no dispute that an amount of Rs.1,09,344/- was seized from the (i) possession of Shri S Rengarajan, CO (PW2) Major PK Mehta as well as CO himself have establish to the same. (ii) From the details of Pay and Allowances received by CO during the period May 90 to May 92, the amount seized is far in excess and the plea of the prosecu tion has been that the same was earned through illegal means like selling of Gov t stores etc. The CO who had given the confessional statement on 18 June 92 six days after the seizure, admitted that therein to have indulged in selling Govt stores and thus the part of this amount was accumulated. However, subsequently h e has refuted and disowned the same statement. (iii) Notwithstanding above it can not be overlooked that the confessional sta tement (which forms part of the deposition of (PW-2 Major PK Mehta )was given after six days of the incident in presence of the witness i.e. Capt PK Mehta (n ow Major) and was recorded by another officer. (iv) The CO has cross examined Major PK Mehta on this account during the inqu iry and there is nothing to establish that his earlier confessional statement w as given under any threat, pressure, persuasion or coercion. It is well established that the conduct and the action of a govt serva (v) nt should be transparent and any accumulation of wealth beyond known sources o f income is to be satisfactorily accounted for falling which it is to be constr ued that the same has been earned through dubious or illegal means. The plea of the CO that he had accumulated this amount from his earlier (vi) service after passing Diploma and as well as Rs.30,000/- loan from his friends might be correct but does not appear so in the present context especially when his conduct and actions were under probe apart form the fact that various better safe mode of transmission like Bank Draft, Mail Transfer etc. were available ra ther than carrying huge amount while proceeding on leave. (vii) It is well known that despite free food and clothing given in GREF as a Supvr one has to spend some amount every month towards his food, drinks, perso nal clothing and on recreation. From the details of pay and allowances, if FRM O compulsory subscription like GPF etc. and the amount spent for above is deduc ted, a meagre amount can only be saved. (viii) The circumstances of seizure coupled with the circumstantial and direc t evidence, statement available on record and adduced during the inquiry needle of suspection is definitely raised towards the charged officer that the amount m ight have been earned through illegal means and not satisfactory accounted for . (b) Charge II :- (i) In his confessional statement given on 18 Jun 92, the CO has admitted to have sold Govt. stores like Cement, diesel, explosives etc. During preliminar y inquiry Shri Abdul Roy of Thenzaml village had stated that he had purchased 3 0 bags of Cement from Shri S Rengararjan @ Rs.120/- per bag. Shri Abdul Roy also cross exanmined by the charged officer during preliminary inquiry. However, th e prosecution has failed to produce Shri Abdul Roy during DE. But the fact that he was earlier cross examined by the CO is very much relevant so far as the st ory of prosecution is concerned. (ii) Shri DS Giri (PW3) in his statement in DE has stated that he had taken 1 0 bags of Cement from Shri S Rengarajan, however he denied to have made payment (Q No.3 to PW 3 in DE refer). This shows that the CO was in the habit of givin g Govt. stores free or on payment without any authority. (iii) The board of officers during Preliminary Inquiry had carried out measure ments which was done in presence of CO and there was a lot of variation in the q uantity booked and quantity based on ground measurements. The very fact that Sh ri S. Rengarajan was the member of the team and did the measurement establishes that measurement was done in his satisfaction and he had not raised any objecti on at any stage. The full copy of the preliminary inquiry was given to Shri S. Rengarajan prior to commencement of the DE. At no stage he had raised objection regarding the quantity shown therein. (iv) The plea of the CO that there is general practice of indulging of overboo king may be correct but that does not give him the authority to resort to over booking which is a serious irregularity and the person doing so is to be person ally blamed. (cid:28)

#27. Thus, it is seen that the Inquiry Officer had acted upon the confessiona l statement of the petitioner made on 18-06-1992 during the course of inquiry c onducted under the Army Act, which was subsequently retracted by the petitioner himself by saying that the confessional statement was extracted from him under coercion. Interestingly, the Inquiry Oficer partially accepted the contention of the petitioner that he had accumulated the amount in question from his earlie r service as well as by taking loan from friends by saying that the plea of the charged official (cid:28)might be correct (cid:29). The Inquiry Officer, however, gives his o wn reasoning by saying that an official like Supervisor has to spend some money towards his food, drinks, personal clothing and nutrition and, therefore, only a meagre amount can be saved. He, therefore, concludes that the amount in quest ion (cid:28)might have been earned through illegal means and not satisfactorily account ed for (cid:29).

#28. In so far charge no.2 is concerned, the Inquiry Officer again relied on the preliminary inquiry, where one Abdul Roy was stated to have purchased 3 0 bags of cement from the petitioner but the said Abdul Roy was not produced dur ing the departmental enquiry. However, the Inquiry Officer took the view that since the said Abdul Roy was earlier cross-examined in the preliminary inquiry that would be very much relevant. Thus, it is seen that the Inquiry Officer base d his finding on what transpired in the preliminary inquiry.

#29. It is true that in a departmental proceeding, the standard of proof is not to be equated with that of a criminal trial. While in criminal proceedi ng, the charge against the accused must be proved beyond all reasonable doubt, in the case of a departmental proceeding, it is pre-ponderence of probability. Notwithstanding the above, it cannot be denied that even in a departmental pr oceeding, the charge against the delinquent must be proved or established as is understood by a reasonable man. Though the strict rules of evidence and the pro visions of the Evidence Act may not be applicable but none-the-less, the Inquiry Officer or the disciplinary authority must base their findings on materials, wh ich were before the disciplinary proceeding. There must be reasonable nexus betw een the materials produced in course of a departmental proceeding and the find ings recorded. Just because a prima- facie finding of guilt is recorded agains t the delinquent in the court of inquiry or in the preliminary inquiry, the same ifso facto would not entitle the Inquiry Officer as well as the disciplinary a uthority to draw adverse inference against the delinquent without the charge bei ng proved independently in the departmental proceeding.

#30. Therefore, the learned Single Judge is correct in saying that the court of inquiry held under the Army Act and the evidence recorded therein as well as the evidence collected in the preliminary inquiry cannot be the basis of holding that charge nos. 1 & 2 against the petitioner stood proved in the disciplinary proceeding.

#31. For the aforesaid reasons, we are not inclined to interfere with t he decision of the learned Single Judge. However, the direction given for paymen t of interest @ 6% per annum on the amount seized from the petitioner is conside red not necessary in the facts and circumstances of the case, which portion of t he order is accordingly set aside.

#32. The judgment of the learned Single Judge is upheld to the extent indicated above, not on the first ground but on the second ground. The appeal accordingly stands disposed of. However, there will be no order as to cost.